Proceedings of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference

General Editor: Radhavallabh Tripathi

Vol. II : Vyākaraṇa Section

Vyākaraṇa
Across the Ages

Edited by
George Cardona
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Foreword

The 15th World Sanskrit Conference (WSC) was organized by Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, in association with International Association of Sanskrit Studies (IASS) during 5 January–10 January 2012. The Conference was conducted through twenty sections including Veda; Linguistics; Epics and Purāṇas; Tantra and Āgamas; Vyākaraṇa; Poetry, Drama and Aesthetics; Sanskrit and Asian Languages and Literatures; Sanskrit and Science; Buddhist Studies; Jain Studies; Philosophies; Religious Studies; Ritual Studies; Epigraphy; Sanskrit in Technological World; Modern Sanskrit Literature; Law and Society; and Manuscriptology along with the Pañḍitapariṣad and Kavisamavāya. Apart from these sections, the event was marked with some special panels on the themes — Models and Theories in Sanskrit Grammar and Linguistics; Electronic Concordance of the Great Epics; Re-interpreting Pāṇini; Nāṭyaśāstra in Modern World; New Perspectives on Scientific Literature in Sanskrit; Boundaries of Yoga in Indian Philosophical Literature; Śaiva Philosophy; Innovations in Sanskrit Pedagogy; Sanskrit Inscriptions in South-East Asian Countries; Manuscripts and Their Intellectual Preservation; and Sanskrit in Global Perspectives.

Right from its inception, Vyākaraṇa has been one of the most versatile sections of this conference. I am happy to note that during the 15th WSC, the Vyākaraṇa section remained vibrant for the vigorous exchange of ideas between traditional and modern scholars, and the deliberations covered a wide range of topics including lexical and grammatical positions, Pāli Vyākaraṇa as well as the non-Pāṇinian systems of Sanskrit grammar.
IASS has authorized Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan to bring out all the volumes of the proceedings of the 15\textsuperscript{th} WSC. We are grateful to Prof. George Cardona for making a very judicious selection and for having edited the papers presented in the Vyākaraṇa section of the conference.

Radhavallabh Tripathi
Preface

The articles in this collection are those accepted for publication from the papers presented in the Vyākaraṇa section of the XVth World Sanskrit Conference. These cover a wide range of topics, centered about Sanskrit grammar, with major emphasis on vyākaraṇa, in particular Pāṇini’s work.

The collection opens with a paper providing a general background, in which Iwona Milewska surveys currents in European traditions of Sanskrit grammars. Beginning with early works by missionaries, she proceeds to categorize and describe Sanskrit grammars composed with various aims: philological, comparative, and pedagogical.

The next group of contributions directly concerns Pāṇinian grammar.

Peter M. Scharf deals with an important theoretical issue: should a formal grammar like Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī countenance situations such that the proper application of certain rules to provide for particular forms requires looking forward instead of depending strictly on what is provided by rules for what is available at given stages of derivation.

Scharf considers the use of locative forms such as ārdhadhātuke in Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 2.4.35: आर्धधातुके and sārvadhātuke in A 3.1.68: कतरि शप (सार्वधातुके 67) and subsequent sūtras. According to the usual Pāṇinīya interpretation, sārvadhātuke, stated overtly in A 3.1.67 (सार्वधातुके यक) and understood to recur in the following rule, designates a right context before which an operation applies (A 1.1.66: तस्मिनिनि निदिश्ये पूर्वस्य): when a sārvadhātuka affix introduced on condition that an agent is to be signified follows a verbal base, the suffix śap (a with the
markers ş and p) is introduced after the base. For example, pac-ati (← pac-ti ← pac-l) ‘... is cooking’. Similarly, A 3.1.71: तनादिकुःः उः serves to introduce u after verbs of the set beginning with tan ‘stretch’ as well as kr (dukrñ) ‘do, make’: karo-ti (← kr-u-ti ← kr-ti ← kr-l). As shown, the sārvadhatuka ending tip replaces an l-affix, here laṭ.

Now, at each stage of deriving a form such as karoti an accentual adjustment is made: an accent that is newly introduced sets aside one which was there previously. The affix u brings its own high pitch and sets aside high pitch of the base kr. This accounts for karoti, with low pitch on kar and high pitch on the suffix vowel o. By the same principle the form kur-u-tah (3rd du. pres. act.) would have high pitch on -u- following the base, but the required form has high pitch on the ending: kyutah. Accordingly, Pāṇiniyas accept that the principle in question has an exception: a suffix such as u, which comes between a verbal base and an ending, does not set aside the previously present accent. They also invoke a Pāṇinian sūtra as making known that Pāṇini too operated with the exception. Scharf differs from the tradition. He argues for interpreting sārvadhatuke in the pertinent rules as a locative of domain (viṣayasaptamī). Under this interpretation, an operation applies in the domain where a given affix will occur. Accordingly, Scharf argues that in deriving kurutah the post-verbal affix u is introduced on condition that a sārvadhatuka will occur, before this is actually allowed to occur as a replacement for an l-affix. In this way, the general principle is maintained without exception.

Ajoyikar and Kulkarni also deal with this principle, except that they extend the range of exceptions. They consider rules that may apply in deriving forms of compounds such as prāṅc- ‘directed to the fore’, parāṅc- ‘directed into the distance, afar’ and conclude
that the accentuation of \textit{parācāh} (acc. pl. masc.) requires recognizing an exception to the satīsiṣṭasvara principle.

Sharon Ben-Dor takes up a comparatively general issue, with respect to sūtras in which \textit{dā}, \textit{mā}, and \textit{gā} are used to refer to verbal bases. A term such as \textit{dā} could refer not only to a base \textit{dā} (\textit{dudāñ}) that contains \textit{ā} in its primitive form listed in the dhātupāṭha but also to bases with \textit{ā} gotten through substitution, such as \textit{dā} (\leftarrow \textit{daip}) ‘clean’. For, according to A 6.1.45: आदेश उपदेशार्जिति as traditionally interpreted, -\textit{ā} unconditionally replaces -\textit{e}, -\textit{o}, -\textit{ai} or -\textit{au} of a verbal base unless this is used with an affix bearing the marker \textit{s}. In his richly detailed philological study Ben-Dor presents evidence to support the thesis that one need not look ahead to target forms in order to determine which particular bases \textit{gā}, \textit{dā}, and \textit{mā} refer to in particular sūtras. On the contrary, it suffices to determine carefully the conditions under which the operations provided therein apply.

Tiziana Pontillo also takes up a general topic and disagrees with traditional Pāṇinīyas. According to Pāṇinīyas, the procedure in question is one whereby a single remainder (\textit{ekāśeṣa}) is provided where two or more homophonous (\textit{sarūpa}) items can occur with one ending or set of endings (A 1.2.64: सर्वपायाभिषेष एकविभक्तिः). For example, instead of a potentially indeterminately long dvandva compound \textit{aśvāśvāśvāśva}, the single remainder \textit{aśva-} is allowed to occur with the ending \textit{jas}, to derive \textit{aśvāh} (nom. pl.) ‘horses’. Similarly, by A 1.2.68: भ्रातुपुजाः स्वसु-\textit{ह्रात्स्वरस्त} instead of a dvandva \textit{bhrātāsvasr}- the single remainder \textit{bhrātr-} is allowed with the ending \textit{au: bhrātarau} (nom. du.) ‘brother and sister’. According to Pāṇinīyas, \textit{sarūpāṇām} of A 1.2.64 is a genitive form designating a group out of which one entity is set apart specifically (A 2.3.41: यत्त्र निर्णायितम्). Pontillo
argues that this should be interpreted instead as a genitive referring to items that are replaced (A 1.1.49: पद्ध स्वानेयोगा) by a single item. This argument is couched within general considerations about ellipsis and discussion of passages from the Mahābhāṣya.

Toru Yagi studies the use of instrumental forms such as chāṭrena (‘student’) in छात्रोपाध्यायमद्राधीत् (‘... saw [that] ... [was] a teacher [upādhyāya], because of his student [chātra’]), where the instrumental chāṭrena serves to refer to a student as a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) whereby someone is known to be characterized as having a particular status (itthambhūta ‘become thus, who has attained such and such a state’). A person is recognized as one who is a teacher by virtue of his relation to a student. Ancient scholars argued whether such instrumentals could justify formulating a distinct rule (A 2.3.21: इत्यमूलकक्षणो) or should instead be considered to refer to an instrument (karana) in the performance of an act or an accompanying entity with (saha) which something is said to occur, thus being accounted for by other rules.

Still within the compass of Pāṇini’s grammar, Dipesh Katira, Chinmay Dharurkar and Malhar Kulkarni take up the use of forms with vat in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The data discussed mainly involve usages with derivates in the taddhita affix vati as accounted for by two major sūtras, A 5.1.116-117: तेन तुल्यं ज्रिया चेत्त्रि:, तत्र तस्ये व. Examples generally considered to illustrate these in the object language and the Aṣṭādhyāyī are: ब्राह्मणवर्त्तते (‘... is like a brāhmaṇa’), पाटलिपुत्रवस्थीते परिष्ठि (‘the moat in Sāketa is like the one in Pāṭaliputra’), A 1.1.56: स्थानिवददेशोज्जलिच्छी (‘A replacement behaves like the entity it replaces except with respect to an operation that depends on a sound’), A 1.1.21: आयन्तवदेक्षिण् (‘[An operation] occurs for a single [sound] as it
does for an initial or final element’). The authors consider how modern lexicographers describe derivates with \textit{vat}, how modern translators have interpreted śūtras with such terms, link the use of words with \textit{vat} to simile (\textit{upamā}), metaphor (\textit{rūpaka}) and imaginative equating (\textit{utprekṣā}) in Indian poetics, and account for ambiguities and indeterminacies in modern translations of the \textit{Aṣṭādhyāyī}.

Subodh Sharma and George Cardona deal with questions concerning items called \textit{nipāta} (‘particle’) and \textit{upasarga} (‘preverb’). The class of particles includes terms such as \textit{ca} (‘and’) and a subset of preverbs such as \textit{anu} and \textit{pra}, used with verbal bases. There are two extreme views concerning these. All the terms in question signify certain meanings; they are signifiers (\textit{vācaka}). Alternatively, all these terms serve merely as cosignifiers (\textit{dyotaka} ‘illuminator’) which serve to bring out meanings that, for semantic and formal reasons, are attributed to items with which they are used. In addition, there is the position that nipātas other than upasargas are signifiers, while upasargas are cosignifiers. For example, in \textit{idān} cāḍaś ca (‘this [\textit{idam}] and that [\textit{adas}’]), \textit{ca} is said to signify a meaning. On the other hand, in \textit{pra} jayati (‘… is extremely victorious’), the preverb \textit{pra} is said merely to bring out a qualification of being victorious, excellence, which is part of the meaning attributed to the base \textit{ji} itself (\textit{jayati} ‘… is victorious’). Difficulties arise in connection with pairs such as \textit{āste} (‘… is seated’) : \textit{upāste} (‘… reveres’), \textit{bhavati} (‘… is’): \textit{anu} \textit{bhavati} (‘… experiences’), \textit{tiṣṭhati} (‘… comes to a stand, remains’) : \textit{pra} \textit{tiṣṭhate} (‘… departs’). Here there is a stronger case for considering that the preverbs \textit{upa}, \textit{anu}, and \textit{pra} separately signify particular meanings. Such questions occupied Indian thinkers over many years and the discussions involved
grammarians, etymologists, logicians of the Nyāya school, and ritualists (mīmāṁsaka). Subodh Sharma considers a wide range of thinkers, succinctly pointing out major arguments. George Cardona’s purview is more limited. He concentrates on the reasons for and consequences of adopting one of two views. First, a complex like *anu bhavati* involves a single lexical unit *anu-bhū* ‘experience’ distinct from *bhū* ‘be, become’. Alternatively, this complex involves two syntactic words (*pāda*), only one of which is included in the class of verbal bases (*dhātu*).

Hideyo Ogawa’s study takes us into the general area of relations between speech forms (*śabda*) and their meanings (*arthā*), with specific reference to Bhartṛhari’s view. One of the verses of the Vākyapadīya outlining the topics of this treatise (1.25ab: कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिता: 1) notes two of these. First, speech units and their meanings have the status of being cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*): from a hearer’s vantage, a perceived linguistic unit causes the understanding of a meaning this conveys, and from a speaker’s vantage a meaning he wishes to express causes him to use a particular linguistic unit. Secondly, a term has the property of being fit, hence capable (*yogyatā*) of conveying a particular meaning. In addition, there is the relation of one being the other (*सोज्यमिति सम्बन्धः*), conceived of as the result of a superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of one on the other, not in the same manner that in common usage one imputes imaginatively a property on someone — as when one says that a Vāhīka is an ox (*गौवाहीकः*) — but an identification that has been in place since language use began. Although Bhartṛhari does not mention this identity relation (*abheda*) in the passage noted, he does in his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā and auto-commentary on the Vākyapadīya. Helārāja notes that Bhartṛhari does not give separate status to this
as opposed to the cause-effect and fitness relations, because it is ultimately the basis of these two, so that it is not merely a third possible relation. In his meticulously documented paper, Ogawa presents the textual evidence concerning this issue and refutes the claim that Bhartṛhari did not recognize the identity relation.

Yuki Tomonari takes up several points concerning which Prabhākaramīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas differ from and attack Pāṇinian grammarians. The arguments considered concern twelve sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Seven of these are rules which assign to direct participants in actions (kāraka) category names — apādāna, sampradāna, karaṇa, adhikaraṇa, karman, kartr, hetu — and thereby assign participants to particular semantic-syntactic categories. Three rules serve to introduce the category names dhātu ‘verbal base, root’ (A 1.3.1: सूचाययो धातवः) and prātipadika ‘nominal base’ (A 1.2.45-46: अर्थवन्द्रातरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्, कृतज्ञितत्वमासाद्र). One is a major heading whereby taddhita affixes are optionally introduced and, where specified, are introduced after the first of semantically and syntactically related syntactic items (A 4.1.82: समस्तानां श्रवणात्मक). Another rule (A 2.1.1: समाधेः पदविन्ध्रः), traditionally considered a metarule with scope over the entire Aṣṭādhyāyī, provides that an operation concerning paddas applies only to such terms as are syntactically and semantically related. Tomonari treats parallel arguments from Prabhākara’s Brhatī on Šabara’s Bhāṣya on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsutra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamaṇjarī. He considers the relations between the passages in question to each other and to what Pāṇinīyas said earlier, finally concluding that the arguments presented in the Brhatī and Nyāyamaṇjarī amount to cavilling (vitanḍā).

Vedmitra Arya’s contribution brings in a non-Pāṇinian grammar, the Sārasvatavyākaraṇa of Anubhūtisvarūpa. Arya
discusses the different formulations for describing nominal case forms (subanta) in the Sārasvatavyākaraṇa, contrasts these descriptions with those of Pāṇini, and argues that the Sārasvata procedures are simpler.

Finally, Paramanand Jha brings us into the area of modern Sanskrit literature, discussing the usage in the prose work Śivarājāvijaya of Ambika Dutt Vyas. Jha surveys the use of forms in different categories and speaks of this work with admiration. He also notes that some usages that do not conform to chaste Sanskrit in accordance with Pāṇinian grammar and suggests that a new revised edition is in order.

The thirteen articles in this collection thus cover a broad range of topics within the general area designated vyākaraṇa.

I am happy now to acknowledge the help of colleagues. As joint conveners, with me, of the vyākaraṇa section of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference, Professors Saroja Bhat and Dipti Tripathi read all the abstracts submitted and contributed to our final joint decisions for the program. In the course of my editing the papers which finally were invited, they also responded when I called on them to react to my comments on some papers. The authors of papers published here merit mention not only for their contributions but also for their cooperation. They responded to my comments and queries in ways that eased my task as editor. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Radhavallabhbh Tripathi and his aides for their prompt and helpful responses to my questions, help in organizing sessions during the 15th World Sanskrit Conference, and subsequent help in the publication stages. Their management of the entire conference has made it a pleasure to participate.

George Cardona
Contents

Foreword ................................................................. v
Preface ................................................................. vii
Iwona Milewska
Main currents in the European tradition of
Sanskrit grammars ................................................... 1
Peter M. Scharf
Teleology and the simplification of accentuation in
Pāññinian derivation .................................................. 31
Anuja Ajotikar and Malhar Kulkarni
On the accent of the word पराच: as stated
by A 6.2.52 ............................................................ 55
Sharon Ben-Dor
The use of the terms dā, mā and gā in the
Aṣṭādhyāyī .............................................................. 73
Tiziana Pontillo
“Where the sense is intended although the
corresponding speech unit is not employed”:
the ekaśeṣa case ....................................................... 97
Toru Yagi
On the so-called predicative instrumental .....................133
Dipesh Katira, Chinmay Dharurkar and Malhar Kulkarni
Vat: a textual study .....................................................147
Subodh Sharma
स वाचको विशेषणां संभवाद् योतकोषषि वा ..................... 169
George Cardona
Combinations of upasargas and tīnanta forms:
lexical versus grammatical positions ............................ 189
Hideyo Ogawa
Bhartṛhari on three types of linguistic unit-meaning
relations .......................................................... 217

Yuki Tomonari
  Just a cavil or not: an example of outsiders’
  dispute on the Aṣṭādhyāyī ........................................... 281

Vedmitra Arya
  सारस्वतव्याकरणे प्रक्रियासारल्यम् — सुबल्लसन्द्धेऽ .......................... 301

Paramanand Jha
  शिवराजविजयस्य शाब्रिकदृश्या समीक्षणम् .............................. 313

Contributors ............................................................. 345
Main currents in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars

Iwona Milewska

The subject of this article is an attempt to differentiate and briefly describe the main currents which have appeared in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars. As this topic has never been discussed before in a concise form, let us look at it from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives.

The history of the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars is a comparatively long one as nearly four hundred years have passed since the first known book on Sanskrit grammar was composed. This was the grammar of father Heinrich Roth from 1660, which has survived until the modern day in manuscript form. Altogether we are dealing with nearly four hundred years of modern tradition of India–Europe contacts during which more than one hundred grammars were composed by Europeans and most of them were published, thanks to which they can be described and analyzed here. The only grammars not published at the time of their preparation are the first grammars which survived in manuscript form and which, it is worth stressing, only recently have come to light. Such is the case with the manuscript of Grammatica grandonica by Ernst Johann Hanxleden (1681-1723), discovered in 2010 in Convento di San Silvestro, a Carmelite monastery located in Montecompatri in the Province of Roma. The manuscript was found by a Belgian scholar Dr. Toon van Hal. Most probably there are also at least some more grammars, not accessible to the modern researcher, which have been composed but never published or presented to the general public in such a way that any traces of them could now be found. Probably some of these grammars were shared by their authors only with their “direct public”, that is, with pupils who were taught by them as teachers — authors of materials who tried to invent their own solutions of the presentation of
Sanskrit grammar and add them to the existing written and published sources. However, the circulation of such grammars or materials was, even if meaningful for particular adepts, a limited one. They are unknown to others, and in most cases there is no information on them in any libraries. As a result, one can find them only in the memories of people who met their authors and who are still alive. These facts show the possibility of still some more discoveries to be made in future by scholars who will focus on searching for them or of such a discovery being made by sheer chance. This can happen also to somebody not directly connected with the study of Sanskrit grammar, who may come across a grammar preserved in the form of a manuscript or, less probably, in printed form. From what we know so far, it seems that over one hundred grammars is quite an impressive number and certainly one which allows certain generalizations and classifications. It allows the attempt to deal with the topic of main currents which appeared during the years of the European modern tradition.

By “European tradition” we will understand here, first of all, grammars of Sanskrit composed in most cases by scholars coming from Europe. However, we will add also those composed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by researchers from America, Canada and Australia, as it seems that for historical reasons and dependencies these authors and the grammars written by them can be included in what we call here the European tradition. One of the readily visible features of these grammars is that European methods of exposition are used in them. Only in some of them, in

1. The author knows of at least one such case where the materials in written form of a Sanskrit grammar covering most major topics together with exercises was prepared but never published. It is a grammar entitled First year Sanskrit course, prepared, after many years of effort, by J. E. B. Grey, lecturer at the London School of Oriental and African Studies. The manuscript, more than two hundred pages long, is ready for publication but not published to date. The grammar, as mentioned above, is the result of many years of work by an eminent Sanskrit teacher who based its content on his own experiences of teaching Sanskrit. It contains several new solutions in presentation (e.g. of the alphabet) and certainly it is a loss that it still awaits publication.
rather rare cases, are there attempts to join European and Indian
ways of presenting Sanskrit. These can be put into a separate
group which, perhaps, will be one of the promising options for
future attempts. This feature of what may be called the European
method of presentation of Sanskrit grammar is, aside from the
European origin of their authors, who took the grammars
developed in Europe as their guides, also the fact which makes
them very different from the traditional Indian ones. We must not
forget, however, that many European grammars were, in their
content, obviously based, at least partly, on Indian sources.

The main reason for the decision to describe here only works
included in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars is the
need to limit the area covered by this investigation and the thesis of
their particular features. An additional argument is that at least
some of them are the result of the limitations faced by European
scholars: their scope of access to the Indian sources, their generally
European education, their lack of training in memorization
techniques as a method of dealing with Sanskrit grammars, the
influence of the European tradition of grammars developed and
used for languages other than Sanskrit, to mention only a few.

One more limitation set here is the exclusion of grammars
composed in Japan, China and other countries whose traditions are
not connected with the European tradition. Such grammars
obviously exist but they have to be excluded from this study, even
if at least some of them probably use European methods of
presenting grammatical content. This subject may open the field
for an interesting future investigation.²

We have to add also that the main focus of this presentation
will be to describe grammars in English and German, since they
are most significant as examples of the main currents which have
appeared during the modern years of the European tradition of

². The author is conscious of these traditions but due to the lack of command of
respective languages and lack of opportunity to visit libraries which may have
these grammars even a bird’s-eye view of them is not possible.
Sanskrit grammars. Grammars in other European languages, in the majority of cases, were copies or slightly changed versions based on Sanskrit grammars written in English or German.³

As already mentioned above, about a hundred grammars have been composed in what we call the European modern tradition. The reasons for preparing so many of them might have several explanations. Firstly, their authors were not satisfied with the existing sources of the European information on Sanskrit grammar. Secondly, they were, most probably, deeply convinced that their presentation had the value of being new and different in major features from others composed earlier or contemporaneously. Thirdly, and more commonly, their authors did not have the information or access to other grammars already composed and published. For obvious reasons such was the situation with the grammars which were composed in the first period, that is those which did not have any tradition preceding them. They were genuine, even if sometimes similar both in their content and presentation methods to others.

When we try to look at the European tradition diachronically we can differentiate several stages of its development as far as the content and methods of the exposition of Sanskrit grammar used in them are concerned. These stages covering the oncoming centuries are connected with the history of modern European-Indian contacts. These contacts, as we know, have a long lasting modern tradition starting from the period of first travelers who reached India at the end of the fifteenth century. We will not focus on this history of contacts here, since this is not our main subject and it has already been described in detail in many other books and

³ Of course there have been, especially in the twentieth century, at least some genuine attempts to deal with Sanskrit grammar in a new way in languages other than English or German (e.g., French or Italian), but it is impossible to discuss them here in detail. For more extensive information on some other grammars one can consult, for example, Milewska 2008.
articles.⁴

These stages in diachronic perspective can be described as follows:
- grammars composed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by European Catholic missionaries (Heinrich Roth, Johann E. Hanxleden, Paulinus a Sancto Bartholomaeo)
- grammars coming from the beginning of the nineteenth century whose authors were connected with the activities of the East India Company (Charles Wilkins, Henry Thomas Colebrooke, William Carey, Horace Hayman Wilson)
- grammars from the same period written mostly by German scholars such as Franz Bopp, which were based on sources available in Europe in the nineteenth century but whose authors had never been in India themselves
  - grammars from the second half of the nineteenth century based on direct Indian sources and personal visits to India resulting in studies undertaken there (Georg Buehler, Franz Kielhorn) and endeavours of particular scholars who worked in Europe and used both Indian and European sources of information (Adolf Friedrich Stenzler, William Dwight Whitney)
  - grammars of the turn of nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which the search for simplicity and conciseness is visible (Arthur Anthony Macdonell)
  - a grammar of the opposite kind, extensive, descriptive and historical, begun by Jakob Wackernagel at the end of nineteenth century, subsequently continued — though not yet completed — by the next generations of scholars, which was directed mostly to linguists
  - twentieth century grammars that are examples of many different choices of methods used for presentation of Sanskrit grammar (Jan Gonda, Michael Coulson, Robert Goldman and

⁴. It will suffice to mention one: Halbfass 1981, which is one of the most popular sources of such information, translated into English (Halbfass 1988) and other languages, e.g., Polish (Nowakowska and Piotrowski 2008)
Sally Sutherland)  
- twentieth century grammars whose authors are well acquainted with European grammars used for teaching or learning European languages, both ancient (W. Maurer, D. Killingley) and modern (Ashok N. Aklujkar, Madhav M. Deshpande)  

The diachronic method may be one way of presenting the currents which appeared in their respective periods. In our article, after this short resume showing the currents in their historical development, we will focus on the synchronic perspective, where the currents may be seen as having certain common features reappearing during the passage of time, having their own separate tradition of development. These currents will be shown in this way and then briefly described with a collection of examples illustrating these tendencies as evolving during consecutive years. We will use this method of description here as it seems more clear for a short presentation.

The current which seems to be the most popular in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars is that of a descriptive nature. Sanskrit grammar is presented here in the form of chapters of a general nature divided into smaller units devoted to particular grammatical topics. Large chapters on particular grammatical categories (such as the categories of nouns or verbs) are organized as consecutive explanations of particular grammatical phenomena: declension tables, roles of cases, conjugation paradigms, tenses, moods etc. These constitute books which can be read in at least two possible ways: chapter by chapter or only select paragraphs, as necessary. Such grammars are called descriptive. Within chapters or smaller units they are synthetic in their description. Examples of certain forms are given but, in most cases, not in large numbers. Exceptional forms are added to the typical ones. We may observe that sometimes the right balance between typical and atypical forms is not achieved. The result of not giving the right view of the typical forms is the price for such a description. This
“tradition” continues to the present day and hardly anywhere can one find any theoretical reflection on this problem.

The descriptive mode of presentation of grammar is popular not only for Sanskrit but also for other European languages. Grammars of this type can obviously be used not only by those who are starting their adventure with Sanskrit and want to become specialists in this language but also by linguists, specialists in philosophy or religious studies and so on. The European public is certainly well accustomed to such grammars and such ways of presentation.

In this presentation we will not give details of the earliest three manuscripts mentioned above, as they did not have much influence on the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars and our goal is to describe briefly only the most typical works. An exception will be made only for the grammar of Heinrich Roth (1620-1668), since it was, to our knowledge, the first one written by a European. His grammar, written most probably between the years 1660 and 1662, was an example of this kind. It is evident that Roth based his grammar on Indian grammars popular at the period of his stay in India. Roth most probably learned Sanskrit from the local pandits and the region he stayed in for most of his time spent in India was that close to Agra. The title of his grammar, written in Latin, was *Grammatica linguae Sanscretane Brachmanum Indiae Orientalis*. It was brought to Europe by Roth in 1664. Unfortunately, due to the policy of church superiors, for a long time his grammar did not become known to the greater public, being hidden in the depths of the library in Rome and kept there in manuscript form. In 1988, after its fortunate discovery this work was published and only since then have we the chance to analyze its structure.5 This descriptive grammar consists of five large chapters covering the topics of orthography (De Ortographia), the declension of nouns, adjectives

5. The discovery was made by Arnulf Camps and Jean-Claude Muller after many-years of searching. Its facsimile was published together with an extensive introduction (1988).
and pronouns (De Declinacionibus Nominum), the conjugation of verbs (De Conjugacionis Verborum), nominal forms of verbs (De Verbalibus seu kridamtaḥ) and syntax of Sanskrit (De syntaxi huius Linguae). The last chapter contains a section devoted to the subject of adverbs. Roth added to his grammar also some information on major kinds of metres (Appendix ad universam grammaticam). The description of Sanskrit given by Roth seems to be versatile and comparatively complete. The presentation, based on direct Indian sources, follows the Indian tradition as far as particular grammatical forms are differentiated and as far as the choice of examples is concerned. It adopts the traditional Indian examples used for illustration of certain grammatical topics. However, the grammatical terms given by Roth are, in most cases, in Latin, and the theoretical parts are also written in Latin. This grammar, even if unknown to the later European tradition, is meaningful, since its structure is repeated in many descriptive grammars which followed. The way of gathering and presenting information on Sanskrit may be labelled a mixture of Indian and European ways of dealing with grammar (European structure, Indian examples).

It is a striking fact that one of the most famous authors of a Sanskrit grammar of this kind, very important for the later European tradition, Adolf F. Stenzler (1809-1877), in his work published over two hundred years later (1868), used a similar method in his description of grammar topics even if Roth’s grammar was most probably not known to him. Stenzler covered the major topics of Sanskrit grammar in nine descriptive chapters devoted to separate large categories. The first three chapters dealt with the writing system (Schriftlehre), phonology (Lautlehre), and declension of nouns (Flexionslehre). He divided the last topic into vowel and consonant declensions, and within this division he differentiated nouns of one, two or three stems. In the next chapter he described the rules of comparison (Komparation), then the pronouns (Declination der Pronomina) and numerals (Zahlwörter).
Following this came the chapter on conjugation (Konjugation) where he described the systems of conjugation. Word formation, nouns and adjectives together with feminine forms (Wortbildung), were given in the next chapter. Stenzler devoted his last chapter to the explanation and classification of compounds of both verbal and noun character (Kompositionslehre). Within these large chapters Stenzler divided the information into smaller sub-chapters, adding also detailed cross references which might help navigating through the grammatical content. The construction of his grammar was very clear. The grammatical topics, as we have seen, were presented in a logical sequence and the choice of them was very well thought out. As mentioned above, the structure of the grammar resembles the one given nearly two hundred years earlier by Roth. As I have also noted, such a model of description most probably came out of the fact that both grammars were dependent on the Indian and also the European tradition of presentation. They were not dependent on each other, for the reasons described above. It is worth stressing, nevertheless, how good father Roth was in his pioneering effort to deal with Sanskrit grammar. The difference between these two grammars is that Stenzler added a short part with grammatical exercises, chrestomathies of fragments of Sanskrit texts and a glossary.

Stenzler’s descriptive grammar has become a source of inspiration for many grammars written in other European languages.\footnote{See, e. g., Gawroński 1932.} It was also translated into other European languages more than one hundred years later, that is at the end of twentieth century, which shows its value also in modern times.\footnote{See Söhnken 1992, Knic 1995.} In Germany it has had, to my knowledge, eighteen editions, being probably the main Sanskrit grammar for many generations of both German and other Sanskritists. The last edition was published in 1995.\footnote{2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. Breslau 1872; 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. 1875; 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. Breslau 1880; 5\textsuperscript{th} ed. 1885; 6\textsuperscript{th} ed.}
The descriptive attitude is the feature of many other Sanskrit grammars published in Europe. Let me mention only some being published in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first ones were composed by English scholars connected with the activities of the East India company. Such were the grammars of Charles Wilkins (1749-1836) (1808) and Henry Th. Colebrooke (1765-1837) (1805). Similar were the works by H. H. Wilson (1786-1860) (1841), M. Monier-Williams (1819-1899) (1846), and F. Max Mueller (1823-1900) (1866). All of these grammars appeared in the nineteenth century.

In the twentieth century the tradition of the descriptive approach continued to have exponents in the works of scholars from different countries of Europe; for example: V. A. Kocergina (1956), Louis Renou (1896-1966) (1968). The latest descriptive Sanskrit grammar, in German (Guhe 2008), stems from the beginning of twenty-first century. The popularity of this descriptive method of presenting the rules of Sanskrit grammar to the European public shows that this method is acceptable to large circles of readers with European philological training due not only to clarity but also well thought out structure and range.

The descriptive current which appeared in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars, in addition to having its exponents in extensive grammars, was also used by some authors who decided to prepare them in a much more condensed way.

Shortening and simplifying Sanskrit grammar was the goal of Arthur Anthony Macdonell (1854-1930) in his work of 1901, in which he tried to simplify wherever possible and to present the content of his grammar in a user-friendly way. His main target was students of Sanskrit and he wanted to give them the tools necessary
for reading original Sanskrit texts. This was a pocket-sized book. It has had many editions since the day of its first publication, the last at the end of the twentieth century, reprinted in India. The main features of grammars similar to Macdonell’s can be summarized as follows: a concise exposition of grammatical topics, clarity of presentation, a user-friendly form. Similar, and even more concise, is the grammar by Jan Gonda (1905-1991) (1941), in which the author covers the main topics of Sanskrit grammar in a pocket-sized book of only ninety-six pages. It is meaningful that his grammar gained huge popularity and was translated not only into major European languages like English (Ford 1966), French (R. Rocher 1966) and Spanish, but also into Japanese. 9 Another example of a descriptive but at the same time very concise Sanskrit grammar is the one by Klaus Karttunen (1984).

The next current which appeared comparatively early in the history of the European Sanskrit grammars was that which can be labelled comparative. Sanskrit has become one of the major languages used for comparisons with other languages of the Indo-European family of languages. The first scholar whose works are to be described here is certainly Franz Bopp (1791–1867). As we know, in his first book (1816), he already established the standards for comparative philology. His main goal was to trace the common origin of grammatical forms of inflection in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Persian and Germanic languages. Some years later (1828), Bopp also published a comparative dictionary which was meant to accompany his grammar. His last, extremely comprehensive work, in six parts (1833-1852), was a comparative grammar. The value of all Bopp’s works for the history of the European approaches to Sanskrit is indisputable. He gave a new perspective to studies on

Sanskrit grammar, established the standards for such study and also showed the importance of the knowledge of Sanskrit for the needs of comparative linguistics studies.

Descriptive but simultaneously comparative, even if not as wide-ranging as Bopp's, was the grammar of Monier Monier-Williams (1846). In addition to describing the forms, he compared them to the appropriate ones from ancient European languages in order to point to their common origin. Similar grammars were written in other European languages; to mention just some: in French: A. J. Carnoy (1925), in Italian: Vittore Pisani (1943), in Spanish F. R. Adrados (1953).

In all these works the Indo-European perspective used for comparative reasons takes precedence over other aspects of exposition of the content. The examples which are given in them come obviously from the above-mentioned languages and they are often shown in schemes or tables arranged in horizontal order, which is different from the traditional vertical exposition used in most other grammars. They are a perfect source of information for linguists who are interested in Sanskrit as compared to other languages of the Indo-European family.

Another type of comparative grammar is one that can be called historico–comparative. The first versatile book using this method of presentation was the one already mentioned above, by M. Monier–Williams (1846). But the one to become very popular was composed by the American Indologist William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894) and published in 1879. In his grammar, Whitney included not only a full descriptive presentation of Sanskrit grammar but also the earlier Vedic and Brahmanic forms in order to give information on them and to put stress on their origin.

Probably the most exhaustive grammar of this kind was begun by Jakob Wackernagel (1853-1938), then continued and revised by Albert Debrunner and Louis Renou — who composed on new general introduction to the work — as well as Richard Hauschild, who compiled an index to the published volumes. This work aims
at covering all grammatical topics, including syntax, and in its presentation mode it is directed mostly to linguists.

Simultaneously with the currents mentioned above, though not so wide spread, there appeared a new current important for the history of European ways of describing Sanskrit grammar and the methods used for its presentation. This can be labelled a current of step-by-step presentation or a current of handbooks of grammars. It seems that one of the major reasons for preparing grammars of Sanskrit arranged in this way was pedagogic. The authors realized that if the goal of their works was to help potential readers learn the grammar mostly for practical reasons, among which the most important was reading original texts, they should invent another structure. As a result of such a defined target, in the opinion of these authors what can be called a good grammar should be arranged in a way that enables reaching this goal. Descriptive or comparative grammars were a very good source of information mainly as reference grammars, but they were most useful for seeing the language from a bird’s-eye view or to check grammatical topics or particular forms which were already known to the reader from previous studies.

Probably the first one who tried to propose such a method was William Carey (1761-1834), a baptist missionary who went to India to convert its inhabitants to Christianity. He spent most of his stay in India in Calcutta and was appointed a teacher of both Bengali and Sanskrit. It is believed, though not known certainly, that with the help of local pandits he learned to speak Sanskrit and some other Indian languages. His task was to teach Europeans staying in India at this time and he tried to give them basic information in an easy-to-comprehend way. His grammar, published in 1806, did not become popular in India and it was hardly known in Europe, although we can note that in some French works on Sanskrit grammar dating from the mid-nineteenth century Carey’s grammar is mentioned as a source of
information.\(^\text{10}\)

The single most widely known and popular for using such a didactic method was devised by Georg Buehler (1837-1898). Buehler also spent many years in India, and he was able to speak Sanskrit fluently. In his work Buehler (1883) divided the material into separate lessons in which he introduced particular grammatical topics in a concise form. Some grammatical problems — or what we can call items — were treated in one separate lesson while others continued through several of them. Small glossaries were added to each of the lessons. These lessons contained also collections of exercises meant to help in the active acquisition of the language. It is worth adding that these exercises were mostly artificially devised for training in particular grammatical topics. The method used in this book was what in modern applied linguistics is called grammar—translation. This was something new in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars, although at this time it was already used for teaching and learning other European languages, including classical European ones like Greek or Latin. As mentioned above, Buehler’s work was a handbook rather than what we call a descriptive grammar. It was soon translated to English by Edward Delavan Perry and published in the United States in 1885 to great acclaim.\(^\text{11}\) Such grammars are meant to teach Sanskrit grammar step-by-step with the help of a teacher.

One step further were the grammars devised in the manner of teach-yourself books. The role of a teacher was limited and grammatical topics were explained in such a way as to enable a pupil to study them without any help. It is not widely known that the precursor of such an idea was James Robert Ballantyne (1813-1864), a professor of Moral Philosophy at the Sanskrit College in Benares. In 1843 he published a small booklet (only twenty-two pages long) in which Sanskrit grammar was explained

10. See, for example, M. Desgranges 1845-47.
11. To my knowledge Perry’s work has had four editions (1885, 1886, 1901, 1936) and is still used in quite a few places where Sanskrit is taught.
in the form of questions and answers, with questions being asked by a potential student. It covered the topics of alphabet, sandhi, nouns, verbs and compounds in a very simplified way. Even if it was certainly too short and in many parts not accurate enough for learning Sanskrit, its main novelty and advantage were the new style in which it was written. In 1850 another of Ballantyne’s books was published. This time the author explained the grammatical topics in twenty-three consecutive lessons. He included several extracts from the Hitopadeśa, and adjoined grammar exercises in the form of questions and answers. A small Sanskrit-English dictionary was appended at the end of the book. This work became popular, with at least four later editions (1862, 1865, 1885 and 1941). However, it was not very widely known in Europe even during Ballantyne’s lifetime, and it took many years for Europeans to come back to the idea of teach-yourself grammars as applied to Sankrit.

Not until 1976 did any subsequent work of this kind appear. The next such book was by Michael Coulson (1936-1975). Published in the teach yourself series of grammars, Coulson’s book appeared after the author’s death, seen through the press by Richard Gombrich, then revised by Gombrich and James Benson. It is still very popular. This book is based on extracts of texts drawn from Sanskrit dramas. Its content is divided into fifteen chapters through which, step by step, the reader is prepared for independent work. It is very clearly designed, contains several appendices with grammatical paradigms, classical metres, exercises with key and small Sanskrit-English and English-Sanskrit glossaries. It also contains sandhi grids which due to their clearness of presentation are used by many modern-day Sanskritists. An important feature of this grammar is that it can prepare one for the reading of specialized kind of texts, in this case, dramas. In my opinion this current should be continued, and probably introduced to the process of learning after general introductory grammar courses. It may stand as a perfect tool for
enabling work with particular kind of texts: literary, philosophical, religious or even more specialized, especially as far as Sanskrit literature or philosophy is concerned, covering different styles and structures used for particular works.

It is worth mentioning that at the end of the twentieth century the method of using courses in classical European languages as guides for the Sanskrit grammar books reappeared. Additionally, the methods widely used for teaching modern European languages, including exercises used, influenced works on classical European and Indian languages. Typical examples of such books are those of Walter Maurer (1995) and Dermot Killingley (1996-1997). Both of these, influenced by strategies used for teaching classical European languages, are oriented towards a much more active knowledge of a language. They are full of exercises, not only involving translation but also teaching particular grammatical structures.

This feature of a much more active command of Sanskrit is realized in the wider spectrum of proposals and is typical for most of the grammars coming from the end of the twentieth century. This is the dominant attitude also in the grammars in which European and Indian methods of teaching languages are mixed. Such is the work of Robert Goldman and Sally Sutherland, first published in 1980 and, as far as I know, published in a revised version in 1987 and yet again in 1992, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2011. The authors of this primer take advantage of their fluency in spoken Sanskrit. Being influenced by Indian methods they suggest the memorization of parts of Sanskrit texts. This memorization should gradually cover larger and larger fragments. Their handbook is meant as a preparation for the reading of the epic Rāmāyaṇa by oneself, without any external help. Starting from artificially devised texts, step by step the student is faced with more and more complicated structures of the language. At the end of this process of learning an ability to read the original text of the epic should be achieved. Goldman and Sutherland’s proposal is to
use Indian grammatical vocabulary for the description of separate grammatical forms instead of Latin terminology. Their very good argument is that this is much more appropriate and, in many cases, helpful. This proposal is certainly worth considering in future grammars of Sanskrit to be developed by Europeans. Goldman and Sutherland’s procedures are followed, most probably independently, by an Indian author working in the United States, Madhav Deshpande (1997). He also uses artificial Sanskrit sentences for the purpose of facilitating the approach to original texts. An innovation is that he adds to his handbook simplified versions of famous Sanskrit stories like those of Śakuntalā, Rāma, Nala and Damayantī and some others.

Another very interesting modern attempt to deal with Sanskrit grammar not only in the form of an introductory course but also as a primer which can be used with a particular, specialized kind of text is Scharf’s primer (2003). This work is very well planned and has a versatile introductory part. General topics of grammar are discussed and suggestions of modes of usage for both students and instructors are included. Scharf presents the story of Rāma taken from the Mahābhārata with grammatical analyses of Mbh. 3.257-276, small glossaries added to each part, fragments of texts both in Devanāgarī and Roman transliteration, and English translations. Appendixes include a glossary of proper names with short characterizations of characters, genealogy tables, a word index and a short bibliography. From what I can see it seems this extremely extensive book (over nine hundred pages-long) is what I have foreseen as the next step to be worked on in the future history of grammars of Sanskrit.

To my knowledge, in the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars the only one composed in English in which the most recent European linguistic terms are used in the description of Sanskrit is the small book written by Siew-Yew Killingley (1940-2004) and Dermot Killingley (1995). Modern European linguistic terms like phoneme and lexeme are applied here to
Sanskrit grammar, enabling linguists trained in the West to look at Sanskrit from this perspective. The book includes a very precise and detailed description of Sanskrit syntax, which is a rarity in nearly all previous grammars. The question whether it will stand as the beginning of the new current in the exposition of Sanskrit grammar is an open one.

In 1990 Ashok Aklujkar, whose training was both traditional Indian and European (as was M. M. Deshpande’s), composed and published a primer which includes the majority of methods of presenting Sanskrit. It covers most of the currents which have appeared during the years of the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars. In his book, in four volumes accompanied by six cassettes, Aklujkar includes both a descriptive grammar and a handbook of Sanskrit in which the language is presented step by step. The work abounds in exercises, paradigms of forms presented in manifold ways with different types of tables adjoining the main exposition of Sanskrit grammar rules. Small glossaries are also appended to the course. This is the first grammar in which the methods of teaching and learning are described and analyzed theoretically in the introduction and where the goals to be achieved by using the book are clearly described. Probably Aklujkar’s is the first concise text of theoretical reflection over the strategies which can be or are being used in the exposition of Sanskrit grammar to European readers.

As might have been expected, modern day internet communication has already brought us some grammars of Sanskrit available for users of computers. One of these courses consists of Sanskrit grammar explained in separate lessons, with additional audio parts added. In this course the goal to be achieved is described as gaining the ability to read the original text of the Bhagavadgītā without any external help.12 Most probably, the internet, which is becoming a more and more popular method of

12. This course is available at www.learnsanskrit.org.
obtaining information on every subject, will also become the major source on Sanskrit and its grammar. It is interesting to think of what influence it will have on future currents of description of Sanskrit. However, we should hope that the old tradition of books in paper form composed during the years of the European tradition of Sanskrit grammar is not to cease totally.

For reasons of space I have not touched here on an important field closely associated with the subject of grammars, that is the history of dictionaries, chrestomathies or collections of exercises planned, collected or invented by Europeans. All of these sources of information have been of major importance to the European public, but they require a separate treatment.

To summarize the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars described above, we can state that at least the following currents may be differentiated: descriptive grammars; comparative works, arranged synchronically and diachronically; didactic works, with several subtypes, namely handbooks or step-by-step grammars, teach yourself books, those in which only European methods of arrangement and presentation are used, and grammars which connect European and Indian ways of description and methods. The next currents, which appeared only in the twentieth century, are those in which techniques of modern methods of applied linguistics are used and the ones in which modern European linguistic categories and terms are applied to Sanskrit. Finally, we have the tendency of grammars in which the authors try to look at Sanskrit in a more active way. They prepare the reader not only for ancient texts but also for the creation of original Sanskrit sentences. This trend is most probably influenced by “Spoken Sanskrit” courses, which have been organized since the 1960s. Last but not least we have grammars in which most of the previously invented methods of description are used. Their authors take advantage of what, in their opinion, was the best and most productive in the previous traditions of both Indian and European origin. It is worth adding that the focus on audio methods as used
simultaneously with the traditional ones is nowadays visible.

As mentioned above, the internet will without doubt bring opportunities for new ways of treating Sanskrit grammar. There will certainly be a time when any invention will have a chance of becoming immediately available globally. Will there perhaps be a time of virtual grammars and virtual teachers? A time of opportunity for virtual visits to distant countries? Or perhaps visits to ancient times? Will this bring something really genuine as far as the European tradition of Sanskrit grammars is concerned? Time will tell.
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Teleology and the simplification of accentuation in Pāṇinian derivation

Peter M. Scharf

Considerable work has been undertaken over the past decade to create computational implementations of Pāṇinian derivational procedure. Shivamurthy Swamiji, P. Subrahmanyan, Amba Kulkarni, Anand Mishra, Girish Nath Jha, and I myself have all modeled segments of Pāṇinian grammar computationally. Others, such as Gérard Huet and Oliver Hellwig, are creating computational morphological generators and syntactic analyzers that do not attempt to model Pāṇinian procedure. The Sanskrit Computational Linguistics Consortium, which will hold its fifth symposium 3-8 January 2013 at IIT Bombay, provides a forum for sharing progress in this line of work. Attempts to model Pāṇinian procedure formulate determinative rules to produce finished speech forms from initial conditions consisting of semantic conditions and basic speech units such as roots and undervived nominal stems. A computational implementation of Pāṇinian derivational procedure succeeds if the derivation of forms according to rules does not rely on knowledge of the finished form to be produced; that is, if the derivation is not circular. Robustness of the Pāṇinian linguistic description itself depends on the lack of circularity in the generative processes of the grammar.

Certain scholars have raised objections to the attempt to implement Pāṇinian procedure computationally on the grounds that Panini never intended his grammar to be a determinative generative grammatical device. Jan Houben, for instance, has recently argued that users of the grammar have certain speech forms in mind that they want to check for correctness and that these speech forms guide the derivational procedure which therefore does not proceed from semantic conditions and basic speech forms in a deterministic manner.
In Scharf 2011, I have demonstrated that Pāñinian derivational procedure does indeed proceed from semantic conditions and basic speech forms. Yet I have also noted (Scharf 2011: 67-69) that there are three instances in which rules are formulated using the anticipatory device of the viṣayasaptamī. Patañjali escapes from the mutual dependence of the provision of an affix upon the presence of a preceding speech form and vice versa by stating that the affix in the locative is a locative of domain (viṣayasaptamī) rather than a right-context locative (parasaptamī).

Patañjali resorts to the locative of domain under A. 2.4.35 आर्धधातुके, A. 3.1.31 आयाद्य आर्धधातुके वा, and A. 4.1.90 यूनि लुक् (see Scharf 2011: 67–69). For example, A. 2.4.52 अस्तेऽपूः provides that the root as is replaced by the root bhū in the domain of an ārdhadhātuka-affix. A. 3.1.97 अन्तः यत् provides that the affix yat occurs after a vowel-final root, and A. 3.1.124 श्लोण्यत् provides that the affix nyat occurs after roots that end in r or in a consonant. The former affix conditions guṇa replacement of the final vowel of the root by A. 7.3.84 सार्थधातुकार्धधातुक्योः: and high pitch on the first vowel of the derivate by A. 6.1.213 यत्रो ज्ञावः, while the latter conditions vṛddhi replacement of the final vowel of the root by A. 7.2.115 अन्तः द्विग्यति and circumflex (svarita) on the affix vowel by A. 6.1.185 तित्स्वरितम्. In order to obtain the form bhāvyam the affix yat must occur after the root bhū. However, the affix yat cannot occur until the root as is replaced by bhū since it only occurs after vowel-final roots; it does not occur after the root as, which ends in a consonant. If ārdhadhātuke were a parasaptamī, the replacement of the root as by the root bhū could only occur after the ārdhadhātuka-affix nyat had been provided. The result would be the erroneous form *bhāvyām, with vṛddhi replacement of the final ṛ of bhū and circumflex on the final vowel. The correct form bhāvyam results if the replacement of the root as by
the root bhū occurs in the domain of an ārdhadhātuka-affix, prior to its provision. The locative of domain permits the comprehension of the affix prior to its provision; it is a technique of looking ahead in the derivation and implies that the user of the grammar has some foreknowledge of the speech form to be derived. The locative of domain therefore implies that teleology plays a role in rule implementation in the grammar.

While the device of a locative of domain is admitted only under duress and is avoided as far as possible by commentators beginning with Patañjali, the fact that it is resorted to at all raises the question whether the rule set itself was not composed with the intent to utilize such a device more prevalently. Now, attempts to interpret Pāñinian procedure independent of commentators, especially independent of Patañjali, inevitably inspire suspicion. If nearly two and a half millennia of astute grammarians do not consider an issue, it is unlikely to be relevant. Yet there are criteria to judge the correct interpretation of a system independent of commentary. These criteria are the simplicity and adequacy of the system to its intended domain. If an interpretation of the Pāñinian linguistic description under one interpretation accounts for correct Sanskrit usage more efficiently, more simply than under a second interpretation, evidence is served in favor of the first interpretation. The case is strengthened if support for the interpretation is found in the discussion of commentators.

There is a major section of the grammar consisting of rules with locatives interpreted by commentators as right-context locatives (parasaptami) which if interpreted as locatives of domain (viṣayasaptami) would lead to a simplification of accentual rules. In the section of rules that introduces stem-forming affixes (vikaraṇa), namely A. 3.1.34–90, the locatives from leṭi in A. 3.1.35 to līṇi in A. 3.1.86 are accepted by commentators as right-context locatives. The verbal terminations are taken to be introduced prior to the stem-forming affixes. Table 1 shows the gloss of these rules in the Kāśikā, and Table 2 shows their gloss in
the Siddhāntakaumudī, wherever the comment clarifies the case use. The commentaries do not mention or do not interpret the locative at all in the gloss of sūtras not listed; they never interpret any of these locatives as viṣayasaptamī. The Kāśikā utilizes the term parataḥ after a locative to show that it is a parasaptamī. Similarly, the Siddhāntakaumudī utilizes the term pare. For example, the Kāśikā paraphrases A. 3.1.68 कर्तरि शष्य, “The affix śap occurs after a root when a sārvadhātuka affix denoting an agent (kartr) follows (parataḥ).” The Siddhāntakaumudī paraphrases the same rule (SK. 2167), “The affix śap should occur after a root when a sārvadhātuka affix meaning agent (kartr) follows (pare).” The use of the terms parataḥ and para implies that the verbal termination is already present following a root when the stem-forming affix is provided. In the derivations according to these commentators, therefore, the verbal terminations occur first and the stem-forming affixes subsequently.

Table 3 shows the derivation of kurutaḥ, the third person dual present indicative active of the root kr, according to Pāṇinian tradition. Steps 1-6 show the semantic conditions leading to the introduction of the l-affix laṭ after the root kr. Step 7 replaces the l-affix laṭ by the appropriate verbal termination; steps 7a-f determine the selection of the verbal termination tas. Steps 8-9 concern accent, which is the issue at hand. The affix has a high-pitched vowel in accordance with A. 3.1.3 (step 8).

Now, accents accompany items when they are introduced and are adjusted at each stage in a derivation in accordance with the principle, stated in 6.1.158 अनुवादां पदमेकवर्जम्, that a pada contains no high-pitched vowel save one (step 9). As Cardona (1997: 376) writes, “At each stage of derivation, an accentual adjustment is made such that, in general, the accentuation proper to the unit introduced at this stage cancels a previously existing accentuation.” The principle is articulated by Kātyāyana under A. 6.1.158, in vt. 9: सतिशिष्टवर्जप्रयास्यित्वं च (step 9a). Patañjali
comments: सतिशिष्टस्वरो बलियान्भवतीति वक्तव्यम् (MBh. III.99.23) (step 9b). Hence the accent of the verbal termination overrides the accent of the root.

An exception is made, however, to the accentuation principle that the accent of what is taught overrides the accent that was formerly present. The exception states that the accentuation of a stem-forming affix (vikarana) does not override the accentuation of a sārvadhātuka verbal termination. Step 11 of the derivation introduces the stem-forming affix $u$ which is high-pitched, just as was the verbal termination $tas$, in accordance with A. 3.1.3 (step 12). Yet instead of the accent of the newly introduced affix $u$ overriding the accent of the verbal termination already present in accordance with the satiśiṣṭa principle, the accent of the stem-forming affix must yield to the accent of the verbal termination, even though stem-forming affix is introduced later. Kātyāyana notes this exception to the satiśiṣṭa principle in vt. 11, स्वादिस्वराप्रसंगः तत्सि: परस्यानुदात्तवचनान्तः, under A. 6.1.158 (step 13a). Patañjali comes to the point, “The accent of the stem-forming affix, even though it is taught while the other accent is already present, does not block the accent of the verbal termination.” (step 13b).¹ The rest of the derivation culminates in step 24 with the form kurutāḥ, with the accent on the verbal termination rather than on the stem-forming affix.² In general the accent of a verbal termination prevails over the accent of a stem-forming affix.

In order to achieve the proper accentuation of verbal forms such as kurutāḥ — which are quite prevalent in ordinary Sanskrit as well as in Vedic — an exception to the principle that the accent of the item introduced later prevails must be stated. The statement of such an exception can be avoided, however, if the stem-forming

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1. सति शिष्टो धिप विकरणस्वरो लेक्खाधातुस्वरं न बाधते। (MBh. III.100.8-11).
2. In Devanagari, I use a vertical stroke above the headbar to indicate high pitch (udātta) and leave other pitches unmarked.
affix is introduced prior to the replacement of the \( l \)-affix by the verbal termination. Doing so requires understanding the locatives in the rules that introduce stem-forming affixes as locatives of domain rather than right-context locatives: the verbal terminations are not yet there but are anticipated. Table 4 shows the modifications necessary to the derivation. Step 7, instead of replacing the \( l \)-affix by an appropriate verbal termination, introduces the stem-forming affix \( u \). The accent of the stem-forming affix overrides the accent of the root in accordance with the general accentuation principle that the accent of the item introduced later prevails (steps 9-9b). Then in step 10 the \( l \)-affix is replaced by the appropriate verbal termination \( tas \). The accent of the verbal termination then prevails over the accent of the stem-forming affix by the same general accentuation principle (step 13-13b). No exception to the general accentuation principle is needed.

Now, the view that there is an exception to the general principle that the accent of what is taught overrides the accent that was formerly present in the case of vikaraṇas has a long history. The question comes up in the discussion of accentuation under A. 6.1.158. In vārttika 8 (सिद्धं तु प्रकृतिस्वर्णवलीयस्त्वात्त्रयस्वरभावः), Kātyāyana states that the accent of an affix overrides the accent of the base, and in vārttika 9 (सतिशिष्टस्वरवलीयस्त्वं च), that the accent of what is taught overrides the accent that was formerly present (the sati śiṣṭa principle). In vārttika 10 (तत्त्वानेकप्रत्ययसमासार्थम्), he states that the latter is necessary in the case of multiple affixes and in the case of complex compounds. The derivation of verbal forms such as kurutāḥ is a case where multiple affixes occur. Now, Patañjali raises an objection to the solution presented in vārttika 9. If the sati śiṣṭa principle applies, then the accent of the vikaraṇa would block the accent of the verbal termination in sumutāḥ and
This objection assumes that the vikaraṇa is taught after the replacement of an \textit{l}-affix by a verbal termination because \textit{विप्रतिपेश्ये परं कार्यम्} applies throughout the grammar so that replacements to \textit{l}-affixes taught in 3.4.78 occur before the vikaraṇas taught in 3.1.33-90.

Kātyāyana’s \textit{vārttika} 11 on A. 6.1.158 (स्यादिस्वराप्रसङ्गगश्र तासे: परस्यानुदातवचनात्) answers the objection. According to this \textit{vārttika}, the mention of \textit{tāsi} in A. 6.1.186 तास्यानुदात्तेन्निद्यदुप-देशाल्लसार्वधातुकमनुदातमन्त्रिन्योः: is an indication (\textit{jiṇāpaka}) of an exception for vikaraṇas. A. 6.1.186 teaches that a verbal termination after \textit{tāsi} (which is a vikaraṇa), among other speech forms, is anudāṭta. Teaching that a verbal termination after \textit{tāsi} is anudāṭta indicates that the accent of a vikaraṇa does not block the accent of a sārvaḍhātuka affix taught in place of an \textit{l}-affix, even though the vikaraṇa is taught later than such a sārvaḍhātuka affix. The fact that one has to state that after \textit{tāsi} such sārvaḍhātuka affixes are anudāṭta indicates that they wouldn’t be anudāṭta just by the satiśiṣṭa principle. It implies an exception to the satiśiṣṭa principle for vikaraṇas, if one accepts that replacements to \textit{l}-affixes taught in A. 3.4.78 occur prior to the vikaraṇas taught in A. 3.1.33-90.

However, this statement assumes that \textit{विप्रतिपेश्ये परं कार्यम्} applies throughout the grammar so that replacements to \textit{l}-affixes taught in 3.4.78 occur prior to the vikaraṇas taught in 3.1.33-90. Yet if this is not the case, if vikaraṇas occur first and verbal terminations subsequently, then the satiśiṣṭa principle itself lets the accent of the terminations take precedence, and there is no need for 6.1.186 to indicate it. Still A. 6.1.186 has to be stated to bring about the low pitch of the sārvaḍhātuka affixes in the specific cases mentioned because they would otherwise keep their high-pitched

3. यदि सतिशिष्टस्वरवलीयस्त्वमुच्यते स्यादिस्वर: सार्वधातुकस्वरं बाह्यैत। सुनृत: चिन्तुत: । (Mbh. III.100.6-7).
accent by the sāṭiśīṣṭa principle. This is exactly what Kaiyāṭa states in his commentary on the MBh. on vt. 11. He writes,

[A. 6.1.186] is said to be an indication by resorting to the derivation according to which the stem-forming affix tāṣi occurs after replacements for l-affixes have already been made because the latter are provided by later rules. However, [A. 6.1.186] is not an indication if the sārvadhātuka (replacements) arise after the stem-forming affix tāṣi has been added at the stage of the l-affixes because the provision of low pitch [by A. 6.1.186] serves the purpose of blocking accentuation of the sārvadhātuka replacements for l-affixes which would obtain because of the sāṭiśīṣṭa principle."  

The sāṭiśīṣṭa principle by itself, without special exception for vikaraṇas, applies to allow the accent of the verbal termination to remain; high-pitch accent is specifically overridden by 6.1.186.

In vārttika 12 (शब्दपरिवर्तिते शब्दपरिवर्तिते शब्दपरिवर्तिते शब्दपरिवर्तिते), Kātyāyana considers an alternative explanation for the fact that the vikaraṇa does not get the accent in forms such as sunutāḥ and cinutāḥ. He states that because the principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict cannot properly restrict the accent, it succeeds because of the principle that the later speech form gets the accent in cases of conflict. The details of the proposal, the objection raised to it, and its solution are not immediately relevant here. What is relevant is that Kātyāyana and

4. परत्वाल्लादेशेषु कुते तासिरिति प्रक्रियाश्रयेण ज्ञापकमूष्यते। लाब्धायं तु तासी कुते साप्तं भवति लाब्धायं वृक्त्वर्गमण्यां सतिशिष्टत्या प्रसाधात्। तद्वाधानाय अनुदातविधानस्य॥ (Pr. 4.492).

5. The proposal in vārttika 12 under A. 6.1.158 is objected to because in the case of the provision of dhātu-forming affixes such as kāmya, āya, and īya, the accent of the affix would take precedence over the accent of the root. Since the root is the whole sequence of base + affix while the affix is just the later part, the accent provided by 3.1.3 आचार्यत्वम् would take precedence over the accent provided by 6.1.162 धातोः (अन्त: उदात्त: १५९). The latter provides that the final vowel of the root is high-pitched, the former that the first vowel of the affix is high-pitched. If the accent of the affix took precedence, one would then erroneously get *putrakāmyati, *gopāyati, *ṛtiyate instead of the correct putrakāmyāti,
Patañjali consider an alternative to the principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict throughout the grammar.

The principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict is stated in A. 1.4.2 विप्रतिपेधेः परं कार्यम् under the heading A. 1.4.1 आ क्षड़रोऽक्ष कान्त्रम्. As Scharf (2012) discussed in detail, Patañjali applies the principle that the rule which is stated later prevails in cases of conflict throughout the grammar. Yet he concludes under A. 1.4.2 that it is the desired rule that applies rather than the later rule (MBh. 1.306.4–10) thereby casting doubt upon the use of the principle for rule ordering generally. Modern scholars limit the principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict to the section of technical terms headed by A. 1.4.2 and do not accept that it applies generally throughout the grammar.

Although the principle that the later speech form gets the accent in cases of conflict is dismissed, the fact that an alternative to the principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict is considered in the context of the satiśiṣṭa principle is pertinent. It is precisely this consideration that the present paper pursues. Since the principle that the later rule takes precedence in cases of conflict does not apply throughout the grammar, there is no reason to effect the replacement of l-affixes by verbal terminations prior to the provision of the vikaraṇa. Let the locatives such as sārvadhātuṇa in A. 3.1.67 सार्वभाटुके यत् be viśayasaptamīs. Let the vikaraṇas arise before the verbal terminations replace l-affixes. Then, since the verbal terminations occur subsequent to the vikaraṇas, the
gopāyāti, rīyāte. The objection is dismissed on the grounds that the principle that the later speech form gets the accent in cases of conflict applies only where both accents are possible at once, but it is not the case that both accents are possible at once here. As Kaiyaṭa explains, the accent of the affix is taught outright at first, when the accent of the affix has already been effected, once the speech form ending in the affix has been termed dhātu by A. 3.1.32 सन्तात्वत्ता धात्रा, only then does the accent of the root take effect. Kaiyaṭa therefore concludes that one only needs to resort to the satiśiṣṭa principle, i.e., that the accent of what is taught overrides the accent that was formerly present.
satiṣīṣṭa principle by itself accounts for the proper accent. There is no need for an exception to the satiṣīṣṭa principle and no need to interpret A. 6.1.186 as an indication (jñāpaka) of such an exception. The interpretation of A. 6.1.186 as such an indication is only valid under the assumption that vikaraṇas occur subsequently to the replacement of l-affixes by verbal terminations. In the absence of such an assumption, that is, if the replacement of l-affixes by verbal terminations is provided subsequent to vikaraṇas, the accent of the termination takes precedence over the accent of the vikaraṇas just by the satiṣīṣṭa principle alone. Thus the terminations ḍā, rau, and ras of the so-called periphrastic future (lūṭ) after the vikaraṇa tāṣi would be high-pitched by the default accentuation rule A. 3.1.3 and the satiṣīṣṭa principle. In this situation, to avoid the undesired high-pitch in certain speech forms, A. 6.1.186 serves simply to effect the low pitch of the terminations ḍā, rau, and ras as well as of other verbal terminations following the specific items mentioned in the rule. A. 6.1.186 is just as much an indication (jñāpaka) that verbal terminations replace l-affixes subsequent to the provision of vikaraṇas as it is of an exception to the satiṣīṣṭa principle. Verbal terminations can replace l-affixes subsequent to the provision of vikaraṇas if the locatives in A. 3.1.33-90 are understood as locatives of domain (viṣayāsaptamī) rather than right-context locatives (parasaptamī).

The derivation of accent can be achieved more simply by understanding the locatives in rules that introduce stem-forming affixes as locatives of domain rather than right-context locatives. Simplification is a virtue in scientific description just as lāghava is in the ancient Indian grammatical tradition. Moreover, the approach proposed is supported by the fact that commentators suggest an alternative to the principle that the later rule applies in cases of conflict.

The Mahābhāṣya discusses the type of saptamī in stem-forming affiliation rules only once (MBh. II.60.19-20 [on A. 3.1.78]) where
reference is made to A. 1.4.13 यस्मात्रत्यविधिस्तवादिप्रत्येकद्वादिन्नर्गम् in a pūrvapakṣa. The locative is there interpreted as a parasaptamī, paraphrasing यस्माच्च थत्यविधिस्तवादिप्रत्येकद्वादिन्नर्गम् एवते उज्जगसंधिं भवति.

The fact that the affix śnam does not occur after roots such as bhid but after their last vowel (in accordance with A. 1.1.47 मिदरो ज्ञेयात्तर:), and that the stem with respect to the affix śnam does not terminate with that last vowel (for example bhi of bhid) shows that in fact pratyaye in A. 1.4.13 cannot be a parasaptamī.

Understanding the locatives as viśayasaptamī implies a less mechanic procedure of rule selection. Specific conditions for the occurrence of stem-forming affixes in the form of specific verbal terminations must be envisioned prior to the replacement of l-affixes by those verbal terminations. This implies that a foreknowledge of the form to be derived guides the derivational procedure teleologically. To this extent, it may be correct to assert that Pāṇinian derivation begins with speech forms: it is undertaken with the target speech form in mind, at least to the extent that the user envisions an affix to be used as a viśayasaptamī prior to the introduction of the affix. Such envisioning does not compromise the robustness of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a linguistic description of Sanskrit, but it does complicate the ability to undertake a computational implementation that closely models the rules. Computational implementation must rely on some procedure of rule implementation that permits anticipation of conditions.

Scharf (2010) describes such a procedure to implement a forward-looking rule where a decision at an early stage in the derivation requires evaluation of conditions that do not obtain until a subsequent stage in the derivation. The situation concerns the addition of the affix-initial augment i (iḥ) in the derivation of perfect active participle forms such as jagmīvān. A. 7.2.67 वस्त्रेकाजात्सामृ provides the addition of the initial augment i to the affix vas (kvasu) on the condition that the root be single-syllabled
after stem-internal changes and root doubling (A. 6.1.1 etc.) have applied. The problem is that stem-internal changes and root doubling require the prior addition of the augment \( i \). The root is doubled by A. 6.1.8 लि० धातुरनव्यासस्य after 6.4.98 गमहनजनवनः-प्रमां लोपः क्रियावनिधः applies. The latter in turn deletes the penultimate vowel of the mentioned roots \( gam \), etc. followed by a vowel-initial affix other than \( n \) marked with \( k \) or \( ṇ \). Note that the root vowel is deleted only if the affix is vowel-initial. The affix is vowel-initial only \textit{after} the augment \( i \) is added by A. 7.2.67. The problem is therefore that A. 7.2.67 must evaluate whether the root is going to turn out to be single-syllabled in order to determine whether to add the augment or not but the root can turn out to be single-syllabled only once the augment has already been added. Scharf (2010) describes implementation of a decision delay mechanism that produces both options, with and without the augment \( i \), and eliminates the incorrect option at a subsequent point in the derivation where the monosyllabicity is able to be evaluated. Hence, although the decision whether or not to implement A. 7.2.67 is forward-looking, i.e., requires knowledge of a subsequent state in advance, it is not indeterminate.

The situation is similar in the case of the viṣayasaaptamī. Just as the forward-looking condition in the case of the derivation of perfect active participles was not indeterminate, the viṣayasaaptamī is not indeterminate either. A decision delay procedure is capable of determining the correct result in the same way. In the case of the derivation of the form \textit{bhāvyam} in the example above, one can produce both options, proceeding on one option as if the subsequent affix is ārdhadhātuka and on the other as if it is not, until the affix is introduced and its status is known. Then discard the incorrect option. In this way no indeterminism is introduced. The simplification of accentuation rules by the expanded use of the viṣayasaaptamī therefore would not introduce the fault of indeterminacy into the grammatical procedure.
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| ३११.३३ स्पतास्मी लुटो: | लुटो: | चढ़पमुक्तस्तहस्त जान्य सामान्यमेकैव।
| ३११.३४ सिन्धुलन लेटि | लेटि | ग्रातो: सिन्धुल शाप बहुत लेटि परत।।
| ३११.३५ कास्त्रयायादामने लिटि | लिटि | काशु शाब्दकृतायामस। तत: प्रयान्तेभयः
| ३११.३६ इजादेत्र गुफमतो जून्न्ज्ञः | जून्न्ज्ञः | इजादियो स्तहुकृत्वाद्विन्तितस्तस्माच लिति परत आम्प्रत्ययो। भवति।
| ३११.३७ दयायास्त्र | | दय दानन्दितस्त्रणु। अथ गतो। आस।
| ३०१.२८ उशविवज्जाप्त्यो ज्ञ्यतरस्याम् | उप दहे। विद जाने। जागु निद्रायथे। एतेभयो
| ३०१.२९ भीहीभुधवां शुज्व्यव्य | जिबमि भये। ह्री लज्जायम्। हुषुषु
| ३११.४० कुस्तात्रुमुद्यते लिटि | लिटि | आम्प्रत्ययस्त पश्चात्कुस्तात्रुमुद्यते लिति परत।।
| ३११.४३ च्वल लुड़क्क | लुड़क्क | ग्रातोमिति: प्रययो। भवति। लुड़क परत।।
| ३११.४८ शिंशिदुसूव्य: कत्तरी चढ़ | पिजपवाद्यद्विधियाते। ण्यन्त्यो भातुभ्यः।
| ३११.५२ अस्ततिविन्ति-क्ष्यातिभ्यो उष्ण | असु केसण। वच परिपाण्ये। बृहादेशे बो।
| ३११.५४ आतमेवेद्य-न्यतरस्याम् | आतमेव-पदेः | लिपिसिंहल्बु आतमेवेद्य परतक्लेवदेशे।

Table 1
Significance of the locative in rules introducing stem-forming affixes according to the Kāśika
| श्री १५५ | पुष्पदिवसाचार्यवन्दितः | परस्मै-पदेषु | पुष्पदिवस्य चुतादिभ्य लक्ष्मणस्य धातुभ्यः | परस्मै चतः: परस्मै-पदेषु परतो द्राजादेशों भवति। |
| १५६ | च्याते पदः | ते | पद गतो। असमाद्य: परस्मय चलेक्षणादेशों भवति तथादेशं परतः। |
| १५६१ | दीपजनवधुपरिताचिया-प्राचिन्यो ज्यतरस्याम् | च्यात: श्रीति वर्तते। दीपी दीपी। जनी प्राप्तम्। वुध अवगमने। पूर्वी आप्यायने। तायु सन्तानपालनयोः। आप्यायी वृद्धी। एतेभ्यः परस्मय चलेक्षणादेशं परतो ज्यतरस्यां चिन्यादेशों भवति। |
| १५६२ | अन्तः: कर्मकतरीर | असमाद्य: परस्मय चतः: कर्मकतरीर तथादेशं परतचिन्यादेशों भवति। |
| १५६६ | च्यात: कर्मकर्मणोः | श्रीतो: परस्मय चलेक्षणादेशों भवति भावे कर्मणि तथादेशं परतः। |
| १५६७ | सार्वक्षातुके पक्ष | सार्व-प्रातुके | भावकर्मवाचनिनि सार्वातुके परतो ध्रातोपकम्प्त्यों भवति। |
| १५६८ | कर्तिर: श्रुः | कर्तिरचनिनि सार्वातुके परतो ध्रातो: श्राप्त्यों भवति। |
| १५६९ | हलः र्मः शानज्जी | हृः | हल उत्तरस्य श्राप्त्यस्य शानज्जादेशों भवति हृः परतः। |
| १५६६ | लिङ्गाशिम्यंकः | लिङ्गः | आशिष्षिविष्ये यो लिङ्गास्मिनपर्वतस्यन्त्सि बिष्ये उह्प्रत्यों भवति। |
## Teleology and the simplification of accentuation in Pāñinian derivation

### Table 2

**Significance of the locative in rules introducing stem-forming affixes according to the Siddhāntakaumudī**

| 2167 | नृत्ति छापु | कृत्ति भारार्तकु तुके परे हराती: छापु स्वातृ। |
| 2186 | नृत्ति लतुटो: | हराती: स्वतासी एतो स्तो लुटुटों: परत। |
| 2239 | कृप्ति नुमुश्म्व निर्दित | आम्लातू निदिप्त: कृप्ति नुमुश्म्व निर्दित। |
| 2269 | हरितो वा | हरितो धरातीस्लेटेढ़वा स्वातृ परस्मै परे परे। |
| 2312 | नृत्ति छापु: कृत्ति जड़ | नृत्ति धर्मार्थस्व जलेढ़वा स्वातकर्त्तैः तुड़ि परे। |
| 2321 | वा धीलास्मात्प्रमुः-कृप्ति जुमुसिमुसिटुल्चोटः | एतेभ्य: स्वत्वा स्वातकर्त्तैः सार्वान्द्रातुके परे। |
| 2328 | दीपजादभुरिः-ताथियाभिभ्यो न्यातस्याम् | एत्यश्चलेढिण्वा स्वादेशवने ताब्दे परे। |
| 2338 | अध्यो न्यातस्याम् | अध्यो वा गुप्तत्त्व: स्वातकर्त्तैः सार्वान्द्रातुके परे। |
| 2375 | विभाषा घोटायो: | आय्यार्ज़लेढ़वा स्वातुन्वाचाचिनि तुड़ि परे। |
| 2513 | चित्ते पदः | पदलेढिण्वा स्वातृ ताब्दे परे। |
| 2557 | हल: शन: शानज्जु | हल: परस्म शन: शानजादेश: स्वादू धौ परे। |
| 2756 | सार्वान्द्रातुके यक् | धारात्तैः प्रत्यय: स्वाद्वात्नब्रम्बाचाचिनि सार्वान्द्रातुके परे। |
| 2758 | चित्तावक्तर्मिणो: | चलेढ़िण्वास्वात्त्रात्नब्रम्बाचाचिनि ताब्दे परे। |
| 2768 | अज्ज: क्षमतार्तिर | अज्जातू चलेढ़िण्वा वा स्वात्त्वात्नब्रम्बाचाचिनि ताब्दे परे। |
| 3434 | लिङ्गाशिण्ड़ | आय्यालिङ्गिक परे धातोढ़ स्वाच्छन्दसि। |
The derivation of कृत्वा: (the third person dual present indicative active of कृ) according to Pāṇinian tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Simplex</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>स्वतन्त्रताविभिन्न-द्वितीयविभिन्नाय-वर्तमानकालीन-करणातुकूल-व्यापार:</td>
<td>1.4.54</td>
<td>स्वतन्त्र: करता</td>
<td>They two do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>द्वितीयविभिन्नकूल-वर्तमानकालीन-करणातुकूल-व्यापार:</td>
<td>MDhV. 8.12</td>
<td>द्वितीय करण</td>
<td>The independent participant in the action is termed ‘agent’ (कर्त्र).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>कृत्वा</td>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>भूवाद्यो धातवः</td>
<td>The items in the list beginning with bhū are termed dhātu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>कृ</td>
<td>6.1.162</td>
<td>धातो: (अन्त: उदात: १५९)</td>
<td>The last vowel of a root is high-pitched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>कृ-नद्</td>
<td>3.2.123</td>
<td>वर्तमाने लक्ष्य</td>
<td>The l-affix lat occurs after a root if the action it denotes occurs in present time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6a</td>
<td>3.4.69</td>
<td>ल: कर्मिणिः च भावे</td>
<td>The l-affixes occur when a direct object (कर्मण) is to be denoted and, after roots without a direct object, when the action (भाव) is to be denoted, as well as when the agent (कर्त्र) is to be denoted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>कृ-तम्</td>
<td>3.4.78</td>
<td>तित्तकांस्तिः...इत्यहिंस्तिः (लस्य भर)</td>
<td>The affixes tip etc. occur in place of an l-affix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a</td>
<td>1.4.22</td>
<td>द्वाराकोभिद्वचनोक-वचने</td>
<td>A dual or singular termination occurs to denote dual or singular number respectively.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b</td>
<td>1.3.78</td>
<td>शेषात्तकत्तैरिपरस्मैपदम्</td>
<td>A parasmaipada verbal termination occurs when an agent is to be denoted after the remainder, i.e., after any root under any conditions for which an ātmānepada termination has not been provided.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7c</td>
<td>1.4.99</td>
<td>ल: परस्मैपदम्</td>
<td>A replacement for an l-affix is generally termed parasmaipada.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>English</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7d</td>
<td>1.4.101</td>
<td>तिढ्यमाःणि प्रथममध्यमोत्तमाः</td>
<td>Triplets of the affixes तिः etc. are termed respectively प्रथम, मध्यम and उत्तम.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7e</td>
<td>1.4.102</td>
<td>ताष्येकवचनक्रिवचनक्रिवनान्ये प्रथममध्यमोत्तमाः</td>
<td>Affixes within each triplet are termed ekavacana, dvivacana, and bahuvacana respectively.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7f</td>
<td>1.4.108</td>
<td>शेषे प्रथमं</td>
<td>An affix termed प्रथमा occurs in the remainder, i.e., where there is no correferentiality with a first or second person pronoun, whether such a pronoun is actually used or not.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.1.13</td>
<td>आद्यदात्रभ (अल्पयः १)</td>
<td>The first vowel of an affix is high-pitched.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1.158</td>
<td>अनुदात्त</td>
<td>अनुदात्त पदमेकवज्ञम्</td>
<td>A pada contains no high-pitched vowel save one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a</td>
<td>6.1.158 vt. 9</td>
<td>सतिशिष्टवर्षीय स्त्रं</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patañjali</td>
<td>सतिशिष्ट स्वर्तीय ववियानुप्भवति (MBh. III.99. 22-23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.4.113</td>
<td>तिढ्यसिवत्रवाश्तुकम्</td>
<td>The verbal terminations (तिः) and affixes marked with ś are termed sārvadhātuka.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.1.79</td>
<td>तमादिकुण्डत्वम्</td>
<td>The stem-forming affix u occurs after a root in the list beginning with tan and after the root kṛ followed by a sārvadhātuka affix if an agent is to be denoted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.1.13</td>
<td>आद्यदात्रभ (अल्पयः १)</td>
<td>(see step 8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.1.158</td>
<td>अनुदात्त</td>
<td>अनुदात्त पदमेकवज्ञम्</td>
<td>(see step 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a</td>
<td>6.1.158 vt. 11</td>
<td>स्वासिद्वर्धरः साङ्गश् च तासे: परस्परान्तर-वचनात्</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Patañjali</td>
<td>सांति गिर्जा अष्ट विकरणस्वरोऽलसार्धाधातुकस्वरं न बाध्यते (MBh. III. 100.8-11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 14 | (कृ-उ[आर्धाधातुक])-तंस[सार्धाधातुक] | 3.4.114 आर्धाधातुकेष्योऽशष्टिः | The remainder of affixes taught explicitly after a verbal root (*dhātu*) are termed *ārḍhadhātuka*.
| 15 | (कृ[द्रग्ग]-उ[आर्धाधातुक])-तंस[सार्धाधातुक] | 1.4.13 यस्मात्रत्वेऽविविधोन्तत्वदैव प्रत्यये द्वागम् | The speech form beginning with that after which an affix is provided is termed ‘stem’ (*āṅga*) with respect to that affix.
| 16 | (कृ-उ)-तंस[सार्धाधातुक] | 7.3.84 सार्धाधातुकार्थः-धातुतयोः: (गुणः ८२, अध्यास्य ६। ४१९) | A stem followed by a sārvadhātuka or ārdhadhātuka affix is subject to replacement by a guṇa vowel. |
| 16a | 1.1.2 अदेवगुणः | *a, e* and *o* are termed *guṇa*.
| 16b | 1.1.3 इको गुणवृद्धि | Guṇa and vṛddhi vowels occur in place of a vowel *i*, *u*, *r* or *l*.
| 16c | 1.1.50 स्थानोऽन्तरतमः | The most similar among possible replacements occurs in place of its substituend. |
| 17 | (कृ-उ)-तंस[सार्धाधातुक] | 1.1.51 उपश्रवणः | A vowel *a*, *i* or *u* that occurs in place of *r* is followed by *r*.
| 18 | कृ[द्रग्ग]-तंस[सार्धाधातुक] | 1.4.13 यस्मात्रत्वे विविधोन्तत्वदैव प्रत्यये द्वागम् | (see step 15)
| 19 | कृ[द्रग्ग]-तंस[ह] | 1.2.4 सार्धाधातुकमर्मिन् (वर्ण १) | A sārvadhātuka affix not marked with *p* is marked with *ṅ*.
<p>| 20 | कृ-तंस[ह] | 6.4.110 अतः उत्सार्धाधातुकः (अध्यास्य १, निःसङ्कि ९८, उतः प्रत्ययः १०६, करोते: १०८) | The <em>a</em> of the stem <em>karu</em> of the root <em>kr</em> ending in the affix <em>u</em>, followed by a sārvadhātuka affix marked with <em>k</em> or <em>ṅ</em> is replaced by <em>u</em>. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>कुर्तस्य[प्य]</td>
<td>1.1.5</td>
<td>क्रियात्म च (न ५, इन गुणवृद्धि ३)</td>
<td>Guṇa and vṛddhi do not occur if the affix that would otherwise condition them is marked with क or न.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21a</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.3.84</td>
<td>सार्वस्यतुकार्य-धातुमयोः (गुणः ८२, अद्वर्णस्य ६। ४।१) blocked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>कुर्तस्य[पद]</td>
<td>1.4.14</td>
<td>सुप्लिकल्यां पदम्</td>
<td>A speech form ending in a nominal termination (sup) or verbal termination (tiṅ) is termed pada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>कुर्तरु[ू]</td>
<td>8.2.66</td>
<td>ससस्वप्या ह</td>
<td>The final s of a pada is replaced by ru (r marked with u).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>कुर्ते:</td>
<td>8.3.15</td>
<td>खर्बसानवर्धिन-सर्वोऽस :</td>
<td>Before a voiceless consonant or pause, pada-final r is replaced by h.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4
Alternative derivation of कृतेत्व: (third person dual present indicative active of कृ)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>कृ-उ-तस्</th>
<th>3.1.79</th>
<th>तनादिकृतेत्व: उः (सार्वभौतिके ५७, कातिरि ६८)</th>
<th>The stem-forming affix <em>u</em> occurs after a root in the list beginning with <em>tan</em> and after the root <em>kr</em> in the domain of a sārvadātuka affix if an agent is to be denoted.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्</td>
<td>3.1.3</td>
<td>आत्रादात्तेश्व (प्रत्ययः १)</td>
<td>The first vowel of an affix is high-pitched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्</td>
<td>6.1.158</td>
<td>अनुदात्त पदमेकवर्जम्</td>
<td>A pada contains no high-pitched vowel save one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a</td>
<td>vt. 9</td>
<td>सातिशिष्टवर्जनि बलीयस्तं च</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b</td>
<td>Patañjali</td>
<td>सातिशिष्टवर्ज्जो बलीयानु भवति (MBh. III.99. 22-23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्</td>
<td>3.4.78</td>
<td>तिपतिश्च...इद्हिंहि (लस्य ७७)</td>
<td>The affixes <em>tip</em> etc. occur in place of an <em>l</em>-affix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a-f</td>
<td>= Table 3, steps 7a-f</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्</td>
<td>3.1.3</td>
<td>आत्रादात्तेश्व (प्रत्ययः १)</td>
<td>The first vowel of an affix is high-pitched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्[सार्वभौतिक]</td>
<td>3.4.113</td>
<td>तिपतिशिष्टवर्ज्जो बलीयस्तं च (सार्वभौतिक)</td>
<td>The verbal terminations (<em>tiṅ</em>) and affixes marked with <em>i</em> are termed sārvadātukas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>कृ-उ-तस्[सार्वभौतिक]</td>
<td>6.1.158</td>
<td>अनुदात्त पदमेकवर्जम्</td>
<td>A pada contains no high-pitched vowel save one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a</td>
<td>vt. 9</td>
<td>सातिशिष्टवर्जनि बलीयस्तं च</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Patañjali</td>
<td>सातिशिष्टवर्ज्जो बलीयानु भवति (MBh. III.99. 22-23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Kāśikā Kāśikāvṛtti. See Sharma, Aryendra, Khanderao Deshpande and D. G. Padhye

Kulkarni, Amba and Gérard Huet

Mbh. Mahābhāṣya. See Abhyankar, K. V.

MDhV. Mādhavīyā Dhātuvṛtti. See Dwarikadas Shastri.

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Shivamurthy Swamiji


Vedavrata

On the accent of the word पराचः as stated by A 6.2.52

Anuja Ajotikar and Malhar Kulkarni

1. The verbal root aṅcū (meaning ‘to go’ and ‘to worship’) occupies a unique place in the grammar of Pāṇini. In the whole Aṣṭādhyāyī there are fifteen rules stating special operations related to this root and its derivates. These rules are:

1. अन्याराविदर्तिर्तिदिविकल्सेरमांतःपदार्थाविदिकतियुक्ते। A 2.3.29
2. ऋतिलिब्र्येश्वर्येवसम्भूविविषधुसुत्सांनिः। A 3.2.59
3. अन्यारेश्वृः। A 5.3.30
4. विभाषाविवेशरस्वितिक्रियाम्। A 5.4.8
5. अन्यारेश्वन्द्वयनयन्तिस्वर्तमानास्याम्। A 6.1.170
6. न गोऽन्नावंनवर्णराडाकुक्कुक्कुक्कुः। A 6.1.182
7. चौ। A 6.1.222
8. अनिगन्तोऽन्ती वप्रत्यं। A 6.2.52
9. विनवेदेयोऽन्तेश्वरक्र्यातवप्रत्यं। A 6.3.92
10. चौ। A 6.3.138
11. नांशे:पूजायाम्। A 6.4.30
12. अन्तः। A 6.4.138
13. उगिदां सर्वनामस्थानेनाः। A 7.1.70
14. अन्तः:पूजायाम्। A 7.2.53
15. अन्तःपादाने। A 8.2.48

The special feature of this root is that when it means ‘to go’, inflected forms (subanta) of compounds containing it other than nominative forms as well as accusative singular and dual forms lose the nasal, but if the root means ‘to worship’ all the subanta forms retain the nasal, according to the rule A 6.4.30, a special rule blocking the deletion of penultimate n. Therefore accusative plural and subsequent forms differ in these two meanings. Thus, if the meaning is, ‘to go’, the accusative plural form will be praçah, but
if the meaning is, ‘to worship’ it will be prāñcaḥ. The grammatical process to derive these forms is given in Table I.

Another feature of the verbal root aṅcū is productivity according to the rules in Pāṇini’s grammar. Later prakṛiyā texts have generated varied forms of an upapada compound gonc/goc, derived from the same root with the vigraha गामच्चति (‘one who goes to a cow’). In the normal paradigm of seven cases in three numbers, in the neuter, there are in all one hundred twelve subanta forms of this compound noted in these texts. In the Siddhāntakaumudi, five hundred twenty-seven possible forms of the same word are derived by applying rules stating phonological operations like duplication etc. These features also show how this verbal root occupies a special place in the Sanskrit grammar.

Another important aspect worth studying in connection with this root is rules stating accentual (svara) operations to the root and its derivates. There are four such rules:

1. अन्त्वेश्चन्द्रस्यस्वर्णमस्थानम्। (A 6.1.170)
   KV: अन्त्वेश: परास्वर्णस्यस्याधिककत्रियात्रा भवति छन्दसि रिघवे।
   SK: अन्त्वेश् प्रवन्ति कत्रिया। “In the Chhandas, the case endings other than the sarvanāmasṭhāna, get the acute accent when coming after the aṅc.”

2. न गोङ्क्षन्याजर्वक्रकुक्कुट्स्म्य। (A 6.1.182)
   KV: गोङ्क्षन्याजकर्षक्रकुक्कुट्स्म्य: द्विजे कृष्णकृष्णैः गतलुक्तं तत्तत्त्वम्।
   SK: एभव: प्रापुक्तं न। “The foregoing rules from (A VI.1.168) downwards have no applicability after go, śvan, and words ending in them; nor after a stem which before the case ending of the nominative singular has “a” or “ā”, nor after rāj, or stem ending in aṅca nor as well as after kruṇc and kṛt” (Vasu 1995: 132).

3. (A 6.1.222)

On the accent of the word परान्त: as stated by A 6.2.52

\(KV:\) चाबित्वभवतिरुपन्तवकारो गुह्यते। तस्मिन्परत: पूर्वस्यान्तं उदासो भवति।

\(SK:\) तुवाकारेन्तव्ती परे पूर्वस्यान्तोदात: स्वात्। “In compounds words ending in aṅca, the final vowel of the preceding word has the acute accent in the weak cases in which only “c” of aṅca remains” (Vasu 1995: 91).

4. अनिग्नातांतव्ती वगत्यां। (A 6.2.52)

\(KV:\) अनिग्नातो गति: प्रकृतिस्वरो भवत्वभवती वगत्यां परत:।

\(SK:\) अनिग्नातो गतिवर्ष्णान्तीतव्ती परे प्रकृत्या। “An immediately preceding gati not ending in “i” or “u” retains its original accent before aṅc when an affix having a “v” follows” (Vasu 1995: 155).

In the same context, we wish to discuss in this paper a particular example, परान्त:, which is provided by the traditional texts on A 6.2.52.

2 We discuss the examples of A 6.2.52 in this section so that salient points in the derivation and accent will be clear enough to serve as a basis for further discussion. Among the examples of the rule given in the Kāśikāvärtti are prāṅ and parāṅ, nominative singular masculine forms of prāṅc- and parāṅc-, when either of the meanings of aṅcŪ is intended. In these examples, aṅcŪ is followed by suffix KvIN (null), which contains v, and preceded by pra and parā, members of the gati class. Thus, all the conditions required for the application of A 6.2.52 are met, so that the gati pra and parā retain their original accent, which is initial. The same situation holds true in the dual and plural forms of the words, cited as examples by the Kāśikāvärtti. Since parāṅ is relevant to our discussion, we present its derivational process in Table II.

At the eighth step shown in this table, there is a single replacement (ekādeśa) by a long vowel ā for -ā and the following a-, with which it is homogeneous (savarnadīṛgha). Pārā is a gati and its initial vowel is high-pitched (udāttā); rā in parā has a low-pitched vowel (anudāttā); and the verb has an anudāttā vowel. This contrasts with prā-aṅc- (→ prāṅ), where anudāttā a- is
preceded by udāta -ā of the gati. According to the Svaraprakriyā and Kāśikāvṛtti, the single substitute -ā- of this word gets either a high pitch or the circumflex accent (svarita) by A 8.2.6 (स्वरितो बानुदते पदार्थी [एकादेश उदाहरन 5]). But in the case of parān, the first vowel of the word parā is high-pitched and is -ā is not. The vowel of -aṅc that follows is also low-pitched. Therefore the single replacement for -ā and a- is not subject to the alternation provided for in 8.2.6. The Nyāsa and Padamañjarī mention this clearly but in the Kāśikā and the Svaraprakriyā only the example is quoted.

The counter example related to the word aniganta in the sūtra, as quoted by the Kāśikāvṛtti, is pratyān, where the gati prati ends in a vowel denoted by iK (iganta), so that it is not referred to by aniganta; hence, despite all other conditions being fulfilled, A 6.2.52 does not apply here. The Kāśikā states that since A 6.2.52 has no scope of application here, A 6.2.139 (नतिकारकोपपदात्कृतः) applies, implying that A 6.2.139 is a default rule to which A 6.2.52 is an exception. There is ample support for this view in the discussion in the Mahābhāṣya, where it is also stated that the word aniganta is used to prohibit the application of this rule in the cases like prātīca, the accusative plural form of pratyāṅc. But in the case of the first five forms, where semivowel replacement (yanādeśa) takes place, there is possibility of application of the accent that obtains for a term that does not end in a vowel denoted by iK (aniganta). However, this application is prohibited by the

3. On this term, see Abhyankar and Shukla 1986: 440.
4. This rule requires a pada-initial low-pitched vowel preceded by a high-pitched vowel.
5. See Tripathi 1990: 347, Abhyankar 2001: 142. What the Svaraprakriyā says is similar to what the Kāśikā says.
6. This aspect happens to be the main theme of discussion on this sūtra in the Mahābhāṣya. Also there is another problem raised in the discussion on this aspect in the Svaraprakriyā which we do not enter into here.
statement इगन्तस्य वणादेशे कृतेणि प्रतिषेधः:। Hence, the initial vowel of *pratyāṇ* gets low pitch (*anudātta*).

One more case is discussed where conflict of accentual rules arises, namely, *parācaḥ*. Here no way out is found other than the Mahābhāṣya statement prohibiting the application of the rule चौ (A 6.1.222). Hence the author mentions the Mahābhāṣya and gives initial acute accent to the word *parācaḥ*.

3 The accent of *parācaḥ* is attested in the Rgveda and its padapāṭha, and Sāyaṇācārya also mentions that *parācaḥ* will have an initial udāṭta vowel by A 6.2.52. Other forms, like *prācaḥ*, *avācaḥ* are also attested and it is found that the initial vowel has high pitch in these examples too. Here also the prior component is a gati which does not end in *i* or *u* and *aṅcŪ* has a suffix added to it which contains *v*.

It is found that other accentual rules have scope of application in this example: अखेश्चन्द्रस्यसर्वनामस्यानम् (A 6.1.170) and चौ (A 6.1.222). Here we discuss this aspect of interrelation of sūtras in the svara section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī on the basis of the discussion found in various traditional sources: the Kāśikāvṛtti and Siddhāntakaumudī with their commentaries as well as two independent works related to the svara section, namely Svaraprakriyā and Svaramaṇjarī. Of the last two treatises, only the Svaraprakriyā is found to provide certain clues for discussion so that we focus on this work.

4 Svara rules and their application
The division of the four rules in question (see §1) according to the element whose accentuation is provided for is as follows:

1. A 6.1.170: case endings other than those called *sarvanāma-sthāna* (accusative plural through locative plural) get acute accent

8. E.g., RV 6.44.17 (Sontakke:1941: 143). See §4 below.
9. This form is also discussed in the Mahābhāṣya on A 6.2.52 (Guruprasad 2006: 747).
in Vedic (chandasi); this is applicable for aṅcŪ meaning ‘to go’ and ‘to worship’;
2. A 6.1.182: no acute accent for case ending (applicable to aṅcŪ meaning ‘to worship’);
3. A 6.1.222: the final vowel of a constituent preceding a derivate of aṅcŪ gets acute accent (applicable to aṅcŪ meaning ‘to go’)
4. A 6.2.52: a gati retains its original accent (applicable to aṅc meaning ‘to go’ and ‘to worship’).

The conditions required for application of the sūtras are:
1. A 6.1.170: aṅc is followed by a case ending other than a sarvanāmāstāḥāna;
2. A 6.1.182: aṅc occurs before case endings;
3. A 6.1.222: compound member has only the c of aṅc;
4. A 6.2.52: a gati which does not end in i or u precedes aṅc followed by a suffix containing v.

From the above division it is observed that A 6.1.170 and A 6.2.52 are applicable to the root aṅcŪ in both its meanings. But when A 6.1.170 is applicable to aṅcūṭa ‘to worship’, A 6.1.182 cancels the application of A 6.1.170. On the other hand, when this rule is applicable to aṅcŪ meaning ‘to go’, the condition stated in A 6.1.170 becomes applicable and the final vowel of the ending will get the acute accent. This same condition is stated for the application of the rule त्री (A 6.1.222) which is a later (para) rule relative to A 6.1.170. Hence it is difficult to rule out the application of A 6.1.222. Commentators resolve this conflict by stating that the term asarvanāmāstāḥāna in A 6.1.170 cancels the application of the later rule A 6.1.222. The term asarvanāma-
stāḥāna11 is used in order to include Šas (acc. pl.) among the endings referred to in A 6.1.170. If this rule were applicable only to forms like dadhyaghbyām, with endings in the third and

10. dadhyagh. See Laghuśabdenduśekhara on 6.1.170 (SK IV, 513).
11. असर्वान्तस्यानग्रहणं शस्तिपरिप्रभारम् (SK:512-13), शस्तिप्रभारायधिकान्तस्यानग्रहणानां-साम्याङ्कत्रापि प्रयुक्ते: (Laghuśabdenduśekhara 513 [on A 6.1.170]).
following triplets, then asarvanāmasthāna would not be required, since trīyādir vibhaktiḥ could be understood from A 6.1.168 (साहेरकान्तस्तूतीयादिनिर्भक्ति:). According to them the term asarvanāmā-
sthāna suggests that this expression is meant to include also the accusative plural suffix and the same is a cause to be an exception of the later rule A 6.1.222. The accent of the word dadhīcaḥ (gen. sg.)\(^{12}\) (इन्द्रों दुधीचो अस्थभि: ... ज्ञानं ... [RV 1.84.13] “Indra slew ... with the bones of Dadhyaṅc”) illustrates a high-pitched case ending by A 6.1.170. The derivation process of this word is presented in table III.

A comparable conflict is observed in an example quoted for the rule A 6.2.52: परांचः. The Siddhāntakaumudī quotes two examples under this rule: ये परांच्यस्थानः\(^{13}\) (RV 1.164.19) and जृष्णि कृष्ण्यां कृष्णि परामः (RV 6.25.3).\(^{14}\) The word parāncaḥ is a tatpuruṣa compound. The initial component parā is a gati by definition and the second constituent consists of a verbal root and the suffix KvIN. The initial component of this word does not end in i or u and añc ends in a suffix v (→ Ø). The first vowel of a gati is udātta by the phit rule निपात आवृतात: (Ph. 4.12). Therefore in the word parāncaḥ the first vowel retains its accent by the rule A 6.2.52. But in the example parāch:, other accentuation rules are to be considered: A 6.1.170 and A 6.1.222. The latter is applicable to this example, as the nasal and the vowel a of the verbal root añc are deleted. Hence the word would get the accent on rā. The word parācaḥ contains parā, a word with the class name gati; this is followed by the derivate of the root añc to which a suffix (KvIN) is added which

\(^{12}\) This example of a genitive singular is provided on A. 6.1.170 in the Kāśikā and the Siddhāntakaumudī. An example of the accusative plural is RV 10.87.4: प्राचीनो बुधुर्न (padapātha: प्राचीनो | बुधुर्न) (Sontakke 1946: 596).

\(^{13}\) “Those who have turned ascending” (translation by H. H.Wilson : Sribhāṣṭhāna.org/scripts/veda/rv/rvtop/htm).

\(^{14}\) “Annihilate, Indra, the strength of those who, whether kinsmen or unrelated, present themselves before us, exerting themselves as adversaries; enfeeble their prowess, put them to fight” (translation by H. H. Wilson).
has v. Hence the conditions stated in the A 6.2.52 are fulfilled in this example. Therefore the accent stated in the rule, namely, that the original accent of the gati will be retained. Let us look at the derivational process of the word परांरः, given in Table IV.

This shows that the operation stated by A 6.2.52 is applicable at a prior state (at the third step) as opposed to the rule A 6.1.222. Hence, the accent stated by A 6.1.222 is a sati śiṣṭasvara. Therefore it is very difficult to avoid this rule. It is true that A 6.2.52 is a later (para) rule relative to A 6.1.222. The latter, however, is an exception to all the accent rules, since it provides a sati śiṣṭasvara. Hence, the application of this rule cannot be prohibited at all. So to avoid the undesired application, there is a statement of the Mahābhāṣya which proposes a solution, namely, that A 6.2.52 cancels A 6.1.222 on account of it being later. This statement helps to cancel the accentuation by A 6.1.222. In this way the conflict between A 6.1.222 and A 6.2.52 is solved traditionally. This solution also implies that, by default, a rule’s being later than another (paratva) as a principle used to resolve conflict between sūtras dealing with accent refers to paratva in the derivational process and not to the paratva of the sūtra in the order of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. However, in this special case, on the authority of the statement of the Mahābhāṣya, this default rule is to be set aside and the place of the sūtra in the Aṣṭādhyāyī order is to be referred to by the paratva principle.

However, the traditional discussion does not seem to take into account another rule which is applicable after A 6.2.52 and before A 6.1.222. That rule is A 6.1.170, which is applicable at the fifth-step in the derivation. Hence A 6.1.170 again provides a sati śiṣṭasvara relative to A 6.2.52. A 6.1.170 is applicable when the

15. सतिशिष्टस्वराकल्यायत्वमन्यत्र विकरणेष्यः। (SK IV. 457).
16. अक्रियमण्ये हि प्रतिशृङ्ख्य सवर्पोरादित्य चुन्तनः। (Mbh. 6.2.52 [2006: 747]).
17. चुन्तनारसिद्धेऽस्वरावश्यं प्रत्ययं इत्यय स्वरो भवति विष्णुतिश्रेष्ठं। (Mbh. 6.2.52 [2006: 746]).
verbal root *aṅc* is followed by an ending other than one of the sarvanāmasthāna class. In this way A 6.1.170 provides a sati śiṣṭāsvara and there is no way to stop the application of this rule. If we observe the conditions stated in the rules, it is found that the conditions stated by A 6.1.170 are more specific than the conditions of A 6.2.52. Hence A 6.2.52 has less chance to apply than A 6.1.170. Therefore, in the above example, it becomes difficult to defend the original accent of the gati by A 6.2.52.

The grammarians have not discussed the above conflict when discussing the example for A 6.2.52. They have discussed the clash between A 6.1.222 and A 6.2.52. Nageśabhaṭṭa¹⁸ has mentioned in his commentary on A 6.1.170 that A 6.2.52 is also an exception to A 6.1.170 like A 6.1.222. But there is no strong reason given by any commentator in this regard. A 6.2.52 is not only restricted in application as compared to A 6.1.170 and A 6.1.222 but also an exception to the retention of the original accent of a kṛt suffix, by गतिकारकोपदालकृत् (A 6.2.138), which is a rule later rule than A 6.2.52.

5 A possible solution to resolve the conflict between A 6.2.52 and A 6.1.170 may be to state that, on the authority of a statement of the Mahābhāṣya, when a prior (pūrva) sūtra cancels a later (para) sūtra, even when the operation stated by the former is sati śiṣṭa, it cancels all pertinent later rules. However, this solution is not fully satisfactory and therefore requires further investigation and thought.

What we can certainly say is that whenever a conflict between sūtras stating accent arises, at different levels of a derivational process, by default the paratva that is equivalent to sati śiṣṭa overrules the paratva relative to rule order in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It is only in exceptional cases like the one discussed in this paper that the statement of authority in the Mahābhāṣya, which cancels this

¹⁸. अनिग्न्तोऽब्रजीः हिंि पूर्वप्रकृतिस्वस्त्रय गतिकारकोपदालकृत्यमिपि बाध्यकल्पन तत्रै-
वंदप्रवृत्ते रिक्ताः। Laghuśabdenduśekhara 513 (on 6.1.170).
default rule, has to be invoked to account for a desirable form. The tradition records the default rule by the statement निधिश्वर-बलीयस्वमनप्राण विकरणेन्द्रः (see note 15). In this statement, one exception to this default rule is mentioned, namely, stem forming affixes in verb forms (vikaraṇa).

What we can also say after the discussion in the present paper is that there are other exceptions to the default rule as well. One such exception presented in this paper is the derivation rule related to the nominal termination added to a compound.
Table I. Derivation of accusative plural form of प्र+अच्छ in two meanings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>प्राचे: ‘to some who go directed forward (acc. pl.)’</th>
<th>प्राचे: ‘some who worship extensively’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ विवन् (A 3.2.59)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ विवन् (A 3.2.59)</td>
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<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ विवन् (A 6.4.24)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ विवन् (A 6.4.24, 6.4.30)</td>
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<td>प्र अच्छ ओ (A 6.1.67)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ ओ (A 6.1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ शास् (A 4.1.1, 4.1.2)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ शास् (A 4.1.1, 4.1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 1.3.8, A 1.3.9)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 1.3.8, 1.3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 6.4.138)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 6.4.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 6.3.138)</td>
<td>प्र अच्छ अस् (A 6.3.138)</td>
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<tr>
<td>प्राचे (A 8.2.66)</td>
<td>प्राचे (A 8.2.66)</td>
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<tr>
<td>प्राचे (A 8.3.15)</td>
<td>प्राचे (A 8.3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
<td>स्खलन्</td>
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<tr>
<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
<td>व्</td>
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<tr>
<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
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<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
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<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
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<td>पद्मा अन्न</td>
<td>Ø</td>
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<tr>
<td>तराङ्ख</td>
<td>A 8.2.62</td>
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Table III. Derivation with accentuation of the form दधीचः:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>दधीचः: [dadhy añcati]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. दधिः अञ्चु किवन्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 3.2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.8, 1.3.3, 1.3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. दधिः अञ्चु व</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 6.4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. दधिः अञ्चु Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 6.1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. दधिः अञ्चु Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 1.2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. दधिः अञ्चु हस्तः</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 4.1.1, 4.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. दधिः अञ्चु अस्तः</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 1.3.8, 1.3.4, 1.3.9</td>
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<td>7. दधीचः अस्तः</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 6.4.138, 6.3.138</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. दधीचः च</td>
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<tr>
<td>दधीचः:</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 8.3.15</td>
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Table IV. Derivation and accentuation of पराचः

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<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. परा अन्तु क्विन्</td>
<td>3.2.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. परा अन्तु वृ</td>
<td>1.3.8, 1.3.3., 1.3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. परा अन्तु Ø</td>
<td>6.1.67, 6.2.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. परा अन्तु Ø</td>
<td>6.4.24</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. परा अन्तु शम्</td>
<td>1.2.46, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 6.1.170</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. परा Øच् अस्</td>
<td>6.4.138, 1.3.8, 1.3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. परा च्य अस्</td>
<td>6.3.138, 6.1.222</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. पराचस्</td>
<td>8.2.33</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>पराचः</td>
<td>8.3.15 ,6.2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Italic, bold and underline show the application of three different accentuation rules.*
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Laghūśabdenduśekhara  
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Mbh  
*Vyākaranamahābhāṣyam.* See Shastri, Guruprasad

Nyāsa  
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Ph  
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The use of the terms dā, mā and gā in the Aṣṭādhyāyī
Sharon Ben-Dor

0 Introduction
In the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Pāṇini uses the terms dā, mā and gā to refer to some verbal stems. These terms are mentioned without any marker. They are simply the form (i.e., dā, mā, gā) of the stems that they should refer to. In Pāṇini’s system, there are quite a few verbal stems that have such forms. These stems are of two kinds: those which are mentioned in these forms already in the Dhātupāṭha, and others, which obtain such forms by the application of a grammatical rule. Commentators raise a question concerning which of the two kinds the terms dā, mā and gā refer to: whether they refer only to those which originally have that particular form, or also to those which obtain such forms by the application of a grammatical rule. An examination concerning which items these terms should desirably refer to shows that one cannot use the categories mentioned above for establishing a general rule in this respect. In some cases the term dā, mā or gā refers to one kind of an item and in other cases only to some items from each group. Consequently, commentators argue that with respect to the terms dā, mā and gā there are not any specifications concerning which item they refer to. They express this view by invoking the statement गामादाप्रह्तेष्विशेष: from the Mahābhāṣya1, which in turn appears as a paribhāṣā (‘interpretative principle’) in most paribhāṣā collections.²

1. Bh I.74.21-22 (on A 1.1.20 vt. 1): दोष एवेतस्य: परिभाषाया लक्षणप्रतिपदेक्तयोऽ: प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैवतेति गामादाप्रह्तेष्विशेष इति।

2. The paribhāṣā गामादाप्रह्तेष्विशेष: is considered an exception to the paribhāṣā लक्षणप्रतिपदेक्तयोऽ: प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव प्रतिपदक्तव्रेष्विशेष, which in this context is taken to establish that a term refers primarily to original items (pratipadokta) and not to items which are acquired by the application of a grammatical rule (lakṣana/ laksanokta/ laksanika).
Generally, commentators on Pāṇini agree that in order to know to which items the terms dā, mā and gā refer, one should look ahead and consider the desired target. In most cases, they argue that this is the only way to obtain this knowledge. In some cases, they mention other paribhāṣās or devices which according to them provide the desired knowledge.

In this paper, I show that in spite of the commentators’ view, Pāṇini does not use the terms dā, mā and gā arbitrarily, and there are reasons for stating them as such. As we shall see, in each sūtra where a term dā, mā or gā is mentioned in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, it refers only to that stems which has the form dā, mā or gā in the particular situation where the sūtra is applicable. Thus, if one considers the requirements of the sūtra where the item is mentioned, one can know to which items the term refers. In other words, the context or the situation where the sūtra is applicable provides the knowledge about the correct application of the sūtra. Hence, contrary to the paribhāṣā गामादाग्रहणोपयोगविधेय:, one can find a common feature with respect to the use of the terms dā, mā and gā in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. This allows knowing which items the term in question refers to without the aid of looking ahead and considering the desired target. In addition, there is no need of any device or paribhāṣā for obtaining this knowledge. Lastly, I will argue that the puzzlement with respect to the terms dā, mā and gā is due to an insertion of a notion from another school and that Pāṇini does not follows this notion.

1 A 6.1.145 and 6.1.150
Before discussing in detail the sūtras where these terms occur it is helpful to clarify the role of the sūtras आदेच उपदेशेँघिति (A 6.1.45) and मीनातिमित्तितिदीं ल्यणि च (A 6.1.50), which are involved in most of the cases mentioned below.

1.1 आदेच उपदेशेँघिति (A 6.1.45)
According to this rule, e o ai au of stems are replaced by a long
vowel ā when the stems occur before affixes which are not marked with the anubandha  ś. Thus, for example, the stems deñ ‘to protect’ and meñ ‘to barter, to exchange’ obtain the forms dā and mā respectively when they are not followed by affixes which are marked with the anubandha  ś. With respect to A 6.1.45, it is essential to specify the significance of the negation asiti mentioned in the sūtra. According to Pāṇiniyas, asiti is an instance of what is called prasajya pratiṣedha, that is, it prohibits what would occur otherwise. In other words, in any case where there is not an affix marked with the anubandha  ś the replacement to long vowel ā provided for by A 6.1.45 should occur. As the Kāśikā argues, this replacement occurs unconditionally (anaimittika), before the occurrence of an affix. By accepting this view, one can explain, as the Kāśikā does, how to derive sugla ‘very tired’ and sumla ‘very weak’. These derivates contain the forms gla and mla of the verbal stems glai and mlai, respectively, with the preverb (upasarga) su. Both end with the affix ka provided by आत्मश्रोपसर्गम् A (A 3.1.136), which requires a stem ending with long ā. For this sūtra to be applicable to the case of sugla and sumla it is necessary to consider the stems glai and mlai as ending with long vowel ā before any affix has been added. Considering the stems glai and mlai as ending with long vowel ā is allowed because A 3.1.136 involves the addition of the ka. This affix is not marked with the anubandha  ś and in this situation the replacement provided by A 6.1.45 takes place.

The case of उदूर्वाचाम्मः व्यतीताहः (A 3.4.19) clearly illustrates Pāṇini’s procedure. In A 3.4.19, he uses the term mān. This refers

3. DhP I.1011.
4. DhP I.1010.
5. Kāśikā 6.1.45 (VII.72): अतितीतं प्रसादप्रतिप्रयोगम् | वेदात्माचिन्थिततिकं प्राणोऽपि प्रत्ययोल्लतेनभवतीति। सूच: सुम्न्तः इत्यात्मश्रोपसर्गम् (३.१६) हति कङ्कलयः। सूचः सुम्न्ताम् इत्यातीतेपुष्प (३.२७) हि भर्तरातीतिः सम्वन्धी।
7. DhP I.953.
to the verbal stem $mëñ$ ‘to barter, to exchange’, as it is stated in the Dhātupāṭha. In this case also, A 6.1.45 provides the replacement by $ā$. Why does Pāṇini use $māñ$ to refer to $mëñ$? For he could simply use the term $mëñ$ as the stem is given in the Dhātupāṭha. A 3.4.19 involves cases where affixes other than those marked with the anubandha $ś$ occur. In such cases, according A 6.1.45, the replacement to long vowel $ā$ takes place.

1.2 मीनातिमिनोतिदीडा ल्याप्च (A 6.1.50)

According to this rule, a final diphthong (ec) of the stems $mīñ$ ‘to injure’, $dūmiñ$ ‘to scatter’, and $diñ$ is replaced by a long vowel $ā$. Consequently, these stems obtain the form $mā$ or $dā$. A 6.1.50 is applicable when the $i$ or $ī$ vowels of the stems have been replaced by an ec vowel. This occurs only in cases where an affix that causes a $guna$ or $vrddhi$ replacement follows. Thus, Pāṇiniyas explain that the replacement provided for by A 6.1.50 should takes place in all cases where the stems $mīñ$, $dūmiñ$ and $diñ$ are followed by an affix which causes a $guna$ or $vrddhi$ replacement (eṣvavisaya), that is, affixes which are not marked with an anubandha $k$ or $ṅ$. The Kāśikā adds that this replacement should take place already before the occurrence of the affix, that is, in the stage referred to as upadeśa. In other words, $mīñ$, $dūmiñ$ and $diñ$ should be considered as having the form $mā$ and $dā$ respectively with respect to rules which concern cases where a replacement to $guna$ or $vrddhi$ is anticipated to occur.

8. DhP I.1010.
9. Pāṇiniyas consider this instance as an indication of the existence of the paribhāṣā nātubhāṣākrtamānayantītyas. Therefore, they argue that the negation adāp in A 1.1.20 refers also to the stem daip. See Bh II.171.19-172.2 and Kāśikā 3.4.19 (IV.168).
12. Kāśikā 6.1.50 (VII.76): उपदेश एवात्विविधानादिवर्णान्त्वत्क्रमः प्रत्ययो न भवति। आकारलक्षणस्य भवति। उपदेशस्य वर्तते ईपदुपदान्तिः स्त्रयुग्मौ भवति। || SK III 324-325 (on A 6.1.50): एषामात्त्वं स्थाप्य्यणि चकारादशितयोजनिति ||
I shall now continue with a detailed discussion on the use of the terms mā, gā and dā.

2 Mā
In the Dhātupātha, there are three verbal stems which have the form mā: mā ‘to measure’,\(^{13}\) māṇ ‘to measure’,\(^{14}\) and māṇ ‘to measure’\(^{15}\). The stem meiṇ ‘to barter, to exchange’\(^{16}\) acquires the form mā according to A 6.1.45 (see §1.1). In addition, the stems āumiṇ ‘to scatter’\(^{17}\) and mīṇ ‘to injure’\(^{18}\) acquire the same form according to A 6.1.50 (§1.2).

The term mā occurs in ध्वासमध्य (A 3.2.2), चुमास्वागापाजहृतिसं हलि (A 6.4.66), सनी मीमांशसुरभलभशकपपदामच इत्यह (A 7.4.54) and नर्गददयपतपदपधुमास्वाजहृतियातिवातिविज्ञातिपसातिवपतिवहृतिषाम्यतिचि – नोतिदेशिधिच (A 8.4.17).

In A 6.4.66, mā refers to mā, the two stems māṇ, and meiṇ. It does not refer to āumiṇ and mīṇ. This sūtra does not concern affixes marked with the anubandha ś, and since the stem meiṇ acquires the form mā in this context, the term mā in this sūtra can refer to this stem in addition to mā and māṇ. Moreover, A 6.4.66 requires a stem that is followed by an affix marked with k or n. As

15. DhP IV.34. It should be noted that Sāvana doubts the existence of the stem māṇ of the divādi group. He bases his doubt on Kṣirāsvāmina’s commentary on this stem and on the Nyāsa on Kāśikā 6.4.66, 7.4.40, and 7.4.54, which does not mention this stem. MDhV IV.34 (p. 412) on the stem māṇ: अव्य कैशिवेदेव पद्यते। यदाह स्वामी मात्र मान इति दुः स्वाति | तथा सुमास्वाचितृते न्यासोपपि मेति कस्येदं ग्रहणं किं मेति प्रणिद्धात: इति भौचालिकस्य उत मात्र मान इत्यत्थ जौहोत्यालिकस्य होस्विन्यस्मात: मान इत्यस्वादिकस्य । गामादप्रहृदेष्विशृष्टि इति अयापामपि ग्रहणमिविष्ठि ।
16. DhP I.1010.
17. DhP V.4.
18. DhP IX.4.
the stems ḍumīṇ and mīṇ do not acquire the form mā in such a situation, the term mā in this sūtra does not refer to these stems. Thus, by considering the context where A 6.4.66 is applicable, one can know that here mā refers only to mā, the two stems māṇ and meṇ.19

The same feature as in A 6.4.66 occurs also with respect to the term mā in A 7.4.54, where mā refers to mā, the two stems māṇ, and meṇ.20 This sūtra requires a stem followed by the affix san. This affix is not marked with s and in such a situation the stem meṇ has the form mā. Therefore, mā in A 7.4.54 can refer also to this stem. Moreover, this term cannot refer to the stems ḍumīṇ and mīṇ. According to इको शल्य (A 1.2.9), the affix san occurring after a verbal stem ending with a vowel i, u, r or l (ik) is considered marked with the anubandha k. Consequently, after ḍumīṇ and mīṇ, san is considered marked with k. Since A 6.1.50 does not apply in such cases, these stems do not obtain the form mā in the

19. The Nyāsa provides some explanations with respect to the use of the term mā in A 6.4.66. It says that some (kecit) argue that according to the paribhāṣā निर्तनुस्त्रयक्रहणे न सातुस्तःक्रस्य, the term mā refers to the stem mā. Others (anye) argue that according to the paribhāṣā तुल्करणालुककरणोर्तुलकरण, this term refers to māṇ (Dhp IV.34) and meṇ. Still others (apare) say that according to the paribhāṣā गामादग्रहणेवविषेष, this term refers also to the stem māṇ (Dhp III.6), māṇ (Dhp IV.34) and meṇ. According to the Nyāsa, this last view is the opinion of the Kāśikā. Nyāsa on Kāśikā 6.4.66 (VIII.235-236): अथ मेति कस्येद्र ग्रहणे ति मेठ प्रणिदान हस्त्य भौवादिक्ष्य उत्तर मान इत्यस्य जौजोविदिक्ष्यादिक्ष्यमा मान इत्यस्यादिक्ष्यमा तत केचिदाहूनिर्तनुस्त्रयक्रहणे न सातुस्तःक्रस्यादिक्ष्यमा ग्रहणम्। अथ त्वात्तुलीकरणालुककरणोर्तुलिकरणविद्याब्रह्माणित्यमौलिककरणयोगादिक्ष्यमेठोपरिति। अथरे बचते गामादग्रहणेवविषेष हित वयाणामीपीयोत्रेते तुलिकरस्याय्यात्मात्मितितत्क्षते पृथ्विविशेषः।

20. The Nyāsa explains that this is on the basis of the paribhāṣā गामादग्रहणेवविषेषः. Nyāsa on Kāśikā 7.4.54 (IX.332): मेति गामादग्रहणेवविषेष हित मेठ प्रणिदाने पृथ्वीविशेषा त्रयाण्यां ग्रहणम्।
context where A 7.4.54 is applicable. Therefore, the term mā in A 7.4.54 cannot refer to them. Yet, it is desired that A 7.4.54 should apply also to these stems. Therefore, in order that this sūtra be applicable with respect to these stems, Pāṇini mentions also the term mī, which refers to duniṃ and mīn.  

In addition, with respect to mī used in A 7.4.54 another dilemma arises. This term should refer also to the stem duniṃ. How can mī refer to duniṃ? The vowel i of duniṃ is replaced by a long vowel ī when it is followed by the affix san according to अज्ञानगमां सनि (A 6.4.16), so that in this context the stem has the form mī. As A 7.4.54 concerns the same situation, where stems are followed by san, the term mī can refer also to this stem.

The same feature as in A 6.4.66 and 7.4.54, occurs in A 7.4.40 and A3.2.2. In A7.4.40, the term mā again refers to the stems mā, the two stems maḥ, and meṇ. However, it does not refer to the stems duniṃ and mīn. A 7.4.40 concerns cases where an affix marked with the anubandha k follows. Such an affix prohibits guṇa or vṛddhi replacement and thus A 6.1.50 is not applicable to provide the long vowel ā replacement. Therefore, the term mā in A 7.4.40 cannot refer to these stems, since they do not obtain the form mā in the context where A 7.4.40 is applicable.

In A 3.2.2, mā refers to the two stems maḥ and to meṇ. As this sūtra concerns only transitive verbs, commentators explain that mā

21. The Padamaṇjarī and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita present this reasoning. PM on Kāśikā 7.4.54 (IX.332): ma maṇe maḍ maṇe meḍ prañindane vṛttrāṃpi prahāṇam.  

22. The Nyāsa explains that this is on the basis of the paribhāṣā. Nyāsa on Kāśikā 7.4.70 (IX.332): ma maṇe maḍ maṇe meḍ prañindane vṛttrāṃpi prahāṇam.
does not refer to the stem mā not marked with n, because it is intransitive. Moreover, A 3.2.2 is considered as an exception to आतोद्वस्तर्गः (A 3.2.3), which provides the affix ka after stems ending with a long vowel ā. This affix is marked with the anubandha k, which prohibits guna or vrddhi replacement. In such a situation, A 6.1.50 is not applicable to provide the long vowel replacement. Therefore, A 3.2.3 is not applicable to the stems जुमिन and मिन, since they do not end with a long vowel ā in the context where A 3.2.3 is applicable. Consequently, it is unnecessary to prevent the application of this sūtra to these stems in A 3.2.2. This is the reason why the term mā in A 3.2.2 does not refer to them.

3 Gā

There are two verbal stems which have the form gā in the Dhātupatha: gāṇ ‘to go’ and gā ‘to praise’. In addition, the stem gai ‘to sing’ obtains this form when an affix which is not marked with the anubandha ś follows, according to A 6.1.45 (§1.1). Moreover, the stem in ‘to go’ is replaced by gā in the aorist (lun)

23. PM on Kāśikā 3.2.2 (III.407): माझ माण इति। हि तो माहुपश्योपलक्षणमितिनेन मेंक प्रणिदाने (धा०पा० ९६२) इत्य्यादि प्रणिद्धम्। मा माणे (धा०पा० १०६२) इत्य्य तू सम्भावनार्थ्याकर्मकल्वाद्ग्रहणम्। र। प्रम. II.1657(to SK on A 3.2.2): माहेषेणैर्थिः र।

24. In addition, the addition of the affix an to stems ending with a long vowel ā involves the addition of the augment yuk according to आतो युक्तिः (A 7.3.33).

25. The Nyāsa also explains that these stems get the affix an according to कर्मण्याः (A 3.2.1). Nyāsa on Kāśikā 3.2.2 (III.407): नतु यदि गामाधारणेष्वशेषोष्ट्यद्वा मीत् हिः सायानू हुमिष्ठः प्रक्षेपण इत्येकर्षोर्यो ग्रहण प्रान्तित वस्मामीनातिमिनेजीमीविद्याय ल् च तथा तथावेदिष्किष्य आतो रूढः मेत्यतुदृष्टं सम्पथले। भववेद्यविज्ञायेति पुरुषपुरुषः प्राप्तस्य।

26. DhP 1.998.
27. DhP III.25.
29. DhP II.36.
according to इणो गा लुड़ (A 2.4.45). The stem (adhi) in ‘to study’ is replaced by gāṇ in the perfect (liṭ) according to गाद्व लिट (A 2.4.49). This replacement occurs also optionally in the aorist and in the conditional (liṇ) according to विभाषा लुड़द्वोः (A 2.4.50), and when this stem occurs with nic before san or caṇ, according to नौ च संश्च्चड़ोः (A 2.4.51).

The term gā is used in चुमास्थावापाजहातिसां हृलि (A 6.4.66), स्थानापापत्तां भावे (A3.3.95) and गापीष्ट्य (A3.2.28).

In A 6.4.66, gā refers to all the five stems mentioned above. However, with respect to in and in, it refers only to these stems when they obtain the form gā. This does not have any significance concerning the application of A 6.4.66 but it affects the application of the following sūtra, एलिण्डि (A 6.4.67), where gā occurs by anuvṛtti. In A 6.4.67, this term refers only to the stems gā and gai, since this sūtra is applicable in the context of liṇ. As in this context in and in do not obtain the form gā, the term gā in A 6.4.67 does not refer to these stems.

30. But before the causative affix nic, when this stem does not denote ‘understanding’, it is replaced by gami according to णौ गमर्वोधोः (A 2.4.46).
31. DhP II.37.
32. However, it does not concern the stem gān because गाद्वकादिश्चित्षय्रिन्दित् (A 1.2.1) does not refer to this stem. See SK III.225, on the stem gān (I.950).
33. This sūtra does not concern the stem gān (I.998 gān gatau), since this does not conjugate in parasmaipada (यस्य स्वप्रमैपेद्याद्वात् हिन्ज [A3.4.103]).
34. The Nyāsa provides this explanation. Nyāsa on Kāśikā 6.4.66 (VIII.235-236): मेलिँ | गाद्व गल्लो के मैं शब्दे एती भौवाविक हा स्तुती छन्नतीति वौद्धविरित्वा इणो गा लुड़ीतयार्थो गादेश ज्ञानिक इति वक्तयंत्रितयार्थो गादेशो गाद लिट विभाषा लुड़द्वोरिति चेडै गादवेश एष्य पूर्ववत्सर्वप्रमिश्वेषण ब्रह्मणम् | सत्यपि सर्वं चढ़े यथ स्वद्वादेशातुकपरं सध्यतिष्ठ तस्य च स्वदेश भवति नेतरस्य निमित्तभावात्।। Nyāsa on Kāśikā 6.4.67 (VIII.238): के गाद्वस्योदाहिं न तु गाद्व: तस्य परस्मैपेद्याद्वात्।। नापीणिनिवंगदेशानां (नापीणिनिवंगदेशानां/नापीणिनिवंगदेशानां ?) तेषांपि लिण्डरसम्भवात्।। इदंदेशस्य तु पूर्ववत्स्माच्य हेतु:।।
In A 3.3.95, the term gā refers to the stems gāṅ and gai. This sūtra provides for the addition of the affix *ktiṇ, which is not marked with the anubandha s. In this situation, the stem gai obtains the form gā according to A 6.1.45 (§1.1). Therefore, the term gā in A 3.3.95 can refer also to the stem gai. Moreover, the affix *ktiṇ does not cause in or iṅ to obtain the form gā. Therefore, gā in A 3.3.95 does not refer to the stems in or iṅ. This also corresponds to the fact that Pāṇinīyas consider A 3.3.95 an exception to आत्योपसम् (A 3.3.106), which generally concerns stems ending in a long vowel ā.

The same issue that obtained for A 3.3.95 obtains also in the case of गापमेस्त्र (A3.2.8). Here too, gā does not refer to the stems in and iṅ, since they do not get the form gā before the affix *tak. Moreover, in A 3.2.8 the term gā refers only to the stem gai. The affix *tak, provided for by this sūtra, is not marked with the anubandha s and in such a case this stem gets the form gā. Thus, the term gā in A 3.2.8 can refer to the stem gai. Yet, here the question arises why this term does not also refer to the stems gā and gāṅ.

35. On this sūtra the Kāśikā presents only the examples uḍgīti and saṃgīti (← ut/sam gā+k tiṇ [A 6.4.66]) ← ut/sam gā+i ti (6.1.45) ← ut/sam gā+k tiṇ) ‘singing’ for the term gā. According to the Nyāsa, this term also refers to the stem gāṅ: अन्तः काल गामदाप्रदोष्यविपये इति सै निवृत्ते गाज्यतात्विकति द्रायर्थित ग्रहणम्. Nyāsa on Kāśikā 3.3.95 (IV.68). However, none of the commentators present an example of this stem.

36. This holds for the stems sthā, gā and pā. With respect to the stem pac ‘to cook’. A 3.3.95 is considered an exception to चिन्त्रेतिन्द्रिविपम् (A 3.3.104).

37. This sūtra provides for the addition of the affix an after stems ending with a long vowel ā.

38. In addition, this sūtra is also considered an exception to आत्योपसम् कः (A 3.2.3), which generally concerns stems ending in the long vowel ā.

39. Bhaṭṭoṭi Dīkṣita raises this question and answers that, in the case of these stems, such a form does not occur in ordinary usage. PrM II.1659 (on SK to A 3.2.8): गायतेरेवः प्रहलनं न तु गाज्यति गा स्तुतात्वित्यन्योरतन्मिठाणात्.
Concerning the term gā, the case of gātasyāṣṭupābhūṣyā: सिचः परस्मैष्ठेशु (A 2.4.77) should be mentioned, where Pāṇini uses gāti (gā+ṣṭip) instead of gā. This term refers here to gā that substitutes for in (A 2.4.45). A 2.4.77 concerns sic, which comes between verbal stems and endings that replace luhn, so that gā can refer to gā which replaces in. Moreover, if instead of gāti the term gā were used, this would refer to the stems gāṇ and gā, as well gai, which obtains the form gā in this context. The use of gā, with ṣṭip, in A 2.4.77 prevents this term from referring to all the stems that have the form gā. This is based on the convention that when a stem is referred to with ṣṭip, it is also mentioned with the vikaraṇa affix according to the class to which the root belongs. The fact that the term gāti does not include a vikaraṇa affix shows that it refers to a stem belonging to the class in which the dropping (luk) of the vikaraṇa affix occurs, that is, to the stem in, which belongs to the adādi class.

4 Dā/Dhā
The case of the terms dā and dhā differs from the case of the term mā. By dāda ṣvādu (A 1.1.20), Pāṇini assigns the name ghu to dā

40. This is also in accordance with the paribhāṣā gāmādāprāṇaṇavibhāṣa. In his Laghuśabdaratatka, Nāgēśa argues that this paribhāṣā does not apply here since it is anitya, and, he adds, because it concerns only the term gā and not gāti. LŚR II.1302 (on SK to A 2.4.77): gāmādāprāṇaṇaṃ bhūtāḥ na pravartatāḥ. अनन्त्वत्वात्स्या: | केवलगाप्राणाविश्ववत्वाय ||

41. This is explained already in the Bhāṣya on A 2.4.77 vt. 1 (Bh I.495.12-16): इत्य यो गाण्डेव: पिठवेच्या: पाण्डेव इति वक्तव्यम् | इह मा भूतुः | अगासीन्तः | अपरस्मैत्तिमिति | ततहि वक्तव्यम् | न वक्तव्यम् | इत्य गृह्ये तावार्तमां | निर्देशादेवे व्यक्ते तु लुकिकारणस्य गृह्यान्तिमिति | पाप्राणे चापि वार्तमां | वक्तव्येऽव एतत्त्ववेच पाप्राणेऽलुकिकारणस्य गृह्यान्तिमिति || The Nyāsa (on Kāśikā 2.4.77 [III.187]) presents the same reasoning: gāpāḥ गृह्ये इत्यिन्त्वोपप्रदर्भ्यमिति | इत्यादित्वो गृह्या तावार्तित्वात् एव चिन्तया निर्देशितः | किं चिन्तया निर्देशितः | तस्मात्यत्मेच चिन्तया चिन्तया स्रावतेषु स्वार्थमेव इत्येव ब्रह्मात् | एवं ततैन गामादाप्राणाविश्ववत्वात् गृह्यान्तं भूतिवेच्य | किं चिन्तया निर्देशितः | तस्मादवेच चिन्तया चिन्तया स्रावतिते ज्ञापतिता इत्येव ब्रह्मात् | एवं ततैन गामादाप्राणाविश्ववत्वात् गृह्यान्तं न गावतेच्यितः ||
and dhā excluding dāp. According to Pāṇinīyas, the terms dā and dhā refer to the verbal stems dudān ‘to give’, dān ‘to give’, do ‘to split’, deṇ ‘to protect’, ḍudhān ‘to place, to provide’ and dheta ‘to suck’. Here the question arises: how do dā and dhā refer to the verbal stems do, deṇ, and dheta, since these are not mentioned with such forms in the Dhātupātha? The stems do, deṇ and dheta obtain the form dā (← do/deṇ) or dhā (← dheta) by अदेव उपदेशेषिति (A 6.1.45 [§1.1]) when they are not followed by affixes which are marked with the anubandha ś; e.g., dā-tr-, dhā-tr-. In other cases, where an affix marked with ś follows (e.g., śap or śyan), they do not obtain this form. For example: pranidayate (← prani+daya+te ← prani+deṇ+śap+te ← prani+deṇ +te (laṭ), pranidytati (← prani+dya+ti ← prani+do+śyan+ti ← prani+do+tip (laṭ) and pranidhayati ← prani+dhaya+ti ← prani+dhe+śap+ti ← prani+dheṭ+tip (laṭ). Moreover, the difficulty concerning dā and dhā in A 1.1.20 with respect to the verbal stems do, deṇ and dheta occurs also with the term dāp (in the negation adāp) mentioned in the sūtra. Dāp should refer to the verbal stems

42. DhP III.9.
43. DhP I.977.
44. DhP IV.40.
45. DhP I.1011.
46. DhP III.10. 47.
47. DhP I.951.
48. The affix trc is added according to ण्वलुचौ (A 3.1.133).
49. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): वर्तमाने लट्ट (A 3.2.123)/तत्तत्त्वसमस्वमियत्वस्म-स्तवात्माभासायथामृतिः हिगमिह् (A 3.4.78) / तित आत्मस्थवतान्तरे (A 3.4.79), कर्तवीर नेप (A 3.1.68), एषोच्चवाघावः (A 6.1.78), नर्गननदयक्षुयामात्वेत्नित्यातिविभाति- द्वारात्मातिविविधतिविशापमतिनातिविदेशिपु (A 8.4.17).
50. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): A 3.2.123/A3.4.78, विवाहादिः नेप (A 3.1.69), ओत: नेप (A 7.3.71), A 8.4.17.
51. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): A 3.2.123/A3.4.78, A 3.1.68, A 6.1.78, A 8.4.17.
dāp and daip. As in the case of do, den and dheṭ, the diphthong of the stems daip is replaced by a long vowel ā according to A 6.1.45. Thus, here again there arises not only the question of how dāp can refer to daip but also another key question: how is the knowledge obtained that dā and dhā in A 1.1.20 refer to the verbal stems ḍudāṅ, ḍaṅ, do, deṅ, ḍudhāṅ and dheṭ and that dāp refers to dāp and daip?

There are two indications which show that in addition to ḍudāṅ, ḍaṅ, ḍudhāṅ and dāp, the terms dā, dhā and dāp in A 1.1.20 refer also to do, den, dheṭ and daip, which get the form dā or dhā when not followed by affixes marked with ś, by A 6.1.45. In the Dhātupātha, the stem daip is marked with p. According to Pāṇinīyas, this anubandha does not have any purpose other than to provide a common reference (i.e., by dāp) for both dāp and daip.52 Thus we know that A 1.1.20 concerns also a stem which does not have the form dā or dhā in the Dhātupātha but acquires such a form by the application of a grammatical rule. Another indication which provides the same knowledge involves the expression daḥ ‘(in the place) of the dā (named) ghu’ used in do ṛddhā: (A 7.4.46).

This sūtra provides the replacement dad for a stem dā with the name ghu before an suffix in t- that is marked with k: datta- (← dad-kta) ‘given’. Here, daḥ is obviously intended to exclude only dheṭ. ध्वाते हि: (A 7.4.42) provides hi for ḍudhāṅ in the same

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52. According to the Nyāsa on Kāśikā 1.1.20 (I.207), this indicates that the paribhāṣā गामाध्रेभिषेष: is used: नतु च लक्षणप्रतिलोक्तयो: प्रतिलोक्तयेव ब्रह्मण्यम्. न तु लक्षणप्रतिस्यत्नमाय परिभाषया दो अवबाल्ये देक्त रक्षणेष्ठे पान इत्यत्तेषा ब्रह्मण्य न स्मार्थु:। नतुदसिसि:। तस्या हि परिभाषया गामाध्रेभिषेष: इत्यत्तेवोद्योगस्ति। तेन सत्यमि लक्षणकल्पे दोदेवी ततावहुस्ते।। तेस्तोइपि लक्षणगत्व दर्शिमायते।। तस्यनिलेवं देयं: पक्षानुवन्ध!। स इतराभिविद्यते दाप्रतिलोक्तसमान्यस्य ब्रह्मणं। क्रियः। यदि चाच्चाय: परिभाषया इह व्यापारः यस्याः: पक्षानुवन्धकरणस्य यस्य यस्य न भविष्यतीति किर प्रतिपिठेऽयस्य यस्य।। Kaiyaṭa too presents this explanation (Pradīpa 1.261a): गामाध्रेभिषेष: इति। अस्य चार्यस्य देयं: पिल्लिन्यान्यभिव इतिर्पिल्लिन्य्य सामान्यस्य न भविष्यते। किर प्रतिपिल्लिन्य ग्रहणं।। अन्यथेऽस्य लक्षणिक्लाद ग्रहणं न भविष्यति। किर प्रतिपिल्लिन्य ग्रहणं।।
context as A 7.4.46 provides *dad* for *dhāḥ*, so that *daḥ* in the latter is not intended for excluding *quḍhāṇ*. Thus, the use of the expression *daḥ* in A 7.4.46 is meant only to prevent its application to the stem *dheṭ*. This instance, as well as the use of the anubandha *p* in *daip*, indicates that A 1.1.20 concerns not only stems with original *ā* but also stems which do not have the form *dā* or *dhā* in the Dhāțupaṭha and acquire such forms by the application of a grammatical rule.53

The two indications mentioned above show that *dā*, *dhā* and *dāp* refer both to stems with original *ā* and to those which do not have such forms in the Dhāțupaṭha. One may say that these terms refer also to the stems which acquire these forms by A 6.1.45 simply because this rule is traditionally accepted to be applicable unconditionally, that is, before the addition of any affix. This may be the reason why Pāṇinī did not mention in A 1.1.20 the stems *do*, *deṅ*, *dheṭ* and *daip* with the form they have in the Dhāțupaṭha and refers to them by the general terms *dā* and *dhā*.54 Yet, a question

53. Prādiptā I.261a: वेद द्वितीयमेत्या वा द इत्येव चेदो निवृत्त्यथं सद्धो घुसंजां जापयति। न हि द्वातिनिवृत्त्यथं द इत्येवतत्स्य द्वातिनिवृत्त्यथं ह्यदेविज्ञानां। उद्धर्यामित्रः।

54. Some Pāṇinīyas provide an elaborate explanation on this issue. In his Mahābhāṣyādīpikā, Bhartṛhari argues that the compound *dādhā* in A 1.1.20 is actually a compound of all the six verbal stems. In that case, the form *dā* is a single reminder (*ekaśeṣa*) of the stems *quḍhāṇ*, *dāṇ*, *do* and *deṅ* and the form *dhā* is a single reminder of the stems *quḍhāṇ* and *dheṭ*. The basis of this assumption is that at the first stage this compound had the form *dādādodedhāde*. Afterward, the diphthongs of the stems *do*, *de* and *dheṭ* have been replaced by a long vowel *ā*, as this replacement occurs unconditionally. Dipikā II.21.3-9 (on Bh I.73.22): अस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां वद्यस्त्यायमन्त्रस्रोतां

This explanation is also given in the Nyāsa and the Padamaṇjarī on Kāśikā
arises with respect to the stem \textit{diṁ}. This stem obtains the form \textit{dā} by the application of मीनातिमिनोतिरिह्रात्य ल्यधि च (A 6.1.50 [§1.2]), which is also traditionally accepted to be applicable unconditionally. In fact, Kātyāyana and later commentators agree that the term \textit{dā} in A 1.1.20 may refer to this stem too. In the sixth vārttika on A 1.1.20, Kātyāyana argues for an additional statement that would prohibit the name \textit{ghu} in the case of forms such as upādāsta,\textsuperscript{55} which is derived from \textit{diṁ}. Here, if \textit{ghu} also referred to this stem, \textit{svarūpārthī} (A 1.2.17) would be applicable to provide the replacement of the long vowel \textit{ā} of \textit{dā} in upādāsta by a short

1.1.20 (I.107). This solution is also mentioned by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his ŠK I.141 (on A 1.1.20): दौड़ी दौड़ीबङ्कनामान्तरकरणानि व्यवस्थणां तथा प्रकृतिविददु- करणभाषणाचे उपयोगार्थी हृदयात्वंक्यैंप्रभावितेनेमाः प्रश्ना दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी। It is clear that Kātyāyana did not hold this view. Otherwise he would not argue that A 1.1.20 may be wrongly applicable in the case of the forms pranidārayati, pranidhārayati and upādāsta. pranidārayati and pranidhārayati are derived from the verbal stems \textit{drī} and \textit{dhṛī} respectively and the replacement by a long vowel \textit{ā} provided for in A 6.1.45 does not concern them. upādāsta is derived from the verbal stem \textit{diṁ}. The fact that Kātyāyana recognizes that A 1.1.20 may be applicable in these cases shows that he did not hold this view. Nāgæśa refers to this fact. Uddyota (I.259a): दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी। The argument is also given by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (ŠK I.141 [on A 1.1.20]): अतएव दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी. The argument is also given by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (ŠK I.141 [on A 1.1.20]): अतएव दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी दौड़ी.

\textsuperscript{55} A 1.1.20 vt. 6 (Bh I.75.15) दौड़ी: प्रतिपेध: स्वरूपार्थी। upādāsta derives from the verbal stem \textit{diṁ} ‘to waste’, ‘to decay’: upādāsta ($\leftarrow$ upa adā+s+tā $\leftarrow$ upa ade+s+tā $\leftarrow$ upa adi+s+ic+tā $\leftarrow$ upa adi+cli+tā $\leftarrow$ upa adi+ti+tā $\leftarrow$ upa diṁ $\leftarrow$ ta ($\leftarrow$ luni)). In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): लुढ़ (A 3.2.110)/A 3.4.77/A3.4.78, लुढ़विंडुःद्रव्य (A 6.4.71), विलुढ़ (A 3.1.43), विलुढ़ (A 3.1.44), सावधानुकरण (A 7.3.84), मीनातिमिनोतिरिह्रात्य ल्यधि च (A 6.1.50), अक: सवरण दीर्घ: (A 6.1.101).
vowel \(i\). The commentaries mention solutions to this difficulty which involve the use of a paribhāṣā or an additional statement.\(^{56}\) Yet, these solutions are not needed. In addition to the replacement by an \(i\) vowel, A 1.2.17 assigns to the affix *sic* the property of being marked with the anubandha \(k\).\(^{57}\) Considering *sic* as being marked with \(k\) prevents the application of मीनात्मिनोतितितीद्रं ल्यमि \(\text{Ch (A 6.1.50 [§1.2])}\) because this is not applicable where an affix marked with \(k\) occurs. In that case, \(diṁ\) cannot obtain the form \(dā\) which is acquired after the application of the *guna* or *vṛddhi* replacement provided by सार्वभत्तकार्थातुकम्: (A 7.3.84). In fact, all the sūtras\(^{58}\) that are related to the name *ghu* or mention the term \(dā\) involve affixes which are marked with \(k\) or \(n\). When such affixes are concerned, A 6.1.50 does not apply and consequently \(diṁ\) does not obtain the form \(dā\). Moreover, all these sūtras do not involve affixes which are which are marked with the anubandha \(ś\). In such a situation आदेश उपदेशोः शिष्टि (A 6.1.45 [§1.1]) is applicable so that the stems *do*, *deṇ* and *dheṭ* obtain the form \(dā\) (← *do/deṇ*) or \(dh!\) (← *dheṭ*). Thus, also with respect to *ghu*, if one considers the context where the sūtras that include the term *ghu* are applicable, one can know to which items the term refers.

\(^{56}\) Generally, Paññinīyas provide two solutions to this case. First, by the paribhāṣā सन्‌पितात्वकणो विभ्रानिमित्त तद्विसतस्य (Bh I.75.21-23 [on A 1.1.20 vt. 6]: स तहे प्रतिपेधोऽवक्तव्यः न वक्तव्यः। चुयं्त्ता कस्म्यान्भवति। सन्निपतात्वकणो विभ्रानिमित्त तद्विसतस्ये॥ न भविष्यति॥). Alternatively, they accept the additional statement suggested by Kātyāyana (Bh I.98.12-13 [on A 1.1.39 vt. 8]: एतद्वितीय प्रतिपेधः। उपक्तमेव दीर्घप्रतिपेधः। स्वाभविरिच्छ इति॥)

\(^{57}\) Cf. क्षिति (A 1.1.5).

\(^{58}\) They are: स्याय्त्व्योरिच्छ (A 1.2.17), गातिस्थायुपास्यम्: सिच्छ: परस्मैपदेषु (A 2.4.77), उपस्य घो: कि (A 3.3.92), चुम्मास्यापाण्ड्वाल्यान्तिष्ठा हृदश्च (A 6.4.66), ई हड्डयोः: (A 6.4.113), सनि मीमांसायुपास्यम् यज्ञवार्तान्वितात्सः ह्रदाय (A 7.4.54), घोलोः लेटि बा (A 7.3.70), दो दु: (A 7.4.46), नेर्माद्वन्धःपद्युपस्याविहितायात्मात्सः सांवित्ष्य—

०हृदियाः म्यविनिमोतिदिक्षु (A 8.4.17).
The use of the terms dā, mā and gā in the Ṛgveda (A 8.4.17)

The case of A 8.4.17 is hard to explain. This āṣṭādhyāyī does not require an occurrence of any affix. It concerns cases where the stems are preceded by an upasarga ni that follows another upasarga containing a sound that conditions retroflexion, namely r. Here, āṇhu refers to dudāṃ, dāṃ, do, deṇ, dudhāṃ and dhet. For example, pranidātā (← pranidātr+su ← pranidātr ← prani+do/deṇ+tṛc) and pranidhātā (← pranidhātr+su ← pranidhātr ← prani+dhet+tṛc).\(^59\)

A 8.4.17 applies also in cases where do, deṇ, and dhet do not obtain the form dā or dhā; e.g., pranidhayate (← prani+daya+te ← prani+deṇ+śap+te ← prani+deṭ+te [laf]),\(^60\) pranidyati (← prani+dya+ti ← prani+do+śyan+ti ← prani+dop+tīp [laf])\(^61\) and pranidhayati (← prani+dhaya+ti ← prani+dhe+śap+ti ← prani+dhet+tīp [laf]).\(^62\) In these cases, the stems are followed by an affix marked with ś (i.e., śap or śyan). Therefore, they do not acquire the forms dā or dhā. Yet, it is desired that also in such cases these stems get the name āṇhu in order to apply the replacement by n provided for by A 8.4.17. Thus, arguing that the terms dā and dhā refer to their own forms and not to specific verbal stems would lead to an undesired result, since in the case of pranidhayate, pranidyati and pranidhayati we do not have the forms dā or dhā at any stage of their derivation.

With respect to the term mā used in the A 8.4.17, one of three

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59. The affix tṛc is added according to ष्ठुल्प्त्व (A 3.1.133).
60. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): कर्तमाने जद (A 3.2.123)/तित्तस्सिस्स्स्वस्तप्तस्त (A 3.4.78) / तित्त आल्पेण्डासां तेषे (A 3.4.79), कालिन्त शय्य (A 3.1.68), एण्णोज्ज्ययाय (A 6.1.78), A 8.4.17.
61. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): A 3.2.123/A3.4.78, विवाहिथ्वा: यथू (A 3.1.69), ओत: यथू (A 7.3.71), A 8.4.17.
62. In the derivation process for this form, the following sūtras apply (given in their order of application): A 3.2.123/A3.4.78, A 3.1.68, A 6.1.78, A 8.4.17.
alternatives should be expected. First, mā in this sūtra should refer not only to the stems mā, māṇ (DhP III.6), māṇ (DhP IV.34), but also to the stems dūmiṇ, mīṇ and meṅ. Secondly, in case this term refers to the form which is actually in use, it should refer only to cases where these stems have the form mā. Thirdly, this should refer only to the stems māṇ, and the two stems māṇ which have such a form originally. However, none of these alternatives applies in this case. The term mā in A 8.4.17 refers only to the two stems māṇ and meṅ.

63. See, for example, the Nyāsā on Kāśīkā 8.4.17 (X.425-426). भैय गाभ र में क्षणप्रियान्तर्याम न तु मीष हिन्दाया दुमिं क्र्यास्पन इत्यतोभीमातिकृतिस्वरूपां त्यापि चेति कृत्यान्तर्याम मान इत्यतय । ननु च गामधाराप्रणीति विषयों देन सर्वसाधन ग्रहणं भवित्त्वं तत्कथं माखे जो ग्रहणं लभ्यते । नैवैतदेन । इत्य इद्देश्य व्ययान्तर्यामिति बचनमन्सेव्य बचनेत्यत्व पूर्विनिपातमुक्ते नात्र वचना नु इत्यत्व प्रस्तु-तत्त्वाति तिथियाति शून्यितम । तेन यथैव भवित्त स एव गुरू ॥

64. The Bhāṣya on A 1.1.20 vt. 1 refers to the case of this term with respect to A 8.4.17. The first solution that the Bhāṣya (Bh I.74.15-16 [on A 1.1.20 vt. 1]) offers is to add the term prakṛti ‘original’ to A 8.4.17.: अभवस तत्र मां शक्तिग्रहण कर्तव्यं प्रशिक्षितं प्रयम्यं इत्यतेवमिर्म । तत्तवस्त्रास्त्रृक्षयिते पुष्पकृती मायकृती चेति ॥ Patañjali argues that this term should be placed between the terms ghu and mā mentioned in A 8.4.17. This would provide the knowledge that these terms refer to items which have the forms dā dhā and mā originally and also to items which obtain such forms during the process of derivation. However, in that case, the term mā should refer also to the stems dūmiṇ (in cases such as praniminoti), mīṇ (in cases such as pranimināti) and mā (in cases such as pranimātā), so that such a solution does not solve this difficulty. Therefore, Patañjali says that the term mā in A 8.4.17 should be stated with the anubandha n. In that case, this term would not refer to the stem mā. Bh I.74.16-20 (on A 1.1.20 vt. 1): यदि प्रकृतिग्रहणं क्रियं प्रभिकृत निर्माताय शक्ति प्रतिनिधित्व । अयाक्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणं इति कर्ममाण्य भवित प्रतिनिधित्व । आकारान्तस्य बिजों ग्रहणं बिजायते । यथैव ताहेत्रिक्रियमाणं प्रकृतिग्रहणं आकारान्तस्य बिजों ग्रहणं बिजायते एवं क्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणं आकारान्तस्य बिजों ग्रहणं बिजायते। In the vṛtti 8.4.17, the Kāśīkā refers to this issue and says that the term mā refers to māṇ and meṅ. Kāśīkā 8.4.17(X.426): माख प्रशिक्षितं परिणिमिते । में माण प्रशिक्षितं परिणिमिते । मा इति माकृप्रहणभिषेधं इति. According to the Nyāsā and the Padamāṇjari, the Kāśīkā argues that this involves simply acceptance (iṣṭi ‘desire, acceptance’) of what is required. PM on Kāśīkā 8.4.17 (X.425-426): गामधारप्रणीतिविषयेत इति
6 Conclusion
As we have seen, Pāṇini uses the term dā, mā and gā with a consideration of the context where each sūtra is applicable. Thus these terms are not used arbitrarily. There are reasons for their particular use in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. These reasons also provide the knowledge of which items dā, mā or gā refer to. This position is contrary to the commentators’ view that with respect to the use terms dā, mā and gā there are no specifications and in order to know to which items the terms refer one should look ahead and consider the desired targets.

The question remains why this puzzlement occurred in the first place. This is due to the fact that after the time of Kātyāyana, a view which originally did not belong to Pāṇini’s system was introduced to his system. According to this view, the terms in the Aṣṭādhyāyī primarily refer to original items.65 This is why the commentators struggled to explain why and how, for example, dā and dhā refer also to the stems do, deṅ, ḍudhāṅ and dheṭ. In the Mahābhāṣya, there may be a clue that shows that this view does not belong to Pāṇini’s system. This clue also points to its source. In the Bhāṣya on दाधा ष्वदाप् (A 1.1.20 [§4]), the section leading to the conclusion that with respect to the terms dā, mā and gā there are not any specifications concerning which item they refer to starts with the expression bhāradvājīyāḥ paṭhanti (‘members of the school of the Bhāradvājas teach’). According to this school, dā and dhā cannot refer to forms which are acquired by the application of grammatical rules, as its followers presuppose that

65. I discuss this issue at length in my dissertation (Ben-Dor. 2009; 101-232). I give some evidence which shows that Kātyāyana did not hold this view and that Pāṇini’s procedures do not follow this view.
the terms refer primarily to original forms. Moreover, in the Bhāṣya under A 1.1.56, the same school is quoted as arguing that a partially changed form is not same as the original items. Thus, the school of the bhāradvājīyas values a ‘pure’ untouched original item, yet it does not conform to Pāṇini’s method, which accepts that terms refer also to items which are acquired by the application of a rule in addition to original items.

66. Bh I.73.26-74.1-2 (on A 1.1.20 vt. 1): भारद्वाजीयाः पतव्यति युसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिखरकृतार्थम्। युसंज्ञायं प्रकृतिग्रहणं क्रियते। कि प्रयोजनम्। शिखरं शिखरार्थं च। शिखरार्थं खल्वपि प्रणिदाता प्रणिधाता॥

67. Bh I.136.15-18 (on A 1.1.56 vt. 11): भारद्वाजीयाः पतव्यति। एकदेशविकृतेपूपसंख्यानम्। कि च कारणं न स्थात्॥ अनवदेशविन्यासं॥ आदेशं स्थानिविषदित्युत्चतन्त्रे न चेत। आदेशाः। रूपान्तत्वात्त्व॥ अन्तत्वत्वापि रूपं पंचतीत्त्वश्चत्वर्तिं॥
References and abbreviations

A  Aṣṭādhyāyī.
Abhyankar, K. V.

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Bh Mahābhāṣya. See Abhyankar, K. V.

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Bālamonarāmkhyāṭīkāyā, mahāmahopādhyyāya Śrīnāgēsa (Nāgojī) bhaṭṭaviracitena vidvatpriyena Laghuśabdendu-
śekharākhyna tilakeṇa, svaravaidikabhāge Śrījayakṛṣṇamauniviracitayā Subodhinyākhyaṭi ṭīkayā,
liṅgānuṣāsanaabhāge Śrībhairavamiśrakṛtayā Candralakā-
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“Where the sense is intended although the corresponding speech unit is not employed”: the ekaśeṣa case

Tiziana Pontillo

1 Ekaśeṣa as an exception to the one-to-one symmetry between artha and śabda.

Deshpande (1985: 37-9) reserves a special place for ekaśeṣa, which he classifies as a case of “prescribed word-deletion in Pāṇini”, putting it on an equal footing with the uttarapadalopa taught by A 5.3.82. He concludes (p. 38) that the “obligatory ‘one constituent retention’” is “different from natural ellipsis” for the following reasons: a) because it is “prescribed by rules of the system, and is not simply taken for granted”; b) “by being obligatory, it shows that only the abbreviated expression is grammatical”; c) “there is a clear sense of directionality in the process of retention of a constituent.”

As is well known, the ekaśeṣa rule (A 1.2.64: sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau) teaches that just one of a possible series of items having the same form occurs, as a single remainder, provided that a single ending is used. As a consequence the denotation of many objects (which for instance belong to the same class, such as many trees) corresponds to the unique plural word form vrksāḥ. In other words the remainder vrksa-, i.e. the unique word form which

1 With regard to ekaśeṣa, there is a partly ambiguous distinction introduced by Kiparsky (1982: 37 n. 38) on the subject of the “free deletion process” for which “Pāṇini’s grammar contains no rules that substitute anything for the personal pronouns” mentioned as sthānin in A 1.4.105: “This is distinct from the conjunction rule that drops repeated items in parallel expressions, which Pāṇini states explicitly (1.2.64 [...] ).” I wonder whether, by focusing on the explicit feature of rule A 1.2.64, Kiparsky means that it deals with a lopa rule, or an ādeṣa rule or an (explicit) something else. I agree with all three conclusions about ekaśeṣa expounded by Deshpande (1985: 38), provided that ekaśeṣa is not classified as a case of lopa but of ādeṣa, as I shall propose below.
remains, conveys the sense of all objects denoted by the other word forms which do not remain.

Thus, some objects are denoted even though the matching word-forms are not overtly used, which seems to contradict some well known presupposed grammatical points that are enunciated — possibly in their earliest statement — partly in the very first värttika in Kielhorn’s Edition of the Mahābhāṣya (M I.6:16: siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato ‘rthaprayukte śabdapravoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyaṃḥ’\(^2\) and partly in the first two vārttikas on the ekaśeṣa-rules (M I.233:16 [vt. 1], 20 [vt. 2] ad A 1.2.64\(^3\): pratyartham śabdaniveśan naikenānekasyābhidhānam; tatrānekārthābhidhāne ‘nekaśabdatvam), as follows:

- there is a well established relation between words (śabda) and the knowledge of their objects (artha),\(^4\) which relies on everyday linguistic usage;

2. Both Abhyankar-Shukla 1975 and Joshi-Roodbergen 1986 divide this vārttika into three parts, as they are repeated and commented on separately by Patañjali. With regard to the place occupied by this first vārttika and his supposed author, see Cardona 1999: 223-5.

3. A 1.2.64: sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau “A single remainder of [many] items having the same form occurs, provided that a single ending is used.”

4. Of course this analysis of śabdārthasambandhe as a tatpuruṣa-compound is taken apart from Patañjali’s interpretation; cf., e.g., Scharf 1996: 22. In fact Patañjali’s analysis as a samāhāra dvandva implies a more compelling interpretation as “words, meanings and [their] relations”. As many scholars have noticed, the interpretation of this compound as a samāhāra dvandva seems to contradict the current use of vārttikas. Cf. Joshi-Roodbergen 1986: 90 n. 331; Biardeau 1964: 36; Houben 1995: 37, n. 59. Furthermore, Patañjali glosses siddha as nitya (‘permanent’). Surprisingly enough, this passage is the only one, out of almost 150 occurrences of the term nitya in the Mahābhāṣya, where nitya is attributed to the object meant by a word, instead of to linguistic forms (nitya vs. kārya); cf. Candotti - Pontillo 2010: 42. Additionally, word forms (śabda) are considered as causes giving rise to the cognition of objects (artha) (in the mind of the participants in the communicative event); that is, the addressee actually needs to employ words, for instance to utter them, in order to arouse the relevant mental image in the buddhi of the addressee. Without this perceptible input no meaning could ever be brought about (M I.18:19-20 [ad Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12]: śrotropalabdhir buddhinatingrāhyah prayogenābhijvalita ākāśadeśah śabdaḥ).
- the use of words is prompted by the thing-meant; i.e. it depends in the end on the intention of making something known, of conveying some meaning (through a verbal expression);\(^5\)

- words as a rule apply per object; i.e. one and only one word-form matches with one and only one object.\(^6\)

By contrast the statement hinted at in my title is exactly what is questioned in the very long discussion that Patañjali devotes to this ekaśeṣa rule (A 1.2.64). Since the analysis of the context of this statement seems to be crucial, I shall now take a step backwards, in order to reconstruct at least a part of this complex discussion. This reconstruction will not, however, deal with the very important part proposing the view that a generic term denotes a class property, because this goes beyond the scope of the present study.\(^7\)

The starting point is vt. 27 on A 1.2.64 which introduces the topic of the number of ekaśeṣa formations. The objection envisioned is that the dual and plural desinences cannot be realized because the object of an ekaśeṣa is just one.\(^8\) However, vt. 28

6. Just as a corollary, early grammarians seem to apply this one-to-one relationship not only to words but to all meaningful (arthaḥ) linguistic units, that is, according to A 1.2.45, verb roots (dhātu), nominal bases (prātipadika), and affixes (pratyaya). In fact Patañjali plainly expounds the grammatical process on which this presupposed one-to-one symmetry between the semantic and the phono-morphological level of language is based, by involving the two well known complementary systematic actions, namely anvaya (lit. 'association') and vyatireka (lit. 'distinction'), aimed respectively at catching the continuity and discontinuity between different compared units (M 1.219:19-25 [ad A 1.2.45 vt. 9]). Thus morphemic linguistic units also might have been basically supposed by Patañjali to convey their meaning only if actually uttered within the word.
7. This is the object of Scharf 1996, in particular pp. 47-50.
8. M 1.240:16 (vt. 27 ad A 1.2.64): dvivacanabahuvacanāprasisddhiś caikārthatvāt “And the dual and plural desinences cannot be realized because the object [of an ekaśeṣa formation] is just one.” M 1.240:17-18 (ad vt. 27 on A 1.2.64): \[\ldots\] eko’ yam avasīṣyate / tenāṇena tadarthena bhavītavyam / kimarthena / yadarthah ekāḥ \[\ldots\] “Just one” means that [just] this [word form] is left as a remnant. This [word form] which denotes this object should be realized. - What object? - That which is denoted by this single [word form] (i.e. the remainder).”
denies that a single remainder (ekaśeṣa) denotes a single object, since if it did denote a single object, the rule itself would have no purpose. As a consequence, in order to account for this double object matching a single word form, the discussion shifts to a dichotomy between two devised explanations for this anekarthatā, raised by vt. 29, which assumes that a single word might correspond to more than one object simply by nature (M I.240: 23): aśīṣya ekaśeṣa ekenoktatvāt “The single remainder should not be taught because [the other objects] are already denoted by one and only one word form.” Nevertheless, in this case no input could determine the usage of a second or a third word form denoting some object which is, on the contrary, already denoted, in accordance with the general principle which prohibits the use of more words to express the same meaning which has been expressed by one word (uktārthānām aprayogaḥ). As a consequence, there would be no word form to which this rule could apply; that is, no word form would be generated apart from “that which does remain.”

The two opposing explanations of anekarthatā which Patañjali enunciates as an introduction to vt. 29 (M I.240:21-22 [ad vt. 28 on A 1.2.64]) are the following: iha hi śabdasya svābhāvikī vānekārthataḥ syāt vācanikī vā “Indeed in this case this feature of

9. Cf. Patañjali’s introduction (M I.241:19 [ad vt. 27 on A 1.2.64]): naikārthyaṃ / nāyam ekārthaḥ / kim tarhi / dvyartho bahvarthaḥ ca “This feature of denoting a single object does not occur. This [single word form] (i.e. the remainder) does not denote one object. What is it then? It denotes two or many objects.”

10. M I.241:19-20 (vt. 28 ad A 1.2.64): naikārthyaṃ iti ced ārambhānarthakayam “If we say that this feature of denoting a single object does not occur there, the effort [made in enunciating this rule teaching that one word-form remains] would have no purpose.”

11. M I.240:24-25 (ad vt. 29 on A 1.2.64): ekenoktatvāt tasyārthasya dvitiyasya prayogena na bhavitavyam uktārthānām aprayoga iti “Since [the other objects] are already denoted by one and only one word form, the usage of a second word form denoting this (same) object would not occur, according to this (principle): ‘Usage of [word forms denoting] objects which have already been denoted does not occur’.”
denoting more than one object might be either svābhāvika or vācanika”.

This terminological pair svābhāvika vs. vācanika, both in Kātyāyana and in Patañjali’s work, does not result as being secondary. On the basis of a complete survey of the occurrences, published in Candotti-Pontillo 2010, this pair does indeed result as somehow matching with the more known pair nitya ‘permanent’ / kārya ‘created by means of rules’. Nonetheless, while nitya and kārya refer to words (śabda), svābhāvika / vācanika refer to their denotation (abhidhāna). Accordingly, the denotation of an inflected word can be defined as svābhāvika, if it is autonomous, that is, independent of its morphs, even though these morphs can be regularly abstracted by means of the process of anvaya and vyatireka. Otherwise, if denotation is conditioned by the morphology, that is, if denotation clings to the morphological structure of the corresponding word form — often, but not always, according to some express grammatical rules — it is defined as vācanika. This opposition employed for explaining a special case of denotation seems to anticipate the perspective of the more recent one between arthādhyāhāra, ‘suppletion of meaning’ / śabdādhyāhāra ‘suppletion of words’.12

With regard to ekašeṣa, this vācanika hypothesis consists in a morphological condition which does not need to be established by an additional explicit mention of this special denotation of ekašeṣa, because the sole provision for a single remainder, alone, is sufficient to assure the right denotation.

M I.240:25-241:1 (ad vt. 29 on A 1.2.64): atha vācanikī tad vaktavyam eko 'yam avaśisyate sa ca dvyaartho bhavati bahvarthaḥ ceti / na vaktavyam / siddham ekašeṣa iti eva /

12. With regard to some other different pieces of evidence for the assumed anticipation by Patañjali, cf. Deshpande 1985:54 and 1989: 114-5, 119-20, even though the Nyāya-, Mīmāṃsā- and Kāvyālaṅkāra-traditions which involve them, are of course generally interested in these methods in the context of hermeneutics rather than with respect to the grammatical derivation.
katham punar eko 'yam avaśisyate ity anena dvyaarthatā bahvarhatā vā sakyā labdhum / tac caikaśeṣakṛtām / na hy antareṇa tadvācinah śabdasya prayogaṁ tasyārthasya gatir bhavati / paśyāmaś ca punar antarenāpi tadvācinah śabdasya prayogaṁ tasyārthasya gatir bhavatītī agnicit somasud iti yathā “Otherwise [if this feature of being endowed with more than one object is not autonomous], it is founded on word forms’, but it has to be expressly mentioned [in this way]: ‘only this one remains and it denotes two objects or many objects. - It does not have to be stated. It is realized, just stating that one remains. - But how could the denotation of two objects or of many objects be obtained by means of this statement: ‘This one word form remains.’? - This is also brought about by means of the statement according to which ‘just one word form remains’. In fact there is no comprehension of an object without employing the word-form denoting this. And yet we see that there is comprehension of an object even without employing the word-form denoting this, as we use [words such as] agnicit ‘one who has arranged the fire altar’ or somasut ‘one who has pressed soma (for the relevant sacrifice)’”.

2 Ekaśeṣa compared with lopa
Thus paradoxically, this passage seems, on the one hand, to emphasize the correspondence between śabda and artha, by recalling their well-established relation, and the need of a physical input to cause verbal cognition, and on the other, to present ekaśeṣa as one among the rare exceptions to this rule itself, comparable with the lopa cases, which are presented as standard exceptions. The examples pointed out here are precisely agnicit ‘one who has arranged the fire altar’ and somasut ‘one who has pressed soma (for the relevant sacrifice)’, i.e., two examples of lopa of the affix KvIP, which could be defined as two extreme cases of zero-
replacement. In fact, as is well-known, all the affixes referred to by terms containing the syllable vi are always devoid of a perceptible form of their own, in accordance with A 6.1.67 which teaches a zero-replacement of vi\textsuperscript{14}. Nevertheless this specific zero-substitute mentioned by Patañjali is perceptible at least with regard to its ‘effect’ on the pre-affixal base (aṅga), because it deals with a case of zero denoted by lopa and not with one that concerns a zero referred to by a term containing lu (lumat).\textsuperscript{15} In fact, thanks to the convention governing replacements (recalled by sthānivad ādeśah analvidhau [A 1.1.56]),\textsuperscript{16} the zero-affix will have the properties of its substituend. Thus, since the substituend is marked with p (KvIP), its substitute receives the final augment tuK (-t), as if it were a unit marked with p (pit), according to A 6.1.71.\textsuperscript{17}

In my opinion, it is exactly this specific choice that allows Patañjali to emphasize, some lines below, that a difference between

13. agni- + ci- + Ø (KvIP) + -t > agnicit ‘one who has arranged the fire altar’ is derived according to rule A 3.2.91: agnau ceh (upapada = sup = karman 86; bhūte 84, kvip 87) “When agni occurs as an upapada which is a direct object, the affix KvIP occurs after the verbal base ci-.” soma- + su- + Ø (KvIP) + -t > somasut ‘one who has pressed soma (for the relevant sacrifice)’ is derived according to rule A 3.2.90: some suñah “When soma occurs as an upapada which is a direct object, the affix KvIP occurs after the verbal base su-.” It deals with two kṛt nominal bases which convey the sense of agent, both being taught in the section included between A 3.1.93: kṛd atiṅ and A 3.4.67: kartari kṛt.


15. A 1.1.63 (na lumatāṅgasya) blocks the effect of affixes replaced by zero on their bases: “An affix which is subject to lopa when it is termed with a name which contains lu (i.e., LuK, Slu and LuP) does not condition operations in the place of (a part of) the pre-affixal base.”

16. This inclusion of lopa in the domain of substitution would not have been so obvious at Kātyāyana and Patañjali’s time, but it is a fact that some lopas are mentioned by Patañjali among the exceptions to A 1.1.56 itself. See Candotti-Pontillo: 122ff. For some other Mahābhāṣya pieces of evidence, see Candotti-Pontillo 2012: 119ff., Pontillo 2008 and Freschi-Pontillo 2012: 136ff. Contemporary research on the Aṣṭādhyāyī also speaks of ‘zero replacements’ for describing the various lopa phenomena. See, e.g., Cardona 1997: 46 (§ 79).

17. A 6.1.71: hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk “The final augment tuK is added to a short vowel before a kṛt affix marked with p.”
ekaśeṣa and lopa does exist, at least with regard to operational rules, when the sūtra’s rejector underlines how, on the contrary, both ekaśeṣa and lopa in the end depend on everyday language usage as far as the denotation of terms is concerned, so that teaching them could be useless. In fact, the augment t applied to the mentioned couple of nouns subject to lopa might appear to be ultimately considered as a perceptible input to cause the verbal cognition of a kartr instead of a dhātu.

M I.241:8-11 (ad vt. 29 on A 1.2.64): yadi tarhi loko ’vaśyam śahdesu pramāṇam kimartham ekaśeṣa ārabhyate / atha kimartham lopa ārabhyate / pratyavalakṣanam ācāryaḥ prārthayamāno lopam ārabhate / ekaśeṣārambhe punar asya na kiṃcit prayojanam asti “Then, if the common usage is certainly the standard, as regards words, with what aim is the rule according to which ‘just one word form remains’ undertaken? - Then, with what aim is zero-replacement undertaken? The teacher undertakes zero-replacement, aiming at applying the rules determined by the affix (which is replaced by zero), but there is no scope for him to undertake the remainder-rule.”

By contrast, the special denotation of both somasut and of vrksāḥ, which contradicts the general pratyartham statement, is respectively defined as an effect which is produced by lopa (lopakrtam) and by ekaśeṣa (ekaśeṣakrtam). In other words, from the denotational point of view, they are perfectly comparable, since as the provision for zero-replacement assures the meaning-extension of the unit which is replaced by zero to zero itself, the provision for a remainder also assures the possibility of denoting the objects whose matching word-forms do not remain.

In the example mentioned above, the meaning of the whole analytic string (vigrāhavākya) vrksaṣ ca vrksaṣ ca vrksaṣ ca is denoted by the single plural form vrksāḥ ‘trees’, but even more
evidently in some other classical examples, such as the plural form *aksāh* of the polysemic noun *akṣa*- — which denotes an axle, a die and a rosary seed — corresponding to the prakriyā formula *akṣaś cākṣas cākṣaś ca*, instead of many axles or many rosary seeds and so on: *akṣaś cākṣaś cākṣaś ca > aksāh*.

Analogously, the dual *brāhmaṇau* may denote not only two male *brāhmaṇas* but also a male *brāhmaṇa* and a female *brāhmaṇa*, according to the rule *pumān striyā* (A 1.2.67). That is, a masculine term optionally occurs as a single remainder of two items with the same base meaning that only differ in that one denotes a male and the other a female: *brāhmaṇaś ca brāhmaṇī ca > brāhmaṇau*.

Moreover, even the meanings of two lexically distinct items, which, however, denote a male and female of the same type, can be optionally denoted just by the prior constituent of a compound inflected as a dual noun (or optionally by a dvandva compound); e.g., *pitarau* ‘mother and father, parents’: *pitā ca mātā ca > pitarau* “mother and father” / *mātāpitarau* (A 1.2.70 *pitā mātrā [anyatarasyām 69]*).

In fact, there is no contradiction at all between the *śabda-artha* correspondence and the ekaśeṣa procedure. Only if it is maintained that there is full correspondence between *śabda* and *artha* does the ekaśeṣa provision consistently entail that the meaning denoted by the whole series of terms (i.e. by the relevant prakriyā formula), has to be automatically extended to the remainder, so that more than one object is denoted by a single word form. Nonetheless, this would be the way a substitution works, since it ensures the meaning extension of the substituend (*sthānīn*) to the replacement (*ādeśa*), but this is contradicted by Patañjali and later commentators, as we shall see below.

As in the case of *lopa*, *ekaśeṣa* denotation works in the absence of a part of its perceptible input, because — as we have just seen

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18. Cf. KV 1.2.64 with M I.233: 2-4 (ad A 1.2.64).
— some parts of the meaning (artha) are comprehended (arthasya gatiḥ), even without employing the word-form denoting them (antarena api tadvācinaḥ śabdasya prayogam). This similarity of the ekaśeṣa device with the lopa device probably induced Deshpande (1985) to also classify the former one as a case of lopa, but I really wonder what principle underlies this sort of meaning extension.

In any case, the need for an additional rule to ensure the anekarthatā explained according to the vācanika explanation was rejected by Patañjali himself. Therefore it must depend on some existing rule. Moreover, a mere grammatical device taken apart from actual linguistic usage could not ensure a good shared and understandable denotation, just as a rule stating that a cow has to be called a horse and vice-versa would be in manifest contradiction with the ordinary usage. For this reason one mainly has to turn one’s attention to common usage.

M I.241:5-8 (ad vt. 29 on A 1.2.64): ucyeta tarhi na tu gamyeta / yo hi gāṃ aśva iti brūyād aśvain vā gaur iti na jātucit sampratyayāḥ syāt // tenānekārhābhidhāne yatnaṁ kurvatāvaśyaṁ lokah prṛṣṭhato ‘nugantavyaḥ / keśv artheṣu laukikāḥ kāṁ śabdān prayuñjate iti / loke caikasmin vrksa iti prayuñjate dvayor vrksāv iti bahuṣu vrksā iti “It could be stated (that the word form which remains, denotes two or many objects), but it would be not understood. If one calls a cow a horse or a horse a cow, there would possibly be no comprehension (of the intended sense). For this reason, whosoever makes the effort to denote more than one object has to follow common usage, by turning his attention to this (and by wondering): ‘Which words do common people use to denote which objects?’ In the common usage, vrksaḥ is employed in the case of a single object, vrksau, in the case of two objects, vrksāḥ in the case of many objects.”

Thus, the grammatical effort of describing this specific relationship between word form and its object merely aims at
providing the correct nominal ending, which is consequent to this passing over the general one-to-one principle, while denotation is independent from grammatical rules. As a consequence, Kātyāyana will conclude in vt. 33 (abhidhānam punah svābhāvikam) that “denotation is on the other hand autonomous”, after suggesting in vt. 32 the interesting comparison with dvandva compounds such as plakṣanyagrodhau.

3 Ekaśeṣa compared with dvanda compounds
This comparison, which is intentionally and explicitly propounded by Kātyāyana — whose vt. 32 and vt. 33 furthermore match almost word by word respectively with vt. 14 and vt. 15 on A 2.2.29 — is really enlightening.

M I.241:26-27 (vt. 32 ad A 1.2.64 [= M I.433:17-18 (vt. 14 ad A 2.2.29))]: ekenoktatvād aparasya prayogo ‘nupanna iti ced anuktatvāt plakṣeṇa nyagrodhasya nyagrodhaprayogaya “If it is said that because [the object] has already been denoted by one word form, usage of the other [word form] cannot arise, (the reply is that) there is usage of the word form nyagrodha because the object of nyagrodha has not already been denoted by the word form plakṣa.”

M I.242:4 (vt. 33 ad A 1.2.64): abhidhānam punah svābhāvikam “denotation is on the other hand autonomous” (cf. M I.433:25 [vt. 15 ad A 2.2.29]: abhidhānam ca punah svābhāvikam).

Actually, these two vārttikas on A 2.2.29 (cārthe dvandvah) conclude a long discussion about a problem tackled in vt. 1. In fact, since rule A 2.2.29 teaches the formation of compounds called

19. M I.242:4 (vt. 33 ad A 1.2.64). This assertion of course suggests the rejection of the sūtra, as conclusively advanced by Kātyāyana but not by Patañjali. Vts. 34-35 reinforce Kātyāyana’s position on the matter. In particular, vt. 35 states that if a word denotes a class property (ākṛtyabhidhanāt), even the possiblity of using more than one speech form completely vanishes. For a clear and detailed synthesis of the long and complex discussion by Kātyāyana and Patañjali on A 1.2.64, see Scharf 1996: 40-58.
dvandva under the meaning-condition of ca, even when the compound is not formed, a possible undesired involvement of this name dvandva occurs, because the meaning of ca is understood (although the word ca is not used). A possible solution is advanced early in vt. 2, which proposes a different phrasing of the sūtra itself: yugapad-adhikaraṇa-vacane instead of cārthe. A dvandva would be accordingly formed, only provided that each single constituent refers to both the denoted items simultaneously. Hence these kinds of compounds are considered from a very peculiar point of view. In fact, in a compound like plakṣa-nyagrodha- (nom.-acc. du. plakṣanyagrodhau) the prior constituent plakṣa- is also supposed to denote the object denoted by the other, i.e. the nyagrodha, and vice versa. However, a fresh shortcoming arises: in this case the word form denoting nyagrodha

21. M I.431:6 (vt. 2 ad A 2.2.29): siddham tu yugapadadhikaraṇa-vacane dvandvakacane “But this is solved if a dvandva rule is taught under this (following condition): when the objects meant are simultaneously referred to (by each single constituent).”
22. This view is generally opposed to the view of denotation of meanings in sequence (paurvāparya).
23. In order to keep the general statement about the per-object (pratyartham) denotation as valid, vts. 30 and 31 state that even one word denoting many objects is still precisely per object: vt. 30: pratyartham śabdaniyavesād ekenānekasyābhidhānād apratyartham iti cet tad api pratyartham eva “If it is said that it is so (i.e., that one word cannot denote many objects) from the fact that words apply per object, (the reply is that) the application of words is actually stated per object”; vt. 31: yāvatām abhidhānam tāvatām prayogo nṝṇya iti ced ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānām “If it is said that it is a common practice that as many word forms are used as there are objects to be denoted, (the reply is that) it is also a common practice that more than one object is denoted just by one word form”. This argumentation of course relies on the avyayībhāva nature of the compound pratyartham itself, which can be supposed as derived from prati followed by a second pada which is inflected in the singular, dual or plural number, so that pratyartham could convey the sense of application of a word form to one object or to two objects or to many objects. As a consequence, the statement in question might include some specific but ordinary linguistic usage such as ekaśeṣa denotation itself or other apparent exceptions like this.
itself could not be used anymore, according to the recurring grammarians’ statement that a word form can be used only if its meaning has not yet been conveyed (uktārthānām aprayogaḥ). Vt. 15 ad A 2.2.29, which has just been quoted as corresponding to vt. 33 on A 1.2.64, is the final and conclusive view about the proposal of the so-called yugapad-adhikaraṇa-vacanatā view of a dvandva, which will finally be declared by Patañjali to be painful and hard to justify.24 In fact, the simultaneous reference to the sense of plakṣa and nyagrodha, both by the word form plakṣa and by the word form nyagrodha, could only be accepted provided that the former member of the compound does not stand for the latter one without it and vice versa, even though each single word form aims at denoting the meaning of the whole pair. Otherwise, the analytical string including both word forms could not be justified. In fact we would know the meaning of plakṣa but we could not know why nyagrodha is used, since the former pada already denotes the latter object too. In fact, differently from the classic examples of ekaśeṣa, since it deals with two words whose form and meaning are completely different, it is impossible to guess which is the latter member, merely on the basis of the former, unless ordinary linguistic usage currently registers this combination.

Thus, Patañjali mentions two intriguing options in the use of śabdas: they can potentially stand for an object (arthā) which is prāthamakalpika, that is, for an object which is primarily conceived as it is, or merely for some activity or quality of this object, which is shared by another object. As a consequence, we can use the word form plakṣa in order to denote a tree of the genus ficus infectoria or even to compare, e.g., a ficus indica (nyagrodha) with a ficus infectoria (plakṣa) because of some shared features of these two trees.25 Therefore, by always using the dual plakṣau we

24 M I.434:3 (ad vt. 15 on A 2.2.29): iyaṁ yugapadadhikaranavacanatā duḥkhā ca durupapādā ca.
25. M I.433:25-26 (ad vt. 15 on A 2.2.29): atha veha kaucit prāthamakalpikau plakṣanyagrodhau kaucit kriyayā vā guṇena vā plakṣa ivāyaṁ plakṣe nyagrodha
would be able to denote two plakṣas, as a current dual-inflected noun, and one plakṣa and one nyagrodha, as if it were an ekaśeṣa. Nevertheless, if we want to avoid the doubt derived from these two options, we have to prefer the dvandva plakṣa-nyagrodha, that is, to also perceptibly use the word nyagrodha and this preference is merely determined by the indisputable fact that daily usage does not support the latter possibility. It is a noteworthy coincidence that the only two occurrences of this already highlighted term svabhāvika by Katyāyana are included here precisely in the commentary on the ekaśeṣa rule (vt. 33 ad A 1.2.64), and in the context of dvandva compounds (vt. 15 ad A 2.2.29), which is compared with it here. Actually, these two formation-rules overlap to a great extent: their vigraha and the conveyed meaning are largely coincident with each other. The respective final word forms are different, governed by different morphological procedures merely in accordance with everyday usage. As a consequence, in both cases, at least from Katyāyana’s and Patañjali’s point of view, there is surely no bi-univocal correspondence between artha and śabda; that is, their respective abhidhāna mostly coincides, even though their morphological features diverge from each other.

With regard to Pāṇini’s view, in conclusion, I shall try to assume that ekaśeṣa and dvandva rules (or better, compound rules in general) are simply two operatively distinct substitution rules.

ivāyaṁ nyagrodha iti “In fact there are some words which stand for an object which is primarily conceived as it is, such as plakṣanyagrodha, some other words which stand for some activity or quality of this object, which is like that which pertains to another object. If ficus infectoria (plakṣa) is mentioned, it could be in the sense of ‘like a ficus infectoria’. If ficus indica (nyagrodha) is mentioned, it could be in the sense of ‘like a ficus indica’.”

26. M 1.433:26-434.2 (ad vt. 15 on A 2.2.29): tatra plakṣāv ity ukte saṁdehah syāt kim imai plakṣāv evāhosvit plakṣanyagrodhāv iti / tatrāsaṁdehārtham nyagrodhaśabdaḥ prayañjyate “Therefore if plakṣau is said, there could be the doubt, whether it deals with two plakṣas or with a plakṣa and a nyagrodha. In order to avoid this doubt, the word nyagrodha is also used.
Rule A 2.1.1 is a governing rule for the derivational procedure (prakriyas) of some derivates, referred to as vṛtti. If we continue to follow the pattern of discussion raised by commentaries on the nature of the denotation of compounds and other vṛttis,27 we find another important Mahābhāṣya context involving this category of the svabhāva feature of abhidhāna: the commentary on A 2.1.1: samarthāḥ padavidhiḥ, commonly interpreted as “A provision concerning inflected words [is said] of words having semantic and syntactic connection (samartha)”28 and traditionally considered a heading (adhikāra sūtra) or metarule (paribhāṣā) which teaches the so-called samartha principle for all compounds or even for all the types of vṛtti.29

Of course the discussion of this long commentary goes beyond the scope of the present communication. It is interesting, however, that with a different formulation, which nonetheless involves the term svabhāva, the principle of the one-to-one application of word forms is again questioned by Kātyāyana in precisely this context. In particular, Kātyāyana does indeed propose an interpretation of the category of samartha, looking for a synonym of samartha that is more suitable for compounds. Thus, vt. 1 tells us that samartha refers to the merging in a single integrated meaning (ekārthībhāva) of words having separate objects (prthagarthānām):30 prthagarthānām.

27. These are compounds (saṃśāra), derivates with kṛt and taddhita affixes, derivative verbal bases, single remainder (ekaśeṣa) and a nominal and a following vocative being treated as a single accentual unit (paraṅgavadbhāva). As is well-known, not all commentators include the last two in the category.
28. Cf. the interpretation by Cardona (1997: 66 [§ 109]): “an operation pertaining to padas applies to padas that are syntactically and semantically related”; by Katre (1987: 105): “An operation on padas (takes effect) only when they are semantically and syntactically connected”; by Sharma (1995: vol. 3:1): “An operation concerning fully inflected words is to be syntactically related”. 29. Patañjali considers the rule itself as an adhikāra, i.e. working only for compounds, yet he is also open to a wider application of the sāmarthya principle for all the vṛttis, treating it as a paribhāṣā.
30. As is well known, this term constitutes a pair together with vyāpeksa ‘the mutual expectation / connection’ mainly focused as the distinctive samartha feature for sentences (vākya / vibhaktividhiṇa).
nām ekārthībhāvaḥ samarthavacanam (M I.361:26 [vt. 1 ad A 2.1.1]) “The expression samartha is the merging in a single integrated meaning of words having separate objects.”

According to Patañjali’s examples, this proposed ekārthībhāva could describe the phenomenon according to which, in a sentence such as rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ, the separated objects of the words stay as such, while the compound rājapuruṣaḥ denotes one single object, namely a royal servant. Thus the distinction between the analytical and the synthetical form is so sharp that it entails the autonomous (svabhāva) formation of both.

M I.364:1 (vt. 2 ad A 2.1.1): vāvacanānarthakyaṁ ca svabhāvasiddhatvāt “And the expression of optionality could be vain because of the established autonomous feature [of padas].”

This could therefore lead, as suggested by vt. 2, to the rejection of the optionality, which, on the contrary, Pāṇini teaches elsewhere; for example a string of padas is taught as optional with respect to a compound by A 2.1.11 (vibhāṣā), to a desiderative verb by A 3.1.7 (dhātoḥ karmanāḥ samānakartṛtykād icchāyāṁ vā), to a taddhita by A 4.1.82 (samarthānāṁ prathamād vā). In fact, no option can subsist between a vākyā and a vṛtti if their denotation is not equivalent.

Furthermore here too, once again in the context of the problem addressed with respect to the dissymmetry between the semantic and the phono-morphological level of language, the topic of the number of the padas obtained by composition is introduced by vt. 3, because it could not correspond to the number of objects

31. Patañjali also mentions (M I.364:23-4 [ad vt. 2 ad A 2.1.1]) another interpretation of the samartha condition: bheda versus saṁsarga, that is, respectively as an expression of the meaning by means of distinct words or while they are related to each other: aparā āha / bhedasamsargau vā sāmarthyam iti.

32. M I.361:28 (ad vt. 1 on A 2.1.1): vākye prthagy arthāni / rājñāḥ puruṣa iti / samāse punar ekārthāni / rājapuruṣa iti “In a sentence, objects are separated: e.g. the man/servant of the king; on the other hand, in a compound, objects constitute a single object: e.g. the royal servant.”
involved in the corresponding analytical string (vigrahavākyā). At this point, it seems to be clear that the abhidhāna which raises problems and induces Kātyāyana and Patañjali to depict it as an autonomous feature of words — i.e., independent from their morphological constituent analysis (svabhāvika) — really pertains to the dissymmetry between the combination of inflected padas which constitute the vigrahavākyā and the newly formed pada. Nevertheless, both of these might have failed to appreciate what their problem really was with the vṛtti, so that they meet some difficulties in interpreting A 2.1.1, and vt. 18 even proposes a new wording as samarthānām padavidhiḥ, on which the current translation, questioned above, is based.

By contrast, if samarthāḥ padavidhiḥ simply teaches that “A provision which depends on (/involves/mentions) inflected words denotes the same object [of the output of rule]”, the target becomes the equivalence of the denotation which is taught by the formation-rule and the output of the formation itself, i.e. between

33 M I.365:7 (vt. 3 ad A 2.1.1): saṃghātaṣyaikārthyaḥ nāvayavasamkhyātah subutaptiḥ “if there is just one single word object for the collection, there is no question of production of the case endings following the number of the constituent parts.” As far as the specific terminology is concerned and its possible Sarvastivādin source see Candotti-Pontillo 2010: 43; n. 8-10, 49, n. 33. With regard to the term svabhāva in the history of Buddhism, see Cox 2004 and Tillemans 2007; for saṃghāta, see Bronkhorst 1987.
34. M I.369:10 (vt. 18 ad A 2.1.1): siddhaṁ tu samarthānām iti vacanāt.
35. samartha is overtly explained as tulyārtha in the Kāśikāvaṛti on A 1.3.42: propābhyaṁ samarthābhyām. With regard to the etymology, since the word form which is expected is actually samārtha and not samartha in the sense of ‘whose meaning is equivalent’, Joshi-Roodbergen 1994: 70-71 also recall two possibilities, the first of which is suggested by the Padamaṇjarī, which recalls vt. 4 (sakandhādīṣu ca) ad A 6.1.94 (eṇi pararūpam “A single substitute i.e. the latter of two contiguous phonemes [replaces both the former phoneme-class a as a final phoneme of a pre-verb and the latter one, i.e.] a vowel e or o”) in order to extend the list sakandhādi to the nominal base samartha. The relevant note for the second supposed explanation by Joshi-Roodbergen (1994: 71) is: “Alternatively, the form can be derived as sam + artha in which sam means sama.” I wonder if they hint at A 6.3.84-7 which teach the substitution of samāna ‘equal, common, similar’ with sa- in various contexts or at some other rule which they omit to quote.
the *vigraha* enunciated or suggested by *vṛtti*-rules and the newly formed (and then inflected) *pada*. Thus, moving from the everyday linguistic setting to the metalinguistic one, the targeted equivalence of A 2.1.1 might include all the cases where this dissymmetry between the denotative and the phono-morphological level of language is apparent,\(^{36}\) provided that the relevant rules teach that specific denotation.\(^{37}\) In other words this equivalence is independent from the need of supplying some words more than the segmented constituents and it is furthermore indifferent to the nature attributed to the relationship among the constituents of the uncompounded string, if this relationship is classified as either ekārthibhāva or vyāpeksā. Thus the questioned abhidhāna would not be svabhāva but consistently predicted by means of the vigrahavākya.

This interpretation of A 2.1.1 is not unprecedented, since Joshi-Roodbergen (1996: 1) translated the rule, “An operation involving finished words conveys the same meaning”, signalling that this fresh translation “deviates substantially from the two translations offered” in their work published eighteen years before (Joshi-Roodbergen 1968: 1). In fact, these two translations, matching the two different traditional classifications of this rule as an adhikāra and a paribhāṣā, agree with the current translation expounded above. As Joshi-Roodbergen (1996: 1) remark, the fresh translation is based on the five other Pāṇini occurrences of the term *samartha*, four of which — that is, in A 1.3.42; 2.3.57; 3.3.152 and 8.1.65 — self-evidently mean “which conveys the same meaning”, and the last of which (A 4.1.82) deals once again with a *vṛtti*, exactly as in the case of A 2.1.1. They conclude (1996: 1-2):

36. It might even imply the metaphorical level of meaning - see e.g. the meaning of *plakṣaḥ* as ‘like a plakṣa’ supposed by Patañjali (see above).
37. Cf. Bronkhorst 1987b: 297: “His (= Pāṇini’s) grammar ... does not primarily attempt to describe the surface forms of the Sanskrit language, it rather shows how these surface forms manifest the real elements underlying them, the grammatical elements which directly express the meanings to be expressed.” Cf. Bronkhorst 1981.
“Here both the non-integrated wordgroup and the newly derived, integrated word are regarded as meaning-equivalents. By the non-integrated wordgroup what is meant in this connection is the formally corresponding wordgroup as represented by the technical constituent analysis, the alaukikavigrahavākya, not the meaning-paraphrase, the laukikavigrahavākya”.


The focus of these expressions is regularly some unit mentioned in the rules themselves, no matter if this unit constitutes the object or the condition of the rule itself. By means of the compounds x-vidhi, Pāṇini seems to merely point to a starting “level”, which represents the real consistency of the rule taken as a sentence. Thus, this lexically internal evidence reinforces the supposition that padavidhi in A 2.1.1 refers to a provision that depends on padas, almost by mentioning them; a detail which is only indirectly highlighted by Joshi and Roodbergen (1996), who — as we have seen above — propose to replace, as a second term of the abhidhāna equivalence in question, the laukikavigrahavākya with

38. Pāṇini seems to point to defining the crucial term anga which governs the section A 6.4.1-7.4.97. Note that a number of Kātāyāna’s dosas relative to the discussion of A 1.1.56 can be solved merely by literally taking into account the term anga, mentioned in the wording of the rules in question. Note also the quasi-coincidence with the section (A 6.1-8.1) which Buiskool (1939: 19) considered the object of the supposed sarvartra siddham principle.
the *alaukikavigrahavākya*, i.e. with the string of *padas* taught as *vigraha*.

Further, in my opinion, there is more to this than simply changing the reference string on which the *vr̥ttis* are based — if we consider A 2.1.1 to be a paribhāṣā rule. First of all, the equivalence taught by A 2.1.1 has to be restricted to the types of *vr̥tti* which are actually taught by means of a rule which mentions a string of *padas*.

For instance, as is well known, sūtras devoted to the formation of compounds as a rule indicate two *padas*, in accordance with the pattern taught by the heading A 2.1.4 (*saha supā [sup 2]*): an *upasarjana* expressed by a nominative and a non-*upasarjana* by an instrumental form. For example, in A 2.1.34: *annena vyañjanam* “A *pada* denoting a flavor (*vyañjanam* [= *upasarjana]*) combines with a *pada* denoting food (*annena* [= non-*upasarjana]*)”, this pair of inflected nominal forms is represented by two common nouns, *vyañjana* and *anna*. With regard to the specific classical example *dadhyodanaḥ*, the constituent *padas* *dadhi* and *odanaḥ* would have to be considered in a way hyponyms of *vyañjanam* and *annam*. Nonetheless, yogurt (*dadhi*) is not lexically a *vyañjana* by nature. By contrast, the meaning handed down by Patañjali himself (on the basis of vt. 4) — *dadhnopasikta odanaḥ* ‘rice sprinkled with yogurt’ — actually corresponds to the general combination expressed as *annena vyañjanam*, since, for instance, yogurt is

39. Furthermore, this seems to contradict Kiparsky’s (1982; 2002) distinction of different linguistic levels in the system of Pāṇini’s grammar. By contrast, it is consistent with Cardona’s (2009: 14) explanation of Pāṇini’s derivational grammar not as a ‘compartmentalized system’ but rather as ‘a continuum starting from meanings that a speaker is to convey through to utterances’. Indeed these rules are organized following the units they mention, not in terms of levels to which or from which they map. Often — and there is an increasing awareness in Kiparsky’s position itself — not all the parts of a rule pertain to the same level. See e.g. A 7.2.35 *ārdhadhātukasyeṇ valādeḥ* that uses a unit which belongs at the same time to level 3 (“abstract morphological representation”), *ārdhadhātuka* affix], and 4 (“phonological output form”), an affix beginning with a semivowel except *y*. 
understood as a flavoring for any kind of food, if the noun *dadhi* is used to express an instrument (*dadhnā*) connected to the passive participle *upasiktah* ‘sprinkled with’. In this sense the vidhi A 2.1.34, which depends on the two padas mentioned (*annena vyañjanam*), shares the same meaning of the compounds which it goes on to form, such as *dadhyodanaḥ* which denotes a kind of food, namely *odanaḥ*, whose condiment is precisely the *dadhi*.

Additionally, albeit from a different point of view, it is a fact that *dadhyodanaḥ* is an option with respect to the string *dadhmopasikta odanah*, but this optionality, whose maintenance Kātyāyana (vt. 2 ad A 2.1.1) is so worried about, is indeed taught elsewhere by means of Pāṇini’s specific technical terms (*vā, vibhāsā, anyatarasyām*). Of course, both these options are based on everyday language and as a consequence, a speaker might feel the compound as a shorter or even elliptical substitute for the matching analytical sentence, which is not always literally enunciated in the formation rule. Nonetheless, this optionality does not depend on rule A 2.1.1.

An easier case is that of a ātṛpuruṣa, such as *vṛkabhayaṃ* ‘fear of wolves’ or *rājapuruṣaḥ* ‘king’s man, royal servant’, whose relevant formation rules are A 2.1.37: *pañcamī bhayena* and A 2.2.8: *śaśṭhī* respectively. In accordance with the general formula taught by A 2.1.4: [*sup* *saha supā*, padas with fifth and sixth vibhaktis are regularly mentioned in the rule as upasajarana padas in the nominative case and the second pada, in the instrumental case, is the generic *supā* and *bhayena* respectively. Thus the crucial feature of being a padavidhi, as a rule depending on padas, is

40. With regard to the option between a string (*vākya*) and a compound (*samāsā*) taught by the anuvṛtti of *vā* included in A 2.1.18 and the denial of the traditional yogavibhāga of *vibhāsā* included in A 2.1.11, see Kiparsky 1979: 39 and Radicchi 1985, 1988: II.56-58. On the contrary Cardona 1997: 219 (§ 316) maintains that *vibhāsā* “could remain a heading to be understood in subsequent sūtras, just as *ātmanepadam* of A 1.3.12 is understood to recur in a long series of sūtras that follow”, therefore independently from the yogavibhāga. With regard to a short comparison with other modern descriptive models of compounds, based on this option, see also Pontillo 2005: 228-35.
ensured for all these compounding rules by the formula supplied by the adhikāra 2.1.4, that is, padam saha padena.

Analogously with respect to taddhitas, the set of padas such as A 4.1.92: tasyāpatyam suggests exactly the equivalent of a taddhita as far as the meaning is concerned. For instance, upagor apatyam is the meaning of aupagavaḥ. Both the syntagma and the derivate can denote one of Upagu’s descendants. Once again the fact that it deals with two concurring expressions from the syntactical point of view, is of course not determined by A 2.1.1, but the equivalence between these two expressions is granted by the string of padas mentioned in the relevant taddhita rule. Furthermore, it is tempting to consider aupagavaḥ as a sort of replacement (ādeśa) with respect to the samartha string of padas upagor apatyam, especially after focusing on the non-prescribed substitutions, which compulsorily have to be taken for a given datum, being explicitly mentioned as conditions for some other rules. Furthermore, the initial genitive samarthānam in the general taddhita rule A 4.1.82: samarthānam pathamād vā seems to suggest this substitution frame, as if it taught “In the place of the padas which convey the same meaning (on which the relevant taddhita rule depends, by mentioning them) (according to A 2.1.1) (in order to form a taddhita-final base) [a taddhita affix] is optionally introduced after their first pada”.

As regards single remainders (ekaśeṣa) and the strict relationship between the vigraha taught by each ekaśeṣa rule as an input and their corresponding output, the hypothesis here advanced consists in interpreting them as a case of substitution. For instance, according to A 1.2.70 which depends on the padas pitā mātrā, the denotation of this group of padas is equivalent to pitarau. Once again the initial genitive sārūpānām of A 1.2.64: sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau seems to suggest — in just the same way as samarthānām of A 4.1.82 — a substitution frame for the ekaśeṣa procedure too, something that is explicitly denied by tradition.
“Where the sense is intended although the corresponding speech unit is not employed”: the ekaśeṣa case

M I.233:7-12 ad A 1.2.64: atha śesagrahaṇam kimartham / sarūpāṇām eka ekavibhaktāv ityaty ucyamāna ādesō 'yaṁ vijñāyeta⁴¹ / tatra ko doṣah / aśvaścāśväśvau / āntaryato dvyaḍāttavataḥ sthānino dvyaḍāttavān ādesaḥ prasajyeta / lopyalopitā ca na prakalpate / tatra ko doṣah / gargaḥ vatsāḥ / bidāḥ urvāḥ / aṅ yo bahuṣu yaṅ yo bahuṣv ity ucyamāno lug na prāpnoti / mā bhūd evam / añantam yad bahuṣu yaṅantam yad bahuṣv ity evam bhaviṣyati / naivaṁ śakyam / iha hi doṣah syāt / kāśyaparatikṛtayaḥ kāśyapā iti “- Then, for what purpose is the mention of śeṣa made? If it is said that ‘Just one of a possible series of items having the same form occurs, as a single remainder, provided that a single ending is used’, the rule would be recognized as a substitution. In this case, what is the fault? Āśvaḥ ‘horse’ and aśvaḥ ‘horse’ are aśvau two horses”. Since the substituend has two high pitched sounds, a substitute with two high pitched sounds might automatically be involved, because of its close relationship.⁴² And that which has to be zeroed would not succeed in being zeroed. In this case, what is the fault? [In order to form e.g. these paddas] gargāḥ and vatsāḥ or bidāḥ and urvāḥ.⁴³ The LUK-zero-replacement which is stated

⁴¹. The genitive form sarūpāṇām is interpreted as a sthānin in accordance with A 1.1.49: saṣṭhī sthāneyogā.
⁴³. According to A 4.1.104 anṛṣyānantarye bidādibhyo ’ni, both after bida and after urva the affix a囡 applies to denote a gotra descendant, or an immediate descendant provided that it does not deal with a rṣī, so that baiḍah and aurvah are respectively the name of a gotra descendant of Bida and of Urva; analogously, according to A 4.1.105: gargādibhyo yaṅ, after both gargā and vatsa the affix ya囡 applies to denote a gotra descendant, so that gārgyāh and vatsyaḥ are respectively the name of a gotra descendant of Garga and of Vatsa. A 2.4.64: yaṅaṅṅoṣ ca also teaches a LUK-zero replacement of the affixes ya囡 and a囡 concerning a gotra name (gotre 63) used to denote a plurality (bahuṣu 62) which only has to do with such an affix meaning (tenaiḥa 62) except in the feminine (astraṃṇaḥ 62), so that the plural names quoted by Pataṅjali, namely gargāḥ, vatsāḥ, bidāḥ and urvāḥ are plural names designating the group of all
when $a\ddot{N}$ is in the plural sense and when $ya\ddot{N}$ is in the plural sense could not be obtained. 44 - Let it not be so! On the contrary it will be thus: ‘That which ends in $ya\ddot{N}$ in the plural sense and that which ends in $a\ddot{N}$ in the plural sense’. 45 - It cannot be so. In this case there would really be gotra descendants of Garga, Vatsaḥ, Bidaḥ and Urvaḥ, respectively, almost as if gargaḥ etc. were used aiming at denoting the official representative descendant of Garga and all descendants who are represented by him. The argument of the sūtra-proposer is explained in a more complex way in P on A 1.2.64 (1.2.98): lopasambandho na prāṇaśīrthaḥ / gargaḥ iti / prakṛṭir arthābhedaḥ ekaiva / yaṃpratayāḥ tu bahavahā / yaṃākṛteś ca ekavāda vyavadhānābābhāvād anekasyāpi pratyayasya paratvām na virudhyate / tatra garga ya ya iti sthite yadā gargaśabdaṁ muktvā prayatyanām evaiko yaśabda ṛdeśaḥ kriyate tadā tasya bahvarthatvāluk sidhyati / yadā tu virīpānām api samānārthānām ekaśeṣavad eka ṛdeśaḥ sapakrītikah kriyate tatra garga ya ity asvānyayaś ca ‘yaśabdayor gargaśabdaḥ ṛdeśaḥ “The meaning is that the relationship with the zero-replacement could not be obtained. With regard to gargaḥ, the base is just one because of the non-difference of meaning, but the affixes yaḥ are many. And since there is only one generic form yaḥ and absence of anything which intervenes (between the nominal base and this form), the fact that more than one affix follows is not excluded. In this case in the place of garga followed by three ya, after leaving the word-form garga, when just one word-form ya applies as a substitute of the affixes, then LUK is realized because of the plural meaning of this affix. On the contrary, when only garga ya, as a single substitute along with the base, takes place as a substitute of many word forms, with the same meaning but different form, such as an ekaśeṣa, the word form garga ya is a substitute in the place of garga ya and of the other two ya.” With regard to the interpretation of tenaiva in A 2.4.62 ff., see Cardona 1997: 308 (§ 465), who does not make use of the process taught in A 1.1.72. Somehow, the sūtra’s proponent and rejector also rely on the ambiguity of tenaiva connected to the condition of the plural denotation bahuṣu, which is meant as a modifier to the affix or to the nominal base, for their following discussion about the risk of interpreting A 1.2.64 as an ṛdeśa rule.

44. If gārgyāḥ designates a plurality, namely the gotra descendants of Garga by means of an ekaśeṣa procedure according to A 1.2.64 and this ekaśeṣa formation is considered as a substitute, so that the plurality is conveyed by the whole form gārgyā- before the plural ending. The affix yaḥ of the form gārgyāḥ, does not convey the sense of plurality, which here is assumed to be required as a condition for the LUK-replacement taught by A 2.4.64. This is the reason mentioned by the sūtra’s proponent, in order to exclude that ekaśeṣa is a substitution-rule.

45. Thus, the sūtra’s rejecter denies that the plurality condition taught by A 2.4.64 has to be referred only to the affix yaḥ instead of to the whole form
a fault: kāśyapaḥ would denote many images of Kāśyapa.”

The last counter-objection propounded by the sūtra-proponent which should manage to persuade the sūtra-rejector not to consider the ekaśeṣa as a substitution rule is in fact rejected by Patañjali himself. Actually, the affix aN of kāśyapaḥ meaning ‘images of the gotra descendant of Kāśyapa’ denotes no plurality. In fact, Kāśyapa is only one and his images are many. Furthermore, M gārgya, by relying on A 1.1.72: yena vidhīs tadantasya “The unit by means of which a provision is made denotes a unit which ends in that unit.” Cf. P on A 1.2.64 (1.2.98-99): tatra yaśabdāntasya bahusu vṛttīḥ na tu pratyayamātrasyeti bhāvaḥ / yaḥantam yad bahuṣv iti / ādesāpakṣe ’pi vacanasāmarthāti sārūpyād yaḥbuddhyutpādād yaḥantam etad ity āśṛīyate “In this case the vṛtti of that which ends in the word form ya is in the sense of plurality, but this is not a condition of the mere affix. With regard to ‘that which ends in yaN is in the sense of plurality’: once again from the substitution point of view, by dint of its mention, because of the same form, and since the cognition of yaN is produced, it resorts to that which ends in yaN (as an ādesa).”

46. According to A 5.3.96: ive prakṛṭtau (kan 95), the affix kaN would occur after a nominal base when an image similar to what the nominal base denotes, is to be denoted, but A 5.3.99: jīvikārthe cāpanye (lup 98) teaches a LUP zero replacement of this affix when it is intended for earning a living, though not through its sale. Therefore kāśyapaḥ can denote an image similar to Kāśyapa, whose name is formed according to A 4.1.104 (see n. 43), i.e., by means of the affix aN taught to denote a gotra descendant. If A 1.1.72 is taken into account and the ekaśeṣa procedure is applied, the plural form kāśyapaḥ might be subject to a LUK zero replacement in accordance with A 2.4.64, since an affix aN occurs and that which ends in this affix denotes a plurality. Cf. P on A 1.2.64 (1.2.99): kāśyapā iti / kāśyapa ivāyan tatpratikṛtīrt itīve pratikṛtvā iti vihitasya kano jīvikārthe cāpanye iti lup / tataḥ kāśyapas ca kāśyapaś ca kāśyapaś ceti pratikṛtipracayavivakṣāyām ekaḥ kāśyapaśabdaḥ prayujyate / sa bahvarthe 'nantaṃceti lukprasangāh / laukikasya gotrasya tatra grahamam iti parihāra uttaratra vakṣyate itīha noktaḥ “With regard to kāśyapaḥ, according to A 5.3.99 jīvikārthe cāpanye ‘If the object denoted is an image when it is intended for earning a living, though not through its sale’, zero replacement occurs in the place of the affix kaN taught after a nominal base to denote an image similar to that which is denoted by the nominal base kāśyapa. Therefore, when it is desired to denote a multiplicity of these images, i.e., kāśyapaś ca kāśyapaś ca kāśyapaś ca, only one word form kāśyapa- is employed. And this is a [word form]) ending in aN in the plural sense: there is a potential involvement of LUK zero replacement. The exclusion (of this fault) will be stated elsewhere, since there is a mention of the current sense of gotra; thus it is not enunciated here.”
I.238:24-28 (ad vt. 20 on A 1.2.64) underlines how A 2.4.64 includes the denotation of a gotra among its conditions and this is not relevant for the example of kāśyapāḥ:

mā bhūd evam / aṅantaṁ yad bahuṣu yaṅantaṁ yad bahuṣv
ity evam bhaviṣyati / nanu coktaṁ naivaṁ śakyam iha hi
doṣah syāt kāśyapapratikrtayaḥ kāśyapāḥ iti / naiṣa doṣah /
laukikasya tatra gotrasya grahaṇaṁ na ca ital laukikam
gotraṁ / athavā punar astv ekā prakṛtir bahavaś ca yaṅah /
nanu coktam asārūpyād ekaśeṣo na prāpnotiti “Let it not
be so! On the contrary it will be so: ‘That which ends in
yaNA in the plural sense and that which ends in aNA in
the plural sense.’ Nonetheless it is said: ‘It cannot be so. Here
there would be a fault, when it is said kāśyapāḥ as ‘many
images of Kāśyapaḥ’. Here there is a mention of the
current denotation of gotra. On the contrary this (kāśyapāḥ)
is not a current name of a gotra. Or better, once again let
there be a only nominal base and many yaNA!”.'47

Thus only the first shortcoming is not refuted anywhere by Patañjali and consistently the Kāśikāvatī only quotes this one. Nevertheless the accentuation of sthāṇin should be included among the provisions dependent on phonemes; that is, the fact of having
two high-pitched sounds is a vidhi of sthāṇin which cannot be
extended to the ādeśa aśvau in accordance with the
sthāṇivadbhāva-rule. Therefore, there is no fault if the ekaśeṣa-
rule which determines the formation of aśvau for aśvaścāśvaś ca is
considered as an ādeśa-rule.

Analogously, with regard to the example presented by Cardona
(1997:11), i.e., the dual nominative / accusative form gārgyau
which designates Gārgya (the elder descendant of Garga) and
Gārgyāyaṇa (the younger descendant of Garga) together, according

47. Cf. M 1.492:12-15 (ad vt. 8 on A 2.4.62): mā bhūd evam aṅ yo bahuṣu yaṅ
yo bahuṣv iti / aṅantaṁ yad bahuṣu yaṅantaṁ yad bahuṣv ity evam bhaviṣyati /
nanu coktaṁ naivaṁ śakyam iha hi doṣah syāt kāśyapapratikrtayaḥ kāśyapāḥ iti /
naiṣa doṣah / laukikasya tatra gotrasya grahaṇaṁ na ca ital laukikam gotram.
to A 1.2.65: *vṛddho yūnā tallaṅkaṃ ca eva viśeṣḥ* ("When a
derivate denoting the elder descendant combines with one denoting
the younger descendant of a *gotra*, only the former remains,
provided that the only denotation difference between the two units
is this [i.e. the different age]"). The nominal base of the first name
is derived by applying the taddhita suffix *yaN* in accordance with
the sūtra A 4.1.105 cited above. Its first vowel is high-pitched
according to A 6.1.197: *ṭīṇityādir nityam*. The nominal base
*gaṛgyaṇa*- is derived by applying the taddhita suffix *phaK* in
accordance with A 4.1.101: *yaṃnAca*, ("[The taddhita-affix
*phaK*] occurs after a nominal base ending in *yaN* and *iN* to denote
a gotra descendant"). Its final vowel is high-pitched according to
A 6.1.165: *kitaḥ* (antodattaḥ 159 taddhitasya 164) ("The final
vowel of a nominal base ending in a taddhita affix with marker *K*
is high-pitched").

If *gaṛgyau* is treated as a substitute of the two names
mentioned, there is the possibility of applying the accentuation of
the substituend (*sthānin*) to the replacement (*ādeśa*) according to A
1.1.56. According, if the niyama *analvidhau* of A 1.1.56 is literally
taken into account, A 6.1.165 is an alvidhi, as is each rule which

48. See Cardona 1997: 11: "In accordance with the usual convention governing
replacements, the substitute would have the properties of substituends.
Consequently, although the base in question should have a high-pitched initial
vowel only, one would allow a substitute *gaṛgya* with high pitch not only on its
first vowel but also on its suffix, or on both." Cf. Sharma 1990: II.134: "The
*šeṣa* is used to indicate that *ekaśeṣa* is not *ādeśa* ‘replacement’ in place of the
similar forms. This means that the genitive of *sarūpaṇāṃ* has to be interpreted
not as a *sthānaśaṣṭhi*, or genitive denoting ‘in place of’ (I.1.49 *ṣaṣṭhi
sthāneyogā*). It should rather be interpreted as the genitive of specification
(*nirdhārana*), thereby giving the meaning ‘one from among many which are
similar in form’. These kinds of comments agree with KV 1.2.64: *śeṣagrahaṇam kim? ādeśo mā bhūt;* and with PM 1.2.64 (I.378-379): *ādeśo mā
bhūt / asati śeṣagrahaṇe saṣṭhi sthāneyogā iti vacanāt sthānaṣaṣṭhi syāt, tataḥ
cādeśaḥ syād / astu; śabdato’rthataḥ cāntaratam bhavisyati / sarūpaṇāṃ iti
sthānaṣaṣṭhi syāt / naivam śakyam / svare hi doṣaḥ syāt / dvayor asvaśaśabdayoh
samudāyah sthāni / tatra ca dvāv udāttāv iti dvyudāttā ādeśāḥ syāt / etena
dvyanudāttatvam vyākyātām.
provides for the accentuation of a vowel. 49 As a consequence, this transference of the accentuation of the sthānin to the ādeśa is precisely blocked by A 1.1.56 and there is no fault in classifying ekaśeṣa rules as substitution rules.

By contrast, in my opinion, the mention śeṣa is rather necessary to provide for a phono-morphological feature — the accentuation of the ekaśeṣa formation — which is not taught elsewhere, since these ādeśas governed by the ekaśeṣa rules are not directly taught. In fact we know, e.g., the accent of the nominal base aśva- or gārgya- only as śeṣas (of aśvo ’śvaś ca and of gārgyo gārgyāyaṇaś ca respectively), 50 because of the basic provision of aśvah which is included in the speaker’s lexical competence with a high-pitched first vowel or because of the provision of gārgyah, which is taught with its high-pitched first vowel according to A 6.1.197. Accordingly, that this discussion on the ādeśa-classification of A 1.2.64 actually starts with questioning the use of the term śeṣa might be supposed to be a trace of this specific role of ekaśeṣa rules as apavāda cases of substitution. Ekaśeṣa would now be an example of ādeśa which is not grammatically taught, since it is actually merely supposed by the śeṣa-procedure taught by the general rule A 1.2.64, just as the zero replacements which are supposed but not directly taught both in A 1.4.105 (yuśmady upapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāniny api madhyamaḥ) and 2.3.14 (kriyārthopapadasya ca karmanī sthānīnaḥ) 51 as well as in A 8.1.45 (lope vibhāṣā), 8.1.62 (cāhalopa ehety avadhāraṇam) and 8.1.63

50. I consider here the pṛatipādikas corresponding respectively to the padas aśvah and gārgyah (actually obtained by means of the ekaśeṣa procedure), because nominal endings (which are required in the relevant sentence) only apply to pṛatipādikas, which are the result of a LUK zero replacement in accordance with A 2.4.71: supo dhātupṛatipādikavoh “LUK zero replacement in place of a nominal ending of a pada constituting a verbal stem or a nominal base.”
(cādilope vibhāsā). In fact, there is no regular use of a genitive case teaching the sthānin in the ekaśeṣa rules, apart from the expression sarūpānām included in their general rule. For instance, vṛddho yūnā or pitā mātrā could also be the regular prakriyā of a dvandva or a correct copulative syntagma. Furthermore, in the second case, the matching dvandva formation is optional. A 1.2.65 and A 1.2.70 might respectively teach a śeṣa procedure for two assumed replacements that are not explicitly taught.

As zero replacement ensures the meaning-extension of the unit which is replaced by zero to zero itself — for instance the sense of agent for the zeroed affix KviP — analogously, the absent but potentially present pada mātrā, which, furthermore, is present elsewhere combined with pitr, ensures the additional denotation of this second object (whose matching word-form does not remain) to pitarau.

What is the principle underlying this meaning extension which both grammatical devices ensure? I propose that it could be spotted in the so-called laukika part of substitution, precisely in its more spontaneous side, which Patañjali himself emphasizes in his extremely long commentary (M 1.133:22-24) on the main rule of substitution, A 1.1.56: sthānivad ādeśo 'nalvidhau:

guruvad asmin guruputre vartitavyam iti gurau yat kāryam
tad guruputre 'tidiśyate/ evam ihāpi sthānikāryam ādeśe 'tidiśyate “We have to behave in the presence of the preceptor’s son as if we were in the presence of the preceptor, i.e., that which has to be done (kārya) in the presence of the preceptor is extended in the presence of the preceptor’s son. Analogously, that which has to be done

53. Cf. Cardona 2007: 704: “This appeal to the Laukika status of the most basic principles governing how Pāṇini’s Sūtras are to apply, principles which Pāṇini obvious[ly] observes but does not need to formulate explicitly, brings up a general issue regarding grammar, other Vedāṅgas, and their status in Indian thought”. For a supposed spontaneous side of lopa see Candotti-Pontillo 2012: 122ff.
(the rule/-s which has/have to be applied) when there is the sthānin, is extended when there is its ādeśa.”

Consistently afterwards, Patañjali objects to the necessity of teaching sthānivadbhāva for ādeśas because this kind of extension of rules is actually a common practice, and there is no need for its specific enunciation, as in common life when one obtains the privileges which are due to the person one has been associated with. For instance, a pupil gets the seat of honor etc. when he reaches the clan for which he is going to perform a sacrifice. In fact, Patañjali concludes that rule A 1.1.56 merely aims at a restriction (niyama), that is, the prohibition of extension ‘in case of’ a rule concerning (or conditioned by) sounds (analvidhau)’:

M I.133:24-134:2 (ad A 1.1.56): lokata etat siddham / tad yathā / loke yo yasya prasaṅge bhavati labhate ‘sau tatkaryāni / tad yathā / upādhyāyasya śiṣyo yājyakulani gatvāgrāsanādīni labhate “This is also established from the point of view of common life. As in common life when one obtains the privileges which are due to the person one has been associated with. For instance, a pupil gets the seat of honour etc. when he reaches the clan for which he is going to perform a sacrifice.”
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M *Mahābhāṣya* : see Kielhorn 1880-1885.

P *Pradīpa* : see Shastri 1938.

PM *Padamañjarī* : see Shastri and Shukla 1983-85.

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On the so-called predicative instrumental

Toru Yagi

parihāsavijalpitam sakhe paramārthena na grhyatām vacah.
O friend, let not (my) words, uttered in jest, be taken in earnest
(as of true import). (Śak II 18a)

0 Introduction

Examples of the so-called predicative instrumental are enumerated
by, among others, Speijer¹ and Renou.² The former refers to P.
2.3.21: itthambhūtalakṣane (トリィā 18) as the rule relevant to the
present instrumental. On the other hand, the latter seems to
attribute it to P. 2.3.18: kartṛkaraṇavos triiyā.³ The former,
however, emends the manuscript reading dūtena to dūtyena,
referring to §237 only.⁴ With regard to the text reading coreṇa,
Kangle notes that coreṇa obviously is used for cauryena.⁵ On the
other hand, Ghanāśyāma comments on the above-mentioned
paramārthena (see note 3), as follows: paramārthena
paramārthatveneti bhāvapradhāno nirdeśaḥ, ata eva malinaṁ
pramārṣṭīti rājaśekharaḥ. tathā ca sarvam alīkam iti bhāvāḥ.⁶
(Rājaśekhara [says]: “paramārthena, that is, paramārthatvena, is a

1. For example, Speijer 1998: 51 (§67 Rem.2): dravībhūtam manye patati
jarāropena gaganam (methinks, the filament dissolves and falls down as rain),
184 (§237 Rem): prayāti sma dūtyayā, ... prayātu dautyena «in the quality of
messenger».
2. For example, Renou 1968: 293 (§219 C): paramārthena grhyate «est compris
comme vérité», tad aqnoinaiva devesu brahmābhavat «le b. est apparu chez les
dieux en tant qu’Â.», snaṣṭvena svīkr- «choisir pour bru».
4. Aś 325, 11-12: anyatamaḥ puruṣo dūtyenāḥyoktaḥ.. Cf. BHSG §7.38. With
regard to the word-form dūtyena, cf. Kāśikā on P. 5.1.126 and SK 1791.
5. Kangle 1992: II 275, note 7 on 4.8.7: coreṇābhisiṣto vairadveśābhyām
apadiṣṭakah šuddhah syāt.
wording having as the essential the property of being [verities].\textsuperscript{7} For this very reason, the poet wipes off a fault in grammar.”\textsuperscript{8} And, in this way, the intention [of the second half of the verse] is: All [I say] is false.)

In this paper, basing myself on Nāgeśa, I would like to examine by what rule and on what conditions the instrumental functions as predicative.

1 P. 2.3.21
1.1 Bhaṭṭoji’s and Nāgeśa’s comments

On P. 2.3.21: itthambhūtalakṣane (tritiyā 18) Bhaṭṭoji comments as follows: kaṃcit prakāram prāptasya lakṣaṇe tritiyā syāt. jaṭābhis tāpasah. jaṭājñāpyatāpasatvavīśita ity arthah.\textsuperscript{9} (The third case ending should occur [after a nominal stem denoting] the attribute of someone or something that has already attained the property of being someone or something. [For example,] “an ascetic with [the attribute in the form of] matted hair”, the meaning of which is “[he who is] qualified by the property of being an ascetic to be perceived by matted hair”).

Nāgeśa’s comment is:

\textit{itthambhūta. idamas thamupratyayānta itthamśabdaḥ prakṛtyartham vihāya prakāramātre lākṣanikāh. prāpyarthakabhūdhūtoḥ kartari ktaḥ. karmavibhaktyantena itthamsābdhena bhūtaśabdasya samāsah. lakṣaṇaśabdhah karaṇādhanah. tasya karmāṣṭhyantenetthambhūtalakṣadeṇa samāsah. tad āha kaṃcid ityādi. evaṁ ca sahaiva putrāry ityādau vidyamānatāvācisaḥsabdayoge itthambhūtalakṣane iti tritiyeti keśāṃcid uktiṣ cintyeta bhāvaḥ. lakṣaṇe iti. tatra vartamānaḥ iti śesaḥ. jaṭābhir iti. jñāpyatvarūpah sambandhas tritiyārthaḥ. tad āha jaṭājñāpyeti. yat tu jaṭābhhis tāpaso jñāta ityarthāḥ jñānakriyāyām jaṭādīnām karaṇatvād eva tritiyāsiddher idāṁ}

\textsuperscript{7} P. 5.1.119: tasya bhāvas tvatalau and Cardona 1997: 243 (§348), ‘tva or tal follows a pada with a sixth-triplet ending (tasya) to form a derivate that denotes the property of being (bhāvaḥ) what the base of the pada denotes.’ Cf. Ogawa 2005: 107-114.
\textsuperscript{8} I could not identify the quotation.
\textsuperscript{9} SK 566.
vyartham iti. tan na. karaṇatvāvivakṣāyāṁ ṣaśṭhībādhanārtham 
āvaśyakatvāt. etena hetuṇḍīyayedam sidhām ity apāstam. 
lakṣyālakṣañabhāvasyayiva vivakṣitatvāc ceti diṅk.10

On [SK 566] itthambhūta ...: The word ittham-, which ends in 
the secondary suffix -tham <thamu> [laid down by P. 5.3.24] 
after idam-, expresses secondarily “mode in general”, having 
given up the meaning [“this mode”] of the nominal stem 
[ittham-]; -ta <kta>, [laid down by P. 3.2.102] after the root 
bhū-11 meaning “attainment”, refers to an agent [by P. 3.4.72]; 
[the word in question is] a compound [by P. 2.1.24] of the word 
bhūta- [ending in -s <su>] with the word ittham- ending in the 
second case ending which refers [by P. 2.3.2] to a direct object. 
The word lakṣaṇa- includes a primary suffix referring [by P. 
3.3.117] to a means; [therefore, the word itthambhūtalakṣaṇa- is] 
a compound [by P. 2.2.8] of it with the word itthambhūta- 
ending in the sixth case ending which refers [by P. 2.3.66] to a direct 
object; so he says: kaṅcid ...; and thus his intention is that the 
following assertion of some grammarians is contestable: [They 
assert:] The third case ending by P. 2.3.21: itthambhūtalakṣane 
functions as such when it is construed [by P. 2.3.19: sahayukte 
‘pradhāne’] with the word saha expressing existence,12 as in 
examples such as “[a father to whom some sons really exist, i.e. 
a father] with some sons.” On lakṣaṇe: After [a nominal stem 
denoting ...;] occurring [in the meaning ...] remains [to be 
supplied]. On jaṭābhīs: The meaning of the third case ending is 
the relationship [of matted hair with an ascetic] in the form of 
property of being an object to be perceived [by means of matted 
hair]; so he says: jaṭājanāpyeti. However, [others assert]: Because 
[the phrase “an ascetic with matted hair”] means “an ascetic 
perceived by matted hair”, matted hair, among others, is the very 
means with regard to the action of perceiving [the ascetic]; 
accordingly [the application of] the third case ending [to the 
nominal stem jaṭā-, etc.] is realized [by P. 2.3.18: kartrkaraṇayos 
ṛtīyā]; therefore, the present rule [P. 2.3.21] is of no use. This 
[assertion of them] is not correct. [First of all, the formulation of 
the present rule] is inevitable in order to set aside [P. 2.3.50: 
ṣaṭṭhī seṣe, which lays down the value “relationship in general”

12. Cf. Aneka, Pariśiṣṭakāṇḍa 60<sup>ed</sup>-61<sup>ah</sup>: saha sambandha-sādṛśya-yaugapadya-
samṛddhiṣu, sākalye vidyamāne ca.
of] the sixth case ending [and which is expected to take effect] when a speaker [of the present phrase] does not desire to express that matted hair is a means [of perceiving the ascetic]; by this [very reason the following assertion of the rest of grammarians] has also been set aside: The [phrase “an ascetic with matted hair” means “an ascetic perceived because of matted hair”, so the] present problem has been resolved by [P. 2.3.23: hetau which lays down] the third case ending referring to a cause. And, [secondly,] only the relationship between someone or something to be characterized and his or its attribute [to characterize him or it] has been desired to express [by the speaker]. Such is a right direction [in the present argument].

P. 2.3.19, 18, 50 and 23 have been rejected by Nāgeśa, so that we can proceed to verify on what conditions the instrumental by P. 2.3.21 can function as predicative.

1.2 Conditions for a predicative instrumental by P. 2.3.21

1.2.1 First condition

The other examples which Pāṇinian quote are: api bhavān kamaṇḍalunā chātram adrākṣīt “Did you see a pupil with [the attribute in the form of] a water-pot?”, chātreṇopādhyāyam “a teacher with a pupil”, śikhayā parivrājakam “a religious mendicant with a tuft” and śvetacchātreṇa rājānam “a king with a white parasol”. It is quite natural that these instrumentals do not function as predicative because kamaṇḍalunā, for example, does not refer to one and the same substratum that chātram does to. Therefore one condition under which an instrumental functions as predicative is: one word denoting a lakṣaṇa and the other word denoting a lakṣya refer to one and the same substratum. Instrumentals interpreted on this condition as predicative by modern scholars are: tad aṅginaiva deveṣu brahmābhavat «le b. est

14. Kāśikāvyātti, Haradatta, Annambḥāṭa, Puruṣottamadeva. All these lakṣaṇas are material objects and differ from lakṣyas. They substantially correspond to “3. A material object recognized as appropriate to, and thus symbolic of, any office or actor; spec. in Painting, Sculpture: A conventional symbol added, as an accessory, to denote the character or show the identity of the personage represented” (The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. attribute).
apparu chez les dieux en tant qu’A.»

and *coreṇābhiśasto vairadveśābhyām apadiṣṭakaḥ śuddhaḥ syāt* “Ein als Dieb Angeklagter (coreṇābhiśasta), der zu seiner Verteidigung zeigt, daß Feindschaft oder Haß (der Beschuldigung) zugrunde liege, soll gereinigt sein.”

and so on. By the way, with regard to the relationship between a lakṣya and a lakṣaṇa in the example *api bhavān kamaṇḍalunā chātram adrākṣīt*, Nāgeśa explains: *itthāmbhūtaś [i.e.] chātratyam prāptaś [i.e.] chātras tasya [chātrasya] lakṣaṇaṁ [i.e.] kamaṇḍaluḥ* (“A water-pot is the attribute of a pupil who has already got into such-and-such a mode, i.e., who has already attained the property of being a pupil.”)

And an attribute (lakṣaṇa) is a means to characterize a person or a thing in question (lakṣya).

Agni or a thief is an attribute [by means] of [which to characterize] Brahman or the accused that has already attained the property of being Brahman or the accused. Keeping this in mind, a speaker, who desires to express only the relationship between a lakṣya and a lakṣaṇa [where the latter is the essential in comparison with the former], applies the third case ending to a nominal stem such as *agni- or cora-, which denotes a lakṣaṇa.*

Therefore “The Brahman with the attribute of Agni appeared among gods” amounts to “The Brahman appeared among gods in the quality of Agni” and “The accused with the attribute of thief” amounts to “the accused as thief”. In connection with this type of example, the opinions of Speijer (*dūtena > dūtyena*) and Kangle (*coreṇa > cauryena*) are not compatible with those of Renou, Meyer and Rājaśekhara, though an instrumental of a derivate

18. *Lakṣane iti = lakṣane vartamānād [ḥy-āp-prātipadikā]. This type of attribute substantially corresponds to “1.A quality or character ascribed to any person or thing, one which is in common estimation or usage assigned to him; hence, sometimes, an epithet or appellation in which the quality is ascribed” (The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. attribute).
formed with a suffix denoting the property of being such-and-such or the activity/office of such-and-such (bhāva-, bhāvakarma-pratyaya\(^{19}\)) is preferred in many cases.

The wording prakṛtyā occurs as such in P. 6.2.1, 2.137, 3.75, 83 and 4.163 and it occurs by reiteration in, among others, P. 6.1.125 plutapragṛhyā aci nityam (prakṛtyā 115). This rule provides, I believe, that protracted vowels\(^{20}\) and items called pragṛhya\(^{21}\) remain with the attribute of their original form necessarily before a vowel. This amounts to “A protracted vowel and pragṛhya necessarily remain original forms [or in the quality of original form] before a vowel.” The present interpretation is, I believe, tenable, because Patañjali remarks on the third vārttika to P. 6.1.125 as follows: yad ayain plutah prakṛtyā iti [plutasya] prakṛtibhāvam śāsti tad ... (“Because [of the fact that] this [great Master Pāṇini himself] teaches the property of being an original form [or the office of original form] [of a protracted vowel by the rule] ‘A protracted vowel remains an original form ...’”). If such is the case, his remark suggests the following. First, the three munis (munitraya) are of the same opinion. Secondly the wording prakṛtyā is an expression whose essential meaning is the property of being such-and-such or the activity/office of such-and-such (bhāvakarmapradhānanirdeśa), with which Rājaśekhara’s opinion perfectly corresponds. Like prakṛtyā, the instrumentals dūtena, coreṇa and paramārtheṇa lack an overt affix denoting the meanings noted (bhāvakarmapratyaya), although a bhāvakarmapradhānanirdeśa denotes an attribute. This causes, I believe, Speijer and Kangle to regard these instrumentals as grammatically faulty.\(^{22}\)

20. P. 1.2.27.
22. The word malinam used by Rājaśekhara can be interpreted as “dirt, i.e. a fault” either in grammar or in meter. In the former case, he is of the same opinion as Speijer and Kangle. In the latter, he is consistent. I should translate,
If one condition under which an instrumental functions as predicative is that one word denoting a lakṣaṇa and the other word denoting a lakṣya refer to one and the same substratum, should both these words not be put in the same case, for example, *tad agnir eva deveṣu brahmābhavat?*

By the token, in the sentence *api bhavān kamaṇḍalupāṇīṁ chātram adrākṣīt* (“Did you see a pupil with a water-pot in his hand?”), the prior constituent *kamaṇḍalu-* denotes a lakṣaṇa of a pupil. Therefore, should the third case ending not be applied to *kamaṇḍalu-*? Patañjali removes the doubt, remarking: *tathāhy ayāṁ prādhānyena lakṣaṇaṁ pratinirdiśati: itthambhūtasya lakṣaṇam itthambhūtalakṣaṇām, tasminn itthambhūtalakṣaṇa iti.*

For this [great Master Pāṇini himself] refers to a lakṣaṇa [with the attribute in the form of property of being the essential, i.e.] as the essential, in this way: the compound *itthambhūtalakṣaṇa-* is analyzed into *itthambhūta-as lakṣaṇa-s* (the attribute [by means] of [which to characterize] someone that has already attained the property of being someone); that [compound in this sense is referred to in the present rule thus:] *itthambhūtalakṣaṇe.*

Normally there is no attribute (lakṣaṇa) without a substratum in the form of lakṣya to which it belongs. In this sense, a lakṣaṇa is subordinate while a lakṣya is essential. In spite of this fact, according to Patañjali, a speaker, who desires to express a lakṣaṇa as the essential, i.e., to emphasize a lakṣaṇa in the relationship between a lakṣya and a lakṣaṇa, applies the third case ending to a nominal stem denoting a lakṣaṇa. In addition, one word denoting a lakṣaṇa as the essential must be also the essential. These two are revealed by Pāṇini’s wording and the latter does not hold for the word *kamaṇḍalu-* that is a subordinate member.

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for example, “From this very fact, the poet wipes off an expected fault in meter in advance.” The present meter is called *Vaitāliya* (6 moras, \(\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim /\)) of Piṅgala 4.33: *vaitāliyaṁ dvīhsvarā ayukpāde, yugvasavo ‘nte r-l-g-ah.’
To return to the main subject, Patañjali’s opinion is, I believe, applicable to agni-. Agni is an attribute of Brahman and so, in fact, Agni is subordinate while its substratum Brahman is essential. In spite of this fact, a speaker, desiring to express Agni as the essential, uses the instrumental agninā.

1.2.2 Second condition

The other condition under which an instrumental functions as predicative is that one word denoting an attribute ends in a bhāvakarmapratyaya as in dūtyena, cauryena, paramārthatvena or the like. In this case, we can understand at first sight that the instrumental is a bhāvakarmapradhānanirdesā and thus functions as predicative. By the way, in connection with kamaṇḍalupāni-, Nāgeśa refers to some grammarians’ opinion: kecit tu kamaṇḍalupāniśabddād atra ṛṭīyāpattih. kamaṇḍalupāṇitvasyaiva lakṣaṇatvād, sakrd asau kamaṇḍalupāniś chātro drṣṭas tasya tad eva lakṣaṇam bhavatīty anur lakṣaṇa iti śūtre (P. 1.4.84) bhāsyāt. tad evety asya kamaṇḍalupāṇitvam evety arthaḥ. anyathā sa eveti vadet ... ity āhūḥ.23

But some grammarians assert: “The third case ending occurs, in the present phrase, after the word kamaṇḍalupāni- because the very property of being [a pupil] who has a water-pot in the hand is an attribute [of the pupil]. For it is stated in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.4.84: anur lakṣāne that, once the pupil, having a water-pot in the hand, was seen, that is nothing else but his attribute.” The meaning of this phrase “that is nothing else but” is “the very property of being [a pupil] who has a water-pot in the hand”.

Otherwise, Patañjali would say: that very [water-pot]...

According to them, if a speaker desires to express only the relationship between a lakṣya and a lakṣaṇa and thus to emphasize the latter, not only kamaṇḍalupāṇitvena but also kamaṇḍalupāṇinā is allowable. A word such as this, expressing a quality, as in buddhyā/prajñayā muktah or pāṇḍityena muktah, refers to a property only, not to a substratum which the property belongs to. On the other hand, śukla- in an expression like śuklaḥ pataḥ (“The

cloth is white, a white cloth”) refers not only to a property but also to a substratum which the property belongs to. So does a bahuṃrīhi compound. In this connection, a bahuṃrīhi corresponds, I believe, to “a type of nominal which he [Pāṇini] called gunavacana, as in A. 4.1.44 (271) and elsewhere. These are nominals that denote properties and things qualified by such properties.”24

2 Conclusion
I have discussed constructions involving two nominals that meet either of the following conditions:

1. one denotes a lakṣaṇa (such as agni- [instr. sg. agnīṇa]) and the other denoting a lakṣya (such as brahma-) and both refer to one and the same substratum.

2. one nominal, denoting a lakṣaṇa (such as caurya- [instr. sg. cauryeṇa]), ends in a bhāvakarmapratyaya.

An instrumental form, by P. 2.3.21, in a construction meeting one of these conditions can function predicatively.

References and abbreviations

Abhyankar, K. V.


Aś *Avadānaçataka*. See Speyer, Jacob Samuel.

BHSG *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar*; see Edgerton, Franklin.

Bś *Brhacchabdenduśekhara*. See Shastri, Sitaram.

Cardona, George

Caturveda, Giridhara Śarmā and Parameśvara Śarmā Bhāskara

DhP *Dhātupāṭha*. See Shastri, Dwarkadas.

Edgerton, Franklin


Joshi, Bhargava Shastri


Kāle, Moreshwar Ramchandra


Kangle, R.P.


Kāśikā *Kāśikā.* See Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa.

Mahābhāṣya See Abhyankar, K. V., Joshi, Bhargava Shastri, Sharma, Shivdatta.

Meyer, Johann Jakob


Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa

Ogawa, Hideyo

Pāṇini.
Piṅgala See Vijayapāla.
Renou, Louis

Raval, Poonam Pankaj and V. M. Bhatt

Śak
Abhijñānaśākuntalam. See Kāle, M. R.

Sharma, M.M.Pandit Shivdatta

Shastri, Sitaram

Shastri, Dwarkikadas
SK  Siddhāntakaumudī. See Caturveda, Giridhara Śarmā and Parameśvara Śarmā Bhāskara.

Speijer, Jacob Samuel

Speyer, Jacob Samuel

Vijayapāla
Vat: a textual study

Dipesh Katira, Chinmay Dharurkar and Malhar Kulkarni

0 Introduction

This paper studies the occurrences of the suffix vat, whose meanings are stated in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini (P. 5.1.115-117: तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेपं । तत्र तस्पेत । तद्द्हम् ई). We survey the occurrences and study the function(s) of vat in rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Based on the senses provided for in P. 5.1.115-117, we classify the occurrences of vat in Pāṇini’s sūtras. Various interpretations of vat have been set forth within and without the tradition (e.g., Bronkhorst 1980). Certain issues also come up within the tradition that would compel modern thinkers to reconsider their arguments pertaining to the interpretation of vat. This raises the issue of the translation of vat, ambiguities that surround it, and the interpretations of vat reflected in the translations.

Based on the three Pāṇinian sūtras (P. 5.1.115-117) that exhaust the possible usages of vat, we can see that vat which occurs elsewhere across the sūtras is based on P. 5.1.115 and 116. This is because the main function of vat in the Aṣṭādhyāyī is extension (atideśa). In several cases, one can paraphrase the interpretation of the sūtra and of vat that occurs therein based on either of the sūtras P. 5.1.115 and 116. The translation of vat would depend on which sūtra-based meaning of vat a translator accepts. All the variations that we see in the translations of vat are an outcome of this. P. 5.1.115 concerns attributive predicates that are verbal (kriyā ‘action’), so that the rule disallows vatI where tulya has scope over a term denoting a quality (guna) or thing (dravya). P. 5.1.116 is meant for attributive predicates other than actions. But we can still

1. An earlier draft of the paper was divided between main body and the appendices. The appendices included several translations considered and an xlsx-sheet dealing with the typology of vat at various levels. We had to omit them due to space constraints.
derive the sense of action (*kriyā: 115*) in P. 5.1.116, by nominalization of a verbal term expressing an action. Once this is established, we can see why translators differ in their translations.

This paper has 10 principal sections. Sections 1 to 8 cover the various aspects of the discourse on *vat*. Section 9 has the main argument, which traces the roots of differences in translations and interpretations of *vat*, due to ambiguity (section 10). The main function of *vat* being extension, the paper problematizes the idea of a unitary translation of *vat* as either ‘same as’ or ‘as if’. We argue that even in cases where *vat* is absent its function is found to be carried out, so that its occurrence cannot serve as absolute evidence for its unitary meaning.

1 **Vat** in Pāṇini

There are three *vat* suffixes mentioned in the Āṣṭādhyāyī, as follows.

i. In words like *vidyāvat*, the suffix is *matUP*, according to P. 5.2.94 (तदस्यास्त्रसिद्धिन्निति मतूप). Its *m* is replaced by *v* (*vat*) in accordance with P. 8.2.9 (मातृप्रायासः मतोर्वद्यादिभ्यः). Words ending in *matUP* are adjectives. P. 8.2.43 (संयोगादेरातो धातोर्य्यञ्चतः) is an example of a sūtra where a word ending in *matUP* has been used.

ii. In words like *yāvat*, the suffix is *vatUP*, used, according to P. 5.2.39-40 (यत्तदेतेम्य: परिमाणे बतुपृः किमिदेतेम्यां बो च:ै) in the sense of ‘measure’. It can be added to *yad, tad, etad, kim* and *idam*. Words ending in *vatUP* are adjectives. P. 2.4.15 (अधिकरणितावल्ल्ये च) is an example of a sūtra where a word ending in *vatUP* has been used.

iii. In examples like ब्राह्मणवदशीति, मथुराबल्ल्ये च and राजवर्त्त्या, the suffix is *vatI*, according to P. 5.1.115-117 (तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेदादि:, तत्र तस्येव, तद्दृश्म). Abhyankar and Shukla’s (1977: 339a) entry on *vatI* is as follows:
(1) tad. affix वत् in the sense of similar activity or thing; e.g. राजवर्गेति, मथुरावर्तु सुन्द्रे प्राकारः; cf. तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वति। तत्र तस्येव P. V.1.115,116; (2) tad. affix वत् in the sense of deserving; e.g. राजवर्ग् पालनम्; cf. तदहृ्म् P. V.1.117; (3) tad. affix वत् applied to prefixes in Vedic Literature without any sense of its own; e.g. यद्वत्तो नवतो याति वप्सत्; cf. उपसागरान्नद्विसि धातव्यम् P. V.1.118.

We conceptualize two propositions: 1) ‘x is y’ or ‘x is equal to y’ and 2) ‘x is y-vat’. We wish to study the second proposition in contrast with the first one, to investigate various shades of meanings that such a proposition using terms with vat can deliver and various ways in which it can be understood and translated. Only the third sense (the first two meanings explained in Abhyankar and Shukla) is relevant to such a discussion of ‘x is y-vat’ in contrast with the proposition ‘x is y’. The first two senses, though associated with vat, would fall under the type ‘x is y’, since the word ending in vat would then be an adjective.

2 Deliberation on ‘x is y’
When a śāstra says ‘x is equal to y’, there are two possibilities:

i. x has no connection with y in reality. That is why we never hear one say, ‘x is x’. For example: (a) That part of a word beginning with its final vowel is called ū. (b) let ā, ai and au be called vṛddhi.2

ii. The śāstra informs us about the identity of x and y in some way, at a deeper level of reality, under the following circumstances: (a) the identity may not appear to hold; for example, तत्त्वम असि, प्रजांनः ब्रह्म (b) we may come to know this from that śāstra itself; for example, करुरीपिषिततम कर्म (P. 1.4.49).

2. Cf. अत्रोज्ज्वलयादि (P. 1.1.64) and बृज्द्विराश्च (P. 1.1.1).
Statements like ‘x is y’ are used by Pāṇini to lay down technical terms in following contexts:

iii. When x is equal only to y and y is equal only to x; for example: यू र्वाङ्ग्व नदी (P. 1.4.3), क्तात्सवत्न निष्ट्रा (P. 1.1.26), गेयो च्यासभ (P. 1.4.7).

iv. When we say that x is y, the following may obtain: (a) There is also a chance that w is also y, so that x is one subset in y; for example, उपदेशेक्षणुतारासिक द्वत (P. 1.3.2); by हलम्पम (P. 1.3.3) a final consonant is also labeled it; अर्थवद्वातःतात्ययः प्रातिपदिकम् (P. 1.2.45), कुलदिवदसमासाः (P. 1.2.46); by the second rule items ending with kṛt and taddhita affixes (krdanta, taddhitānta) as well as compounds also are given the name prātipadika. (b) x can also be z, apart from being y. Here one of y or z may be a subset of the other; for example, (P. 1.1.26) tavyat, tayva and anīyar are not only members of the class called kṛtya but also of the group called kṛt: all kṛtyas are kṛt.
When a śāstra says ‘x is y-vat’ all the above mentioned relations are to be ruled out.

3 Vat in dictionaries

i. Apte (2004: 1383): “वत् ind. An affix added to nouns or adjectives to denote ‘likeness’ or ‘resemblance’ and may be translated by ‘like’, ‘as’.”

ii. Monier Williams (2005: 915): “वत् An affix (technically termed वति; see Pāṇ. v.1,115 &c.) added to words to imply likeness or resemblance, and generally translatable by ‘as’, ‘like’ (e.g. brāhmaṇa-vat, like a Brāhman; pitṛ-vat = pitēva, pitaram iva, pitur iva and pitarīva).”

Macdonell (1993: 212): “vat forms adverbs meaning like from substantives and adjectives; e.g. manu-vāt like Manu; pūrva-vāt, pratna-vāt as of old.”
4 Relevant Pāniniīn sūtras

Three sūtras of Pāṇini are relevant in this regard.

i. Tena tulyam kriya cheditāḥ: (P. 5.1.115). Jijnāsu (2008): cānetaṁ
tūtiyāśarvāṁ bhāṣāyaṁ pūtām nyayaṁ śāstriyāṁ vartī: pratyāyaṁ bhavati
tulyaṁ kriya

amūyuṁ mā sānayo also. A point to be noted here is that the word kriyā does not come into this
sūtra by anuvṛtti. Hence, the object that is compared when one
says tatra iva and tasya iva may or may not be an action (kriyā).

bhāṣāyaṁ pūtām nyayaṁ vartī: pratyāyaṁ bhavati. Udā.- rajaṁ
tatvātāhputā. kriyaṁ mānasaṁ tulyānvartī. cānetaṁ<brabarām.

Two points are to be noted here. First, vātur by this sūtra is to be
added to a nominal which denotes an object something is worthy
of, not one to which something is similar. Second, what is worthy
of that object is an action. For example: vidhiṁ abhāṁtī pūja =
vātātā
pūja (vidhiyōvya pūja iti). rajaṁ abhāṁtī sthitī = rajaṁस्थिति: (rajaneti
sthitī:), but rajaṁ abhāṁtī cātvaṁ ≠ rajaṁ cātvaṁ.
5 Sūtras considered
There are in all thirty-seven sūtras where words ending in vat (vatI) occur. Apart from these sūtras, terms with vat occur in more than one hundred-fifty others through anuvṛtti. Only the former have been considered in this study.

6 Vat and extension
6.1 Atideśa using vat
From the examination of the type of sūtras that contain words ending in vat, one can easily observe that most of them are extension rules (atideśasūtra). Thus, no matter what purpose this suffix serves in the rest of Sanskrit literature, it seems to work as a tool used by Pāṇini for making extension rules. Abhyankar and Shukla (1977: 10b) say the following about atideśa and the role of vat therein:

अतिदेश extended application; transfer or conveyance of application of character or qualities or attributes of one thing to another. Atideśa in Sanskrit grammar is a very common feature prescribed by Pāṇini generally by affixing the tad. affix मत् (sic) or बत् to the word whose attributes are conveyed to another, e.g. लोटोलबचत् P. III 4.85.

The Mahābhāṣya under P. 1.1.56 (Joshi and Roodbergen 1990: 3) also elucidates the purpose of vat in atideśasūtras, as follows:

वत्करण क्रियारूपत् स्थानायादेशोऽजल्विधान्वितीयत्वृत्तमाने संज्ञाधिकारो ज्ञम् तत्र स्थानी आदेशस्य संज्ञा स्वात् । तत्र को दौष्ट्? आहो यथाः आत्मनेपदं भवतीति वघेरेष्व स्वात् । वक्तव्य पुनः क्रियाभासे न दौष्टो भवति । स्थानिकार्यंमादेशेऽत्विदिश्यते । गुरुग्रहे पुनः इति यथा ।

“What is the purpose in adding vat (in sthānivat)? If (the rule) is stated as sthānī ōdeśo ’nalvidhau ‘the ādeśa is

3. Charudeva Shastri (1968: 497) in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya mentions 7 types of atideśa, namely- nimitta, vyapadeśa, tādātmya, śabda, rūpa, kārya and artha.
sthānin except in a rule (prescribing an operation) conditioned by a speech-sound’, (we have to keep in mind that) this is the section dealing with samjñā ‘technical designations’. This being so, sthānin would be the designation of the ādeśa ‘substitute’. This being the case, what is the difficulty? (The difficulty is that) the ātmānapada endings (prescribed) by P. 1.3.28 would be (applied) after (the verbal base) vadh- ‘to kill’ only, not after han-. But when we add vat (in sthānivat), this difficulty is not there. (The effect of adding vat is that) an operation applicable to sthānin is extended to the substitute, like (we have in) guruvat guruputre “towards the son of the teacher (one should behave) like towards the teacher” (Joshi and Roodbergen 1990: 7, 9).

6.2 Atideśa without using vat
At several places, atideśa is intended even without using vat. For example:

i. बहुगणवतुद्दिति संख्या (P.1.1.23). Here, saṁkhyā is a class name (samjñā) that is assigned to the words bahu, gana, words ending in vatU and ṇatI as well as number words. The term saṁkhyā here is anvartha, hence the sūtra is interpreted as बहुगणवतुद्दिति संख्याविवर्त.

ii. गाङ्कुटादिभद्धोज्ञिणिणू हित (P. 1.2.1). The meaning of nīit is to be understood as that of nīdvat. Even in असंयोगाल्लिट्ट कित (P. 1.2.5) kit has the meaning of kidvat. This is known from a jñāpaka, as follows. If we do not consider kit equivalent to kidvat, a second option is to consider P. 1.2.1 a samjñāsūtra. P. 1.2.1 is one of a series of sūtras that includes न क्त्वा बेद्द (P. 1.2.18). Now, the samjñā kit was never assigned to Ktvā. This tells us that kit is to be interpreted as kidvat.
7 Translating vat

7.1 Translating vat ordained by तेन तुल्यं क्रियाचेद्वति (P. 5.1.115)

The sentence

(1) He walks like an old man

conveys that someone’s act of walking is comparable to the walking of an old man. This is an exact equivalent of सः वृद्धवत् चतवति। or सः वृद्धः इव चतवति। (according to तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वति.)

Another way of saying the same thing is

(2) He walks as if he were an old man.

However, we cannot say

(3) *He walks as an old man.

Nevertheless, one can say

(4) He works as a director of a company

but

(5) *He works like a director of a company

is not acceptable in the same sense.

From the above exercise we can conclude that ‘like’ is used for indicating similarity in action whereas ‘as’ indicates similarity in agency. That is why sentence (1) seems to be an exact equivalent of a sentence using a term with vat. However, (2) also conveys the same sense by using the words ‘if he were’ in addition to ‘as’, thereby equating the agent of the first action with the agent of a second, understood, act of walking, but in a different manner. Sentence (3) does not use ‘if he were’. It fails to convey the similarity of action. ‘As’ in (4) performs the function of equating the agents referred to by ‘he’ and ‘director’. Thus, this is a good English sentence, whereas ‘like’ in (5) does not perform the same function and so that this sentence is bad. The function of ‘like’ in such a sentence is to establish similarity in action— as in (1) — whereas the function of ‘as’ is to establish identity of agents.

7.2 Translating vat ordained by तत्र तत्स्थेत्र (P. 5.1.116)

(1) My shirt is like that of Suresh
is an exact equivalent of त्रुष्णश्वयं इव मम युतकम् or सुरेशबर्तू मम युतकम्. *Vat* in this case means ‘like that of’ (तस्स्वेच).

(2) Just as in Gujarat, now there is a water-shortage in Maharashtra too
is an exact equivalent of गुजरातेषु इव अधुना महाराष्ट्रे अष्टि जलस्य अभावः
अष्टि or गुजरातवत् अधुना महाराष्ट्रे अष्टि जलस्य अभावः अष्टि. *Vat* in this
case means ‘as in’ (तत्र इव).

7.3 Translating *vat* ordained by तद्धृष्ण (P. 5.1.117)

(1) He receives king-like honor
is an exact equivalent of राजवत् सक्रियते अयम्. *Vat* in this case means
‘deserved by’ (तद्धृष्ण).

8 Inputs from sāhityaśāstra

*Vat* never has the meaning of *samāna*. The main import of *vat*
being similarity (*sādrśya*), we now survey three alaṅkāras based on
sādṛśya to see the various possible shades of similarity and the
means of communicating them.

8.1 Upamā

In Sāhityadarpaṇa, similes (*upamā*) are defined as follows: साम्यं
बाच्चमैत्रेय्यम् बाच्चैवक्य उपमा हयो: “Simile is the resemblance between
two things expressed in a single sentence and unaccompanied with
the statement of difference” (Kane 1995: १७, 89). A simile can be
of two types, called *pūrnā* and *luptā*. The former is defined as
follows: सा पूर्णा यदि सामान्यत्रश्च औपम्यबाच्ची च। उपमेयं औपमानं अभेदात्मयम्
“The simile is fully expressed, when the common property, the
word implying comparison, the object of comparison, and the
standard of comparison are all expressed” (Kane 1995: १७, 90). If
any one or more of these be unexpressed, there is elliptical (*luptā*)
upamā. Fully expressed similes are of two types, called *śrautiḥ* and
ārthī. The verse defining these two types is: श्रौती यथेवच्चवाचन्ति ॥वाचाँ
वा वतियंद्रि। आर्थि तुल्यसमानाः तुल्यांयः यत्र वा वति॥ "That (pūrṇa) again is Direct (śrauti) in which the notion of comparison is conveyed by particles, such as yathā, iva, vā or by the affix vat when it is equivalent to iva; it is Indirect (ārthi) when the notion of comparison is conveyed by attributive words such as tulya, samāna etc. or by the affix vat when employed in the sense of tulya (equal)” (Kane 1995:17, 91, 92).

Yathā, iva and vā express similarity (sādrśya), the relation between two things based on possession of a common property; for example, पचामित्र मुखम्. By the employment of iva, a lotus (padma) and a face (mukha) are directly shown to be related to each other on account of their possessing some common property. The words tulya etc., on the other hand, are used in the sense of ‘similar’ (sadrśa and not sādrśya); e.g., पचेन तुल्यं मुखम् conveys that a face is is an object similar to another, a lotus. The idea of sādrśya (possession of common property) is not conveyed directly, but has to be inferred by the listener.4

The expressive power of words like tulya is exhausted in being attributive to an upamāna when they qualify it. They have no further power to express sādrśya. It is only after we reflect upon them, considering that two things cannot be comparable unless they have something in common, that we come to know, that there is some sādrśya between them.

It follows from the above discussion that upamā is śrauti when vat is used in the sense of तत्र तस्येष्व ति and is ārthi when the suffix is used in the sense of तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेत्तितः.

8.2 Rūpaka
Kāvyaprakāśa defines metaphor (rūpaka) as follows: तद्दस्यकम्भेदो य उपमानोपमेयोः। (93) (Sharma 2000: 234). The Sāhityadarpaṇa description is रूपकं रूपितारोपाद विषये निरपल्लवे “Metaphor consists in

4. As per Kane 1995: 91.
the representation of the subject of description, which (subject) is not concealed, as identified with another (a well-known standard)” (Kane 1995: 22, 114).

There are several similarities and dissimilarities between upamāna and upameya, but, for the sake of depicting close affinity, an identity (abheda) is imagined between the two in rūpaka. Both upamā and rūpaka are based on the principle of sādṛśya. However, a clear distinction is shown between upamāna and upameya in upamā, whereas an imaginary (āhārya) identity (abheda) is established between the two in rūpaka. Similarity is perceived in upamā and identity is perceived in rūpaka. Similarity is literal (vācyā) in upamā but in rūpaka it is suggested (vyaṅgya).

8.3 Utprekṣā
Sāhityadarpaṇa defines utprekṣā as follows: भवेत्सम्भावनोक्रेष्ठा प्रकृत्स्य परात्मना। (Kane 1995: 29, 142).

In utprekṣā a poet sees a strong imaginary possibility (sambhāvanā) of something that is inexistent in the thing under consideration. Apart from sambhāvanā, being based on possession of common property (sādṛśyamūlakatva) remains a prerequisite for an alaṅkāra to be called utprekṣā; for example, लम्भा मन्ये लवितमनु ते पार्वत्य: पच्चल्लमी। (Sharma 2000: 232).

9 Vat in the light of the above discussions
In the proposition ‘x is y’ considered in section 2, x is an embodiment of various qualities that constitute y. However when we say ‘x is y’ in the domain of metaphor (rūpaka alaṅkāra), the identity established is between two mutually independent entities e.g., the moon (candra) and a face (mukha). An actual identity between x and y is meant from the proposition ‘x is y’, discussed in section 2, whereas the identity established to constitute metaphor is imaginary (kavikalpita ‘conceived by a poet’). The objective behind establishing this kind of identity of x and y is to
enhance the beauty of a literary piece. Tradition⁵ believes that identity of grammatical entities as proposed by Pāṇini is meant for the function of extension (atideśa). The cases of atideśa being intended even without using vat, discussed in section 6.2, also tend to substantiate this claim. The sūtra असंयोगालिन्ट् क्रित् (P. 1.2.5) is interpreted as असंयोगालिन्ट् किंत्रु with the help of a jñāpaka. However, the jñāpaka only prohibits the interpretation of this sūtra as a samjñāsūtra. The acceptance of kit as kid-vat seems to be rooted in common sense or the fact that grammarians do identify grammatical entities to show extension of properties and operations from one to the other.

The issues in question may be illustrated with some examples.⁶

1. P. 4.3.156: क्रितवत्त्वपरिमाणात्

S. C. Vasu: “After a word denoting ‘a measure’, the affix expressing ‘its product or part’ is the same as the affix having the sense of purchased.”

R. N. Sharma: “A taddhita affix occurs after a nominal stem which signifies some measure (pramāṇa) and ends in genitive in a manner similar to that of an affix with the signification of krīta, provided that the derivate denotes ‘modification’ and ‘part of a whole’.”

Here we see that Ramanath Sharma translates vat ‘in a manner similar to that of’ while Vasu simply translates it ‘is the same as’.

2. P. 6.2.175: बहुवृत्तक्षेत्रपदभूमिः

S. C. Vasu: “A Bahuvrīhi with बहु, has the same accent as नज, when it denotes muchness of the object expressed by the second member.”

R. N. Sharma: “The final constituent of a bahuvrīhi compound is accented like naiN when it occurs with bahu ‘many’ used with the signification of its own multiplicity (bahutva).”

⁵. See Kaiyata’s Pradīpa on Bhāṣya under P. 6.4.22 (Shastry 2006: 863).
⁶. The examples are given together with the translations of S. C. Vasu and R. N. Sharma.
Translations and traditional commentaries when viewed with this background, make us conclude that ‘same as’, apart from conveying the sense of ‘actually same’, can also convey the sense of ‘metaphorically same’. And metaphors are suggestive of likeness as discussed in section 8.2. Figure 1 elucidates this.

From the discussion about translation of vat in the sense of tulyakriyā in section 7.1, we conclude that both ‘like’ and ‘as if he/she/it were’ are good translations of vat ordained by तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वति. However we come to know about a subtle difference between the two translations after surveying the similarity-based alaṅkāras in section 8. With the use of ‘like’, the sentence ‘He walks like an old man’ becomes an example of śrauti upamā, while using ‘as if he were’ in ‘He walks as if he were an old man’ is an example of ārthī upamā. This subtle difference in translation is observed at many places. For example:

3. P. 8.1.9: एकं बहुत्रीकृतंत।
S. C. Vasu: “When एक is repeated, it is treated like a member of a Bahuvrīhi compound.”
R. N. Sharma: “A sequence of two, in place of one whole form of ekam ‘one’, is treated as if it is a bahuvrīhi compound.”

4. P. 1.2.69: न्युनकमनंपुसके-नैकवच्चास्वायत्तरस्याम्।
S. C. Vasu: “A neuter noun, which has the same form, only differing in affix; is optionally retained, and the other is dropped, and it is like a singular number.”
R. N. Sharma: “That which denotes neuter remains when it is used with that which denotes non-neuter, provided the difference is due
Figure: 1
only to these items. In addition, the neuter is treated optionally as
denoting singular.”

The sentence हृदि: रामचुद् गायति is clearly in the domain of the
rule तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वति:. However, the sixth case is used to indicate
many non-kāraka relations as well as two kāraka relations, namely
kartr and karmān, as in रामस्य गमनम् and चक्रस्य चलनम्. The tradition
tells us that the word kriyā from तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेद्वति: does not get
carried over to the immediately following rule (तत्र तस्येव); by
maṇḍūkapluti, it gets carried over to the rule which follows the
latter, namely तद्हृष्ट्. This helps in making vat by तत्र तस्येव
available even in case of similarity of nonverbal relations. This
also helps in limiting the scope of तद्हृष्ट् only to deserving actions.

Had kriyā come into the following sūtra by regular anuvṛtti, this
rule would have included kriyā alone, and the non-kriyā which
have to be taken care of by तत्र तस्येव would have been excluded.

Thus, going by the given ordering of sūtras, one could argue that
blocking of kriyā in तत्र तस्येव is for the sake of non-kriyā coming
under the scope of this sūtra. Non-kriyā entities are nouns that do
not reflect any action: go, prākāra etc. and not gamana, gata etc..
However, in the case of kṛdantā nominals such as pathanam or
gamanam in sentences like रामचुद् गणेशस्य गमनम् one could debate
over whether (a) kriyā of P. 5.1.115 should carry over into P.
5.1.116, so as to include an action expressed by a kṛdantas or (b) a
form with vat in a sentence such as this stands for non-kriyā alone.
The problem with regular anuvṛtti would be that it would include
kriyā expressed by finite forms (tiṇanta). And the problem with
thinking that vat in the sentence cited stands for non-kriyā alone is
that it includes kriyā expressed by kṛdantas. However, as tradition
says, one could maintain that non-kriyā (absence of kriyā, as kriyā
is blocked) means atiṅ. So, in sentences like रामचुद् गणेशस्य गमनम् it
is unclear whether *vat* here is accounted for by virtue of तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेत्तति: or तत्र तस्येव. This also creates some differences in translating *sūtras*. For example:

5. P. 3.4.85: लोटो लड़बल्।

S. C. Vasu: “The personal endings of the Imperative are as those of the Imperfect.”

R. N. Sharma: “Affix *LOT* is treated as if it were *LAÑ*.”

6. P. 6.2.175: वहीरन्त्वदुत्तरपदसूचिनिः। (see above, 2)

A subtle difference in the meaning of the above interpretations is that direct similarity as in *śrautī* उपामाः is understood from the translation ‘as that of’ and indirect similarity as in अर्थी उपामाः is understood from the translation ‘as if it were’. Acceptance of the accrual of *kriyā* also apart from the non-verbal elements in P. 5.1.116 तत्र तस्येव would have two consequences:

1. We will have to agree that domains of तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेत्तति: and तत्र तस्येव partly overlap. Hence the cases as above can be translated and interpreted in both the ways.

2. It will help us validate sentences like राजप्रासादश्रङ्ग गृहे भोजनम् which would otherwise be erroneous according to Pāṇini. It should be noted in this respect that Kāśikā in its comment on आदेन्तवदेक्सिनिः (1.1.21) says the following: सप्तमयेऽवत्ति। आदेविव अन्तः इति एक्समिनिपि कार्य भवति. It thus clearly supports the accrual of *क्रिया* also in तत्र तस्येव.

At times various commentators interpret the occurrence of *vat* in Pāṇini’s *sūtras* according to different rules. One classic example of such a case is as follows:

7. P. 1.1.21: आदेन्तवदः एक्समिनि।

7. The sentence can be arrived at with the help of तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेत्तति: in the following manner: रामेश तुल्यं गमनं रामचरि गमनम् गणेशस्य।
S. C. Vasu: “An operation should be performed on a single letter, as upon an initial or upon a final.”

Comment: आच्छन्तयो: इव एकसिंन् व्यवहारः आच्छन्तवत् एकसिंन् (व्यवहारः) (तन्त्र तस्येव).

S. D. Joshi: “When the question is of (applying a grammatical operation to) one single (phoneme), it is to be treated as if it were the initial (of a sequence) or the final (of a sequence).”

Comment: एकसिमिन् विधौ कर्त्येऽ सः एकः आच्चन्ताभ्यां तत्त्वम् आच्चयेत् । (तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेष्टितः).

Among Hindi translations only the one by Brahmadatta Jijnāsu has been taken into consideration in this study. A remarkable point in his translation of the sūtras in question is that all the meanings of vat that occur in these sūtras by virtue of different vat-ordaining sūtras have been tapped in his translations by merely using the phrase ke samān on almost at all occasions. This may be due to the power of the phrase ke samān in Hindi to encompass all the meanings.

Another striking point is that vat according to तद्धृतम् does not occur anywhere in the sūtras examined. An obvious reason behind this can be the fact that the sūtra तद्धृतम् does not facilitate the function of atideśa, for which vat has been used as the tool throughout the Aṣṭādhhyāyī.

On many occasions, translators have preferred to give the consequence of a suffix vat rather than its translation. This makes it easier for the readers to understand the implication of the sūtra rather than the literal translation. However, a translator’s understanding of vat in that particular sūtra cannot be understood in such instances.

10 Ambiguity and translations of vat
Vat poses an ambiguity for translators. A scrutiny of translations

8. In what follows, all comments are ours unless otherwise noted.
gives an insight into how translators have understood and interpreted vat. We try to assign a sūtra-ordained sense to each translation and interpretation of vat. Ambiguity or difference in interpretations seen in the translations is at the root of how scholars translate the sūtras. On the literal level one translation is convincing, while, having considered the implications, another is convincing. Considering implications and translating should be a result of the intent to make the sense of a sūtra obvious, thus making it easier for the reader to understand.

Translators end up giving different translations or interpretations because they deal with the sūtra either literally or after having considered the consequences or implications of a literal understanding. It becomes important in translating sūtras to consider whether to translate literally or to consider first the implications of a literal translation. That pretty much determines what interpretation of vat is reflected in a translation

11 Conclusions
Even the absence of vat in several instances carries out its function, atideśa, so that a unitary meaning of vat based on occurrences as evidence, cannot be established.

Translations of vat vary mainly because translators either translate literally or consider first the consequences and implications of a translation. Translations, therefore, do not really deal with the essential, literal and residual sense of vat. Translations vary also because of the two main different paraphrases and interpretations of vat which are possible, based on either P. 5.1.115 or P. 5.1.116.

If vat is interpreted as showing similar actions, that is, a padagenerative process (prakriyā), P. 5.1.115 (तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेतति:) takes precedence and if vat is interpreted as showing attributive similarity, then P. 5.1.116 (तत्र तस्येव) takes precedence.
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स वाचको विशेषणां संबंधवाद द्योतकोंपि वा

सुबोध शर्मा

भगवान् पाणिनि: ‘सुनिधंत& पदम्’¹ इति सूत्रारा प्रकृतिप्रत्ययसमुदायरूपं हिशिंध पदविभागं स्वीकार। कथितं प्रकृतिमात्रस्यापि शास्त्र-प्रकृत्यानिवाहाय पदसंज्ञा मनुष्यः।² प्राचीनाचार्यांस्तु चतुर्विधं पदविभागं स्वीकृतवतः। तथाहि – ‘चतवारि वाक्यारिणिता पदानि’ इति ऋग्वेदे,³ ‘तदार्थायार्थनि चतवारि पदार्थार्थनि नामाख्याति चोपसर्गनिपाताद्य तानीमानि भवनिः’ इति च नित्यस्तेः उद्यमः। अत एवः च महाभाषेः – ‘चतवारि पदार्थार्थनि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताद्य’⁵ हिद्युक्तम्। मीमांसाशास्त्रेऽपि ‘चतुर्विधं पदं चात्रा’⁶ इति निर्देशम्।

तत्र नामातपेत सुनवतं गृहाते, नमिति = आख्यातार्थं प्रत्य विशेषणोन्भवति व्युपते:। आख्यातपेत च तद्दशस्य प्राणं भवति, यथा – ‘आख्यातामाह्यातेन त्रियासात्त्वे’⁷ हिद्युत्त। उपसर्गादपेत च उपसर्गः: क्रियायोगः⁸ इति सूत्रेण बोधिता उपसर्गसंज्ञा: प्रादयो गृहाते। निपातश्चेत च निपातसंज्ञकमव्ययपदं गृहाते। पाणिनिमते निपाता अथा अव्ययवात् सुनवतं एवंति तेषाः न पृथ्वीग्रहणम्। प्राणीनामिः प्रान्त्रः”⁹ इति निपातत्वाद्वयेन सुनवतत्वमेवंति पाणिनिनाः हिशिंधमेव पद्य स्वीकृतम्।

अथ सुनवतं तिडंतं वा अधिकृत्तं भगवान् पाणिनि: नाना सूत्राणि प्रणिनाय। निपातार्थविवेकाय च न तथा प्रणीतवान। अतोऽत्र विषयं विद्वान: स्वस्युक्ततिं: निपातार्थविषयं कृतपरिश्रमा: भवनिः। निपाता द्योतका वाचका वेद्यत्व विपुर विसंबाददि भवनिः। अत एव च ममापि निपातार्थविवेकानि प्रवृत्तिज्ञाता।

¹ प.सू. 1.4.14
² ‘न: कथा’ प.सू. 1.4.15, ‘सिति च’ प.सू. 1.4.16, ‘स्वादिश्वतस्वानमस्थान’ प.सू. 1.4.17
³ ऋ.वं. 1.64.45 उद्ध: म.भा.प्रस्तशा (1.17)
⁴ नि. 1.1.1
⁵ म.भा.प्रस्त (1.18)
⁶ मैद. 1.3.9 तत्कवार्तिकं (पृ. 306)
⁷ प.सू., प.सू. 2.1.72
⁸ प.सू. 1.4.59
⁹ प.सू. 1.4.58
निपातशब्द: ‘अर्थआदिभ्योऽऽ’

10 इत्यप्रतयोऽऽ: = अनेकेश्चधर्षु निपातोऽऽस्ति येषां

ते निपाता:। निपतं निपात इति भावजनतनिपातशब्दादातिस सति निपातशब्दस्य निपाता:।

अथवा ज्ञालदिकातः ‘ज्ञालित कसनतथ्योऽऽ’। इति कत्ति प्राप्यः = निपतति

अनेकेश्चधर्षोऽऽस्ति निपाता:। ‘उच्चावक्षेपक्षी निपातन’।

तत्र भवता भण्डता पाणिनिन महती संज्जा कृता – ‘प्राणीश्रावनिपाता:’।

निपतति

उच्चावक्षेपी = अनेकेश्चधर्षु।

निपातविषये शास्त्रकारणा विदुषाँ वेमत्यं भवति। कोचिन् निपातानां द्रोतकत्वं

स्वीकृतिति। कोचिच्च वाचकत्वमेजीकृतिः। कोचिच्च द्योतकत्व वाचकत्वः

कोचिच्च केशाश्चननातानां द्योतकत्मेव, केशाश्चननपातानां वाचकत्मेवेति।

संह्रुगयः:, महाभाष्यः, वाक्यपदीयः वा व्याकरणशास्त्रस्यक्रमः भवति।

तत्रते सर्वं समभाविताः: पक्षा: चिचित्ता: ध्यनिता: बा सन्त।

तदुक्तम् = ‘सबवेदपरिषद् हींद शास्त्र तत्र नैः:

पध्या: शाक्य आस्थातुः’।

तत्र प्रथमः निपातस्य द्वित्तिः विभाग: कल्प्यते प्राणुपर्यंतरूपः

तद्वितरिक्तकः। भाष्यकारे

भगवान् पत्त्विति: उपस्मातिनितिनिपातानां द्योतकत्वं वाचकत्वं

स्वीकृतिः। तथाहि

- महाभाष्ये प्राणम्वे ‘अथ श्वदानुशासनम्’।

इत्यत्र ‘अथेश्च श्वदानुशासनम्’। अथ श्रीकृष्टतः।

- ‘अधिकारः प्रस्तावः द्योतकनास्य प्रयोजनमित्यथः’।

निपातानां द्योतकत्वं वाक्यपदीयनिपात: ‘

इत्युक्तः। अनेन निपातानां द्योतकत्मायति।

‘अधिकारः’ इत्रनेन अधिकारः: वाच्योऽर्थः इति नागेशः:

‘परेत्व वाचकत्वमेवेच्छति। अधिकृतमिति च

तथेत् वदनिः’।

इतुक्तः। उपर्युक्तविवेचनेन निपातविषयेण द्योतकत्वं

वाचकत्वः

भयमायति। ‘अवयं विभागः’।

इति सूत्रे भाष्ये भाष्यकारः: – ‘हि

कथमान भवति – सुदर्श: सुपार्शः:; सुपुत्रः: सुचत्रत्र इति।

समुद्रां साक्तवः इति क धार्मिक। नैः देषः।

इह कथितः समासः पूर्वपदार्थप्राधानः; कथितउपपदार्थप्राधानः;

कथितन्यपदार्थप्राधानः; कथितुभयपदार्थप्राधानः। पूर्वपदार्थप्राधानोऽवयेयभावः,

10 ए.सू. 5.2.127

11 ए.सू. 3.1.140

12 नि. 1.2.1

13 ए.सू. 1.4.56

14 मा.भा. 2.1.58 (2.634)

15 मा.भा.परस्परा. (1.1)

16 मा.भा.परस्परा. प्रदेशी (1.2)

17 मा.भा.परस्परा. उदेशी (1.3)

18 ए.सू. 2.1.6
उत्तरपर्वदर्शनसत्पुरुषः, अन्यपर्वदर्शनान्य बहुःहिः, उभयपर्वदर्शनान्य इनः। नाचने पूर्वपर्वदर्शनान्य गम्यन् १९ । इतःक्रिया अनन्तरम् - 'अथवा नेमे समासायेः निर्दिष्टाः। किं ताहि? अथवायेः इने निर्दिष्टाः। एव अथौषु यद्यव्यं बलंते तसुकुलं सह समस्यं। २० इति उक्तवान्। 'अथवायेः इमे' इत्यनेन निपातानावचकत्तमेः आयताः।

अत्र कै यत: - 'अथवस्य शुद्धार्जनसत्स्तत्सत्स्तुप्पेय विभक्तायैयो विशेषणानि। तत्र यदोत्तरपर्वदर्शनवृत्ति समुदायायेः प्रतिपादित्यिषिता भवत्ति तदाव्यं समुदायार्द्वीनां वाचकमितिः तेषां तद्यद्य भवति। सुम्रा इत्यत्र तु महानाब्द एव समुद्रदिनिषिद्धशस्त्रार्थेः, सुभवद्वृत्तु समुद्रदिनिषिद्धक्रोऽन्त्र न तु वाचकः। सपुरुष इत्या रापि सहस्वादस्वत्योगस्य वाचकः न तु साकात्यस्य। २१ इति व्याख्यातिः। तदनेन स्पष्टायति यन्तिनेनानाहालकल्यं वाचकत्तमेः लक्ष्यानुस्त्रृतात स्वीकर्त्तो। 'नन्त्रू' २२ इत्यत्र 'किं प्रधानान्य समास: ? इत्युक्तम् महाभाष्ये। तत्र पूर्वपर्वदर्शनयेव उत्तरपर्वदर्शनाय यथात्। अत्यत्र नावः 'वाचकत्तमायति। 'अन्नासाम्यः' इत्यात्र आरोपितानासाम्यः इत्यथः। अत्र आरोपिताय: 'श्रव्य एव। यदि आरोपिताय नववचाच्यं भवेतु तत्व 'अन्नासाम्यः' इत्यत्र आरोपानासाम्याविरिगुल्लेन विद्यो न स्यात्।

उपसापानान्तु दोषकल्यंमेवति सूचितम् गतिण्यः २४ इति सुनेन्। तथाहि - 'इहापि ताहि न प्राणोऽति-' अन्युद्वरिः, समुदात्यिः, उपसापाद्यात। अत्रापि नामेवेद्य प्रति क्रियायोऽ। किं ताहि? हरि प्रति क्रियायोऽ। नैष दोषः। उद्य प्रति क्रियायोऽ। कथम्? उद्य हरिक्रियाः विशिष्टतचत। उद्य विशिष्टयं अभिः: विशिष्टतचत। तत्व 'यतु क्रियायुक्ता' इति भवत्त्रेव संयात्य प्रति क्रियायोऽ। इहापि ताहि मन्त्रसाधना क्रियाःशास्त्राधिक्षर्वेते - 'आयाहि मन्त्रैै रू प्रति। ननु पूर्व धातुरूपस्मरण युन्ते पक्षातु साधनेनात। नैतत्तु सामम्। पूर्व धातुः साधनेन युन्ते पश्चातुपर्वस्मरण। किं कारणम्? साधने हि क्रियाः निर्विरूत्यति तामुस्मार्गो विशिष्टतचत। २५ अत्र प्रत्यः - 'अभिव्यञ्जने, विशिष्टतचत' इत्यादिकथनेन उपसापानान्तु दोषकल्यं आयताः।

\[19\] म.भा. 2.1.6 (2.569-570)
\[20\] म.भा. 2.1.6 (2.570)
\[21\] म.भा. 2.1.6 भृ.पृ (2.570)
\[22\] पा.सू. 2.2.6
\[23\] म.भा. 2.2.6 (2.666)
\[24\] पा.सू. 8.1.70
\[25\] म.भा. 8.1.70 (5.345-346)
एवेंव च ‘सूरदास’ को भगवान

172  सुबोध सर्वां

...
भवति, तदवश्यं समृद्धावलीनां वाचकमू इति तेषां तदवश्यता भवति’ इत्यत्र स्पष्टमेव वाचकलमू उक्तवत्:। उपसर्गप्राणतु दोक्तकलमू एव ‘भवादयो धातवः’। इति सूक्ते ‘क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः।’ इति वातीक्यायायानावसेरे ‘इह ताहि व्यक्तमलोक्तरं गम्यते–तिष्ठति–प्रतिष्ठत इति। तिष्ठति इति ब्रज़क्रियाया निवृत्ति:, प्रतिष्ठत इति ब्रज़क्रिया गम्यते। ते मननामेव – ‘उपसर्गकृतमेवलोक्त ब्रज़क्रिया गम्यते’ इति। प्रार्थयं दृष्टापचारः: आदिकमिणि वतते’ इति भायस्यं ‘प्रोक्तमिति’ प्रतीकमादय ‘अन्यत्रापि प्रयोगम्। तत्त्वं अन्यत्तत्वं योऽथाम् दोल्यः: स एवहापि इत्तूनमौयः। अनेकार्थलवदृधातुं धातूः तिष्ठतिसे गतिवाचीतिं निर्यायः। हत्युक्तवत्:। गतिर्मनि।। 40) इति सूक्ते ‘प्रायोक्त विशिष्टया: क्रियाय: नाण्यनेन सम्बन्धः प्रतिपादितसु सोपसर्गसमुदायः प्रयुक्तकते। . . . परमार्थातो ध्रुवप्रसादः एव क्रियावाची पृथ्वीपुर्णेशसः धृत्युपसर्गयोरंदविद्यवस्थातः। तदनेन नूनपुसर्गप्राणं दोक्तकलमू सम्बन्धं कैत्यतमते। अथापि अधिकाओऽपि दोक्तकलक्यं समर्थादृ दोक्तकलमू सर्वत्र उत्तमे सम्प्रतिमिति भावति।

हरदतािसमि: दोक्तकलमू निपातनामू तथा हि – ‘अधिकारः: प्रस्तावः: = प्रारम्भः।’ तमरस्येबृहो दोक्तमिति:। 41) ‘पूर्वप्रक्रतिस्थल वाक्यस्य अन्वयावलोक्तनाय आकारः: प्रयुक्ते।’ 42) ‘निवृत्तिपदवर्कोऽन्त्र ब्रह्मणशब्दः: सा च निवृत्ति: स्वाभाविकः नजा दोल्याः।’ 43)

श्रीप्रभो नागेश्वरद्वारा अर्थ उपसर्गार्िकानिपातानं दोक्तकल्यं वाचकलक्याङ्गीकृतिः।

अमी हि ‘अथ शाब्दानुशासनम्।’ इत्यत्र ‘निपातानं दोक्तकल्यं’ इति प्रदीप्य्तप्रतीकमादय अन्यथा व्याख्याते – निपातानं दोक्तकल्यशेषयथः। उपसर्गार्िकानिपातानं दोक्तकाचारक्यस्यत्तातीस्यविषयं विभक्ति सूक्ते भाषेय स्पष्टातः। उपसर्गाण्तु दोक्तकलः हेच्छुन्ति स्पष्टं गतिर्मिति सूक्ते भाषेय इति तत्वेऽव निरूपविषय्या:। अत: एव साश्च क्रियते भुगुर्विद्याय संग्रहेते।’ 45) इति। अर्थन उद्योगव्यायानेन ततेऽं मरे निपातानं दोक्तकल्यं वाचकल्यं नूनं समर्थातं भवति। अर्थ च एतेऽं मरे अविशेष्ये निपातानं

37. पा.सू. 1.3.1
38. म.भा. 1.3.11 का.वा. 7
39. म.भा. 1.3.1 प्र.टी.
40. पा.सू. 8.1.70.
41. का.उ.प.टी. अथ शाब्दाः (1.7)
42. का.उ.प.टी. 1.1.14 (1.133)
43. का.उ.प.टी. 2.2.6 (2.105)
44. म.भा.प.स्पशा. (1.1)
45. म.प.स्पशा.उ.टी. (1.3)
वाचकत्वं दौँकत्वः भवमापि सम्मतम। तथाहि - 'अन्यं विभक्तं'। \(46\) इति सूतस्म्यप्रदीप्तात्सतीकमादान। 'निपातानं दौँकत्वं, वाचकत्वं, लक्ष्याणुरीवाच् व्यवस्थेन भव।'।\(47\) गतिपालितं सृजाभाष्यातोत्तरं अड़ाबिभव्यज्ञत इत्येन दौँकत्वपरं चूचयति। \(48\) प्राणिशरणनिपातः। 'इति सूचूः शेषें, 'एषां दौँकत्वं वाचकत्वं यथा कार्यं यथा प्रयोगं वोध्ययमित्वं विस्तरं।'। \(49\) 'एषां = प्रादीनं चारीनं'। \(50\) 'निपातानं दौँकत्वं वाचकत्तेख्यतेन भाष्यं स्पष्टं।' इत्यादिवचनं: श्रीमता नागेश्वरपादानं निपातान्यायं दौँकत्वं वाचकत्त् भवमापिन्तेप्रतमं इति स्पष्टमेव। परमलघुन् जूहायायं निपातार्थानिर्णयं च अति लिखितं 'यद्यपि कृत्याचाविद्या निपातानं वाचकत्वे 'शोभनं: समुच्चयं।' इतिवद् 'शोभनकं' इत्यापितं: 'घटस्य समुच्चयं।' इतिवद् 'घटस्य च' इत्यापरिश्चत्वाहुस्तं। \(52\) अनेन चकन्थं स्पष्टेन स्पष्टमेव चारिनिपाताविषयं वाचकत्वं श्रीनागेश्वरस्म्य सम्मितिप्राप्तान।' 'उपसर्गाणं दौँकत्वं तदिनिर्निपातानं वाचकत्वम्।' इति नैयायिकमम् 'वेष्यमेव बीजाध्रवतं।' \(53\) इत्यूतकः औष्ठम् यत्र प्रतिभाः यत्र इतिनिपातं दौँकत्वं वाचकत्वं वा लक्ष्याणुसारस्म्यत्र इत्यत्र नाग्रहः। कऽन्तां। पश्च: समाध्रिवित्तं शक्तते तत्थि कथं वेष्यमेव स्वक्ष्रियते। अनेन निपातान्यायं दौँकत्वं वाचकत्वं च सम्मितिश्च भवति।

वेयाकरणसिद्धान्तम् जूहााः निपातार्थायं अनेन नागेश्: प्रतिभायनिति - 'वस्तुतस्तु निपातानं शकितं गुरुतवतः लक्षणाणायेनपि बोधातु चानविकिज्ञानकार्यकारणभावानुसरितं।' अर्थं शाक्तिमातानं लक्ष्याणुश्च बोधातु कार्यकारणभावोऽयावस्य कतिथि दौँकत्वं शक्तिवेश्युत्भवमापिन्तेनान्याविषयं मतनिशिक्षकं।' \(54\) उपसर्गाणान्तु दौँकत्त्वेन इति 'ादाबिभव्यज्ञते' इति 'गतिर्तं' इति भाष्यप्रामाण्यान्। 'यद्यपि एभिभव्यान' जाते यदूं उपसर्गानिर्निपातान्यायं दौँकत्त्वं वाचकत्त् भवमापिन्तेनान्यायं सम्मितिनान्तं नागेश्वरस्म्य तथापि मन्त्रावनीं भौस्मृतो दौँकत्त्वपक्षं च सम्मितिनान्तं सम्मेव मन्त्रामेव दौँकत्त्वपक्षं एव नागेश्वरस्मितम।

\(46\) प.सू. 2.1.6
\(47\) म.भा. 2.1.6 उ.टी। (2.570)
\(48\) म.भा. 8.1.7। उ.टी। (5.346)
\(49\) ल.श.शं.स.प्र. (1.144)
\(50\) ल.श.शं.स.प्र.स्या। (1.114)। ल.श.शं.न.प्र.टी। (पृ. 132-33) - एषां = प्रादीनं चारीनं च आदिनाथायेन।।। एतत् उपसर्गाणं दौँकत्वं तदिनिर्निपातानं वाचकत्त्वात्मकमित्त्वायावश्यकः अद्वैतानिविष्यं सर्वें दौँकत्त्वं वाचकत्त्वात्मकमितत्र दीक्षिताद्वैतकः परस्तं।
\(51\) ल.श.शं.अन्यायभावप्र। (2.798)
\(52\) प.ल.म.निश्च। (पृ. 116)
\(53\) प.ल.म.निश्च। (पृ. 115)
\(54\) वै.सिमन्त्रायणिनिश्च। (पृ. 54)
स वाचको विशेषणां संभावन छोटकोडिप वा

द्वात्याठ्यमात्यै परि समन्वयः कार्यः। निपताण्य द्वात्यकत्यादेऽवै वैयक्तिकः। व्यञ्जनावृत्तिः स्वीकृतिः।

नैयायिकमत्तपेनम्

निपतार्थिविषये शाब्दिकान्तः कुतः प्रदानप्रतिष्ठादिरूपेण नैयायिकः। प्रत्यविषयः। एतन्मेव उपसर्गान्तः द्वात्यकत्यादेऽवै निपताण्य कार्यः। व्यञ्जनावृत्तिः स्वीकृतिः।

अत्र नैयायिकः। समाद्धिः यतृत्वः सम्वेदनः कार्यः। निपताण्यः द्वात्यकत्यादेऽवै वैयक्तिकः। व्यञ्जनावृत्तिः स्वीकृतिः।

अत्र च विचारयमात् – उपसर्गान्तः द्वात्यकत्यादेऽवै निपताण्यः। तत्र निपताण्य व्यञ्जनावृत्तिः। चाद्वात्यकत्यादेऽवै निपताण्यः कार्यः निपताण्य कार्यः।

65 अ.कृते। 3.3.243
चत्तादिकम्। तथा सति विनिगमनाविरहातः पटत्वादिकमादय अनन्तकार्यकारणाभावः प्रसन्नते। एवं ग्रुपूर्तिपि समेता निपातनामगुतरूपं चालकत्व वाचकत्व वायुपययम्।

निपात धोकाकः। निपाततः उपसन्नतं। अत्र जातिःमुपाधिरूपं वा पक्षवाचकस्थुद्रकः संकेतसमवेन निपातपरवर्तें हेतुहृति पक्षवाचकस्थुद्रकस्नेहायौ चिन्तित न व्याप्त्याहत्वादित्वः। अहंद्रव नाशंकर्त्नाय यथा पादपुराण्यकः 'च वा ह' इत्यादी धोककवाचकस्थुद्राति, निपाततः च सत्वात् व्यभिचार इति, वाचकत्वाधवृत्तम् धोककस्थुद्रस्य साध्यतेन विवक्षाणात। तस्य च पादपुराण्यकं चादानिष चत्तेन दोषाभावात।

अथायस्य दौषग्यनिरस्तायु नैयायिका: प्रतिपद्यन्त्यत् यतृ - यत्र बहव: व्यायामः: व्यापकार्यम्बृजकोरूच्चदक्षमेन उपसिद्धोऽथ भवति, तत्र गौरवात अनुगतात्वात् बहुतः व्यायायमानवाचदक्षमेन नौचतमाः। किंतुकेस्वैव व्यापकम्भुवाचकस्थुद्रकलं हुण्यते। यत्र तु एक एक व्याययोऽधमः, एक एक च व्यापकोऽधमः। तत्र व्यायायम्बृजकोरूच्चदक्षमेन स्वीकृत्यते। तत्सर्यानुवानत्प्रसस्तवतः गौरवाभावाः। अत एव शीमाकलेखपि द्रव्यचारुपं प्रतिः उद्योगरूपं कारणः तत्र च कार्यवाचकस्थुद्रकं व्यायं द्रव्यचारुपवेष्टत न तु द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षात।

किंतु निपाततः पादपुरवे निपाततः विद्यता। तत्र च धोककस्थुद्रस्य साध्यसाध्यतेन अतिप्रसक्तवाति निपातस्थुद्रकस्थुद्रकलं न युण्यते। अतः 'प्रादयो धोकका उपसन्नताः' इत्यतुमानेन प्रादयाः धोककस्थुद्रमिति नैयायिकाः।

'निपात धोकका निपाततः' इत्यतुमानातु तु न निदुष्माः, उपसन्नतयोपविधानवामात्राय हेतोः सोपार्थिकतातु व्यान्त्यसांस्कृतिगंगुन्तवात्। यतो हि यत्र यत्र धोककन्तः तत्र तत्र नैयायिकमते उपसन्नत्वमिति साध्यवाचकता। यत्र यत्र निपाततं तत्र तत्रप्रसक्तत्वमिति तु वक्रुः न शक्यते चादः व्यविचारानुसारित्व साधनावाचकता तति उपसन्नताविधातिः सुसंपद्य प्रतिभात।

अथवेदं चिन्तनीयम् - प्रकरणिदित: प्रादयाच्य: प्राध्यव्यव्यतिरंकानुविधायिशायव्य-वृद्धिविषयतः, धातवत्वादिकमानुविधायिशायव्य-वृद्धिविषयताः। एवं ग्रुपूर्तिति इत्यादी जयादे: धातुवाचत्वम्, प्रकरणिदेस्तु प्रादयाच्यतम्। प्रकरणियं स्वश्रुपसमवेनेन जयादेष्व: नामार्थवाचत्वेऽयेऽ साधकादेसमस्वेनान्यस्यायुपननतत्वा तद्विरीधपिरः। निपातितिकलितानिवेशेन करणीय इति वैयाकरणात्वदाराय नैयायिकोऽन्येऽति प्रज्ञातीत्वाद्री कथ्यं दुस्प्रभुपतावपि 'प्रतिष्ठा' इत्यत्र प्रशंसस्य अभावकपूर्वोऽर्थोऽवाचः। तस्य च गमनाभावात्वेऽ इति विशेष्यस्य प्रामाण्यायाम्बानम्भुप्रमाण्यं इति धातुवाचत्वविकारकात् 'प्र' इत्यत्र उपसन्नतां व्यवहन्ते। अतः उपसन्नां धोककता एवेऽति नैयायिकसिद्धान्ताः।

यथापि धोककतापुराणोऽवा व्यज्ञनाधृति-वाच्यायमे नासिक्रियेत्, तथापि एतस्य धोककतं नाम स्वसमवाहतपदात्वृद्धिबोधकस्थुद्रमृ। एवं च प्रज्ञातीत्वाद्री धातोः प्रकरणिदिविविषये
स वाचको विशोधाणां संभवादू घोतकोरपि वा 177

जये लक्षणा भवति। प्रपदन्तु तासयङ्ग्राहकं भवति। ‘प्रतिष्ठेत’ इत्यत्र तु धातुःनामनेकाश्चार्थवात्
गमनार्थकत्वं तद्धामित्वस्य च प्रायःद्रोहत्त्मपुष्पहतस्ति। एवाऋ न्यायनेये उपसर्गाणं
घोतकतः तदतिरिपातान्तः वाचकतः स्थिरोभवति एवाऋ अनुभूयेति सुखम्, साशालक्रियेति
गुरुः: इत्यादिक शम्येण लकार उपन्यासं इति।

किन्तु विचार्यां - यथायं परिष्कारः: सकर्मकत्वस्य स्वीकृतः - स्वस्वसमभव्याहत
- निपातान्यतार्थकार्यसिद्धिकरणाश्वराभावकात्तिमिति तत्र ‘प्रायागत्त् कार्यं गच्छति
चेत्ते’ इत्यत्र उत्तसदेशसस्योनुकूलोऽश्व यथापि: तत्प्रयोज्यं यत् विभागपुर्वं फलं, तदाश्रयः
प्रायः इति तस्य कर्मविवारणाय कर्मलक्षणं व्यापारप्रयोज्यक्षेत्रार्थितविवाहित्यत्र फले
धार्मित्वं निवेशस्यिन्यम्। तथा सति ‘साशालक्रियेति गुरुः’: इत्यत्र साशालकाररूपकन्त्य
निपातार्थतं धार्मित्ववाहिनात, तदाश्रयार्थकार्यस्वलाभाभावात् गुरुः: कर्मविन्यरूपतमहस्तिम।
वेद्याकरणाते तु अविशेषेण निपातान्यतार्थ घोतकाध्वःकारणं साशालकाररूपकन्त्य
धार्मित्वततयाः गुरुः: कर्मविन्यरूपमुष्पत्ति इति नैदृष्टिगमः। अतोद्विशेषेण घोतकन्त्येव
समादर्शनीयित्वम् वेद्याकरणमिद्यात॥

घोतकतः मीमांसककसम्पतिः

निपातानं घोत्यार्थकतः मीमांसकानाममिपि सम्मितिस्वतेयेव। तथाहि - भट्टादैर्कृत्यधि
करणेः मीमांसाभाष्येः तत्वतातिक॥५६ प्रोक्तम् -

गौरित्येवविधा: शव्वा: साधुःचनेन निरूपितः:।
तेषामेवाभिधेयेःस्य व्यापारः: वेचिति चिन्तयेते॥
चतुःसिद्धे पदे चात्र द्विविधस्यार्थिनिर्णयः॥
क्रियेत संशयोत्तप्तेऽनेष्ट्यन्तिप्राप्तयोः॥
तयोरसाभिधाने हि व्यापारे नैवं विद्यंते॥
यद्यघोतकं तौ सु तु वाचकः स विचार्ये॥ इति ।

अयमाशयः: - पदानं चरुविभिज्ञम्-नामाकार्यातोपसाधिन्यपातरूपं भवति। तत् नामः
आख्यातस्य चेति द्विविधयेव पदार्थस्यार्थिनिर्णयः: क्रियेते, तत्रैव संशयोदर्यात्।
संशयाकारश्र-नामाः: जातिर्यक्तिवाः? धार्मिक: व्यापारः: फलमू, तुढ़भयं वा?
इत्येवसंहिरुप:। चरुसीघपुर्वम पदमू, तत्र संशयं एव नोदेतुमहि - कस्ततावन्निष्ठाः?
को वा उपसाधः? इत्येवसंहिरुप:। अर्थाभिधाने उपसाधिन्यपातयोः: शक्तिरूप लक्षणारूपं
वा व्यापारे नैव विद्यति इति कथ्यित्वं तत्र संशयः: उद्दैनाम। संदेहासारङ्गाय एव

56 मैत्रे. 1.3.9 तत्त्वशास्त्रं (पृ. 306)
वाक्यप्रयोगनियममात्र। नाम आर्थिकता वा वाचकभूतत्व प्रतिपादो यो विषयः, तत्स्येव छोटकल्पनमन्योऽः निपातोपसर्गः: विद्वैत इति नामाख्यातयोगेवोक्तस्वंदेहानामाख्यातसाधनार्थनिर्ण्यं निमालसकं: प्रक्रियात्ः। अतः ‘उपसर्गनियमः’ इति प्रयोगर ग्राहणवसिद्धव्यपेक्षानेत्र कृतो वोधः। एवं नीमालसकानां मतेष्वपि निपातानं छोटकल्पमेरेति प्रतीतयेत्।

छोटकल्पवादेशाक्सरायनमतम्

‘न निवर्तः: उपसर्गः: अर्थानिराहुरिति शाक्सरायनः।’ ५७ उपसर्गः: = प्रदयः, निवर्तः: = निरूपः निर्कृष्टः, (नामाख्यातमथ्यात) बाधः = पदावक्षरुप्रेण रचितः: सतः: अर्थानु न निराहुरिति शाकस्करायन आचारायां मन्यते। ५८ ततः उपसर्गः अर्थवतः: कथ्मिति जिज्ञासायामः उक्तमः - ‘नामाख्यातयोगेस्तु कर्मोपसयोगशोकोतकाः भवन्ति’ ५९। नामाख्यातयोगेव यत्कर्म = योगः: ततः = तदार्थव्यपेक्षाने उपसर्गोऽगवन उपसर्गनिमित्तेन छोटकल्पः: भवन्ति।

हरिसमभवक्षणम्

वैयकरणाः निकाये आचार्याणां ग्रंथेऽपि निपातार्थविषयेन जयः: पश्चा विवेचिता दरोदरः। तत्र प्रथमः: पश्चा निपातानेन विशेषार्थ्योक्तकल्पित्यायात्ः। यथा - ‘अनुभवति’ इत्यत्र उपसर्गस्यायूपाधार्थलोककल्पमः। यदुक्तः हरिणा -

क्वचितु सम्भविनो भेदः: केवलेनिर्द्वितिःः।
उपसर्गः समानेः व्यञ्जनेऽपि प्रभुत्विना। ६० इति अतः ‘व्यञ्जनेऽ’ इत्यनेन उपसर्गाणां धातुभिन्नोक्तकल्पं नितरामायात्ः।

तत्र तत्रोपसर्गाणां विशेषार्थवाक्यबन्धकत्वमपि चर्चितमसित�। स चाय द्वितीयः: पश्चाः। यथा - ‘प्रतिद्वद्वे’ इत्यत्र गतिनिवृत्ति: स्थायात्तरः।। प्रापसर्गस्य च गत्यार्थोऽभिदेवः। तदुक्तः वाचकपदोऽये - ‘स वाचको विशेषार्थः’ ६१ इति

तृतीयः: पश्चाः - सहिष्ठो धातुपर्सर्गो सहेव विशेषमर्थव्रृत्।। एवं नीमालसकानां नियमानेन उपसर्गाणां सहकरात्तिवृत्तति। तथाहि प्रज्ञतत्त्वाद्विक्रमवेष्टी जयं धातुपर्सर्गोऽसहेव प्रतिपादतः। तदित्तमुक्तमः -

५७ नि. १.१.४
५८ नि.३.१.४ (म.म. पण्डट श्रीमुकुन्दशासामकृतशिल्पितः)
५९ नि. १.१.४
६० वा.प. २.१८७
६१ वा.प. २.१८८
रक्षत्याधानाय धातोवां सहकारी प्रकृत्याते।

एवं जयोऽयेति पश्चः तास्ते चरिति दीर्घयस्य यथान्तरप्रकीर्ण जातृत्वाधानोकारणोत्तरकोर्तमेव जित्यज्ञातितम। एवव जत्यत्तत्वात्र इत्यत्र धातुनिवनकार्यानुसार प्रक्रियाधिति अनुमानप्रयोगेण च स्थायतोर्व गत्यथस्यकम्ब भवति। प्रशाश्वस्तु तादृशस्य विलक्षणार्थस्य जोतकल्पमात्र कुतरे। तत्तदं सिद्धान्तवचनमार्थायं: आस्थायं -

स्थाविभं: केवलेविचच्च गमनादि न गमते।
तत्रानुमानाद्विद्वाट तद्र्वमा प्राधिकूर्वयते।

एवं जत्यान्तरप्रकीर्ण: प्रसिद्धशास्त्रया स्थायतुतुतुकाभित्रयार्थ इत्युतुतुकायां केवलेन धातुन गमनस्थ्योत्तरकोर्तमेव भावित है। जित्यत्यज्ञातितमात्र निवनकार्यानुसार प्रक्रियाधिति अनुमानप्रयोगेण च स्थायतोर्व गत्यथस्यकम्ब भवति। प्रशास्तु तादृशस्य विलक्षणार्थस्य जोतकल्पमात्र कुतरे। तत्तदं सिद्धान्तवचनमार्थायं: आस्थायं -

निपाता जातका: केवलतू प्रथमगतिभिधाविनः।
आगमा इव केवले र्यु: समभूतार्थ्रक्य वाचका:।

एवं विवेचनेन इदं ताब्जु त्रिमित्याति यतो उपस्यवाणिज्य विद्यधिनितन्तानामधि जोतकल्पमेव भूतहरियापेभ्यो रचते।

चादयो न प्रुद्धनेयो पदत्वे सति केवला:।
प्रत्ययो जातकल्पोपि केवलो न प्रुद्धनेयते।

श्रीमंतं: भोटोऽज्ञीक्षयत्महाभागः शव्दकौस्तुम्भो भूपणकार्यादो च निपातार्थविषये पर्यच्यों विवेचितोत्तर। शव्दकौस्तुम्भस्य प्रार्थे: 'अथ शव्दनुसारस्तु' इति महाभाष्यवाक्यस्य 'अथ' शव्द्य प्रकृत्य निपातसामान्यस्यार्थनिरूपणाय संकर्नुक्युक्तपुष्पधानिपुर:सरं श्रीदीश्वतः:
अथवा नियतस्य प्रारम्भप्रारंभाद्योक्तकां प्रतिपादनन् निपातसामान्यस्य सच्चाचत्वात् वाचकत्वाभावं व्यवस्थापनं योग्यकत्वं स्थिररक्षोतति।

अनुभवतीताय दृश्यमानोऽनुभवार्दिपूर्वकः भानुनामवें, उपर्युक्त सा तत्त्वात् तात्पर्यग्रहकरणसे योग्यकत्वे भवति। अतः एवं 'अनुभूते सुखम्' इत्यत्र स्वाधिकृतत्वथा करणव्यापारायणकरणसे करणमिथ्य लक्षय: सिद्धयति। एवमेव 'साश्वातिक्यते गुहा' इत्यादिवर्षी साश्वातिक्यार्त्तथाः धातोरेष्व, साश्वातिकित स्थितस्य तु तद्यथाविद्योतकत्वमात्रम्। अतः एवं करणमिथ्य लक्षार्त्तथाः: सिद्धयति।

उपसृभावतिर्रत्निनिपातानं वाचकत्वमेविष्ट नैयायिकोऽकं तु न सूचिन्म। चैत्ये बीर्जाभावातु तत्त्व अयापितंकर्मवच्छेदन योग्यकत्वाकरणमिथ्य साधीय:, प्रमाणान्त नामाये पक्षपापातु। तथा च उपसृभावपेश्या यापकं निपाततमः, अखण्डोपाधिपतिमस्तु, जातियपतिमस्तु, शास्त्रवृत्तां वापातु। एतत्तत्त्वक्षेत्राःपि प्राविष्टवचारिष्टथे समं सिद्धते। किंतु निपातस्य पंचविद्यायकं पवित्रपायति। अथोऽपि चाविष्ट्व: प्रादित्य किमिधि चालेकण्यं न विद्यते। एवमेव उपसृभावायाध्यस्थ कथा अन्यलघ्यात वेत्तिं संवत्त्वयोपत्योपाध्यायाःपि: तथैव केवल विदितरुपिनिपातानाम्यप्रयोगानां किमिधि हेतु परमेयं यस्मेकस्य योग्यकत्वपरमस्य तु वाचकथं प्रतिपादते। तदुक्ताम्

चार्यो न प्रयूज्यते पदते सति केवला:।

प्रत्यायो वाचकत्वेऽपि केवलो न प्रयूज्यते।

यथा 'विजयते' इत्यत्र विशिष्टसंरचनास्य लक्षणामें भीने स्वकृतातु उपसृभाव योग्यकता स्वकृतातु, तथैव 'घटक' इत्यपि घटबार्त्तस्य सुमुच्छित्करणसे लक्षणामें करणकरणसे नैयायिककत्वं उपसृभावायाध्यस्थ करणरुपिनिपातानामिथ्य योग्यकत्वाभावं नैयायिकसे समानादिकरणान्तितद्व: कार्यादेशदत्तितित्व: सम्बन्धोऽव्युपयोगति इति स्वयुपति निपाततत्त्वतन्त्रकस्य संक्रमणानदेखितस तथिपि प्रमाणानुमतत्त्वमात्रिकर्त्तरम्।

किंतु यथा समुच्चारादिप्रयोगाः घटकस्य समुच्चारतः पर्यंतरेष्व भवति संरचनास्य चार्यो न पदार्थ्ये प्रारम्भस्य सरवविषीये प्रारम्भसंरचना प्रारम्भस्य शास्त्रविशेषास्तरातु तद्वादिकरणान्तित्वात् यस्मेकस्य योग्यकत्वपरमस्य पदभापेश्य वाच्ये प्रारम्भस्य सरवविषीये प्रारम्भस्य व्यवस्थापनस्य आपदामात्रः न शक्यते। 'पदार्थः' पदार्थनान्वतित न

66 वै.भू.स.का. 42-43
67 वा.प. 2.194
तु पदार्थकृतेश इत्युक्ते।

वाचकतत्वादन तत्त्व अयोग्य दोषः दुःस्थत्वः 
तत्: प्रत्येक कौवेक भावान्वित रविद्विगमः
शरीरसूत्रियोंचिद्यान्त उद्घरिणयु रसानि।

अर्थार्थः: पक्षमदिनिविजयन्तरग्रसः भावान्वित उद्घरिणयु: शरी: रसादृश्यान्त उद्घरिणयु रजः: उद्घरिणयु कौबेरिम् = उद्घरिणयु दिवस प्रत्येक इति। एवोऽधिक उद्घरिणयु स्वरूपाधिकर्षणे सत्येव उपयोगे। तत्थः इति निपातस्य तद्वृत्तिश्लोकान्तः
यदि तृ निपातानां वाचकलय स्वीकृतयते तथा प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यार्थान्तवस्वाधिकर्षणमतिरत्वातिपालो आपदाते। वथा हि - उद्घरिणयु करणेन तृतीया किंतु उद्घरिणयु श्रावणांक्रियार्थयमानां करणत्व नास्ति, अभुस्तर्यान्यामः इवार्थेत्रृश्यायसः
करणेऽऽधिक प्रकृतयार्थान्तत्वाधिकर्षणमतिविक्षिप्तमिति व्युत्तस्याधिकर्षणदेशः आपदाते। वथा हि - उद्घरिणयु करणेन तृतीया किंतु उद्घरिणयु श्रावणांक्रियार्थयमानां करणत्व नास्ति, अभुस्तर्यान्यामः इवार्थेत्रृश्यायसः
करणेऽऽधिक प्रकृतयार्थान्तत्वाधिकर्षणमतिविक्षिप्तमिति व्युत्तस्याधिकर्षणदेशः आपदाते। वथा हि - उद्घरिणयु करणेन तृतीया किंतु उद्घरिणयु श्रावणांक्रियार्थयमानां करणत्व नास्ति, अभुस्तर्यान्यामः इवार्थेत्रृश्यायसः
करणेऽऽधिक प्रकृतयार्थान्तत्वाधिकर्षणमतिविक्षिप्तमिति व्युत्तस्याधिकर्षणदेशः आपदाते।

अर्थ नैतिकिकः: वरदित - इवपृश्र्यणयु लुच्चतुत्तीयाया: अर्थः: करण, तत्र इवार्थेत्रृश्यायसः
नौक्तस्नुपत्निविशेषः इति। किंतु अस्तवार्थकस्य इव श्रावणांक्रियापरात्त्वत् दूरपेत्रं
करणात्मिति 'इव' इत्यत्र तृतीयाय: तथापित्युक्तिति: कथा साधीसि स्यात। 'स्वयं
कृतमुः' इत्यादिपि तृतीयाय करणात्मिति: प्रतियते इति वक्तुं न शक्यते उक्तयुक्ते।
किंतु तत्र आत्मकरणात्मर्णृपो र्श्यायसः: अववयस्यावेषि बोधय्य, अन्यथा
उद्घरिणयु यायमाण्त्वतुत्तीयार्थान्यायस्यादातः: वज्ज्लेपायिति: स्यात।

इदित्यध्वेषयु - योगिः सिद्धातः: 'उद्घरिणयुद्वावन्त्वपुः।'६६ इति स नौक्तस्नुपपर्मेऽऽवर्षितस्थले
पूर्वपदस्य नवः: वाचकतत्वाभास्वातः तदाधिकर्षणस्य उदरपार्थस्याभास्वातः सिद्धान्तश्चः,
तदापित: प्रतियते। किंतु इति इविवर्तितत्वस्य सुपपार्थव्याश्चः तदाधिकर्षणस्य उदरपार्थस्याभास्वातः
नवः: वाचकतत्वाभास्वातः सिद्धान्तश्चः तदाधिकर्षणस्य उदरपार्थस्याभास्वातः

शोत्यर्धायः व्रतिपदिकन्यात्यपर्यऽपर्योपसेवः हेतुः: शोत्यर्धायः व्रतिपदिकन्यात्यपर्यऽपर्योपसेवः हेतुः: शोत्यर्धायः

68 रघु. म.का. 4.66
69 म.भा. 2.1.6 (2.570)
70 म.भा. 1.2.45 (2.81)
प्रमाणम् - ‘तु हि च स्म वै पादपूरणे’। कमीमिद्विति पादपूरणांशः।’

इति निरुक्तं च। तदिर्दं कारिक्यं संकलितम् -

बस्रुपात्रा शब्दपरिणामस्य सामान्यतिर्थ्यं विशेषाध्ययनेर्वस्थापकरक्तव्र द्वाकात्मकम्, न तु ख्यातन्येन तदुपस्थाकर्मित्वा तेनाध्ययायमेव व्यक्ततिर्थ्यं प्रतिपद्धतिः निपातत सम्भवित इति निपातेऽथ लुप्तिवानं व्यः सत् अव्यः: अर्थवत्ताभावेत च सूक्ष्मतिर्थवत्वं इति ज्ञाते। किंवद् ‘निपातस्यानर्थकसंज्ञा वक्ति’ वाचिकायम्: समावते भाष्यकारेण अति न दोषः।

अतः “कृत्तिनमसासायन”74 इति सूत्रं चकार्यान्युक्तमुच्यायकर्त्वं किरीटानां संग्रहाति, निपातस्यं विशेषायादिवाचितीकं सूतल्यायायावतानुवादसूचीयै।

अथवा ‘अत्यर्थी अन्यथको’75 इति सूत्रं निपातानामर्थकत्वं ज्ञापितं। तथाहि -

गत्यपपरसोन्यावानाध्वर्म नर्मज्ञायिन्यं ज्ञापिष्टं, किंतु अन्यथकी इत्यतनयः। क्रियायोगाभास्कर वार्त्याः: संज्ञायोगाभास्क तदवाध्यायायमेवाङ्गम्यो धिधिः व्यः सत्यापयति, अर्थसाधित्वश्रृंपि = विशेषाध्ययनकाकर्माभावेत ज्ञापितानामर्थकत्वं ज्ञापितं। स्यटो*देद प्रकृतत्त्रो भाष्ये। निपातस्यं नर्मज्ञायिन्यावतानुवादः। धातवस्थापितकरक्तव्रयं।

एवक्तः - अर्थस्युस्त्रवस्र्वातोर्थसिद्धां वनकस्तालयास्येकाराः। किंतु उपपरसोन्यावायुक्तेऽवोदस्यानर्थकत्वं ब्रह्मचर्य्यं ज्ञापिष्टत। किंतु उपपरसोन्यावायुक्तेऽवोदस्यानर्थकत्वं ब्रह्मचर्य्यं ज्ञापिष्टता।

इत्यदहि इत्यतनयं इत्यतनयं इत्यदहि सूत्रानुवादम्। इत्यदहिः अध्ययने इत्यतनयं निर्देशाध्वर्म.

एवमेव ‘सर्वस्य देष’77 इति सूत्राभासे - “इस तरह ‘परीक्षणर्थ’78 इत्यतनयावायुक्तेऽवोदचर्य्यं वनकस्तास्यासमागमान्याय ज्ञापिष्टत।

71 अ.कृ. 3.4.4
72 निर्देश: 1.3.9 ‘पादपूरणार्थस्य मिताध्ययनन्तर्क: कमीमिद्विति’। श्र.कृ. (1.2) ‘कमीमिद्विति पादपूरणार्थस्य: इति निरुक्ताचार्य’
73 वैभवशास्त्रतः. 46
74 अ.सू. 1.2.46
75 अ.सू. 1.4.93
76 अ.सू. 1.2.45 पदम, न्यास (1.339-340)
77 अ.सू. 8.1.1
78 अ.सू. 8.1.5
79 म.भा. 8.1.1 (5.280)
स वाचको विशेषणां संभवादू गोत्रकोषिप वा

‘यथात्तरेण द्विवचनं परिज्ञानतः: प्रकृत्येति परि त्रिगतेषुः।’

उपस्मृगण धात्विकं बलाद्यवन्न नीतस्त।
प्राकाराससांहार-विहार-परिहारस्तु॥

इति वृद्धिकर्तारीपि निपातमात्रस्य घोतकल्वं प्रमाणयति उपस्मृगणस्य निपातमान्त्रोपलक्ष्यवातः,
धातुपदस्य च पदान्योपपलक्ष्यवाच्चेति भावः। एवं दीक्षतिमहानुबाधवो विस्तरेण
उपस्मृगणानाति मयं तद्वितिविपत्तानामापि घोतकल्वपक्षश्चेति द्रढ़ीकृत्य शब्दकोऽस्तुभे
भूपाकारिकादृ च स्थायपवति।

किन्तु अन्ततो गवथा निपातमात्रस्य वाचकत्वमतिमि पक्षमप्रभ्यत्वापि ग्रंथे भृत्रोजीविशिष्ठः:
अन्नवन्यवतिः। बैयकरण्युह्मणार्कारियाः यथा - ‘निपातानां वाचकत्वमव्यवहतिस्यकोऽथ।’
शाब्दकौऽलुभे यथा - ‘अस्ृत न मातास्त्रम्न निपातः: वाचकः’
इति घोतकल्वप्येण च अस्वार्थयो व्यक्तयति। तथाहि - चन्द्र इव मुखः पुस्ते इति इवपदसमविभवाहारे
तदुश्चर्थः: प्रतीवते। तद्भवे तु न प्रतीवते इत्यव्यवहतिर्कायां निपातसारात्यस्य
वाचकत्वमेव चुपयते। तथा च अनुमानप्रयोगः - निपातः: वाचकः: स्वसमवार्षिक्रियायायाढ़प्रतीतिक्रतवातः।
अतः पश्चात्वर्च्छेदकाच्छेदने अनुमितिरुद्धर्या
पक्षतवाच्छेदकसमानानिधिकरणये वा? आद्य व पश्चातवर्च्छेदकच्यवपक्तव्यस्य हेतौ भानिष्मपातू,
अन्यत्वकिन्नित्य निपातस्य विद्यमानतया व्यवित्यः। अत्ये च हेत्वभावार्पणाविद्यमास्य
दुर्शुदद्वमू: इति।

तत्रेद्वितीयाध्यायम् - सत्यम्, अवच्छेदकाच्छेदने दोपस्तातुन्दरारातू पश्चात्वर्च्छेदक-सामानाध्यकरणेवा:नुमितिरिष्यते।
तत्र च भागालितः: दोषाय न कल्पत इत्युक्तामानने
निपातानां वाचकत्वमायतः। न च वोदकत्वरुपश्वबते: वाधः: केनापि प्रमाणेन लघुत्यते।

उपर्युक्तप्रत्यक्षःन्यव्यतिरिष्यः: तात्त्वार्थाहकच्चेषिपि उपपत्ति: सम्भवतीति न ताभ्यां
वाचकत्वमायतलिंतिमि तु नासौकन्यम्, यति हि प्रकृतविशिष्टस्य जययूपाध्ययेष्य धातृवृत्तमूः,
उपर्युक्तस्य तु तात्त्वार्थाहकच्चेषिपि धातृवृत्तम्याहं नासौकन्यम् केनापि तात्त्वार्थाहकच्चेषिपि
तत्क्षणास्विकरणः तिडादेशिपि तात्त्वार्थाहकच्चेषिपि केनापि स्यात। एवं अन्यव्यवहतिर्क्ष्याभिमिमतः यति तिडां वाचकल्वं तद्युत्स्य। अत्युत्त्वार्थाह तिडादेशिपि
निपातानामापि वाचकत्वमेवः।

80 म.भ.प्र.दृ. 8.1.1 (5.280)
81 द.म.क्र. 3.154 ‘उपस्मृगण धात्विकं बलाद्यवन्न नीतस्त: प्रतीवते’इति वै.भू.सा.मिन. प. 377-78
82 वै.भू.सा.का. 47
83 श.क्र.परमाण्य (1.2)
यच्च वाचकत्वपक्षेः धात्वर्थप्रातिपदिकार्थ्योः: भेदेनावनवयबोधोःन्वुपन्न इति
समानाधिकरणः प्रातिपदिकार्थ्योऽभेदेनावन इति च व्युपतितवस्त्य विरोध उक्तः: स
गत्यतराभावात् निपातातिरिक्तवियवस्त्रोभिभयमसङ्कोचात् परिहरणीयः। एवमनये०पि
दोषः: नैपायितकोऽयायः। उपात्करणीयः। इदन्तु नाशाकनीवो यथा निपतानाः वाचकत्वे केवलानामपि
प्रयोग आपदते, गत्युपस्पर्षसङ्ज्ञायः: ‘ते प्राप्तातः’। इति सूत्रेण नियमात् केवलातः
केवलप्रकृतिप्रतिप्रयत्नात् उपपत्ता केवलानां प्रयोगाभावात्। किंतु ‘न’ इत्यादीनां
केतिप्रयनिपतानाः केवलानामपि प्रयोग इत्यते एव। तदत्तं समाधिः भूर्हरणःपि
- प्रत्यक्षो वाचकत्वपक्षेः पेवलो न प्रुयतो।
समुच्चयातिरित्यांपि व्यतिरेकोः न विद्वद्।०५

यच्च दृष्ट्यां वाचकत्वपक्षोः - शोभनः: समुच्चयः इत्यथे ‘शोभनः’ इत्यापतिरूपम्, घटस्य
समुच्चयः: इत्यथे ‘घटस्य’ इत्यापतिरूपम्। तद्धिः निराकृतां भवति। तथा हि - एष
शब्दशिक्तवाच्याः यथा निपतात् नियपरस्तना अन्यपदार्थशिक्षणोपेक्रो स्वाध्यम् उपस्थापयतीः
प्रथमापतिरित्यांकृता भवति। एवं भदृष्ठस्वभासन्ध्यों प्राति भेदेनावनवायों प्राति च
निपातेंजनायः: उपरिधेतुतोपप्रेमः द्वितीयापतिरित्यांकृता भवति।

एतदः प्रति भवति - नैपायिकः: उपसर्गानां धोकटल्य तदिदिनिपतानाः
वाचकत्वमिलुरीकुमरीविना। किंतु यथाव युक्तोपपर्गानां धोकटल्य तैर्जीक्रियते तथैव
युक्ता तदििरिनिपतानामापि धोकटल्मल्लकुतः शक्यते। किंतु प्रकारान्तरण
सम्भावितदुस्पन्नानुमदारूपलेन चादिप्राणोः: कस्यचितु वैश्यस्यासतेपि चादीनाः
वाचकत्वमल्लकुरणं तदिदिनिपतानां वाचकत्वमिनि न पुनिते। अत: तुल्युक्त्या समेत
पथा प्राधीनिमवचार्यानामपि धोकटवाविशेषण स्वीकारणीयोपेक्षे रीता वैधिकतानां
प्राधिव्याप्यमतसाधणां धोकटमेवष्टम्। तथापि ‘तुल्यु कु तु दुज्जनः’: इति नायकः यदि
चाव्यावत्तिरिकादिना वाचकत्वा अन्यायगतत्वा ताप्तसैवाविशेष्यन निपातमात्रात् अजीक्रिययाम्।
वाचकत्वपक्षेः दोषानुमदारोऽभवत्येव। अत एव उपसर्ग अवकासेम्, ‘प्रतिपक्ति’ इत्यतः
‘गतिनवृत्तिवाचकः: स्वाध्यातः’, उपसर्गस्वभावस्पर्षितवाचकः: पुष्पराजः।६ विन्दु
केवलातः ‘धोकटल्य’ अन्वेषान्तु वाचकत्वमिनि अधोस्तरां न समीचिन्म्। तदेततः
समाकलितम्

निपातानां वाचकत्वम् अन्वयप्रतिरेकोः।
युक्ता वा न तु तदृश्यते परेऽणां मतमेव नः।।

84  प्र.शृः  1.4.80
85  का.प.  2.194-195
86  वै.भू.सा.द.टी.  (प. 382)
नियतत्वं परेण यत् तदसामान्यति स्थितः।

यापकत्वाचार्यकान्तायागस्वामचेतस्मृतेऽ।८७ इति

स्वसुस्थसं उपसर्गाणं वाचकत्वं न सम्भवति। तथा हि अनुवाच्यतिकायां जयदिन्तुवच्चं:

प्रक्षर्दिस्तु प्रादिवाच्च। एवं त्र प्रतिष्ठिते इत्यत्र गत्यभावस्य धातव्यति

गत्यभावाभावस्यपोषणार्थं न्यायनये तिंद्यायंत्रे गत्यभावाभावस्य अप्रकृत्यतथा

‘प्रत्ययानं प्रकृत्यार्थीयतस्वार्थं’ - कल्यां’ इति व्यपरितविशेषायान्यायानुपपत्ति।

आयाकान्तलस्य प्रस्थानार्धस्य प्रतीतिभावपतितं स्वयं। प्रतिष्ठिते इत्यत्र प्रश्वार्धाभावस्य

गमनाभाव (गतिनिर्वृति) रूपात्वर्धं प्रति विशेषतयतेव भानात् प्रादेशपर्यगचानापतितं

वज्रलेपायिता।

किंतु प्रादेशपर्यगचं गतित्वं क्रियायोगं एव भवति - ‘उपसर्गं: क्रियायोगं’

‘गतित्वं’ ८८ इत्युतं:। एवं कु पर्यगाणं पृथकसत्ताभावातु धारतेव के ते स्वैरः: स्वीकृतः:

भवति। उपसर्गानं सांतकोऽकान।

उपसंस्तिरितक्तंनियतातुसं कंचिद् वाचकाः: कंचिच् ह्योकान इति प्रतीतिः। वाचका

यथा - ऋजोभावो वच्चः नवथा: पद्मकृतितजः: इवार्थं: सादृशेयमः। अन्योगःवच्चंनादिएः

एकार्थः। कु नव: इत्यदाय यथा क्रियावचकासमभिव्याहार: तत्रपर्यगचाभावातु प्रादीनामपि

वाचकत्वमेव। अत् एव ‘प्रादयः’ ९० इति प्रादीनां निपातसंज्ञा क्रियः। तेन

‘स्वादिन्तनिपातसत्यम्’ ९१ इति अप्रयमसंज्ञा भवति। अत् एवं तेषत्वेशु वर्तमानस्य

अन्ययस्याव्यंक्तिभावसमसो भवति। निरंनिर्विकृतमु इत्यदाय निरित्यस्यभाववाचकत्या

उपकृतानिमित्यार्थं च उप इत्यत्सं समीपवचकता।

एवेवब ‘आ नो दिवो बृहत्: पर्यत्ताः’ ९२ पर्यतदावकं इत्यथर्थोः। अत्र च ‘आ’ इति

निपातस्य वाचकत्यं विना दिगर्धस्यन्योगाभावसं पञ्जीमिवभिक्षितः: कथं स्वयं।९३

वाचकतयःपि निपातानां चत्तादिरूपानुवृत्तीप्रेपीय आयात्येव, सामान्यज्ञानं न

विशेषोद्धेशोगीतिः न्यायात्। अत् एव आनुवृत्तीप्रेप जाननं निपातवनाजाननाच्यं बोधो

भव्यस्य।

८७ वैि.भू.सत.सका. ४७-४८

८८ वा.सू. १.४.६०

८९ वा.सू. १.५६१

९० वा.सू. १.५८

९१ वा.सू. १.१.३७

९२ वा.भ. ५.४३.११

९३ वा.सिल.स., हि.भा., प. ८९


| अ.को. | अमरकोषः |
| का.वृ.प.टी. | काशिकावृतिपदमञ्जरीटोका |
| ग.सू. | गणसूत्रम् |
| निः. | निरूकऽम् |
| निः.वृ.: | निरूकवृतः |
| प.ल.म.निः.निः. | परमलसुमञ्जशा नियातार्थानिण्यशः |
| पा.सू. | पाणिनियोऽसूत्रम् (अस्ताध्यायोसूत्रपाठः) |
| म.भा. | महाभाष्यम् |
| म.भा.उ.टी. | महाभाष्यम् उद्योगोत्तरीका |
| म.भा.का.वा. | महाभाष्यम् कात्यायनवाचितकम् |
| मा.भा.पस्य. | महाभाष्यम् पस्सशाहिकम् |
| मा.भा.प्र.टी. | महाभाष्यम् प्रदोषोत्तरीका |

94 वा.प्र. 2.188
95 वा.प्र. 2.194
मी.द. मीमांसादर्शनम्
रघु.म. का. रघुवंशमहाकाव्यम्
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ल.श.श.सं. प्र. लघुशब्देनुशेखर: संज्ञाप्रकरणम्
वै.भू.सा. का. वैयाकरणभूषणसारकारिका
वै.भू.सा.द.टी. वैयाकरणभूषणसार: दर्पणटीका
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Combinations of upasargas and tiñanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions

George Cardona

1 Pāṇini and padakāras

1.1 Pāṇini

Pāṇini’s sūtra उपसर्गदस्मसासंसाधिण ग्रोष्टेस्यः (A 8.4.14) lets ṇ substitute for initial n of a verbal base if this is a base with original ṇ¹ and follows an upasarga² with r, whether or not the preverb and base occur in a compound. For example, the n- of nam (nama) ‘bend, bow’, and ni (niṅ) ‘guide, lead’ is replaced by n- in the derivates -nāma and -nāyaka in the compounds praṇāma ‘bowing, reverence’ and praṇāyaka ‘leader’. Compounding a member of the upasarga class — items of the group beginning with pra, linked with a verb — is provided by कृतिप्रादयः (A 2.2.18), under the heading not only of A 2.1.22 (तत्तुर्वः ४) but also of A 2.1.3 (प्राक्कालः समासः ५) and A 2.1.4 ([[सूप २] सह सूप १]), so that the second member of a compound whose first constituent is a member of the set beginning with pra is a pada that originally contains a nominal ending (subanta). Conversely, a sequence not involving a compound for A 8.4.14 involves a form containing a verb ending (tiñanta) following an upasarga. For example, प्रणयति ‘... bows’, प्रणयति ‘... leads’. Since A 8.4.14 explicitly allows for retroflexion whether or not a preverb and the verbal base with which it is connected occur in a compound, it follows that Pāṇini treats upasargas and following finite verb forms as distinct syntactic elements, separate padas.

In this context, consider also the following examples:

1. This ṇ- is unconditionally replaced by n-: A 6.1.65: जो नाते: (तत्तुर्वः ४).
2. By A 1.4.58 (प्रादयः ४), stated under the heading A 1.4.56 (प्राक्कालः समासः ५), members of the ordered set beginning with pra bear the class name nipāta. According to A 1.4.59-60 (उपसर्गः क्रियायंगः समासः ५), if these are linked with actions — that is, with verbal bases, which signify actions — they have the class name gati as well as upasarga.
(1) अनि: प्र गंधर्षि (TS 1.6.8.1) ‘(The Adhvaryu) brings the water’
(2) यत्र रघुमभिः ... प्र गंधर्षि प्रार्थित्यः नयसि (RV 1.129.1a-c) ‘Indra, that chariot which you lead forth ... which, faultless one, you lead forth with excellence ....’

In (1), nayati immediately follows pra, as does nayasi in pada b of (2). In both instances, the verb form begins with n-. In the third pada of (2), on the other hand, the verb form nayasi is separated from its upasarga, which accordingly does not condition retroflexion. Now, in (1), the tiñanta nayati lacks an udātta vowel. The svarita is contextual: as provided in A 8.4.66: उदात्तादनुदात्तात् स्वरित्; a svarita replaces an anudātta following an udātta. The basic form has only anudātta syllables, as shown in the padapātha corresponding to (1):

(1a) अनि: प्रेति: नयाति: ।

In general, the accentual properties seen in such Vedic texts hold also for the language current at Pāṇini’s time, so that he makes provision for both in common. Thus, A 8.1.16-18: पदस्य । पदेः । अनुदात्त सर्वमपादाती are headings: the first is in force prior to A 8.3.55 (अदायानमयम् पूर्वण्यः ।); the second up to A 8.1.69 (कुमसैं स सुप्रयोगाती ।); and the third sūtra is in force through the end of the first pada of the eighth adhyāya. According to the first heading, operations stated subsequently apply to a pada, and by the second heading operations apply after a pada. Accordingly, by A 8.1.18, the whole of a pada has low-pitched vowels if it follows another pada, except where the pada in question occurs at the beginning of a verse section (apādādau). One sūtra that comes under this heading is A 8.1.28 (तितितितिर्थु: ।): a tiñanta is wholly anudātta if it follows a pada that terminates in an ending other than a finite verb ending. This pattern has exceptions, however. Thus, for example, if a finite verb form occurs in an utterance with the particle hi ‘for, because’, it is exempted from the general rule (A 8.1.34: हि च [न २९]), as is a tiñanta linked with a form of yad in a relative sentence (A 8.1.66: यत्वत्तित्वम् ।). Moreover a gati (see note 2) is anudātta if it precedes a tiñanta that has an udātta A 8.1.71: तिति चोदाचर्ति (गति: ७०).
In accordance with the patterns reflected in these rules, the verb form in (1) originally has all low-pitched vowels; then the first of these is replaced by a svarita. In (2), on the other hand, nayāsi and nayāsi are linked to the relative pronoun yam, so that they are not anudātta; accordingly, the gati pra in (2) is low-pitched. Comparably, in (5) (§1.2), jagāmā retains an udātta syllable in a construction with hi, so that the preceding gati ṣ is low-pitched.

As shown, the sūtras in question here apply to padas. Hence, once more, an upasarga, even if it is anudātta by virtue of preceding a tiṇanta with an udātta syllable, is a distinct pada, syntactically separate from the verb form with which it is linked.

### 1.2 Padakāras

Authors of padapāṭhas proceed differently. They recognize two types: (a) an upasarga precedes a tiṇanta that is sarvānudātta;³ (b) an upasarga precedes a tiṇanta that has an udātta. In the latter case, the upasarga is anudātta.⁴ Under (a), padakāras such as Śākalya, the author of the Rgvedapadapāṭha, treat the upasarga and tiṇanta forms as separate padas, separated by a full pause; under (b), on the other hand, the same padakāras treat the upasarga as the first member of a compound, separated from the tiṇanta by a compositional pause (avagraha).⁵ For example:

**Rgveda**

(3) 1.84.1: अस्मवि मोमं हन्नू ते दशविष्ठं भृणुं गंधि।

(4) 1.85.11: आ गंधष्वतोपशवसं चित्तभानवः।

(5) 10.28.1: विब्रेह हर्दुन्यो अरिरसं जुगामु ममेहु ब्रह्मु ना जंगाम।

3. Pāṇini provides for the tonal properties of a such a verb form by A 8.1.28 (§1.1).
4. Pāṇini provides for this tonal pattern by A 8.1.71 (§1.1).
5. As has been noted (see Whitney 1889: 399 [§1084a]), there are apparent exceptions to this procedure. In the present paper, I cannot deal with these instances, which do not affect my main thesis.
Taittirīyasamhitā

(6) 1.4.39: असांति सोमं हनुर ते शविष्ठ भृणुम गंगिः।
असीवि सोमं हनुर ते शविष्ठ धृणयं एति गृहि।

(7) 1.6.7.1: कस्ये वाहे देवा युज्मे गच्छन्ति कस्ये वा न। कस्ये वा। अहं।
देवा। युज्म। अगच्छन्तियाः-गच्छन्ति। कस्ये। वा। न।

2 Views of modern lexicographers

In his preface to the first volume of *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*, A. M. Ghatage (1976: xiii-xiv) presents an intelligent and well organized discussion of two positions with regard to entries of preverb-verb complexes in a dictionary: (a) complexes that involve finite verb forms are entered under verbal bases, but nominal compounds are treated as distinct entries; (b) preverb-verb complexes are made distinct entries, with nominal derivatives included under them. Under (a), combinations like *anu bhū* and *pra bhū* come under the main entry *bhū*, but *anubhava* and *prabhava* are separate entries. Under (b), on the other hand, *anu bhū* and *pra bhū* are distinct entries, with derivatives such as *anubhava*, *anubhūti*, *prabhava*, and *prabhūti* included under the respective complexes. As Ghatage points out (1976: xiva), different modern lexicographers have adopted one or the other of these positions:

The older scholars dealing with the Dhātupātha and the lexicographers dealt with the roots and the prevers along with the roots under a single dictionary entry and gave meanings and examples to illustrate them under the same head. This is the procedure we find in Westergaard’s Radices Linguae Sanskritae (Bonn, 1841), the dictionaries of H. H. Wilson, Goldstücker, Böhtlingk-Roth, Burnouf, Benfey and Cappeller. Others like MacDonnell, Monier-Williams, Apte, Schoupak and others give the root with a prefix as a separate entry and
place it in the alphabetical order.\textsuperscript{6}

Ghatage also takes up (1976: xiva) some consequences of each procedure. ‘One result of this procedure [scil. (a)]’, he remarks, ‘… is the separation of all the nominal and adjectival derivates from the verbs with prefixes and putting them in different places which obscures their interrelations and entails repetition of meanings.’ A consequence of (b) is that combinations like \textit{anubhū}, \textit{anubhava} and \textit{pra bhū}, \textit{prabhava} are listed separately, according to the alphabetical order of the preverbs, which ‘… is likely to lead to some amount of repetition and obscuration of the connection between the verb and the prefixed form, but the nominal derivates and the basic verb forms will be brought together.’ Ghatage further notes that not only do semantic considerations favor procedure (b) but that ‘… the convenience of the user will also be served by it.’

3 Pāṇinīyas on preverb-verb combinations

3.1 Introduction

As can be seen from what I have noted (see §§1.1-1.2), comparable differences of procedure are to be seen in ancient Indian works. Here, however, the disagreements concern how combinations of upasargas and tiñanta forms are to be treated. There is no doubt that nominal derivates such as \textit{anubhava} constitute distinct nominal bases (\textit{prātipadīka}), compounds which, in Pāṇini’s system, consist of padas containing upasargas — more technically, items called \textit{gati} — and nominal derivates formed from verbal bases. In the early Indian context, moreover, arguments are presented for alternative positions, but, as is to be expected, these arguments do not concern how easy it is for one to use a dictionary. The arguments concern the status of items with respect to

\textsuperscript{6} Apte adopted both procedures. In his larger dictionary, he adopts (b). For example, \textit{ānu} ‘infer’ is a separate entry. In \textit{The Students’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary}, however, (a) is adopted, so that the use of \textit{ni} with \textit{ānu} is noted under the entry for the base. I thank David Buchta for reminding me of Apte’s practice in his students’ dictionary.
grammatical operations.

3.2 Patañjali

In the Mahābhāṣya on A 6.1.135 (सूत्र कात्तुर्वेकः), Patañjali states⁸ that it is proper to consider which operations are internally conditioned (antaraṅga) and which are externally conditioned (bahiraṅga) in the context of deriving forms such as सन्न्यस्तकः (sañ caskāra), सन्न्यस्तरत्तु: (sañ caskaratruḥ), सन्न्यस्तकः (sañ caskaruh), in which the base kr is used with the upasarga sam and the augment sut is introduced before -k-.⁹ Two alternative positions are entertained with respect to the linking of a verbal base with an upasarga and with a verb affix that signifies a kāraka:

I. An operation relative to the complex consisting of a verbal base and an upasarga (dhatu-pasarga-yoh) is antaraṅga, hence takes precedence, because a verbal base is first connected with its upasarga.

II. A verb is first connected with the affix that signifies a kāraka relative to the action denoted by the base,¹⁰ so that an operation associated with this is antaraṅga and takes precedence.

Patañjali presents arguments as follows.

A. Position I is asserted: An operation that involves a verbal base and its preverb is internally conditioned because a base is first linked with its preverb and only later with an affix that signifies a kāraka.¹¹

B. The assertion is challenged: This is not correct. A dhatu is first connected with an affix signifying a kāraka. For a kāraka

7. The sutra is a heading whereby sut, introduced by subsequent rules, occurs before k.
8. मुद्रकाद्विव द्रष्टव्यम् किमन्तरस्य फक्ति भविरधिष्टिः (Bh. IV.477)
9. The augment is provided for by A 6.1.137-138 (सवर्धियांव्यर्धियांमूलम् । च हस्तेः । ।), according to which this is introduced when forms of kr are used with preceding sam and pari, in the sense of adorning (bhushane) and of forming a conglomerate (samavaye).
10. Patañjali uses sādhana, which refers to a kāraka. This is a direct participant in an action, which contributes to bringing an action to accomplishment, so that it is directly related to an action, signified by a verbal base.
11. धातुप्रसर्पं: कार्य यत्सम्प्रन्तः | बन एवतः | पूर्ब हि धातुप्रसर्पेऽण युज्यते पद्धार्मकेऽन्तिः | (Bh. IV.477).
brings an action about and an upasarga qualifies it. One can speak of a qualification of a meaning by an upasarga only if the meaning in question is something that is already existent. 12 That is, one can qualify an object that actually occurs, and an action cannot occur except as it is brought about by its direct participants. 13

C. It is true that this is the way things are. However, the relation that holds between a base and its preverb is first internalized (अभ्यासतः कृत्य ‘after making internal’), and then a verb is linked with an affix signifying a kāraka. 14 And it is necessary to recognize that this is so. For, what could one who maintains position II invoke as a cause to account for the fact that the base ās in

(8) आस्यते गुरुः। ‘The guru is sitting’

signifies an action which lacks an object, 15 and the same base takes an object in

(9) उपास्यते गुरुः। ‘The guru is revered.’ 16

Patañjali thus defends position II, but with a condition: the link between a dhātu and an upasarga is internalized before the verb is

12. नैतिकताः। पूर्व धातु: साधनेन गुणये पक्षादुसगरणः। साधन हि किम्यं निर्वर्त्तवति नातुसगरणी विविधिनाति। अभिनिर्वः नासगरणा। विवेच्ये: शब्दः गुणये। (Bh. IV.477). On abhinirvṛttasya see note 13.
13. Nāgēsa brings out this point in a different manner. By abhinirvṛttasya (‘brought about, completed’), he says, Patañjali means ‘known as something to be brought to accomplishment’: अभिनिर्वः नासगरणा। ज्ञातः। (Ud. IV.477).
14. सत्येष्येव शब्दसर्गोर्षितस्यात्मकस्यत्वादुसगरणां कृत्य धातु: साधनेन गुणये। (Bh. IV.477).
15. The base is therefore said to be akarmaka. Since the act in question lacks a karman, an l-affix (lakāra), in this case lat, is introduced after the dhātu ās on condition that the act (bhāva) is to be signified (A 3.4.69; ल: कर्मणि च भावे भावाभाबनि:); and this affix is replaced by an ātmanepada ending (ta → te); see Cardona 1997: 88 (§138). The teacher referred to by guru- is the agent of the act in question; since a post-verbal affix is not introduced here to signify an agent, this nominal base is followed by a third-triplet ending signifying an agent (A 2.3.18; कः कर्मणात पति तत्तिथा I). In deriving (2), on the other hand, the l-affix lat is introduced after the verb on condition that an immediate object (karman) is to be signified. (9) is a passive counterpart of उपास्यते गुरुः ‘… reveres his guru,’ where gurum (← guru-am) includes an ending of the second triplet introduced to signify an immediate object (karman: A 2.3.2; कर्मणि विवेषा I).
16. अक्षरं बैतिन्निविशेषः। यो हि मन्यते पूर्व धातु: साधनेन गुणये पक्षादुसगरणी तत्स्यास्ये गुणये। (Bh. IV.477).
linked with a postverbal affix signifying a kāraka. This is a position that takes into consideration both the semantic differences between pairs such as ās `sit’ and upa ās `venerate’ and the requirements of grammatical derivation within Pāṇini’s system. For deriving a sentence such as (9), upa and ās are treated as independent units included in separate padas:

(9a) उप-स आस-ख गुम-स

However, the base ās incorporates the meaning ‘revere’, which is cosignified by the preverb upa. The base thus signifies an action that takes an object, so that it is followed by an L-affix —here lat — to signify an immediate object; this is replaced by the ending ta (→ te), before which is introduced the vikaraṇa yak.\(^{17}\) It is the pada with these affixes that is then linked syntactically with the pada containing the upasarga upa.

Elsewhere, Patañjali explicitly says that verbal bases are polysemous and brings this point out by citing the pair sthā ‘come to a stand, stay’: pra sthā ‘depart’. With respect to this pair, he remarks\(^{18}\) that here also sthā alone signifies the act of going and sthā alone also signifies the cessation of movement.

3.3 Nāgeśabhaṭṭa

Commenting on what Patañjali says in the passage that begins सन्त्वसी (see §3.1C with note 14), Nāgeśa captures the issue clearly.

\(^{17}\) सर्वाधिकान्तक यथा (A 3.1.67).

\(^{18}\) एवंहीदारण विनिर्विवधमात्र निविनिश्चर्य वनिनिश्चर्य निन्सिन्दे (Bh. 1.3.1 [II.185]). This is said in the context of an argument concerning whether one may define the term dhātu — which A 1.3.1 (भृत्तोध तत्त्वेन: |) assigns as a name referring to bases listed in the dhātupātha, beginning with bhū — as referring to an item that signifies an action (वनिनिश्चर्य धातु: | [Bh. II.179]). Under this view, a preverb is said to be a qualifier of an action (1.3.1 vt. 7; किविनिश्चर्य उपसर्गः |). Earlier in the same passage Patañjali says that it is due to the upasarga that the act of going is understood when sthā is used with pra: तैल नानावेदनं उपसर्गसापेक्ष्यते वनिनिश्चर्य गम्यस्त इति. He also notes that pra is used elsewhere, in the sense of an action’s beginning: प्रेषन्त दुस्सूचार आत्मिक्षोऽतर्वतीति (Pr. II. 185).
He remarks that what Patañjali intends to convey is the following.\textsuperscript{19} It is certainly true that the relation with a kāraka takes precedence over a relation with a term called upasarga. However, it is after internalizing the meaning which you consider is manifested through the relation between a verb and its preverb — that is, making that meaning one which a verbal base itself conveys (स्वोधितं कृत्यं) — that two steps occur. First, since an action qua something that is brought to accomplishment requires that which brings it to this state, there is established a relation with a kāraka and the grammatical operations associated with it, namely the association of an affix with the base. Then, once there is an understanding of an action’s truly being one by having the property of being brought to accomplishment, there is a relation with a term that is called upasarga. How else could the meaning that is to be conveyed be understood by a hearer, when it is in no way understood from the verbal base alone?

In his Laghumañjūśa, Nāgęša cites the passage from the Mahābhāṣya on A 6.1.135 where the two views I have summarized in §3.2 are presented and concludes with a concise summary of what he considers the Bhāṣya intends, as follows.\textsuperscript{20} A speaker first conceives\textsuperscript{21} of the qualified meaning — involving both a verbal base and an upasarga — that pertains to the base alone. Then, by joining the base with an affix that is introduced due to a relation with a kāraka, one has the understanding of the meaning in question as something that is to be brought to accomplishment, an action. Subsequently, in order that a hearer understand the meaning in question, the speaker links the verbal base with a term.

\textsuperscript{19} यद्वा शास्त्रिन्तु | उपसर्गसंक्षेपकारवाटे गुरूवेच साधनस्वर्ग हृति मन्येष | परन्तु तद्भवमात्र धातूपर्यासमिक्ष्य कृत्यार्थपूर्णात्मकात्मक शब्दं स्वोधितं कृत्यं कारणं: पूर्वं नियमेन वाक्यप्रारम्भित्वा मात्रान्तरसंसाधनस्वर्गं | तत्कार्यप्रयत्नसेव शब्दोऽवस्तुत्वमिति प्रस्तुतित्वात् | (Ud. IV.477–478).

\textsuperscript{20} अवि भाषाय स्वतंत्रविविधाय कुञ्जिका कार्यसंधितयात्मकार्यप्रयत्नसेव अन्तः| साधनस्वर्गकृत्यां कार्यप्रयत्नसेवातः साधनस्वर्गकृत्यान्तः | (LM 598).

\textsuperscript{21} कुञ्जिका कृत्यं ‘after putting in his thought.’
that has the technical name *upasarga*, which depends on its being related to an action.\textsuperscript{22} He does this because this understanding would not apply for the hearer, since the meaning in question is in no way understandable from the verbal base alone.

Nägéśa also refers to predecessors. First, he alludes to what Kaiyaṭa said in his Prādīpa on the Bhaṣya to A 1.3.1 (see note 18),\textsuperscript{23} remarking that according to Kaiyaṭa the particular meaning involved when a dhātu is used with an upasarga pertains to the dhātu alone; the upasarga, however, serves to bring out this meaning for a hearer. Thus, he goes on to say,\textsuperscript{24} what is meant by the formulation of the two positions I and II (see §3.2) is this: First there is the association of a verbal base’s meaning with the meaning of a preverb;\textsuperscript{25} that is, a speaker uses a verbal base to signify a certain meaning, part of which may require a preverb to be understood by a hearer. Next, before the verbal base is connected with the preverb, there is an association of this base with the operation determined by a kāraka; that is, in terms of the formation of padas which express the intended meaning and which are accounted for in Pāṇini’s derivational system, a dhātu is first linked with affixes introduced to signify kārakas. Then there occurs the connection with an upasarga.

In brief, the Pāṇinian derivational sequence that accounts for (9) is as outlined above under (9a) (see §3.2).

### 3.4 Bhartṛhari

Nägéśa acknowledges not only Kaiyaṭa — and through him Patañjali — but also Bhartṛhari, by citing and explaining two of his

\textsuperscript{22} Particles of the set beginning with *pra* (*prādayaḥ*) are assigned the class name *upasarga*, by A 1.4.59 (note 2), on condition that they bear a direct relation with an action.

\textsuperscript{23} नृत्त शूष्कयतः हिति सूर्ये कैपिटो अनेकार्थान्याहं विशिष्टवैभवे भारतेश्वर उपसर्गमु बोधार प्रस्तुति नदेश्वोतक हिति। (LM 598).

\textsuperscript{24} एवदु तृष्णतुपरमेम योगो नाम नदेश्वस्वन्तः तत्त उपसर्गोपां ग्रामुपरिर्यूपः साध्ववर्यूपः। तत्त: उपसर्गेश्वद्योग हिति परिर्यूपः। (LM 598).

\textsuperscript{25} The meaning is cosignified (*dyotya*) by an upasarga, which functions as its cosignifier (*dyotaka*). The actual signifier (*vācaka*) of the meaning is the verbal base itself.
kārikās.26 The verses cited are part of a section in the Vākyapadīya where, reflecting the discussion in the Mahābhāṣya (see §3.2), Bhartṛhari presents the two viewpoints at issue and elaborates on them, as follows.

3.4.1 Position I justified

A dhātu actually is such that it combines a base and an upasarga as a unit, and it is only for the purpose of grammatical operations such as augmenting with initial at that the two are theoretically assumed to be distinct units.27 This viewpoint is also justified by the status of a complex saṅgrāma ‘do battle, fight’. The augment at is provided for a stem that incorporates sam, as in asaṅgrāmayata (3sg. impfct.).28 Particular actions of this sort are signified from the outset by such combinations.29 That is, Pāṇini’s dhātupāṭha has an entry saṅgrāma,30 in which the quasi-upasarga (see note 28) sam is incorporated. The particular action in question is signified from the outset by the complex, which accordingly has

26. LM 598: taddālita hirīṭa: sādhanopādhyāya bhāvita: prakāśita: dhātutila: karmabhaṅg: tamanāṭāpi tūkatām. || budhirājaināyatanānāya bhāva dhātunāpyo: ājñanīkūṭaṃ me: pāndakālakā phalaṃ || ḍhati. (VP 2.184, 186). On these verses, see §3.4.3.


28. Patañjali gives the example asaṅgrāmanāyata: ‘The mighty warrior fought’ in the Bhāṣya on A 3.1.12: phulatāni bhūṣānaḥ. (Bh. III.63), where he remarks that it is necessary to say the initial augment is added to saṅgrām-i, in order to account for asaṅgrāmayata: Ahmedabadās: sāpataṁ sāttvikaḥ sāpataṁ sāpataṁ sāpataṁ ṛthvāniḥ sāpataṁ sāpataṁ. (VP 2.181).


30. asaṅgrāma: sāpataṁ sāpataṁ sāpatamókaḥ. (VP 2.181). The base is part of the tenth set of bases in the dhātupāṭha (curāḍīgana), so that it takes the suffix nie (sāpataṁ sāpataṁ sāpataṁ sāpataṁ sāpatamókaḥ). (A 3.1.25): saṅgrāma-i → sangrami- (A 6.4.48: anya kopaḥ (ārthasaṅgrāmaḥ ṛṣṭi)). I have cited the base as it appears in the texts noted. However, it is also accepted that a low-pitched nasalized a is appended as a marker to show that the base takes ātmAnepada agentive endings (aṭṭāmaṇipada: ātmAnepada). (A 1.3.12). Accordingly, Śivarāmendrasarasvatī (RaPr. 3.1.12 [VI.67]) acknowledges the entry as saṅgrāma a; ātmAnepadā ṛthi. (VP 2.181). I need not consider other details here.
the status of being a dhātu.\textsuperscript{31}

This being so, an action already qualified by the sense understood from an upasarga enters into relations with kārakas, so that an operation that obtains between an upasarga and a dhātu is internally conditioned relative to an operation that concerns a kāraka.\textsuperscript{32} Semantically, a meaning that is fixed for a given verb used with a preverb depends on the relation with the preverb; only after the relation between a verb and its meaning has been established, is it appropriate for another relation to apply for it.\textsuperscript{33}

Under this view, there is a unit upās signifying an action which enters into relation with a kāraka such as a teacher who is the object of reverence, as expressed in (9) उपास्यस् गुरुः। (§3.1).

3.4.2 Position II defended
Something is qualified, distinguished from something else, only if it is already established, an existing entity signified by terms that are capable of actual use.\textsuperscript{34} That is, for something to be subject to qualification, it has to be an existent entity. This enters into a qualifier-qualificand relation, being signified by a term that is known to be used.\textsuperscript{35} The items capable of coming under

\textsuperscript{31} सहारण युथ इति किमाविषेषाय सम्पूर्णः सक्षात एव प्रकर्ष्यते। (VPV. 2.180-181 [232]). In his तिकः on VP 2.180 (76), Punyarāja says that in the case of complexes including preverbs the property of being a dhātu pertains solely to those complexes, since it is they that signify the particular acts in question: बस्तुत्: पुनर्विशिष्टिक्रियायाः एव त इति सीयारणारुपं धातुन्।

\textsuperscript{32} कार्याविषेषां धातुस्यं धातुस्यं। सक्षात्व तथापृत्व सा किम्। (VP 2.182). By тathābhūtā, Bhaṭṭhrāhi means that the action is such that it is signified by a base qualified by an upasarga: तस्मानविशिष्टिवेष्टिवात् विशिष्टाः किम् तथापृत्व सति सा सात्तस्मात्यथ। प्रतिपत्तं। (VPV. 2.182 [232]). Cf. VPṬ. 2.182 (77): तथापृत्व। उपस्विषेषितवेष्टिव कार्यात्मकार्यपूर्णमध्ये।

\textsuperscript{33} उपस्यास्यानामस्य धातुस्यवेष्टिव वाचात्मकस्य नरस्यं निर्देशर विषयम्। (VPV. 2.182 [232]).

\textsuperscript{34} प्रयोगांतु मिदम् (VP 2.183ab); see note 38. Punyarāja supplies dhātuśu to be construed with prayogārīṣu.: तथापृत्वात्मकस्य विषेषान्त:। प्रयोगांतु मिदः। समाधिवेष्टिवयः बचन्मनुस्थानिधिर्म्। तु पूर्वकारः आर्मानात्मकस्यं। (VPṬ. 2.183 [77]).

\textsuperscript{35} इह प्रयोगांतु वेष्टिवानात्मकस्यं तत्त्वस्यानात्मकस्यं। (VPV. 2.183 [232]). For the continuation of the vrṣṭi, see note 39.
Combinations of upasargas and tiṇanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions

consideration are verbal bases in finite verb forms, wherein a verbal base signifies an act as one that is to be brought to completion. An act that is brought to completion requires participants that bring this about — kārakas — and these are signified by affixes attached to verb bases, e.g., -ti in pac-a-ti ‘... is cooking’, -te in āste of upāste ‘... reveres’. Such an act thus cannot be considered existent unless it is related to a kāraka.

Hence, prior to such a relation, an act in process has no actual status, so that it cannot then enter into a qualifier-qualificand relation with a meaning cosignified by an upasarga. Therefore, it is the position of some that a dhātu first is linked to a term denoting a kāraka.

3.4.3 Compromise justifying position I

Bhartrhari follows Patañjali (see §3.2C) in adopting the position that the relation between the meanings connected with a dhātu and an upasarga are first internalized, though he adds two details. First, he specifies that the difference that is internalized is due to the relation between a dhātu and an upasarga that is conceptual. In addition, he remarks that this difference appears explicitly at the time a pada is used. That is, the particular action signified by a complex such as upa ās is present conceptually, in the mind of a speaker, who uses a sentence like (9) उपास्यते गुः: | (§3.2), where the full pada āsyate occurs, with the ending te. At the time this pada is

36. Nāgēśa (LM 599) quotes VP 2.183, then remarks that a base is capable of use after it has taken an affix: प्रयोगार्थ व प्रक्षेपण्यप्राप्ततपस्।
37. This contrasts with action nouns such as pāka, pakti, pacana, which signify an abstract action that behaves like a substance (dravyavat) with respect to grammatical properties and operations.
38. प्राक्षम साधनसंबन्धम् | किष्ट्वा नियोपिताम् | (VP 2.183cd); see note 34.
39. साधनसंबन्धम् | किष्ट्वा नियोपिताम् | (VP 2.183cd); see note 34.
40. पुन्तरचेतासद्धान्तम् बन्धुसस्वाधक्षः | (VP 2.186). Bhartrhari says व्यज्ञतपस्: प्रकाशते ‘appears in manifested form.’
41. In his vr̥tti on VP 2.186 (233), Bhartrhari says व्यज्ञतपस्: प्रकाशते ‘appears in manifested form.’
used, together with the upasarga *upa*, the semantic difference between the meanings of *ās* and *upa ās* is manifest.

In the two kārikās which precede the above formulation, Bhartṛhari draws on two parallels from grammar and one from agricultural lore.

The first grammatical parallel concerns how a verbal base is defined and given the class name *dhātu*. In the Mahābhāṣya on A 1.3.1 (४२३ भाष्य: १), which provides that items of the ordered set starting with *bhū* are called *dhātu*, Patañjali cites an alternative formulation, according to which an item that signifies an action is assigned the name *dhātu*. This presupposes that a base such as *bhū* or *ās* by itself signifies an action. However, as has been argued, one cannot speak of an actual action — qua something that is to be brought to accomplishment in time — unless it is connected with direct participants (kāraka, sādhana) that contribute to its accomplishment. Thus, stating that a dhātu by itself is an item that signifies an action presupposes from the outset (*prakramāt*) its connection with a sādhana, a connection which is to occur later.

Bhartṛhari’s second grammatical parallel involves A 3.1.7: धातोऽष्टेत्तल्क्षणोऽवस्थितं यथा, which optionally introduces the affix *san* after a dhātu that signifies an immediate object of desiring on the part of the same agent as performs the act denoted by the base. In this case also, it is assumed that an act’s being the object of wishing is manifest when a form with a derivate in *-san* is used, as

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42. धातोऽष्टेत्तल्क्षणोऽवस्थितं यथा... (Bh II.179). In subsequent vārttikas, Kātyāyana takes up possible objections to this formulation, which is thus known to have preceded Patañjali.

43. यदि पुनः किमेकम्पो धातुदिवसात्मकः किर्णः (Bh II.179). In subsequent vārttikas, Kātyāyana takes up possible objections to this formulation, which is thus known to have preceded Patañjali.

44. VPA 2.184 (78): किमेकम्पो धातुदिवसात्मकः यथा... Nakṣa (LM 598) explains similarly: आय्यः...
in cikīṛṣati ‘... wishes to do, ... wishes to make’,\(^{45}\) and is present from the outset of the derivation of a base.\(^{46}\)

Bhartṛhari concludes that other technical matters (anyad api (‘something else also’) may be considered (drṣyatām) similarly. That is, one may comparably assume that an action qualified by the meaning associated with an upasarga also is there from the outset.\(^{47}\) As a parallel to this, Bhartṛhari brings in an example from agriculture. Seeds are soaked with substances such as lākṣā juice, and these substances then contribute to the coloring of the products of these seeds through their developing with the properties bestowed on the seeds, such as the red of lākṣā.\(^{48}\)

In accordance with what has been said, some (anye ‘others’) consider that position I is proper.\(^{49}\)

3.5 Conclusion
Both Patañjali and Bhartṛhari consider two opposed positions and end by adopting a compromise. An upasarga is considered to be linked first with a verbal base, since it serves to qualify the act

\(^{45}\) cikīṛṣa-laṭ, with the base cikīṛṣa- ← kr-sa-.

\(^{46}\) In his vṛtti on VP 2.184, Bhartṛhari emphasizes that a primary base such as kr is abstracted, through reasoning by anyaya and vyatireka from complexes that are given in actual usage. This process of abstraction results in constituents and constituent meanings. A base thus abstracted is assumed to signify an action, although an action is not actually manifest except as dependent on a kāraka. Comparably, from a complex such as cikīṛṣati, a base cikīṛṣa is abstracted, and from this one abstracts also the primitive base kr, assuming that it now denotes an act that is the object of desiring. VPV\(^{t}\) 2.184 (233): प्रसिद्धप्रमाण सम्प्रदायकांवत्कथात् कार्यविवेककथा वर्णनानांपरं न कर्मभावत् केवलतः: प्रकृतिप्र-reportedly simultaneous कार्यविवेकानां वर्णनानां यथेष बुद्धेयस्यब्रह्मेवतात् खथीयते यथा च धातृः: कार्यण्ड हेतु कार्यमयात्वमात्रात् सन्तुष्टिनिर्भयते तथा बुद्धेयस्यब्रह्मेवतात् खोरान्तात्।

\(^{47}\) See VP 2.185 (note 42). Cf. BĀUŚ 4.3.7 (p. 247): नेत्रवित्तिनाम् प्रकृतिप्रमाणानं न सत्यतथा-निर्देशितः। SDS 49.15-16: तथा वा लालाशवसितानां कार्यस्वीकारितायत्रक्षुरादित्वप्रम्यग्नान कार्यस्वादी स्वायत्तिष्यम्।

\(^{48}\) This is stated by Puṇyārāja: (VPṬi. 2.184 [78]): भातिस्वचारधारुप्यै विभिन्नात्वकथा-ब्रह्मस्य तृष्णात्मयायां को देख।

\(^{49}\) In the present discussion, it is neither possible nor necessary to take up details of this issue.
signified by that base. On the other hand, a base has first to be linked with an affix denoting a kāraka that contributes to the accomplishment of the action signified by that base, since an action, qua one that is brought to accomplishment, cannot have any status in the absence of a kāraka. The compromise position which is adopted starts with a semantic relation: an action is semantically qualified by a meaning which is conveyed by a preverb used with it. However, this relation is incorporated as a meaning of a base itself, a meaning which then appears (prakāśate) explicitly with the use of a preverb, which serves as a cosignifier that brings out the meaning in question.

Nāgeśa links the compromise clearly with the contrast between speaker and hearer. A speaker uses a form like upāste, with the preverb upa, so that a hearer may understand the meaning conveyed, which is attributed to the base ās itself.

4 Technical reasons for adopting the compromise
Bhartṛhari begins his discussion of the issues in question (see §3.4.1 with note 27) by remarking that a dhātu and a related upasarga are theoretically considered separate in order to allow for the proper distribution of at and other grammatical elements.

4.1 Augmenting
According to A 6.4.71-72: दुःख्व-क्प्युङ्गवद्यमयां म आब्रजाय कार्र (अञ्ज्य २), the augment at is added as the initial element of a stem followed by endings that have replaced l-affixes luṇ, laṇ, lrṇ, but the augment is āt for stems beginning with a vowel. For example: bhū ‘be, become’: abhūt (3sg. aor. ← abhū-s-t ← bhū-luṇ) ‘has been, has become’, abhavat (3sg. impfct. ← abhū-a-t ← bhū-laṇ) ‘was, became’, abhavisyat (3sg. condit. ← abhū-isy-a-t ← bhū-lrṇ) ‘would have been, would have become’; anu bhū ‘experience’: anv abhūt, anv abhavat, anv abhavisyat; ḫṣ ‘look’: aikṣiṣṭa (← āikṣ-s-ta ← ḫṣ-luṇ), aikṣata (← āikṣ-a-ta ← ḫṣ-laṇ), aikṣiṣyata (← āikṣ-isya-ta ← ḫṣ-lrṇ); pari ḫṣ ‘examine’: pary aikṣiṣṭa, pary aikṣata, pary aikṣiṣyata.
Combinations of upasargas and tiñanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions

If position I were accepted not merely from the semantic viewpoint but also for the derivational process, one would recognize anubhū and parīkṣ as complex units. This would allow deriving incorrect forms like *ānubhūt, *ānubhavat, *ānubhaviṣyat; *aparīkṣiṣṭa, *aparīkṣata, *aparīkṣiṣya instead of the forms shown above.

4.2 Perfect forms

Forms called ‘perfect’ in western terminology are derived, with iteration of a syllable of a verbal base, from posited forms that have the l-suffix liḥ. If a base begins with a heavy syllable containing one of the vowels denoted by ie, excepting rcch ‘go’, however, ām is introduced and liḥ is dropped. For example: bhū: babhūva (← bhū-liḥ) ‘was, became’; anu bhū: anu babhūva; īkṣ: īkṣān cakre (← īkṣ-liṅ kṛ-liḥ); pari īkṣ: parīkṣān cakre (← pari īkṣam-liḥ ... ).

If position I were accepted for the derivational process, one would allow deriving *anunubhūva (← anubhū-liḥ). Further, since the initial of parīkṣ is not ī, one would allow *paparīkṣe (← parīkṣ-liḥ).

4.3 Some denominatives

There is also a group of derived bases, formed with the suffix kyaṅ, meaning ‘become …’, in which this suffix is added to items of a set that includes bhṛṣa ‘intense’. This rule serves to form derivates found in complexes such as su manāyate ‘… is, becomes benevolent’, corresponding to which, on the evidence of

50. तिंक भालोत्प्रथामलय (A 6.1.8). This is one of a group of sūtras stated under the heading of A 6.1.1-2: एकाच द्वै प्रथमम | अन्तरदिक्षितेनयम. In general the first syllable of a unit is iterated, but if this begins with a vowel, its second syllable undergoes this operation. For example, the second syllable of e-dhi-dhi-sa is iterated: edidhiṣate ‘wishes to thrive’, where the unit ending in the desiderative suffix san is subject to iteration; see below. It is not necessary to discuss here details of derivation, including whether part of a base is iterated or undergoes replacement.

51. A 3.1.36: जनातित्व कुत्वनानुनि: (आम तिंक ३०), 2.4.81: आम: (से: ४०, लुक्स ५६). Details of derivation need not be discussed here.

52. A 3.1.12: पुष्पाशियो पुष्पाशियोपिक्ष हस: (कप: ११).
Kātyāyana and Patañjali, the imperfect is sv amanāyata, with the augment at added to manā-ya.⁵³ If kyaṁ followed an undivided unit sumanas,⁵⁴ the augment would be added to sumanāya-, so that *asumanāyata would wrongly be derived. Comparably, if the absolutive suffix ktvā⁵⁵ is added to manāya, and then a compound is formed with the preverb,⁵⁶ the suffix is replaced by lyap:⁵⁷ sumanāya-ya → sumanāyya.⁵⁸ If, however, sumanas is treated as a single unit followed by kyaṁ, sumanāya- of sumanāya-itvā is not a compound, so that augmented itvā is now not subject to replacement. Consequently, the grammar would allow *sumanāyitvā instead of sumanāyya. Again, supposing that the desiderative suffix san (A 3.1.7, see §3.4.3) followed abhimanāya- ‘yearn for, be delighted’, the second syllable of abhimanāya-isa would be subject to iteration,⁵⁹ resulting in *abibhimānayiṣa (3sg. pres. *abibhimānayiṣate). On the other hand, the desired form abhi mimānayiṣa (abhi mimānayiṣate) is derived if mānaya is separate from abhi.

This begs the question: why then is the quasi-preverb of saṅgrāma not treated as separate unit? If saṅgrāma were treated in the same way as sumanāya or abhimanāya, one would allow *samagrāmayata instead of asaṅgrāmayata. Patañjali himself reconciles the two situations by saying that Pāṇini includes saṅgrāma in his dhātupātha (see note 30) in order to provide for a

⁵³ In the Bhāṣya on A 3.1.12, while discussing vt. 6 (सोपमांतिदितिः चेदिदि दोष: ), Patañjali quotes this form as well as the absolutive sumanāyya and the desiderative abhimanānyiṣate: सोपमांतिदितिः चेदिदि दोषोऽभिति समनानायति। अन्य्यमयिदमुच्चते अद्वितीयते भवति। अन्तस्यसन्निहायि वकन्या। अन्त्यस्य समनानाय। चेदिदिः समनानाय। भवति। (Bh. III.62). In his sixth vārttika, Kātyāyana only brings up the problem involving at.
⁵⁴ sumanas-ya → sumana-ya → sumanā-ya (A 7.4.25: क्रृत्वायाकार्यवतः।).
⁵⁵ A 3.4.21: समासनान्तिर्दितिः पुर्वकाले (कला १२)। ktvā gets the initial augment if: आर्थित्तकमेष्ठ कले: (A 7.2.35).
⁵⁶ A 2.2.18; see §1.1.
⁵⁷ समासान्तिर्दितिः कलोऽक्ष (A 7.1.37).
⁵⁸ A 6.4.48: अतोऽतोऽतः (आर्थित्तकमेष्ठ ४५).
⁵⁹ सन्तः (A 6.1.9). This sūtra comes under the heading of A 6.1.1-2 (see note 50), so that the first or second syllable of a base ending in san is subject to iteration.
Combinations of upasargas and tiṇanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions

restriction: of denominative verbal bases with a quasi-preverb, only saṅgrāma-i has the status of a unit verb after which an affix is introduced.\(^60\)

5 Pāṇini’s position
As I have pointed out (§1.1), Pāṇini treats sequences of upasargas and related tiṇanta forms as separate padas, even if the upasarga has no udātta syllable. This is compatible with position II, that a dhātu first enters into relation with an affix denoting a kāraka (see §§3.2-3.4). As noted, moreover, this position fits within Pāṇini’s formal derivational system. There is additional evidence in support of the conclusion that Pāṇini adopted the view that a verbal base signifies not only the meanings attributable to it when used without any preverb but also meanings particular to complexes with preverbs, so that the latter serve as cosignifiers of meanings considered to be directly signified by the verbs with which they are linked.

5.1 Multiple meanings given in sūtras for single bases
Consider first a series of sūtras which provide that ātmanepada or parasmapada endings replace l-suffixes following verbal bases.

\[ \text{गन्धन्याखेस्थे पछि} \quad \text{रुप्यांत्मकत्वम्} \quad \text{sāhasikya}; \quad \text{pratikṣyati}; \quad \text{prakathana}; \quad \text{upayoga}. \]

For example:

60. Accident occur: सोपण्डुन्गरस्यादि अवस्थानं विविधत्।
71. अवस्थानं च विविधत्वं। (Bh. 3.1.12 [III.63]). It is not necessary to deal here with the details of the argument involved.

61. atmanepadany of अनुदातिकत आनलेपयते, (A 1.3.12) is understood to recur in this and the following rules.
‘The monkey (Hanumat) addressed the mountain (Menaka), that appeared to challenge the sky, as he favored him greatly, acting towards him in a devoted manner, as though he were his servant, (saying): I am going in haste to see Rāvana, who is approaching with daring the wife of a noble family, o great mountain, who abused Sītā in the forest; do not add (further greatness to) me (through your hospitality).’ (BhK 8.18-20a)

The participles *prakurvānah* ‘serving’, *prakurvānam* ‘approaching in a daring manner’, and the perfect *apa cakre* ‘abused’ illustrate usages provided for by A 1.3.32.  

According to सम्माननोस्माचार्यकरण्यान्वितिविज्ञानव्यवस्थेपुरयन्ति: (A 1.3.36), ātmanepada affixes follow nī (‘lead, guide to’) used in the following senses: honoring (sammānana); elevating (utsaṅjana); act of a teacher (ācāryakaraṇa); knowing, learning (jñāṇa); supporting with wages (bhṛti); pay off what is due (vījanana); expend (vyaya). The forms vinesye ‘I will expend, give up’ and udānesye ‘I will elevate’ illustrate such usage in

11) किवेष्येबो व्रियान राणानुदितनिदेष्य्भव यतः: // ‘I will either expend my own life or, (doing away with Rāvana,) I will elevate my fame.’ (BhK 8.21cd)

According to अः: (A 1.3.44) provides that ātmanepada affixes replace an *ī*-suffix after jñā in the sense ‘hide, deny’. For example, in

12) आमान्तमजानानान: समानवातःविज्ञानम्। ‘(Hanumat) passed the day concealing himself, the size of a rabbit.’ (BhK 8.26ab)

*apajānānah* contains the participle *jānāna*- , with the ātmanepada

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62. In rendering ‘abused Sītā in the forest’, I follow Jayamaṅgala, who glosses *apacakre* with *abhībabhvīva* ‘overcame’ and notes that the ātmanepada ending is used relative to the meaning ‘abuse’. He also remarks that *vaniḥ* is used to refer to the forest as a place where Rāvana committed the act, the ablative being to signify an immediate object signified by an understood absolute *upagamyā* ‘after coming to’. This accords with what Kātyāyana said in 2.3.28 vt. 1 (पञ्चिकानि त्वमयोऽयमवस्तुपुत्रम् ), according to which provision is to be made for the use of a fifth-triplet ending signifying an immediate object when an absolutive with *yaḥ* is understood although not used. BhKJ 8.20: वा स्त्रीलोकः कवित्तूऽः धिक्षितः। त्वमयोऽयमवस्तुपुत्रम्।
suffix śānac\(^{63}\) replacing \textit{laṭ}.

As can be seen, the particular meanings in question require the use of specific preverbs with verbal bases. Indeed, the Kāśikā remarks that \textit{jñā} occurs in the meaning ‘deny’ only when it is used with a preverb, not by itself.\(^{64}\) Yet, in the sūtras cited here, and in other rules of the same section, Pāṇini simply speaks of \textit{kr}, \textit{nī}, \textit{jñā} and other verbs used in certain meanings. This is compatible with the stand that the meanings in question are treated as signified by the verbal bases themselves, but require accompanying preverbs as cosignifiers.

\textbf{5.2 Entries in the dhātupāṭha}

How particular entries appear in the dhātupāṭha also accords with the position that a dhātu alone is considered to signify meanings which may require accompanying preverbs as cosignifiers.

Consider first the entry \textit{अनो रूढ कामे} (KṣṬ 4.65, DhPr. 4.63, MDhVṛ. 4.69). This appears as shown in all editions of the texts in question. However, as Bruno Liebich noted,\(^{65}\) all the manuscripts available to him read \textit{अनु रूढ कामे}, which he emended in accordance with two other entries, namely \textit{आँ: बसि हृष्ट्यायाम} (KṣṬ 1.417) and \textit{आँ: गामु हृष्ट्यायाम} (KṣṬ 2.15). That is, the last two entries have the ablative form of the upasarga \textit{ān}. This usage requires that \textit{ā śas} and \textit{ā sās} not be treated as involving lexical units \textit{āśas} and \textit{āśās}. Instead, they show that the bases \textit{śas} and \textit{sās}, which alone receive the class name \textit{dhātu} by A 1.3.1 (see note 18), are listed and that they are said to be preceded by the upasarga \textit{ān}. The Mādhaviyadvātuvṛtti also has \textit{आँ: बसि हृष्ट्यायाम} (MDhVṛ. 1.407) and \textit{आँ: गामु हृष्ट्यायाम} (MDhVṛ. 2.15). Similarly, the dhātupāṭha accompanying Candragomin’s Cāndravyākaraṇa has \textit{अनो रूढ कामे} (4.112), \textit{आँ: गामु हृष्ट्यायाम} (1.460), and \textit{आँ: गामु हृष्ट्यायाम} (2.42).\(^{66}\)

\(^{63}\) A 3.2.126; व्यवहारे: विख्यात (तत्त्वज्ञानी १२४). The participial form \textit{jānāna-s} compounds with \textit{apa-s} by A 2.2.18 (§ 1.1).

\(^{64}\) अव्याख्यात: अव्याख्यात: \textit{रूढः} अस्त्यार्याम (काः १.३.४४).

\(^{65}\) Liebich 1930: 129 n. 4: ‘\textit{alle Hss. anu}; vgl. I, 660, II, 12.’

On the other hand, although the Dhātupradīpa has अनो रूढ़ कामे I, it also has आङ शसि इच्छायाम्. (DhPr. 1.403) and आङ शसि इच्छायाम्. (DhPr. 2.12) instead of आङ: शसि इच्छायाम्. and आङ: शसि इच्छायाम्. This does not mean, nevertheless, that Maitreya Rakṣita considered the entries to be single lexical units āsas and āsās. On the contrary, it is clear from what he himself says that this is not so. He remarks that śasu has the marker u for two reasons, one of which concerns us here: the marking is made so that the suffix ktvā following this verb be subject to optional augmenting with ıf and cites the absolutes āsāsitvā, āsāstvā. Now, these forms would be appropriate if āsās- found here were not a compound. For ktvā is regularly replaced by lyap in a compound (A 7.1.37, see note 57); and if this replacement did apply, the augment ıf would not come into play, since this is added to ārdhadhātuka affixes beginning with consonants other than y (A 7.2.35, see note 55). Accordingly, Maitreya remarks that the marker in śasu is meant to indicate that this item is not followed by lyap in Vedic usage; the non-replacement of ktvā by this is accounted for by a particular rule providing that in Vedic usage ktvā also occurs in compounds.68

From this, one must conclude that even where the entry does not have an ablative form of the upasarga, the compilers of the dhātupātha did not understand that an entry like आङ शसि इच्छायाम् involves a single lexical unit āsās for Pāṇini’s bhāṣā.

This accords with Pāṇini’s derivational procedures.69

67. A 7.2.56: उदितो या (बिंक 50I, हठ 350) provides that the absolute suffix ktvā optionally receives the initial augment ıf if it follows a base marked with u.
68. क्रृपि इन्द्रसिन (A 7.1.38). DhPr. 2.12: उदितो वेदिति विशेषणावेदिति। क्रृपि इन्द्रसिन्धस्य सम्भविति। तत्व व्याहवक्ष्वकायम्। क्रृपि इन्द्रसिन्धात्वेत।। (DhPr. 2.12). In his comments on KṣṬ 2.15, Kṣirasvāmin also cites āśāstvā, āśāsitvā and refers to A 7.2.56: उदितो या आशास्यां आशासिद्रां।
69. I am grateful to Saroja Bhate, Hideyo Ogawa and Dipti Tripathi for reading a draft of my paper and making typographical corrections.
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KāŚ. Kāśikāvṛtti. See Sharma, Aryendra, Khande Rao Deshpande and D. G. Padhye.

KṣT Kṣīratarāṅgini [gana, serial number]. See Yudhisṭhira Mīmāṃsaka.

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Combinations of upasargas and tiṇanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions


LM *Vaiyākaranasiddhāntalaghumaṇjūśā* [page]. See Bhandari, Madhava Shastri et al.

MDhVṛ. *Mādhavīyadhātuṛtti* [gaṇa, serial number]. See Dwarkikadas Shastri.

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RaPr. *Ratnaprakāśa* [volume, page]. See Narasimhacharyya, M. S.

Rau, Wilhelm


RV *Ṛgveda.* See Sontakke, N. S. et al.

SDS *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha.* See Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev.

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Combinations of upasargas and tiṇanta forms: lexical versus grammatical positions


Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka

Bhartrhari on three types of linguistic unit-meaning relations

Hideyo Ogawa

0 Introduction

In VP 1.24–26 Bhartrhari mentions two types of linguistic unit-meaning relations (śabdārthasambandha): capacity (yogyatā) and cause-and-effect relation (kāryakāraṇabhāva) and discusses these types in the Sambandhasamuddeśa (VP 3.3.29, 32). These two types of relations form two of the eight topics to be covered by the Vākyapadīya. It is important to note, however, that, in addition to these types, Bhartrhari accepts another type also: ‘this-is-that’ relation so 'yam iti sambandhaḥ (Vṛtti on VP 1.23 [59.1]). This relation consists in identity (abheda) between a linguistic unit and its meaning, or what Helārāja and Puṇyarāja call adhyāsa ‘superimposition’. Helārāja is acutely aware that Bhartrhari approaches the linguistic unit-meaning relation from three different angles.

* The present paper is one of the outcomes of the seminar on the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, conducted by Professor Ashok Aklujkar, Kyoto, October 2003–February 2004. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Aklujkar for providing me with the text of the Vṛtti on the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, critically edited, though unpublished, by him.

1. VP1.24–26: apoddhārapadārthā ye ye cārtāhā sthitalakṣaṇāh / anvākhyeyāś ca ye śabdā ye cāpi pratiṇādakāh // kāryakāraṇabhāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāḥ / dharme ye prataye cāṅgaṁ sambandhāḥ sādhvasādhuṣu // te liṅgaiś ca svasaṁdaśiś ca śāstre śminn upavarṇītāḥ / smṛtyartham anuganyante kecid eva yathāgamam // The eight topics are as follows. Two types of meanings: meanings as they really are and abstracted meanings; two types of linguistic units: linguistic units to be explained and those which serve to explain the former; two types of relations: a causal relation and the relation of capacity; two types of results: merit, acquired by using a correct speech form, and an understanding of a meaning, brought about even by using an incorrect speech form. See Cardona 1999: 92.

2. VP 3.3.29: indriyānāṁ svaviṣayeṣv anādīr yogyatā yathā / anādir arthaḥ śabdānāṁ sambandho yogyatā tathā // See §4.2.1. VP 3.3.32: śabdaḥ kāraṇaṁ arthaṣaya sa hi tenopajanyate / tathā ca buddhi viṣayād arthaḥ cābdaḥ pratiyate // See §1.3.
Obviously, he tries to link the three types of relations together when he says the following:

Prakāśa on VP 3.3.1 (123.4–5): \textit{ata eva dvividhāḥ sambandhapadārtho vyavatīṣṭhate yogyatā kāryakāraṇābhaṅga\v s ca / adhyāsas tu dvayor api paramārtha eva na prthag-ṛūpāḥ
//

“For this very reason, the entity ‘relation’ (\textit{sambandha}) is posited [for a linguistic unit and its meaning] in two different manners: as yogyatā and as kāryakāraṇābhaṅga. Both have superimposition for their ultimate [basis]; this superimposition is not separated [from these two types of relations].”

We see here that Helārāja treats superimposition as the primary relation (\textit{mukhyasambandha}) between linguistic unit and meaning.\textsuperscript{3}

In this paper I shall consider: (1) why Bharṭṛhari, who holds that there can obtain the above-mentioned three types of relations between linguistic unit and meaning, specifies only the capacity and the causal relation as the relation between linguistic unit and meaning; and (2) how the superimposition relation is related to the other two types. I shall thereby show that, contrary to a recent claim, Helārāja’s understanding of the linguistic unit-meaning relation is well founded on Bharṭṛhari’s theory about it.\textsuperscript{4} A clue for

3. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.2 (126.15–17): \textit{evaṁ ca kṛtvā tātparyadṛśādhyāsa eva yogyatāyaṁ kāryakāraṇābhaṅge ca phalataḥ sambandho vatiśṭhata iti sa eva mukhyāḥ / (“Viewed in this light, in the final analysis in the relation of capacity and that of cause and effect superimposition is virtually established to be the relation [between linguistic unit and meaning]; therefore the very superimposition is a primary relation.”)

4. Houben 1995: 157–162 discusses the \textit{adhyāsa} relation, observing: “It is to be noted, that superimposition (\textit{adhyāsa}) is according to Helārāja nothing less than the ultimate reality with regard to the two types of relation which are explicitly discussed by Bharṭṛhari, namely the ‘suitability’ (\textit{yogyatā}) relation and the causal relation (kāryakāraṇābhaṅga) (3.3.29, 32). If this was Bharṭṛhari’s conviction too, why didn’t he say so in the Samuddesa devoted to relation? From Helārāja’s explanations one has to conclude that \textit{adhyāsa} concerns the relation between individual word and individual word meaning, so if it was the main relation it should have been discussed in this Samuddesa. As we will see
answering the first question is Pāṇinīyas’ view of relation and a hint about the second question is given in the Vṛtti passage: asyedambhāve sati śabdārthahayoh so ‘yam iti [yah] sambandhaḥ (Vṛtti on VP 1.23 [59.1]). We must say that strangely no light has been thrown to the above-mentioned questions so far.

1 śabdasya arthaḥ; arthasya śabdah

Between linguistic unit (śabda) and meaning (artha) there is a relation (sambandha). Thus one is allowed to have the utterances śabdasya arthaḥ ‘the meaning of a linguistic unit’ and arthasya śabdah ‘the linguistic unit of a meaning’. In these utterances the sixth triplet ending -ṇas (śabda-ṇas, artha-ṇas), whose introduction to the nominal bases śabda- and artha- is explained by A 2.3.50 ṣaṣṭhi šeṣe, denotes a relation.5

later on, there are indeed some kārikās (39–51) which can be interpreted as a support for Helārāja’s mentioning of adhyāsa, although there is no indication that it would be the main relation, underlying the two other types.” Houben 1995: 162 concludes his consideration of the adhyāsa relation by saying: “To conclude: (1) A commitment to the adhyāsa relation (in two different ways)—whether or not one holds it to be in accordance with the gist of Bharṭṛhari’s preferred theories—is much more prominent in Pūnyarāja’s and Helārāja’s commentary than in the VP itself. (2) Helārāja’s adhyāsa remains in the context of individual words and word meanings, and may be supported, perhaps, by 39–51. Otherwise, little support is found for Helārāja’s adhyāsa. (3) Pūnyarāja emphasizes adhyāsa too, likewise with little support in the kārikās themselves. His adhyāsa is quite different from Helārāja’s because it concerns only the sentence and sentence meaning.” VP 3.3.39–51 deals with the metaphorical, secondary, existence of a meaning (upacārasattā). According to Bharṭṛhari, the existence of a cognition of a meaning is superimposed on the meaning, so that the meaning in question assumes existence. This superimposition has nothing to do with the adhyāsa relation between linguistic unit and meaning. It is a matter of course that “there is no indication that it [adhyāsa] would be the main relation, underlying the two other types.” Thus in Houben’s view it must follow that ‘little support is found for Helārāja’s adhyāsa’. But this is not the case. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to distinguish between Helārāja’s adhyāsa and Pūnyarāja’s. It is highly unlikely that Helārāja did not know of VP 2.40: so ‘yam abhisambandho buddhāy prakramyate yadā / vākyārthasya tadaiko ‘pi varnāh pratyāyakah kvacic //. According to this kārikā, the adhyāsa relation serves to establish the signifier-significand relation between any type of linguistic unit and any type of meaning. On this kārikā, see §8.

5. On A 2.3.50, see PWT 251.
1.1 *kriyākārakapūrvaka*

In Pāṇinīyas’ view, a relation is preceded by an action-kāraka relation (*kriyākārakapūrvaka*) and it is expressed either with an action being explicitly mentioned or not. Bhartṛhari says:

> VP 3.7.156: sambandhaḥ kārakebhyo 'nyāḥ kriyākāraka-pūrvvakah / śrutāyām āsrutāyām vā kriyāyām so 'bhidhiyate // “A relation is something different from the [six] kārakas and is preceded by an action-kāraka relation. It is denoted [by a sixth triplet ending], whether or not an action is explicitly mentioned.”

Examples are (1) *putro mātuḥ smarati* ‘The son remembers his mother’ and (2) *rājñāḥ puruṣah* ‘servant of the king’. (1) contains the verb form *smarati* which explicitly denotes the action of remembering and (2) contains no verb form. In (1) the sixth triplet ending -"nas in *mātuḥ*, whose occurrence is accounted for by A 2.3.52 *adhīgarthadayēśāṁ karmaṇi*, denotes that relation of the mother with the act of remembering which is preceded by an action-object (*karman*) relation between the act and the mother as in *putro mātaram smarati* ‘The son remembers his mother’. In (2), on the other hand, the sixth triplet ending -"nas in *rājñāḥ*, whose occurrence is accounted for by A 2.3.50, denotes the possession-possessor relation (*svasvāmibhāva*), which presupposes that the king and the servant take part in the same main action as certain kārakas as in the utterance *rājā puruṣāya dadāti* ‘the king gives [something] to the servant’, where the king serves as agent (*kartr*) and the servant as recipient (*sampradāna*) with respect to the action of giving (*dānakriyā*). For Pāṇinīyas, any relation among substances (*dravya*), which are denoted by nominals, results from their being related to a shared action. Thus we must assume that

6. For a full account of VP 3.7.156, see Cardona 2007.
7. Prakāśa on VP 3.7.156 (355.6): *rājā hi puruṣāya dadāti yatas tato rājñāḥ puruṣa iti svasvāmibhāvo 'vatiṣṭhati / 8. See Cardona 2007: 19. The concept of a substance here is what is explained in VP 3.4.3: *vastiṣṭpalakṣanāṁ yatra sarvanāma prajñyate / dravyam ity ucaye*
the relation between linguistic unit and meaning as expressed by the utterances śabdasya arthaḥ and arthasya śabdaḥ is preceded by an action-kāraka relation.

1.2 karaṇa: karman

Bhartṛhari specifies what the action which a linguistic unit and a meaning conjointly bring to accomplishment is.

VP 2.405: kriyāvyavetāḥ sambandho drṣṭaḥ karaṇakar-
maṇoḥ / abhidhāniyamas tasmād abhidhānābhidheyayoḥ //

“It is observed that an instrument (karaṇa) and an object
(karman) are related to each other through the intermediary
of an action. Therefore, [the relation of] that by which [a
meaning] is denoted (abhidhāna) and that which is to be
denoted by it (abhidheya) is regulated by the action of
denoting (abhidhā).”

Bhartṛhari here takes into consideration the following utterance:

[1] devadattaḥ śabdena artham abhidhatte ‘Devadatta
expresses a meaning by using a linguistic unit’.

In this utterance the linguistic unit serves as instrument and the
meaning as object. To express the linguistic unit as an agent as in
asīṣ chinnati ‘The sword cuts’ for asinā chinnati devadattaḥ ‘Deva-
datta cuts with a sword’, one has the following utterances.

[2] śabdaḥ artham abhidhatte ‘A linguistic unit denotes a
meaning’.

[2’] śabdaḥ artham vakti ‘A linguistic unit signifies a mean-
ing’. 10

We may accordingly say that a linguistic unit and a meaning are
related to each other through the intermediary of the action denoted

so ’rtho bhedyatvena vivāksitah // (‘That, with reference to which a pronominal
that refers to an entity is used, is called a substance; this meaning is something
that is intended to be conveyed as something to be differentiated.’)

9. That the relation in question is regulated by the act of denoting means that
whenever this relation is present, the act of denoting is also present.
10. One may have the following utterance also: [1’] devadattaḥ śabdena artham
vakti ‘Devadatta expresses a meaning by using a linguistic unit’. See VP 2.403
(§6.1), where it is stated that a linguistic unit and a meaning are related to each
other through the act of expressing (uκtī).
by abhi-dhā or vac (expressing, denoting, signifying, conveying) and that the relation between them is preceded by the relation of the linguistic unit, serving as instrument, to the action and that of the meaning, serving as object, to the same action.

Another question arises: What is the action denoted by such verbs? In his Vṛtti on the kārikā Bharṭṛhari ingeniously answers this question in accordance with Pāṇiniyas’ view of an action as leading to a fruit (phala). Bhartṛhari says:

[A] Vṛtti on VP 2.405 (303.3–9): (a) iha kāraṇānāṁ ni-
śrayanīparvanāṁ12 iva sākṣāt sambandho nāsti / (b) kriyāyāṁ tv ekasyāṁ saṅnipatitāṁ tannibandhanāṁ kriyāvavyavahitaṁ sambandham anubhavanti / (c) tatrabhi-
dhānam śabdāḥ karaṇam abhidheyo ’rthaḥ karma / (d) karaṇakarmanoś ca kriyām antareṇa na prakrīptaḥ13 / (e) phalavatī ca kriyāvā nañyasyārthasya phalavattā / (f) tad yathā kañatuṣavipramokṣaviśiṣṭe taṇḍulajanmany ulūkha-
lamusalayōḥ karaṇādhikaraṇayor vṛhīnāṁ ca karaṇānām udyamananipātanaṇāpo ’vahantih phalaprasavanīmittāṁ14 (g) tathābhidhānābhidheyayor api niyatāṁ15 sampratyayā-
khyaṁ phalaṁ prakalpayitavyam //

“(a) In our view, there is no direct relation among kārakas, as [there is not] among the rungs of a ladder (niśrayanī-
parvan).”16

11. As in devadattas taṇḍulān pacati ‘Devadatta is cooking rice’ the verb pac can denote actions performed by the principal agent Devadatta, such as putting a pot on the stove, so in [1] and [1’] (see note 10) the verb dhā preceded by the upasarga abhi and the verb vac can denote actions performed by the principal agent Devadatta, a speaker, such as applying (viniyoga) and directing (pranidhi). See §6. On the denotation of kārakas’ own activities by a verb, see Cardona 1974: 237.
16. Vṛtti on VP 2.197 (237.15–16): kriyā hi dvayaḥ arthayor upaśleṣikā niśrayanī-
parvasambhandhanakāsthavad upagrāhikā / (“Indeed, an action, uniting two entities, helps them to be related to each other, just as [two vertical] pieces of
(b) When kārakas assemble (saṁnipatita) for the purpose of bringing a single action to accomplishment, however, they enjoy, on the basis of the action, a relation, which obtains through the intermediary of that action.

(c) There [in the case of the relation between linguistic unit and meaning], that by which [a meaning] is denoted (abhidhāna), a linguistic unit, is an instrument and that which is denoted by it (abhidheya), a meaning, is an object.

(d) And it is not in order for a certain thing to be an instrument or an object without an action.

(e) Furthermore, an action alone brings forth fruit (phalavatī) and nothing else.

(f) For example, [in the situation expressed by the utterance vṛihin avahanti ‘... beat (out) the [unhusked] rice’, the arising of polished rice (taṇḍulajanman), which is qualified by the removing husks from grain (kaṇatuṣavipramokṣa), is related to a wooden mortar (ulūkhala) which serves as locus (adhikaraṇa), a pestle (musala) which serves as instrument, and the unhusked rice (vṛīhi) which serves as object. In this case, the action of beating (avahanti) constituted by lifting and letting fall [the instrument] (udyamana-nipātanarūpa) is the cause of producing the fruit [in the form of the arising of polished rice].

(g) Similarly, [with reference to the action of denoting which is] related to that by which [a meaning] is denoted and to that which is to be denoted by it, too, it is to be assumed that this action produces a specific (niyata) fruit which is called the understanding [of a meaning] (sām-pratyaya).

wood which connect the rungs of a ladder.”) This statement is parallel to the following Bhāṣya passage. MBh on A 2.1.34–35 (1.386.22–387.1): kārakāṇāṁ kriyāyā sāmarthyaṁ bhavati na teśāṁ anyonyena / tadyathā niśrayanyā dvābhyaṁ kāśṭhābhyaṁ sāmarthyaṁ na teśāṁ anyonyena / See Cardona 2007: note 42. 17. Vt. 2 on A 1.1.68: na vā sabdaprūvakō hy arthe saṁpratyayas tasmād
The point made in [A](a)–(b) is that kārakas are related to one another through the intermediary of an action, which has already been shown in §1.1. In [A](c) it is explicitly stated that a linguistic unit and a meaning respectively function as instrument and as object with respect to one and the same action of denoting. Let us note [A](e)–(g). Bharṭṛhari says the following. An action bears fruit (phalavat). Just as in vṛiḥīn avahanti the action of beating produces the fruit of the arising of polished rice, so in [1] the action of denoting produces the fruit of the understanding of a meaning. A parallel argument is found in the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā. According to Bharṭṛhari, the result of the action of denoting is: an understanding of a meaning (sampratyaya), the conveying of a meaning (pratyāyana), a cognition of a meaning (tadavabodha). The action denoted by abhi-dhā, we may say, consists in the activity that leads to these fruits. Thus [2] can be paraphrased as follows:

3 śabdaḥ arthasampratyayam (arthāvabodham) janayati
‘A linguistic unit brings about the understanding of a meaning’.

arthanivṛttih // MBh on A 1.1.68 (I.176.5–6): śabdapūrvako hy arthe sam-
pratyayaḥ / śabdapūrvako hy arthasya sampratyayaḥ / A hearer understands a
meaning after hearing a linguistic unit. It is likely that Bharṭṛhari has the present
vārttika in mind in using the term sampratyaya here.

18. An action is a composite of component actions, which leads to a result. When Bharṭṛhari states the following kārīkā, he takes this for granted. VP 3.8.15: anantaram phalam yasyāḥ kalpate tām kriyāṁ viduḥ / pradhānabhūtāṁ
tādarthhyād anyāsāṁ tu tadākhyaṭā // According to Bharṭṛhari, in the view of some,
a component action immediately after which a certain result comes about is
called kriyā ‘action’ and other preceding component actions are secondarily
called so on account of the relation such that the latter are meant for the former.

pratyāyanaṁ phalam / śabdaḥ karaṇam / śabdārthayoh karmakaraṇayoh asati
kriyārthe sambandhābhāvāt kriyābhypagantavyā / yathā ca dhānyānāṁ
vṛiḥīnāṁ avahanane muśalodyamananipātanābhāyāṁ vyavahitena sambandho
bhavati tataḥ ca kanamokṣatāśavipramokṣaḥ phalam nirvartate / evam ihāpi
śabdo dravyabhūtāḥ karaṇam / arthaḥ karma pratyāyate / tadavabodhaḥ
phalam / tat phalam kriyāyāḥ / See also Vṛtti on VP 2.403 ([J](b) [§6.2]).
[3'] *śabdah artham sampratyāyayati* (avabodhayati) ‘A linguistic unit makes understood a meaning’.

1.3 *arthah śabdena upajanyate*

[3] reminds us of VP 3.3.32, in which Bhartṛhari assumes that the action of bringing about connects a linguistic unit and a meaning. The kārīkā is as follows:

VP 3.3.32: *śabdah kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate / tathā ca buddhiśayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratiyate //*

“A linguistic unit is the cause of a meaning. For a meaning is brought about by a linguistic unit. In addition, a linguistic unit is understood from a meaning which is in the domain of the mind (buddhiśaya).”

A linguistic unit is understood by a hearer when it is uttered, brought about, by a speaker. Here Bhartṛhari assumes that one may have the following utterances:

[4] *śabdah artham janayati* ‘A linguistic unit brings about a meaning’.


It goes without saying that [4] is pertinent to the situation where from hearing a linguistic unit there arises the understanding of a meaning to a hearer of the linguistic unit and that [5] the situation where a speaker utters a linguistic unit to convey to a hearer the meaning which the speaker has in mind. The question of how a causal relation obtains between linguistic unit and meaning shall be discussed in detail later.

1.4 As shown above (§1.1), a linguistic unit and a meaning are related to each other through the intermediary of the act denoted by *abhi-dhā* or *vac* and the act of bringing about. This is how it is

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21. See §3.
established that, between linguistic unit and meaning, there obtain the relation of what denotes and what is to be denoted (abhidheyyābhidhānabhāva) or that of signifier and significand (vācyavācakabhāva) and that of cause and effect (janyajanakabhāva, kāryakāraṇabhāva).

2 artha: svarūpa, bāhyārtha, jñāna

To be sure, there are the above-mentioned relations between linguistic unit and meaning, but we are now confronted with the question of what is meant by the term artha ‘meaning’. As [3] and [4] suggest, this term may have different senses, since what a linguistic unit brings about is the understanding of an artha in [3] and it is just an artha in [4]. Thus we have to consider the following kārikā, in which Bhartṛhari mentions a threefold meaning that is related to a single linguistic unit.

VP 3.3.1: jñānām prayoktur bāhyo ’rthaḥ svarūpaṁ ca pratiyate / śabdair uccaritais teṣāṁ sambandhaḥ samavasthitāḥ //

“A speaker’s cognition (prayoktur jñānam), an external object (bāhyo ’rthaḥ), and a linguistic unit’s own form (svarūpa) are understood from linguistic units which have been uttered. The relation of those things with the linguistic units is fixed [in both the things and the linguistic units].”

The meaning (artha) which is deemed to be related to a linguistic unit is threefold: a cognition (jñāna), an external object (bāhyārtha), and the linguistic unit’s own form (śabdasvarūpa). How is the linguistic unit related to these meanings?

It may be useful in this connection to consider what Helārāja says in commenting on the present kārikā. He makes the following points:22

22. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.1 (122.5–123.7): prayogeṇābhijvalitaiḥ śabdais tritayam avagamyate—ātmīyam rūpaṁ arthaḥ ca phalasādhanaḥ prayoktur abhiprāyaś ca / ... svarūpe prathamam pratipattir ... / tato ’dhyastasvarūpe ’rthakriyā-kāriniḥyām ābhyaṁ arthasvarūpābhyyāṁ śabdasya vācyavācakanasambandhaḥ /
1. From a manifested (abhijvalita) linguistic unit\(^{23}\) three factors are understood: the linguistic unit’s own form; an external object, which brings forth fruit or causal efficacy (arthakriyā) and on which the linguistic unit’s own form is superimposed (adhyastasvarūpa); and a speaker’s intention (prayoktrabhprāya).

2. Between a linguistic unit and an external object and between the linguistic unit and its own form, the signifier-significand relation (vācyavācakasambandha) obtains.

3. Between a speaker’s intention and a linguistic unit, the cause-effect relation obtains.

4. Between what a speaker has in mind (vaktrabhprāyārūḍha) and a linguistic unit, the cause-effect relation obtains.\(^{24}\)

\[prayoktrabhprāyena tu saha kāryakāraṇahāvah / ... vaktrabhprāyārūḍhasayai-vā śabdārthatve tatra kāryakāraṇasambandham āha / ... yathā cehopacārassattāsamāviṣṭam vastu śabdārtham vakṣyati tathā kāryakāraṇabhāvo ’pi sambandhaḥ /\]

23. See Vṛtti on VP 1.25 ([D] [§3.2]), where the expression nādābhivyakta ‘manifested by the sequential utterance of sounds’ is employed.

24. See §3.2. Helārāja cites from Dharmaṅkīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, to support this point. PV II.2: vakrtyāpāraviṣayo yo ’riho buddhau prakaśate / prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya nārtha-tattvanibandhanam // According to Dharmaṅkīrti, the meaning which a speaker intends to convey appears in a hearer’s cognition; a linguistic unit is a valid means of cognition with respect only to the intended meaning and not to reality. In commenting on VP 3.3.1, Helārāja says the following. Bhartṛhari, accepting that what a speaker has in mind is a meaning of a linguistic unit, states that a linguistic unit has a causal relation to something a speaker has in mind. This is to include incidentally (upasamgrahārtham) the view of those (Buddhists) who accept that an external object is not the meaning of a linguistic unit, since the science of grammar is an associate of all schools of thought. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.1 (123.14–15): sarvapārṣadam punar idam śāstram iti ye bāhyasyārthasya śabdavācyatvām necchanti tanmatopasaṅgrahārtham vaktrabhprāyārūḍhasayaiwa śabdārthatve tatra kāryakāraṇasambandham āha / This remark of Helārāja’s is somewhat misleading. From his remark we should not understand that Pāṇiniyas do not hold what a speaker has in mind to be the meaning of a linguistic unit or that the concept of the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning is not rooted in the Pāṇijnian tradition. As shall be shown further on, Bhartṛhari builds up the theory on the linguistic unit-meaning relation by means of considering closely what a speaker and a hearer have in mind in actual communication. When
5. Between a linguistic unit and an entity which is endowed with metaphorical existence (upacārasattāsamāviṣṭavastu), the cause-effect relation obtains. This existence consists in the image of an object (arthākāra) which appears in the mind (buddhisamārūḍhārthākārarūpā sattā).²⁵

Point 1 shows that Bhartṛhari means a speaker’s intention by ‘a speaker’s cognition’ (prayoktur jñānam). Point 5 shows that the cognition related to a linguistic unit is not restricted to a speaker’s and that a hearer’s cognition is also related to the same linguistic unit. Thus [4] and [5] may be respectively paraphrased as follows:

[6] śabdāḥ jñānam janayati ‘A linguistic unit brings about a cognition.’


In this connection it is important to note that [7] is a paraphrase of the following utterance:

[7’] buddhiviṣayārthah śabdam janayati ‘A meaning in the domain of the mind brings about a linguistic unit’.²⁶

Helārāja says the above, he must intend to imply that Bhartṛhari’s argument that there is a causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning results in including the Buddhists’ view.

25. VP 3.3.39: vyapadeśe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī / sarvāvasthāsu sarvesām ātmarūpasya darśikā // (“By virtue of verbal expression, [external] entities (padārtha) have a different existence, which is something metaphorical and which, of all entities in all states, presents their own images.”) Prakāśa on VP 3.3.39 (150.11–13): vyapadeśe vyapadeśānimittam śabdena pratyāyane padapratyāyānām arthānām bāhyānām vastūnām bāhyavilakṣaṇā sattā buddhyopacaritā bāhyārthasattāyā hi anyā buddhisamārūḍhārthākārarūpā sattā /

26. See VP 3.3.32 (§1.3).
Patañjali uses the term buddhiṣaya to refer to something mental.²⁷ According to Helārāja, by the term jñāna in the present kārikā Bhartṛhari means what appears in a speaker’s intention (vaktraḥbhi-prāyārūḍha) [point 4] and the image of an object which appears in a hearer’s mind (buddhisamārūḍhārthākāra) [point 5]. Accordingly, [6] and [7] must be respectively paraphrased as follows:

[8] śabdāḥ arthākārajñānam janayati ‘A linguistic unit brings about a cognition with the image of an object’.

[9] arthākārajñānam śabdam janayati ‘A cognition with the image of an object brings about a linguistic unit’.

Bhartṛhari thoroughly discusses how the image of an object takes part in a verbal cognition, which shall be considered in dealing with the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning.²⁸

Concerning a speaker’s intention, there is a point to make clear. As shown in VP 3.3.1, what is understood from a linguistic unit must be a meaning of the linguistic unit.²⁹ In Bhartṛhari’s view, a mere intention of a speaker, which is something understood through inference (anumāna), should not be considered to be a

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²⁷. MBh on A 3.1.26 (II.36.17–18): te ’pi hi teṣām utpattiprabhṛty ā vināśād ēddhīr vyācaksāṇāḥ sato buddhiṣayāvan prakāśayanti / Patañjali says: Narrators of the story of the slaying of Karṣaṇa, when speaking of his flourishing from birth to death, illuminates in the mind of the audience him, who is existent as something in the domain of their minds. The point made by Patañjali is stated by Bhartṛhari in VP 3.7.5, as follows: śabdopahitarūpāṁ ca buddher viṣayatāṁ gatān / pratyaṇaṁ iva kamsādīn sādhanaatvena nānayād / (“And besides, [a narrator of the story of the slaying of Karṣaṇa and the like] considers [them] to be a sādhana, whose forms [i.e., images] have been created by linguistic units and who have entered the domain of his mind, as if the narrator perceived them.”) Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (61.28): sato buddhiṣayān iti / buddhiṣayān sata iti / buddhiṣṭhān sata ity arthāḥ /

²⁸. See §3.

²⁹. Evidently, in VP 3.3.1 Bhartṛhari presupposes Pāṇiniyas’ definition of ‘meaning’ (artha), which is given in VP 2.330: yasmām uccarite śabde yadā yo ’rthah pratiyate / tam aḥur arthāṁ tasyaiva nānayād arthasya laksāṇam // (“When a linguistic unit is uttered, a thing (artha) is understood. [Others (Grammarians)] call the thing the meaning (artha) of the very linguistic unit. There is no other definition of ‘meaning’. ”) According to this definition, a meaning is what is understood from a linguistic unit when it is uttered.
meaning. To understand what a speaker intends to convey is one thing and to understand that a speaker has the intention to convey something is another. Not to speak, what a speaker intends to convey by uttering a linguistic unit must be considered to be a meaning of the linguistic unit.

Point 2 shows that [2] is paraphrased as follows:

[10] śabdaḥ bāhyārtham abhidhatte ‘A linguistic unit denotes an external object’.


We need not take a linguistic unit’s own form into consideration here since it is the most internal, non-deviating, meaning of a linguistic unit and hence it necessarily takes part in a verbal cognition. Regarding [10] questions arise. As shown by [3], [10] is paraphrased as follows:

30. VP3.14.198: śabdād arthāḥ pratāyante sa bhedānāṁ vidhāyakaḥ / anumāṇam vivakṣāyāḥ śabdād anyan na vidyate // (“[Different] meanings unfold from [different] linguistic units. Linguistic units create differences [with regard to a single entity]. There is no other means of inferring (anumāṇa) a speaker’s intention than the linguistic unit.”) A speaker utters a linguistic unit which is capable of conveying the meaning the speaker intends to convey. With reference to the same woman, if the word dāra (m.) is used by a speaker, a hearer understands that the speaker of this word has the intention to convey the woman as qualified by the property of being a male; if the word bhāryā (f.) is used by a speaker, a hearer understands that the speaker of this word has the intention to convey the woman as qualified by the property of being a female. Prakāśa on VP 3.14.198 (247.24): dāraśabdāḥ strīyām puṁstvaviśeṣaṇāṁ ācāste / bhāryāśabdāḥ strītvaṇiśṣṭām /

31. VP 3.3.2: pratipattur bhavaty arthe jñāne vā saṁśayaḥ kvacit / svarūpeśūpa- labhyesu vyabhicāro na vidyate // (“In some cases a hearer entertains a doubt as to an external object or its cognition. When linguistic units’ own forms are perceived, there is no deviation in their understanding.”) A hearer (pratipattṛ), who has not learned the relation between linguistic unit and meaning or who has heard a homonym such as akṣa ‘axis, cart, die, etc.’, conceives a doubt: On the basis of the cognition of what did a speaker utter a linguistic unit? Even such a hearer can understand the linguistic unit’s own form. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.2 (127.13–16): apravṛttasanketasya arthe tadviṣaye jñāne sandheho jāyate na tu śrute svarūpe / arthāparijñānāc ca kim ayaṁ veda vaktety ayaṁ api vakṛ- jñānaviśaḥ sandheho jāyata eva apravṛttasanketasāpya aksādisāmānyāsadbhād eva cākṣādau sandheho na tu svarūpa iti siddham /
[12] śabdaḥ bāhyārthāsampratyayam janayati ‘A linguistic unit brings about the understanding of an external object’.

What is the understanding of an external object? How is this understanding linked with the cognition with the image of an object? These questions are also fully discussed by Bhartṛhari in his Vṛttī in dealing with the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning.

3 kāryakāraṇabhāva

In the Vṛttī on VP 1.23 and 1.25 Bhartṛhari gives a detailed account of the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning.

3.1 Vṛttī on VP 1.23 arthasarūpapratyavabhāsa

VP 1.23 states that the Pāṇinian tradition declares that the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is permanent (nitya). In the Vṛttī on this kārikā Bhartṛhari mentions three types of relations, to which I referred earlier in §0.

[B] Vṛttī on VP 1.23 (60.2–61.2): arthasarūpapratyavabhāsānāṃ vā prayayānāṃ bāhyēsv artheṣu prayastānāṃ aksaranimitṭakṣarakalpanāvad arthavad evaikaviṣayatve

‘bhuyapagamyamāne nityam avicchinnapāramparyah kārya-kāraṇabhāvah śabdārthatyoh sambandhah /

“(a) Alternatively, [there obtains a causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning.]

(b) [From a linguistic unit there arise] cognitions (pratyaya) in which a form similar to an [external] object appears (arthasarūpapratyavabhāsa).

(c) [In this case] they are superimposed (pratyasta) on external objects (bāhyēsv artheṣu).

32. VP 1.23: nityāḥ śabdārthasaṁbandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ / sūtrānāṁ sānutantraṇāṁ bhāsyānāṁ ca pranetṛbhiḥ //

33. Aklujkar: arthatve.

34. Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.23 (61.10): arthena bāhyena samānarūpapratyavabhāso yesāṁ prayayānām /

35. Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.23 (61.11–13): yadā te prayayāś teṣu bāhyēsv artheṣu prayastā buddhyāropitā bāhyam evedāṁ vastv iti paricchidyamānāḥ kiñcitsārśyāt prayastā bhavanti, yatas taddarśanāt taddhyavasāyaḥ /
(d) [Consequently] it is always (nityam)\textsuperscript{36} accepted that they have objects identical with the external objects (tadekaviṣayatva) as if they had for their objects the external objects (arthavat).

(e) This is comparable to the case where written symbols (lipyaksara) which have as their causes [true articulated] sounds (aksaranimitta) are spoken of as sounds (aksaravyavahāra).\textsuperscript{37}

(f) This being the case, there obtains a causal relation [whose understanding is conditioned by convention (samayopādhi)]; this relation comes down in uninterrupted transmission [and hence is permanent].\textsuperscript{38}'

According to Vṛṣabha, when there arise cognitions in which a form similar to an external object appears, they are superimposed on external objects because of some similarity in form; and, when this superimposition takes place, one determines that the entity one has in mind is nothing other than an external object (bāhyam evedam vastu), since the cognition that this is X (taddarśana; darśana, see [D] [§3.2]) leads to the determination such that X is an external object (tadadhyavasāya).

36. Paddhati on Vṛṭti on VP 1.23 (61.16): nityam iti / sadaivaisām arthākārapratyayajananam / Vṛṣabha says that whenever meaningful linguistic units are uttered, they bring about cognitions in which an image of an object appears. This is the reason that the cognitions appear as if they had for their objects external objects. The form of an object which appears in such cognitions is determined to be an external object. See Vṛṭti on VP 1.25 ([C](b) [§3.2]).

37. Paddhati on Vṛṭti to VP 1.23 (61.13–14): yathāksaranimitteṣu lipyaksareṣu anaksaresv apy aksaravyavahārāḥ tadekatvavavasāya ca lipidarśane ‘ksarāvabodhāt tathā tadṝpe ‘pi pratya ye ‘ṛṭhavyavahāra iti / According to Vṛṣabha, one speaks of written symbols, which are in reality not articulated sounds, as articulated sounds and as identical with them since on seeing the written symbols one understands them to be articulated sounds; in the same manner, one speaks of a cognition, in which a form similar to an external object appears, as the external object.

38. The phrase samayopādhiḥ is construed with the phrase kāryakārunabhāvaḥ. According to Vṛṣabha, only one who has learned the causal relation between a linguistic unit and a meaning can have the understanding of the meaning from the linguistic unit. In this sense samaya ‘convention’ may be said to function as a co-operator (sahakārin). Paddhati on Vṛṭti to VP 1.23 (61.17): atrāpi samayopādhir iti sambandhanīyam / tena sahakārinā saha kāryajananāt / Here the term samaya means the observation of the usage of elders (vyavahāradarśana).
The present Vṛtti explains the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning from a hearer’s point of view. [B](b) says that the cognition that arises from a linguistic unit has a form similar to an external object (*arthasarūpa*). This cognition is superimposed on the external object ([B](c)). When this superimposition takes place, the cognition appears as if it had for its object the external object because it has an object identical with the external object ([B](d)). According to Vṛṣabha, this amounts to saying that the form (*rūpa*) or image (*ākāra*) which appears in the cognition is determined to be the external object. The form which appears in the cognition is assumed to be the external object, just as a written symbol is assumed to be an articulated sound itself ([B](e)). This implies that when a hearer understands something from a linguistic unit, the hearer understands it as if it existed in the external world.

3.2 Vṛtti on VP 1.25 *arthākāra*

VP 1.25 is one of the set of kārikās (VP 1.24–26) which mentions the eight topics to be dealt with in the Vākyapādiya. In the kārikā in question Bhartṛhari mentions the two types of relations between linguistic unit and meaning, *yogatā* ‘capacity’ and *kāryakāraṇa-bhāva* ‘causal relation’. The following Vṛtti passages explain the causal relation.

In connection with the relation of capacity, Vṛṣabha says (Paddhati on VP 1.23 [60.20–21]): *samayo vyavahāradarśanam / sa upādhir asyā yogyatāyāh / bhūyastvena vyavahāram drstavatah sa yogyatāpratipattinibandhanam /* Helārāja also says the same thing. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.31 (144.25): *vṛddhayava- hāraparamparāparaparyāyāt samayāt ... /* One learns the relation between linguistic unit and meaning from the usage of elders.

39. According to Vṛṣabha, the point made by the present Vṛtti passage is: From a linguistic unit there arises a cognition with an image of an object, which image is determined to be an external object; in this case the linguistic unit is a cause and the cognition is an effect. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (61.14–15): *sabdād dhi sārthākāra buddhir utpadaye taṁ tv ākāram ayaṁ bāhyatvena manyate iti kāryakāraṇa alakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ /*

40. Similarly, a speaker speaks of a thing as if it existed in the external world. See note 27.

41. See note 1.
To begin with, Bhartṛhari explains that a linguistic unit is the cause of a meaning, as follows:

[C] Vṛtti on VP 1.25 (71.4–5): arthākāranirbhāsamātrānu-gatasya prayayasyārtheṣu prayastarūpasyārthatvenādhy- avasāye tasyārthātmanah śabdo nimittaṁ /
“(a) A cognition (prayāya) is accompanied by images of objects (arthākāra), which are something appearing in the cognition (nirbhāsa) and which appear as if they were parts (mātrā) of the cognition.
(b) The cognition is determined to be external objects (arthatvenādhyavasāyaḥ) because its forms are superimposed on external objects.
(c) When this determination takes place, a linguistic unit is the cause (nimitta) of that cognition which is identical with the external objects (tasyārthātmanah).”

[C](a) clearly says that, in a cognition arising from a linguistic unit, there appears an image of an object, which appears as if it were part of the cognition. [C](b) says the same thing as [B](c)–(d). We notice that for Bhartṛhari there is no ontological distinction between a cognition and the image appearing in the cognition.42 As shown in [C](c), when a cognition has the image which is identified with an external object on account of the determination of the image as the external object, the cognition itself is said to be identical with the external object.43

Bhartṛhari goes on to explain that a meaning is the cause of a linguistic unit.

[D] Vṛtti on VP 1.25 (71.5–6): tathārthāvagrahadarśanaṁ so 'yam iti śabdārthayoh sambandhaprasiddher nādābhi-

42. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.16–17): arthākāraṁ nirbhāsaṁ avayava [read: avayavair] ivānusyātasya prayayasya / artheṣu iti / teṣāṁ bāhyārthatve-nādhyavasāyāṁ te tatra prayastā ucyante /
43. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.17–18): arthatvena iti / vastutvena / tasyārthātmano buddhinivṛṣṭasya śabdo nimitakāraṇam / What enters into a cognition (buddhinivṛṣṭa) is something mental (buddhistha) and hence a mental image of an external object.
vyaktasyāntahkaraṇasanniveśināḥ śabdasya pravrtau kāraṇam /

“(a) And likewise,⁴⁴ a cognition which determines an object (arthāvagrahadarśana) is the cause of the occurrence of the linguistic unit which enters into the internal organ (antahkaraṇasanniveśin) [i.e., a linguistic unit enjoying mental existence (buddhistha)]⁴⁵ and which is manifested by the sequential utterance of sounds (nāḍābhivyakta).

(b) For the relation of ‘this-is-that’ is established between linguistic unit and meaning.”

According to Vṛṣabha, what Bhārtṛhari means by arthāvagrahadarśana ‘a cognition which determines an object’ is a cognition with an image of an object (arthākāraḥ pratyayah).⁴⁶ It is important to note here that the linguistic unit which is deemed to be the cause of a meaning is something mental which is to be manifested by the sequential utterance of sounds.⁴⁷ This is an indication that a meaning brings about a linguistic unit within the mind of a speaker. Vṛṣabha describes this: the cognition with the image of a linguistic unit arises from the cognition with the image of an object.⁴⁸

⁴⁴. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.18–19): evaṁ kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇam sambandham abhidhāyaṁtraivaḥhedalakṣaṇam antarbhāvayisyam āha tathā iti / It is important to note here that Vṛṣabha states that [D] is meant for including the relation of identity in the causal relation. See §6.3.
⁴⁵. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.21): antahkaraṇasanniveśināḥ iti / buddhisthasya /
⁴⁶. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.19–20): arthāvagraho ‘rthaśaparicchedaḥ tadātmakadarśanam arthākāraḥ pratyayah /
⁴⁷. In VP 1.47 Bhārtṛhari says that a linguistic unit which appears in a speaker’s cognition (buddhistha) is the cause of a linguistic unit which is actually heard (śruti). See note 96.
⁴⁸. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.25 (71.21–22): yato ‘rthākārāyāḥ buddheḥ śabdākāraḥ buddhir uptpadyate / Vṛṣabha says that a cognition with a mental image of a linguistic unit (śabdākāra) arises from a cognition with a mental image of an external object (arthākāra). In this case it is said that an external object is a cause while a linguistic unit is an effect; namely that a causal relation obtains between the two. Note that in his Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 Vṛṣabha states that a cognition with an image of an object arises from a linguistic unit. See note 39. We may say that the relation of identity between linguistic unit and
More significantly, Bhartṛhari states that what establishes such a causal relation is the relation of ‘this-is-that’ ([D](b)). In his view, it is on the basis of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ that the image of an object brings about that of a linguistic unit. According to Vṛṣabha, the relation of ‘this-is-that’, which is characterized by identity (abhedalakṣāṇa), is included in the causal relation. Naturally, it is conceivable that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ accounts for the fact that the cognition with the image of an object arises from the cognition with the image of a linguistic unit within the mind of a hearer. These points shall be considered in dealing with the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning.

3.3 We are now able to see that Bhartṛhari views the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning as follows:

[13] śabdākārajñānam bāhyārthajñānam janayati
[14] bāhyārthajñānam śabdākārajñānam janayati

[13] means: A cognition with the image of a linguistic unit brings about a cognition with that image of an object which is determined to be an external object. [14], on the other hand, means: A cognition with that image of an object which is determined to be an external object brings about a cognition with the image of a linguistic unit. [13] applies in a hearer and [14] in a speaker.

Three points are now ascertained: First, Pāṇinīyas hold that a cognition has an image (ākāra, rūpa). In a verbal cognition there appear the images of an object and a linguistic unit, which are precisely what is in the domain of the mind (buddhistha, buddhaviṣaya). When Pāṇinīyas say that a cognition is a meaning, they meaning establishes the causal relation between them. See §6.3.

49. Vṛṣabha, commenting on VP 1.25 (64.15–16), says the following: kāryakāraṇabhāvena iti / sambandhasya dvāvidhyam / abhedalakṣāṇasyāsya kāryakāraṇabhāve niśarbhāvam vaksyati / See note 44 and §6.3. It is important to note here that Vṛṣabha states that the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is twofold. Such an account presupposes that the relation spoken of as the one between linguistic unit and meaning is of the type tasyedam ‘this-of-that’. See §1 and §5.1.

50. See §5.2 and §6.3.
intend to imply that the image of an object which appears in the
cognition is also a meaning (arthasya buddhirūpatā).\textsuperscript{51} Secondly,
the expression bāhyārthajñāna means ‘a cognition where there
appears the image of an object which is determined to be an exter-
nal object’. To speak of the action denoted by abhi-dhā, this action
must consist in the activity leading to the understanding of some-
thing as if it were an external object. It goes without saying that it
is because the occurrence of a verbal cognition is independent of
the existence of an external object (bāhyasattā, mukhyasattā) that
bāhyārthajñāna has to be interpreted in the above-described
manner. Thirdly, the relation of ‘this-is-that’ plays a crucial role in
determining the causal relation between linguistic unit and mean-
ing.

4 yogyatā
There is no point in simply saying that there are the relation of
what denotes and what is to be denoted (or that of signifier and
significand) and that of cause and effect between linguistic unit
and meaning. For this may be seen from observation of everyday
interaction. It is evident that in the exposition of the causal rela-
tion in the Vṛtti Bhartṛhari spends himself on the task of analyzing
a verbal cognition which arises from a linguistic unit and a verbal
cognition which lets a speaker utter a linguistic unit. In the case of
the relation of capacity, on the other hand, he imposes on himself
the task of showing that this relation is permanent in his Vākya-
padīya and Vṛtti. For Bhartṛhari’s theory of kāraka necessarily
leads him to positing the relation of capacity between linguistic
unit and meaning.

4.1 sāmarthya
As said in §1.2, Bhartṛhari, assuming that [1] is generally used in
everyday speech, observes that a linguistic unit and a meaning
respectively function as instrument and as object with respect to

\textsuperscript{51} To support this point Bhartṛhari cites the Bhāṣya passage under A 3.1.26,
quoted in note 27. In his Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (61.18) Vṛṣabha says:
buddhirūpatām cārthasyāgamena pratipādayati /.
the action denoted by *abhi-dhā*. It is well known that in the Sādhanasamuddeśa of his Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari defines a sādhanā ‘what brings an action to accomplishment’, or a kāraka, as follows:

VP 3.7.1: *svāsrave samavetānāṁ tadvad evāsrayāntare / kriyāṇāṁ abhinispattau sāmarthyam sādhanaṁ viduḥ //*

‘[Pāṇinīyas] recognize that a sādhana is the capacity with respect to bringing about actions that reside in a locus of [the capacity] itself or, in a like manner, in another locus.”

In his Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā, Bhartṛhari treats a linguistic unit in [1] as a substance (*dravya*). 52 Patañjali holds that a kāraka is a substance or a quality (*guna*) and Bhartṛhari calls the quality as a capacity (*sāmarthya*). The substance bears this quality. 53 Thus it must follow that in [1] a linguistic unit has the capacity to function as instrument with respect to the act denoted by *abhi-dhā* and that a meaning has the capacity to function as object with respect to the very same act. Vṛṣabha explicitly states that what Bhartṛhari means by *yogyatā* in the context of the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is none other than the capacity. 54 On the assumption that *abhi-dhā* signifies the act of denoting, accordingly, we may say that a linguistic unit and a meaning respectively have the capacities to denote and to be denoted. In cutting wood, one who wishes to cut the wood employs as an instrument a thing which is capable of cutting it, such as an ax. Similarly, Devadatta utters a specific linguistic unit which is capable of denoting a specific meaning. The specific linguistic unit has the capacity to denote the specific meaning. The wood, on the other hand, is capable of being cut by the ax: what is not capable of being cut cannot be cut. Similarly, the specific meaning has the capacity to be denoted by the specific linguistic unit. Thus the relation of what denotes and

52. MBhD IV.1.24.28: *śabdo dravyabhūtah karaṇam* / See note 19.
54. Vṛṣabha explicitly states that what is meant by the term *yogyatā* is *sāmarthya* ‘capacity’, which is a synonym of the term *śakti*. Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.23 (60.14): *yogyatā iti / sāmarthyaṁ /* On Bhartṛhari’s concept of ‘capacity’, see Ogawa 2009.
what is to be denoted consists in a composite of the linguistic unit’s
capacity to denote the specific meaning and the specific meaning’s
capacity to be denoted by the linguistic unit. This is the relation of
capacity between the specific linguistic unit and the specific mean-
ing.

4.2 prakāṣyaprakāṣakabhāva

In the Vṛtti on VP 1.23 and 1.25 Bhartṛhari explains the relation of
capacity, assuming that [3’] can be paraphrased as follows:

[15] śabdaḥ artham prakāṣayati ‘A linguistic unit makes
known a meaning.’

[16] arthāḥ śabdena prakāṣyate ‘A meaning is made
known by a linguistic unit’.

In these utterances, of course, a linguistic unit is intended to be
conveyed as an agent with respect to the act of making known.
According to Bhartṛhari, a linguistic unit has a capacity to make
known a meaning (prakāṣakabhāva, i.e., prakāṣakatva) and a
meaning has a capacity to be made known by a linguistic unit
(prakāṣyabhāva, i.e., prakāṣyatva). Now let us consider relevant
Vṛtti passages.

4.2.1 Vṛtti on VP 1.23 samayopādhi

As said earlier in §3.1, VP 1.23 talks about the permanence of the
relation between linguistic unit and meaning. Of the relation of
capacity Bhartṛhari says:

[E] Vṛtti on VP 1.23 (60.1–2): indriyaṇiśayavad vā prakāṣyapra-
-kāṣakabhāvena samayopādhir yogyatā śabdārthayoh
sambandhah/

“(a) Alternatively,55 as between sense organs (indriya) and
their objects (viṣaya), a relation such that one is capable of
making known and the other is capable of being made
known (prakāṣyaprakāṣakabhāva) holds between a linguis-
tic unit and its meaning.

55. Under VP 1.23 Bhartṛhari mentions three types of relations between linguis-
tic unit and meaning in the order of the relation of ‘this-is-that’, that of capacity,
and that of cause and effect.
(b) This relation of capacity, [whose understanding is] conditioned by convention (samayopādhi), [is permanent].” [E](a) shows that, like a sense organ and its object, a linguistic unit and its meaning have the relation of capacity, which consists in the relation of what makes known and what is to be made known (prakāśyaprakāśakabhāva). As said above, the relation of capacity in question must therefore consist in a composite of the capacity to make known and the capacity to be made known.56

[E](b) says that the relation of capacity between a linguistic unit and its meaning is that whose understanding is conditioned by convention (samayopādhi). The point is this: Just as the visual organ, even if it has the capacity to make known color, does not function to make known the latter requiring an assisting factor in the form of light, so a linguistic unit, even if it has the capacity to make known its own meaning, does not function to make known the latter unless it expects an assisting factor in the form of convention.57 Accordingly, the undesirable consequence does not follow that as, for all persons, the visual organ makes known its object, so, even for a person who has not learned the relation between a linguistic unit and its meaning, the linguistic unit makes known the meaning.58

The present Vṛtti passage is, in passing, a parallel to the following kārikā:

56. Paddhāti on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (60.14–16): prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvena iti / śabdasya prakāśakatvam arthasya prakāśyatvam / etad dvayaṁ samhātyaikah sambandhaḥ na punah pratyekeṁ śabdārthayor yogyatayā prthak sambandhaṁ bhidhānām / Vṛṣabha comments: A linguistic unit has the property of making known (prakāśakatva), while a meaning has the property of being made known (prakāśyatva). These two properties jointly form a single relation, but each of these is not separately spoken of as a relation.
57. Paddhāti on VP 1.23 (60.21–23): tatra yathaiva caṅṣurādayaḥ satyām api rūpaprakāśanayogatayāṁ nānapektālokaśahāyāṁ rūpaṁ prakāśayanti tathā śabdāḥ satyām apy arthaprakāśanayogatayāṁ samayaṁ satyāyāṁ iti /
58. Paddhāti on VP 1.23 (60.18–19): yathāiva tarhi indriyāṁ svayogatayā viśayaṁ sarvasya prakāśayati tathā śabdo ’nirjñatasaṁbandhasvāpya prakāśayed ity āha samayopādhiḥ iti /
VP 3.3.29: indriyāṇāṁ svaviṣayasyaṁ anādir yogyatā yathā / anādir arthaṁ śabdāṇāṁ sambandho yogyatā tathā //
“Sense organs have a beginningless relation of capacity with their own objects [such that the former have the capacity to make known the latter and the latter have the capacity to be made known by the former]. Similarly, linguistic units have a beginningless relation of capacity with their meanings [such that the former have the capacity to make known the latter and the latter have the capacity to be made known by the former].”

4.2.2 Vṛttī on VP 1.25 sādhubhāva

In the Vṛttī on VP 1.25 Bhartṛhari elaborates on the points he has made in the Vṛttī on VP 1.23.

[F] Vṛttī on VP 1.25 (71.7–9): (a)–(c) indriyaviṣayavat tu prakāśyapråkapāsakabhāvena viśiṣṭānāṁ śabdāṇāṁ viśiṣṭeṣv artheṣu nityam akartrvyāpārasādhyaṁ avyabhicarita-prasiddhasādhubhāvānāṁ vācakānāṁ śabdāṇāṁ۵⁹ vācyeṣu yogyatvam (d) aprasiddhasambhandhānāṁ prathamapratipādane samayopādhikam /
“(a) Just as sense organs and their objects have the relation of capacity such that the former have the capacity to make known the latter and the latter have the capacity to be made known by the former, on the other hand, so also do specific linguistic units (viśiṣṭa-śabda) and their specific meanings (viśiṣṭa-artha);
(b) the relation of capacity is not something that could be brought about through the function of a creator (akartrvyāpārasādhya).
(c) In this case, the specific linguistic units, whose correctness (sādhubhāva) [with respect to the specific meanings] has been established as always (nityam) not deviating from them, are the signifiers (vācaka) of the specific meanings

۵⁹. Aklujkar omits this.
and the specific meanings are the significands (vācyā) of such specific linguistic units.

(d) Insofar as those for whom the relations between linguistic units and meanings have not been established are [observed to be] taught the relations for the first time, [the relation of capacity is] that whose understanding is] conditioned by convention.”

The points made in [F](a), (b), and (d) have already been stated in Vṛttī on VP 1.23. Let us note [F](c). According to Vṛṣabha, Bhartṛhari here takes into consideration the following cases:

[17] gośabḍaḥ sāśnādimardhartham prakāśayati ‘The word go makes known an object with a dewlap and so on’.
[18] goṇiśabḍaḥ sāśnādimardhartham prakāśayati ‘The word goṇi makes known an object with a dewlap and so on’.
[19] goṇiśabḍaḥ āvapanaviśeṣārtham prakāśayati ‘The word goṇi makes known a specific vessel (āvapana)’.

The form goṇi is an incorrect speech form with respect to the object with a dewlap and so on which is understood from this form and a correct speech form with respect to the specific vessel which is also understood from this form. It is open to question whether or not an incorrect speech form is a direct signifier of a meaning. Therefore, Bhartṛhari here confines himself to dealing with the relation of capacity between a correct speech form and its meaning. If the view is accepted that an incorrect speech form

60. Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.25 (72.6–9): avyabhicarita iti / avyabhicaritaḥ prasiddhah sādhubbhavo yeśām iti / ye nityaṁ sādhutām aparītya-jantaḥ prasiddhāḥ / yathā gavādayah / etac cābhidhe āvyabhicārātī / na hi gośabḍaḥ svam arthāṁ jaḥāti / hāne punar asādhutaiva / yathā goṇiśabdasyāvapanārtha-parītyāge gotvena sāśnādimati pravṛttasya /

61. That is why in the Vṛttī passages succeeding the above-cited passages Bhartṛhari states that there are two views regarding this question: the direct signifier view (pratyakṣapakṣa) and the indirect signifier view (anumānapakṣa). Vṛttī on VP 1.25 (72.2–3): viśīṣṭapratyayotpattau ca pratyakṣapakṣena vyavasthāṁ prakalpayati / anumānapakṣena tu sambandhisambandhād aksi-nikocādvad apabhramśāḥ pratyayaviśeṣeṣv aṅgabhāvam upagacchantī / See VP 1.180–181 and VP 3.3.30. Cardona 1999: §4 considers the question in some detail.
conveys a meaning by calling to mind a correct speech form, the incorrect speech form cannot be said to have the capacity to convey the meaning.

5 so 'yam iti sambandhah
In [D] we have seen that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning determines the causal relation between them.62 We are now in a position to consider the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning. In the following, let us consider this relation.

5.1 tasyedam; so 'yam
Generally speaking, the relation of ‘this-is-that’ is to establish the relation of identity between two different entities. Before moving on to the main task, it is desirable to see what this relation is. Patañjali says the following:

MBh on A 4.1.48 (II.218.13–19): nāvaśyam ayam evabhīsambandho bhavati tasyedam iti / ayam apy abhisambandho sti so 'yam iti / katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati / caturbhiḥ prakārair atasmin sa ity etad bhavati tāṭṣhyāt tāddharmyāt tāṭṣāmīpyāt tāṭṣāhacaryād iti /

“It is not necessarily the case that there is only a relation (abhisambandha) designated by the expression tasyedam ‘this of that’. There is also a relation designated by the expression so 'yam ‘this is that’.

[Question] But how is a thing (Y) which is not that (X) spoken of as that?

[Answer] In a fourfold manner Y which is not X is spoken of as X: due to Y being located in X (tāṭṣthyyāt); Y having a property of X (tāddharmyāt); Y being in proximity to X (tāṭṣāmīpyāt); Y being accompanied by X (tāṭṣāhacaryāt).”

According to Patañjali, on the assumption that Y is not X, the extended usage Y is X is brought into play on the basis of the identity relation between X and Y which is not a primary one but

62. See §3.2.
something superimposed. Thus the relation designated by an expression of the type so ‘this-is-that’ here in the context of the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is the relation of identity which is superimposed on a linguistic unit and a meaning that are two different entities and that originally have the relation designated by an expression of the type tasyedam ‘this-of-that’.

5.2 Vṛtti on VP 1.23 asyedambhāva

Now we have to consider the following passage in the Vṛtti on VP 1.23:

[G] Vṛtti on VP 1.23 (59.1–3): (a) asyedambhāve sati šabdārthahyoh so ’yam iti yah sambandhaḥ (b) so ’ṛthā-deśanasya kartum aṣakyatvād autpattikah svabhāvasiddhah (c) na kenacit kartrā kaṇcit pratipattāraṁ praty ajñāta-pūrvah tatprathamam kṛta iti / (d) tasmād anādir nityam-prāptāvicchedah 64 śabdārthahyoh sambandhaḥ /

“(a) When there is the occurrence (bhāva) of asyedam, there is the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning.

(b) This relation is eternal (autpattika) and something established by nature (svabhāvasiddha) [in a linguistic unit and its meaning], since one cannot teach meanings. 65

(c) It is not the case that the relation, which had not previously been known by some hearer, was created by some creator for the first time for the sake of the hearer.

(d) Therefore, the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is beginningless, ever-present (nitya[m]prāpta), and without interruption (aviccheda).”

63. Pradīpa on MBh to A 4.1.48 (III.503): caturbhīr iti / āropyate tādrūpyaṁ na tu mukhyam ity arthah /
64. Aklujak: nityam aprāptāvicchedah.
65. Patañjali gives three reasons for not teaching meanings: for the sake of brevity (lakṣaṇavrtha) to avoid the fault of infinite regress, because of impossibility (asambhava) owing to polysemy, and the existence of items whose meanings are not perceptible. See MBh on A 2.1.1 (1.363.7–28).
[G](b)–(d) are devoted to explaining that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning is permanent. According to Bhartrihari, permanence discussed by Pāṇinīyas in the context of their linguistic theory consists in the uninterrupted tradition of usage (vyavasthānityatā), or the uninterrupted transmission of verbal activities from generation to generation (vyavahāranityatā).

We must note [G](a). According to Vṛṣabha, the compound word asyedamabhāva may be paraphrased as asyedam ity arthasya bhāvaḥ ‘the occurrence of a thing spoken of as asyedam’ or asyedam iti sabdasya bhāvaḥ ‘the occurrence of the utterance asyedam’. The thing asyedam or the thing referred to by the phrase asyedam is sārūpya ‘the state of having this essential feature’ or a cognition as its effect (kārya). The cognition is such that this has this for its signifier (asyedam vācakam); this has this for its significand (asyedam vācyam). It is to be noted in passing that sārūpya as ‘the state of having this essential feature’ is, in the words of Patañjali, tāddharmya.

In addition, the locative absolute asyedambhāve sati ‘there

66. VP 1.28: nityatve kṛṭakate vā teṣām ādir na vidyate prāṇinām iva sā caisā vyavasthānityatocate // Bhartrihari says: Linguistic units, permanent or produced, have no beginning just as animate things’ acquisition of bodies; being beginningless is called the permanence in the form of the uninterrupted tradition of usage. The permanence said of the causal relation and the capacity relation is also this permanence.

67. Padhathi on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.12–14): asyedam iti sārūpyaṁ jñānam vā / [I] tad abhidheyatvenāsyedamśabdenocate tasya bhāva iti samāsaḥ anukaraṇam vā / asyedam ity etasya sabdasya bhāva iti kva cāsyā bhāvaḥ yatra tadartho 'sti /

68. Padhathi on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.10–12): asyedam rūpam api / [I] yatra sārūpyam tatrābhedena sarvasya sarvenetī / pratipattinibandhanaṁ vā sārūpyam, tāc ca svata eva vyavasthitam, asyedam vācakam asyedam vācyam iti jñānena kāryena pratīcate /

69. When the behavior observed in Brahmadatta is observed in a certain ascetic, the ascetic is spoken of as Brahmadatta. This is an instance of the extended usage based on tāddharmya, given by Patañjali. MBh on A 4.1.48 (II.218.16–18): tāddharmyatā jātīnaṁ yāntaṁ brahmadatta ity āha / brahmadate yāni kāryāṇi jātīn api tāni kriyanta ity ato jāti brahmadatta ity ucyate /
being the occurrence of *asyedam* signifies the domain (*viṣaya*) in which the relation of ‘this-is-that’, which Vṛṣabha characterizes as identity (*abheda*), occurs.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, so ‘*yam iti*’ refers to the cognition ‘this is that’ (so ‘*yam iti jñānam*’) and by so ‘*yam iti*’ meant the object of this cognition, that is, the non-difference in essence (*abhinnarūpatā*). The relation of identity consists in this non-difference in essence.\textsuperscript{71} Thus [G](a) means the following:

1. *sārūpyasya bhāve sati śadbārthayoh so ‘yam iti [yah] sambandhaḥ*

‘When there is the occurrence of the state of having this essential feature (*rūpa*), there is the relation of ‘this-is-that’, the relation of identity, between linguistic unit and meaning’;

2. *asyedam vācakam asyedam vācyam iti jñānasya bhāve sati śadbārthayoh so ‘yam iti [yah] sambandhaḥ*

‘When there is the occurrence of the cognition: this has this for its signifier (*asyedam vācakam*); this has this for its significand (*asyedam vācyam*), there is the relation of ‘this-is-that’, the relation of identity, between linguistic unit and meaning’.

A linguistic unit and a meaning are different entities. There is in reality no identity relation between them. Thus the essential feature of a meaning is not found in a linguistic unit nor is the essential feature of the linguistic unit found in the meaning. These two essential features are respectively brought about in the linguistic unit and in the meaning on the basis of superimposition. Consequently it follows that interpretation 1 means that the identity relation between linguistic unit and meaning is established on the basis of superimposition.

A linguistic unit (L) has its own essential feature and a mean-

\textsuperscript{70} Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.10): *asyedambhāve ity abhedalakṣaṇasambandhasya viṣayakathanam /

\textsuperscript{71} Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.15–16): so ‘*yam iti* / svarūpakathanam / so ‘*yam iti jñānena viṣayanirdeśaḥ / abhinnarūpatetī yāvat /
ing (M) also has its own essential feature. If L, losing its own essential feature, has the essential feature of M, it follows that L is M; and, if M, losing its own essential feature, has the essential feature of L, it follows that M is L. This is what is meant by the term *sārūpya*.72

The identity relation between a linguistic unit (L) and a meaning (M) warrants the following:

(1) On condition that the essential feature of M is superimposed on L and L is identified with M, M is understood when L is understood;

(2) on condition that the essential feature of L is superimposed on M and M is identified with L, L is understood when M is understood.

We have to note that insofar as the identity between linguistic unit and meaning is a relation, it must reside both in a linguistic unit and in a meaning.73 According to Vṛṣabha, (1) explains the case in which a linguistic unit serves as the cause of a meaning.74 When the essential feature of a specific meaning is transferred to,75 or superimposed on, a specific linguistic unit so that the specific linguistic unit may have the essential feature of the specific meaning and the specific linguistic unit may be identified with the specific meaning, the specific linguistic unit, when grasped, is grasped only as something to which the image of a certain object

72. Of course, in reality it is impossible for L (or M) to lose its essential feature and get a different essential feature. To be strict, L (or M) appears as if it did so. See [H](e) (§5.3).
73. Paddhati on *Vṛttī* to VP 1.23 (59.16–17): *sārūpyasyobhayagatate 'pi ... /
74. In this case, according to Vṛṣabha, the linguistic unit has the essential feature which is identical with that of the meaning, having the identity relation with the meaning. This identity relation in the direction of the meaning is the cause of understanding the meaning when the linguistic unit is understood. And besides, when the linguistic unit has the identity relation with the meaning, it is said to have the relation in the form of the non-abandoning of the meaning (*atyāga*). Paddhati on *Vṛttī* to VP 1.23 (59.19–20): *sā ceyam abhinirnirptatā śabde *ṛthasya pratipatthetutvāt / atyāgo *ṛthena vā sambandha ity uktah /
75. Paddhati on *Vṛttī* to VP 1.23 (59.16–17): *śabde prakāśakatvabhāvatvāt arthasya rūpasamkrāntīḥ ... /
(arthākāra) has been transferred. Thus this linguistic unit becomes what makes known the meaning. Vṛṣabha says that when the linguistic unit has the essential feature of the meaning, one has: ‘This linguistic unit denotes this meaning’. This is accounted for by the second interpretation.

As Vṛṣabha states, there is a causal relation between the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning and the cognition ‘This has this for its signifier’; ‘This has this for its significand’. The former is the cause of the latter. The cognition in question shows that there is the signifier-significand relation between the linguistic unit and the meaning and hence that there obtain a causal relation and a capacity relation between them. Thus it follows that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning underlies those two types of relations between them.

5.3 Vṛtti on VP 1.48: arthe niveśitah
In VP 1.48 Bhartṛhari states that, before being uttered by a speaker to convey a specific meaning, a linguistic unit has been determined by the mind of the speaker and has entered into the specific meaning and that this linguistic unit is manifested by the sequential utterance of sounds produced by the articulatory organs. These points have already been suggested by [D]. A question is precisely what makes it possible that one utters a specific linguistic unit to

76. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.18–19): śabdo gṛhyamāṇāṁ samkrāntā-rthākāra eva gṛhyate /
77. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.23 (59.20–21): kas tarhi śabdasyārthe vyāpāraḥ / ayam ucyate so ’ṛtham abhidhatta iti /
78. VP 1.48: vitarkitāḥ purā buddhyā kvacid arthe niveśitah / karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so ’nugṛhyate // Paddhati on VP 1.48 (105.10): dhvaninā nādena / amugṛhyate abhivyajyate / In the Vṛtti Bhartṛhari uses the terms śabdatattva, dhvani, and nāda. The atomic sound dhvani and the audible sound nāda are the appearance of the Word Principle (śabdatattva) in a form different from the one in which the Principle in itself is (vivṛtta). There is no need to go into details about this issue.
79. See §3.2.
convey a specific meaning. Under the Vṛtti on the present kārikā Bhārtṛhari says the following:

[H] Vṛtti on VP 1.48 (105.3–6): (a) iha śabdārthayoh so 'yam iti sambandhānugame kriyamāṇe yac chabdarūpam arthe samāropayitum iṣyate (b) yasmin vārtharūpam upayogena vyāveśāṁ labhate (c) tat pūrvaṁ buddhinirūpaṇayā kṛtasamṛpaṇam (d) abhidheyaṁtmanī prāpyamāṇam yathābhī- prāyaṁ (e) rūpaviparyāseneva rūpāntaropagrāhi svarūpaṁ nivesāyati /

“(a) In our view (iha), when the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning is taught (sambandhānugama), the form of the linguistic unit (śabdārūpa) [i.e., the image of the linguistic unit] is desired to be superimposed on [the form of] the meaning;

(b) or, the form of the meaning [i.e., the image of the meaning] (artha-rūpa) attains entering (vyāveśā) into the form of the linguistic unit through the function (upayoga) [of superimposing itself on the form of the linguistic unit].

(c) [In the case where a speaker utters the linguistic unit to

80. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.48 (105.12): sambandhānugame iti / sambandhavypatpādane / When one learns a relation through an utterance of the type ‘this-is-that’, such as ayāṁ devadattā ‘This is Devadatta’, a linguistic unit used in the utterance, such as devadatta, is anvācaka or a signifier in a secondary sense. For the linguistic unit is not established as a signifier with respect to a thing referred to by ‘this’ until the relation with the thing is established. This secondary signifier functions as a dyotaka or the revealer of the meaning. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.48 (105.11): śabdārthayoh iti / vācyānvācakatayāpy ubhayor api sambandho 'mugantavyah / In the Sarinagruha quoted in the Vṛtti on VP 1.44 (101.2–3) it is stated: upādāno dyotaka ity eke so 'yam iti vyapadeśena sambandhopayogasya śakyatvād iti / (“Some say the following: [When] upādāna[śabda] [i.e., a signifier] is not connected with its meaning as its signifier, it is something that brings out the meaning (dyotaka). For, such an upādāna[śabda] can be employed for [teaching identity] relation through an expression of the type ‘this-is-that’ (so 'yam iti vyapadeśah).”)

81. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.48 (105.16): artharūpam arthākāraḥ /

82. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.48 (105.116–17): upayogena iti / vyāpūreṇa svārūpasamāropanākhyena /
convey the meaning[,] before the utterance of the linguistic unit [the following has taken place].\textsuperscript{83} The form of the linguistic unit\textsuperscript{84} has already been connected with the determination by [the speaker’s] cognition [i.e., it has already been determined by the cognition];\textsuperscript{85} (d) the form of the linguistic unit has itself (śvarūpa) enter into the [meaning] itself which is to be denoted by the linguistic unit (abhidheyātman) in order that it may be obtained in the meaning according to the speaker’s intention.

(e) [In this case,] the form of the linguistic unit appears as if it seized a different essential feature by means of changing its own essential feature (rūpaviparyāsa) [since it appears as if it abandoned the essential feature of the linguistic unit and got the essential feature of the meaning].\textsuperscript{86}

In VP 1.48 Bharṭṛhari makes clear what is essential for a speaker to utter a linguistic unit. There are two things to be done by a speaker before the utterance of a linguistic unit: (1) the determination of a linguistic unit to be uttered; (2) the learning of the relation between the linguistic unit and its meaning to be conveyed by it. It is a matter of course that the determination of a linguistic unit precedes

\textsuperscript{83} Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.48 (105.19): pūrvam iti / uccāraṇāt /

\textsuperscript{84} Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.48 (105.18–19): tad iti / śabdarūpaṃ / pūrvatra hi paksadvaye 'pi yacchabdēna śabdo 'bhihitāḥ / Vṛṣabha suggests reading yac chabdarūpaṃ in [H](a) as yacchabdarūpaṃ 'the form of a certain linguistic unit' (← yacchabdasya rūpaṃ) and interprets tat in [H](c) as referring to the form of a linguistic unit (śabdarūpa). Here Vṛṣabha seems to think that a linguistic unit is not distinguished from its form or image appearing in a verbal cognition.

\textsuperscript{85} Paddhati on Vṛttī to VP 1.48 (105.20–21): buddhyyādininūpyamāṇas tad- viśayabhāvāpatteḥ sprṣṭa ity ucyate / Vṛttī on VP 1.54 (113.3–4): ...pravokā śabdaviśesaviśayam prayatnam abhipadyamānaḥ pratiśabdam paritaḥ pari- cchimāṃ śabdātmanaḥ samāpṛśāṃ iva manah pranīdhathe / Here Bharṭṛhari says: a speaker, making an effort to articulate a specific linguistic unit, puts the speaker’s mind to the linguistic unit to think as if the speaker touched a linguistic unit per se, determined to be differentiated in every respect from other linguistic units.

\textsuperscript{86} Paddhati on VP 1.48 (105.25): śabdarūpaṃ apahāyārtharūpāpatteḥ /
its utterance ([H](c)). This determination is none other than the determination of the linguistic unit’s own form.\textsuperscript{87} Thus in [H] Bhartrhari devotes himself to explaining how the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is taught and how one learns it.\textsuperscript{88}

Now we have to note the point made in [H](a)–(b) that when the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning is taught, either of the following takes place for one who learns the relation:

(A) The form of the linguistic unit is superimposed on that of the meaning, that is, the form of the linguistic unit enters into that of the meaning;\textsuperscript{89}

(B) the form of the meaning enters into that of the linguistic unit, that is, the form of the meaning is superimposed on that of the linguistic unit.\textsuperscript{90}

The relation of ‘this-is-that’ may be learned in two manners: (A) is relevant to the case in which one who does not know a linguistic unit with respect to a meaning has to learn the identity relation of the meaning to the linguistic unit, while (B) the case in which one who does not know a meaning with respect to a linguistic unit has to learn the identity relation of the linguistic unit to the meaning. However, it is to be noted, once one has learned the relation in question, one can let the form of the linguistic unit merge with that of the meaning and vice versa because of the relation consisting in the relation of identity.

\textsuperscript{87} Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.54 (113.11–12): \textit{śabdoccāraṇāya prayatnam ārabhamāṇah prathamataḥ sabdarūpam buddhyā nirūpayati tad iti rūpeṇa /}

\textsuperscript{88} [H](d) explains the expression \textit{arthre niveśitaḥ} ‘[the linguistic unit] has entered into a certain meaning’ in VP 1.48. Vṛṣabha comments on this expression (105.9): \textit{etena vyutpannasambandhatām āhā}. According to Vṛṣabha, the linguistic unit which has entered into a meaning is the one whose identity relation with the meaning has been learned.

\textsuperscript{89} See note 108.

\textsuperscript{90} Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.48 (105.17–18): \textit{pūrvatra śabdādhyāropo 'rthe sampraty artharūpādhyāropah śabda iti /} According to Vṛṣabha, as to (A) the following must hold: the form of the linguistic unit enters into that of the meaning.
Let us note [H](d)–(e). First of all, it is extremely important to note Bhartṛhari’s concept of ‘identification’ (vyāvesa ‘entering’, sanniveśayati ‘has something enter into something else’).

According to him, the following holds:

If X is superimposed on Y, then X enters into Y or X is identified with Y, so that X appears as if it got the essential feature of Y.

There are two points to note: First, the identification is a mental process, so that Bhartṛhari brings in the concept of a mental image (rūpa, i.e., ākāra) here. Secondly, the superimposition of X on Y is different from that of the essential feature/property of X on Y. In the former superimposition X is transferred to Y, so that X is identified with Y. In the latter, on the other hand, the essential feature/property of X is transferred to Y, so that Y is treated as X.

Now, with reference to the linguistic unit whose relation of ‘this-is-that’, the relation of identity, to a specific meaning has been established through (A) or (B), before its utterance there can be two ways of setting it and its meaning in the identity relation: (1) by means of identifying the linguistic unit with the meaning or (2) by means of identifying the meaning with the linguistic unit. [H](d)–(e) explains the case in which (1) takes place. The point is: The linguistic unit, entering into the meaning in question, identified with the meaning, and appearing as if it acquired the essential feature of the meaning, receives the meaning as its significand and becomes a signifier only of the meaning.

91. I find it difficult to render -viś and its derivates into English. It is well known that they are commonly used to describe the situation where a certain person is possessed by a demon or a devil.
92. This is also found in the superimposition of a cognition or an image of an object on an external object. See [B](c) (§3.1) and [C](b) (§3.2).
93. This superimposition is found in (1) and (2) in §5.2.
94. On the case where a meaning enters into a linguistic unit and is identified with the latter, see [K](b) (§6.2).
signifier of the meaning the speaker intends to convey and not of other meanings.

5.4 upādānaśabda

We have seen that the relation between linguistic unit and meaning which is to be taught and learned is the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between them. For one who has not learned this relation, the linguistic unit as its relatum cannot function as a signifier of the meaning as its relatum. We have to say that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning determines a specific linguistic unit being a signifier with respect to a specific meaning. This idea, interestingly, is reflected in the concept of upādānaśabda.

In [D] and VP 1.48 it has been shown that a speaker utters a linguistic unit which the speaker has in mind. In VP 1.44 Bhartṛhari rightly observes that two kinds of linguistic units, between which a causal relation holds, are recognized in a speaker uttering a sound to convey a meaning: according to VP 1.47, one is a linguistic unit which appears in the mind (buddhistha), a mental linguistic unit, and the other a linguistic unit which is actually heard (śruti). In VP 1.44 Bhartṛhari uses the term upādānaśabda to distinguish meaningful sounds (vācaka) from mere sounds such as the gurgling of a river (nadīghoṣa).

In the Vṛtti on VP 1.44 Bhartṛhari explains the term

95. VP 1.44: dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ / eko nimittam śabdānām aparop rthe prayujyate // (“Experts in language recognize two linguistic elements in upādānaśabdas: one is the cause of linguistic elements [which are directly heard] and the other is conducive to [a hearer understanding] a meaning.”) On this kārikā, see Cardona 2012: 100–101.

96. VP 1.47: aranisthāṁ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakaṇāṁ / tadvac cahādo 'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutināṁ kāraṇam prthak // (“Just as the fire in a fire stick is the cause of another, kindled fire, so also a linguistic unit which is in the mind [of a speaker] is the cause of linguistic units which are actually heard and which are different from the former.”)

97. Paddhati on VP 1.44 (100.21–22): śabdaśabdasya nadīghoṣādv api darṣanād avacchinatti upādānaśabdeṣu iti / upādāno vācakaḥ, ... /
upādānaśabda, making clear what happens when material sounds are understood to be meaningful. Bhartṛhari says:

Vṛtti on VP 1.44 (100.6): upādiyate yenaṛthah svarūpe 'dhyāropaye tadbhāvam ivāpādyate san upādānaśabdah /
The linguistic unit termed upādānaśabda has three characteristics which are closely related to one another:

1. upādiyate yenaṛthah saḥ:
upādānaśabda is that by which a meaning is taken.

2. yenaṛthah svarūpe 'dhyāropye saḥ:
upādānaśabda is that by which a meaning is superimposed on its own form (svarūpa).


98. The Vṛtti in question (101.4) gives a different interpretation of this term: a linguistic unit to be taken as a whole (upādeyo vā samudāya upādānah). This interpretation need not be considered here.


100. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.44 (100.25): upādiyate iti / svīkriyate / karana-śādhanam āha [yena iti] /

101. This superimposition consists in the transfer of the image of an object to a linguistic unit’s own form. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.44 (100.25–26): svarūpe iti / ṣabdasvarūpe ‘rthākārasankrāntir adhyāropah /

102. The reflexive pronoun ātman is to be supplied. Bhaṭṭikāvya 8.83: kim vilāpayase ‘Why do you let yourself talk?’ = kim ātmānaḥ vilāpayase ← tvam vilapasi. Mallinātha comments: kim atyarthah vilāpayase vividhaṁ bhāṣayase ātmānaḥ iti śesah / Bhaṭṭi gives this instance to explain A 1.4.52 gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakānāṁ anikartā sa nau (specifically, a verb that denotes an activity whose object is a sound [śabdkarma]). On this sūtra, see PWT 267. The verb pad preceded by ā is the one which denotes a movement (gatyartha).

It is patent, I think, that in order to account for the form tadbhāvam (tadbhāva, acc. sg. m.) the causative form āpādyate (ā-pad-ṇic, 3rd sg. pres. pass.) is to be assumed. The relative pronoun yena refers to an upādānaśabda as a prompter-agent (prayajaka, hetu). We may assume the following sentence: yo ātmānaṁ tadbhāvam ivāpādyati saḥ (āpādayati, 3rd sg. pres. act.). The demonstrative pronoun tad- refers to artha. Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.44 (100.27): tadbhāvam iti / arthārūpatāṁ vihāya svabhāvataḥ svata evāpādyata ity ucyate /

Another interpretation is also possible. 3’. yena tad bhāvam ivāpādyate saḥ: In this reading the relative pronoun yena refers to that to which the image of an object has been transferred (pratisamkrāntārthākāra), a mental linguistic
upādānaśabda is that which appears (iva) to cause itself to attain the state of being the meaning. Characteristic 1 clearly shows that what is called upādānaśabda is a signifier (vācaka) and not a mere sound such as the gurgling of a river. Characteristic 2 accords with what is stated in [H](b). Characteristic 3 shows that what is called upādānaśabda is that which is superimposed on the meaning, which accords with what is stated in [H](a).103 All this shows that, in Bhartrhari’s view, a linguistic unit is what has a meaning, that on which the meaning is superimposed, and that which is superimposed on the meaning. This implies that, for one who has not learned the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning, the linguistic unit cannot work as a signifier of the meaning.104 Here too we see that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning unit (buddhisthaśabda) or the image of the linguistic unit (śabdākāra). This is defined as upādānaśabda. The demonstrative tad (nom. sg. n.) refers to svarūpa. What is meant is that a speaker (prayoktṛ) causes the internal linguistic unit, upādānaśabda, to cause its own form to be heard. Paddhati on Vṛtto to VP 1.44 (101.7–8): pratisainkrāntārthākāreṇa śabdām uccārayan prayoktā prayojaka iti nićā āpādyate iti paṭhanti/ According to Vṛṣabha, a speaker of a linguistic unit causes this mental linguistic unit to cause the linguistic unit to be heard/to arise.

103. According to Vṛṣabha, the superimposition of a linguistic unit on a meaning is of the nature different from that of a cot on the baby lying on the bed as in maṅcāḥ kroṣantī ‘The cots are crying’. Vṛṣabha says that the essential feature of a meaning which a linguistic unit appears as if it got is like a reflection in a mirror (pratibimbakalpa). The mirror can show both itself and the reflection. Similarly, in reality the linguistic unit does not abandons its own essential feature, so that it can convey two distinct entities: its form and its meaning. This is the reason that Bhartrhari uses the word iva ‘as if’. In the case of the superimposition in maṅcāḥ kroṣantī, on the other hand, the cot should abandon its own essential feature; otherwise, the verb form kroṣantī ‘... are crying’ could not be employed. Paddhati on Vṛtto to VP 1.44 (100.26–101.1): na ca yathā maṅcapuruṣayor adhyāropas tathā ity āha / tadbhāvam iti / arthāritpatām vihaya svabhāvatah svata evāpadyata ity ucyate / tasya ca rūpasya pratibimbakalpa- tvād ivaśabdopādānam / ataś ca śabdasaṃvarūpavad arthākāram api pradarsayan pratipādayati ucyate /

104. Paddhati on Vṛtto to VP 1.44 (101.15–16): nāvyutpanne saṃvyavahārād abhede śabdasya vācakatvam/
is essential to determining the linguistic unit to be the signifier of the meaning.

5.5 śaktyavaccheda

In §4 we have seen that there is the capacity relation between a linguistic unit and its meaning. According to Bhartṛhari, the establishment of the identity relation between them serves to restrict their capacities. Let us consider the following Vṛtti:

[I] Vṛtti on VP 1.68 (126.3–5): (a) svarūpādhyaropacikārṣāyāṁ bāhyesv arthātmāsū śabdārthānāṁ105 svarūpenādhiṣṭhāna-bhūtenārthavattvāt prathamā vidhiyate / (b) so ’yam iti ca sañjñinā śaktyavacchedalaksanāḥ sambandho niyamyate / tad yathā / gaur vāhīkaḥ simho māṇavaka iti /

“(a) Of the meanings of a linguistic unit, when the form of the linguistic unit is desired to be superimposed on external (bāhya) [i.e., other] meanings themselves [as in ayaṁ devadattāḥ ‘This is Devadatta’], a first triplet ending (prathamā) is introduced [after the linguistic unit, which is a nominal base (prātipadika)], because of the meaningfulness (artha-vattva) based on the linguistic unit’s own form, which is its fundamental significand (adhiṣṭhāna).106

(b) By means of providing [a name with] a thing to be named by it (sañjñin) through an utterance of the type ‘this-is-that’, the relation [of the name-word with its meanings] is restricted [to a specific meaning], since the relation [of the name-word with the specific meaning] is characterized by exclusion of other denoting powers (śaktyavaccheda). This is comparable to the case where the utterances gaur

106. In devadattaḥ (devadatta-su), the nominal base devadatta is assigned the name prātipadika by A 1.2.45 arthavadadhātur apratyayāḥ prātipadikam, which provides that a meaningful element (artha-vat) other than a verb, an affix, or an item that ends in an affix is called prātipadika, and the first triplet ending su is introduced after devadatta by A 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacana-mātre prathamā, which provides that when nothing more than a base meaning and a gender, a measure, or a umber is to be denoted, a first triplet ending is introduced. On these sūtras, see PWT 48 and 156, respectively.
vāhīkaḥ ‘The inhabitant of the Vāhīka country is an ox’ and siṅho māṇavakaḥ ‘The boy is a lion’ are used.’

In the name-giving utterance ayaṃ devadattaḥ, which is the kind of utterance that teaches the linguistic unit-meaning relation (sambandhavyutpādanavākya),107 the nominal base devadatta is meaningful (arthavat) because it denotes its own form. In this utterance, the speaker of the utterance intends to superimpose a

107. Viṣṇubha says that the utterances given below are sambandhavyutpādanavākyas. Paddhati on Vṛtta to VP 1.68 (126.21): sarvathā sambandhavyutpādanavākyam / According to Helarāja, there are different utterances to teach the relation between linguistic unit and meaning. (1) ayaṃ gauḥ ‘This is an ox’; (2) ayaṃ arthaḥ ‘This is the meaning’; (3) ghaṭasabdasāyam arthaḥ ‘This is the meaning of the linguistic unit ghata ‘pot’; (4) yadā gaur ity ucyate tadāyaṁ sānādīmān artho bodhavyaḥ ‘When the linguistic unit go is uttered, this meaning, a thing with a dewlap and so forth, is to be understood’. (1), which may be paraphrased as yo ‘yaṁ arthaḥ sa gośabdah ‘That, which is this meaning, is the linguistic unit go’, and (2), which may be paraphrased as yo ‘yaṁ śabdah so ṛthah ‘That, which is this linguistic unit, is the meaning, is found in everyday speech. From these utterances one has a cognition in which a linguistic unit and its meaning appear as identical with each other (śabdārthayor abhedāvabhāsanam). Therefore, it is determined that a linguistic unit denotes its meaning only if it denotes its own form. (3) and (4) are used to explain the relation. In these utterances the term ‘this’ (ayaṃ) refers to the meaning grasped as identical with the linguistic unit in question (śabdābheda) and not to a mere meaning. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.2 (123.10–16): ayaṃ gaur ayaṃ artha iti śabdārthayor abhedāvabhāsanat svarūpam abhidhadad eva śabdo ṛtham abhidhatta iti niścīyate / svarūpāvivekenaiva hy arthaparāmarśo bhidhānam ucyate / vṛddhavayahārāt tathaiva sambandhavyutpatteh / tathā hi ayaṃ gaur iti saṅketaḥ kriyate [/] bhedenaiva ghaṭasabdasāyam artha iti tu vyākyātyāḥbhir na vyavahāradasā / atrāpi cāyaṁ iti śabdābheda eva / yadā gaur ity ucyate tadāyaṁ sānādīmān artho bodhavya ity ayaṁ ity abhedenaiva parāmarśe saṅketa-pravr̥ttiḥ /

It is interesting to note that Helarāja explains, by using the term anupraveśa ‘entering into’, the reason that in (1) there occurs the cognition in which the linguistic unit and the meaning appear as identical with each other. He says that from (1) the linguistic unit’s own form is grasped precisely as what enters into the meaning which is the chief qualificand (pradhānabhūtaviśesya) of the verbal cognition arising from (1). Prakāśa on VP 3.3.2 (125.3–6): tad yathā śuklaḥ pāto ‘yaṁ iti śuklagunacakheṇaṁvahāya sakrd eva viśeṣa-paṭaṇa-prayamānasāhuḥ / na hy atra śuklagunasya prthakparāmarśaḥ / evam ghaṭo ‘yaṁ iti pradhānabhūtaviśeṣa-anupraveśenaiva ghaṭasvarūpāparāmarśa ity ekaivaṁ śabdānāṁśaṃ kārttītī śabdārthayoh /
linguistic unit’s own form on a meaning other than the form so as to have the form enter into the meaning.\textsuperscript{108}

Let us note [I](b). The exclusion of other denoting powers can be explained as follows. Linguistic unit L1 has more than one power to denote a meaning: it can denote meanings M1, M2, M3; and M1 has more than one power to be denoted by a linguistic unit: it can be denoted by linguistic units L1, L2, L3. In L1 different denoting powers are intermixed (\textit{saṅkīṛṇa}) and in M1 different powers to be denoted. Once the utterance to identify L1 with M1 is made, L1’s power to denote M2 and M3 are excluded (\textit{vyavaccheda}) and its power to denote a meaning is restricted to M1 (\textit{niyama}). The same is said of M1’s power to be denoted.\textsuperscript{109}

Consider the following utterances:

A. \textit{gaur vāhikaḥ} ‘The inhabitant of the Vāhīka country is an ox’.

B. \textit{gām adhyāpayet} ‘One should teach the ox’.

The word \textit{go} in B refers to the inhabitant of the Vāhīka country who is spoken of as an ox in A. Now in A the inhabitant of the Vāhīka country is a thing named by the word \textit{go}. The word \textit{go} is a name (\textit{saṅjṇā}) for the inhabitant. The word \textit{go} has the powers or capacities (\textit{yogyatā}, \textit{sāmarthya}) to signify both a thing with a dewlap and the inhabitant of the Vāhīka country. In A the word \textit{vāhika}, which refers to a person who is to get the name \textit{go}, excludes the power of the word \textit{go} to signify a thing with a dewlap.

\textsuperscript{108} Paddhati on \textit{Vṛttī} to VP 1.68 (126.9): \textit{ayam devadatta iti śabdārūpaṁ yadā tasmin saṅjṇini niveśayitum icchati /} In the utterance \textit{ayam devadattah} one who teaches the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a certain entity to be named and the name \textit{devadatta} wishes to have the form \textit{devadatta} enter into the entity. According to Vṛṣabha, when there takes place the superimposition of the form \textit{devadatta} on the entity, the form enters into the latter. See §5.3.

\textsuperscript{109} Paddhati on \textit{Vṛttī} to VP 1.68 (126.16–20): \textit{kīṃsvabhāva ity āha śakty-avacchedalakṣaṇah [iti] / sa puruṣas tām śaktim tadviṣayatayā niyacchati / pratyayārthapratipādikā (pratyāyārthapratipādikā?) [na] bahvyo saṅkīṛṇāḥ śaktayah / tatra puruṣas tadanyāḥ śaktir avacchidyāikāṁ śaktiṁ vyavahāryatāṁ nayatīti niyamah / arthāntara-pratipādana śaktīṁ vāpasya tadviṣayaih śaktiṁ prabodhyata iti / niyamaś cārthāntarebhyo vyāvartanāt / so 'yam iḍrśo niyamah /}
and restricts a denoting power of this word to the inhabitant.\footnote{Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.68 (126.22–25): yadā sarve śabdā guṇasamudāye vartante iti pakṣāḥ tadāyaṁ gośabdhah sarvān jātyādin āha / tatra yadā vāhika-śabdena śakyavacchode jātyādinivṛttyā viśiṣṭārthābhidhāyitvam gośabdasya tadā puruṣena saṁjñāśabdānāṁ śakyavaccheda iti / On the view that a linguistic item denotes a collection of qualities (guṇasamudāya), see MBh on A 2.2.6 (I.411.15) and Wezler 1985.} Thus the identification of a linguistic unit and a meaning, given by an utterance of the type ‘this-is-that’, serves to specify the relation of capacity between them. A linguistic unit has more than one capacity to convey a meaning and a meaning also has more than one capacity to be conveyed by a linguistic unit. When the relation of ‘this-is-that’ is established between the linguistic unit and the meaning, the restriction on the linguistic unit’s capacity to convey a meaning is made: This is capable of conveying only this meaning; and, at the same time the restriction on the meaning’s capacity to be conveyed by a linguistic unit is made: This is capable of being conveyed only by this linguistic unit.

The same point as in [I](b) is made in VP 2.369.

VP 2.369: vrddhyādināṁ ca śaṣtre śmiṁ chaktyavaccheda-lakṣaṇaḥ / akṛtrimo hi sambandho viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyavat // “Indeed, in this science of grammar also, the non-artificial relation of names like vrddhi with the named consists in excluding their other powers to signify other meanings. This relation is like the relation of qualifier-qualificand.”

To explain the point referring to the Vṛtti:\footnote{Vṛtti on VP 2.369 (292.3–7): śaṣtre ’pi vrddhir ityevamādināṁ saṁjñānāṁ sarvasaṁjñāviśeṣayā śaktir ādaicprabṛhṭiṣv avacchidvate / ādaicprabṛhṭiṁ api sarvasaṁjñāviśeṣayā śaktir vrddhyādiṣv avacchidyate / tad yathā nilam iti sarvā-śrayaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣaktir utpalādviśeṣayā parigṛhyate / utpalādināṁ api sarva-viśeṣaṇaviśeṣayā viśeṣyaśaktir nilādiṣu niyamyate / tasmāc chāṣtre ’pi lokavat pravṛttir iti //} The quality blue (nīla) has the power to qualify any substance (viśeṣaṇaṣakti) and the substance lotus (upala) has the power to be qualified by any quality (viśeṣyaṣakti). When the utterance nīlam upalām ‘blue lotus’ is used, the power of the quality blue to qualify any sub-
stance is restricted to the substance lotus and the power of the substance lotus to be qualified by any quality is restricted to the quality blue. The same is said of the name _vrddhi_ and what is named by this name. The term _vrddhi_ is capable of being the names of all things and what is named by this term is capable of being named by any word. When, in grammar, the name-named relation (_saŋjñāsaŋjñīsambandha_) between _vrddhi_ and ādaic is established by formulating A1.1.1: _vrddhir ādaic_, the power of the term _vrddhi_ to convey any thing is restricted to a set of sounds referred to by the term ādaic and the power of the set of sounds to be conveyed by any term is restricted to the term.

It is clear from the above that when the relation of ‘this-is-that’ is established between a specific linguistic unit and a specific meaning, the specific linguistic unit’s capacity to denote a meaning is restricted to the specific meaning and the specific meaning’s capacity to be denoted by a linguistic unit is restricted to the specific linguistic unit, through the exclusion of other capacities.

6 A speaker’s acts: _abhidhā, ukti, pranidhi, viniyoga_

In §1, it has been shown that a linguistic unit and its meaning are related to each other through the intermediary of the act denoted by _abhī-dhā_ and that this act consists in an activity leading to a result, the understanding of the meaning. Bhartṛhari discusses what activity a speaker, an principal agent, performs in bringing such an act to accomplishment conjointly with other kārakas, a linguistic unit as an instrument and a meaning as an object. According to Bhartṛhari, the activity carried out by a speaker is _viniyoga_ ‘the activity of applying [a linguistic unit to a meaning]’ or _pranidhi_ ‘the activity of directing [a linguistic unit to a meaning]’. These activities can be performed by the speaker only if the speaker has learned the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the linguistic unit and the meaning.

It is to be noted in passing that Bhartṛhari accepts that there are three cases in which a linguistic unit is uttered: to commit it to
memory (abhyāsa); to teach its own form: to convey a meaning other than its own form. In the last case a speaker has to perform the above-mentioned activities.112

6.1 pranidhi

In his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Bhartṛhari, discussing speech acts, says that pranidhi is a speaker’s activity in the situation expressed by an utterance like [1].

MBhD IV.I.25.1–2: kā punah sā kriyā / ucyate / pranidhiḥ prayoktoḥ śabdān prerayatas tadviṣayah / pranidhiś cetaso vṛttir ayam yogya etam arthan pratyāyayitum iti / sā kriyā /

“[Question] But what is the action [of a speaker]? An answer is: The action is the activity of directing (pranidhi) linguistic units (tadviṣayah) [to meanings], performed by the speaker who sets the linguistic units into play. The activity of directing is the function of [the speaker’s] mind, performed] as ‘This [linguistic unit] is capable of conveying this meaning’ (ayam yogya etam arthan pratyāyayitum). That is the action.”

The important point to note is that saying a speaker directs a linguistic unit to a meaning amounts to saying the speaker has the understanding that the linguistic unit is capable of conveying the meaning, namely the understanding of the capacity relation between them. This understanding must be the same as the one the speaker has already acquired in learning the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the linguistic unit and the meaning. By calling the

112. In the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Bhartṛhari contrasts viniyoga with abhyāsa ‘repeated recitation’ and parapratipādana ‘teaching a linguistic unit to others’. MBhD IV.I.25.9–10: tathā brāhmaṇaśabdā abhyāsakāle ‘narthakāḥ parapratipādane svarūpapadārthakāḥ evam paṭhaivaṃ paṭheti / viniyogakāle ‘rthavantaḥ /

The words in the Brāhmaṇas are meaningless when being committed to memory; they refer to their own forms when the way of reciting them is taught to others; they are meaningful when being applied to their meanings. The point made in the cited passages of the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā is stated in VP 2.407: āmnāyāsabdāṃ abhyāse kecid āhur anarthakān / svarūpamātravṛttīṁś ca paresāṁ pratipādane //
relation to mind, the speaker can have such an understanding. This point will be made clear in the Vākyapadīya and the Vṛtti.

6.2 VP 2.403 vinīyoga

In VP 2.403 Bhārtṛhari brings in the concept of vinīyoga as an activity to be performed by a speaker.

VP 2.403: vinīyogād ěte śabdo na svārthasya prakāśakah/ arthābhidhānasambandham uktidvāraṁ pracaḳṣate //
“A linguistic unit does not make known its own meaning unless it is applied to the meaning. They say that a meaning and that by which it is denoted are related to each other through the act of expressing (ukti).”

Clearly Bhārtṛhari here bears in mind an utterance such as the following:

[17] devadattaḥ śabdena artham vakti ‘Devadatta expresses a meaning by using a linguistic unit’.

According to Bhārtṛhari, in the situation expressed by this utterance Devadatta performs the activity of applying a linguistic unit to a meaning (vinīyoga). Bhārtṛhari comments as follows:

[J] Vṛtti on VP 2.403 (302.13–18): (a) iha kecid ācāryāḥ śabdajātim arthasambandhinaiḥ113 manyante kecic chabda-vyaktim / (b) anyeṣāṁ tu jātisādhanaḥ vyaktisādhanaḥ vā kriyā sampratyaṣphalā / (c) atrāṇenāyaṁ114 vaktavya ity ubhayor vācyavācakayoḥ parigraham kṛtvā buddhistah śabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyuṣyate pravanikriyate (d) saty apy anekārthatve tatrāṣya sāmarthyaṃ avacchidyate / (e) vāsau115 sabdagaṭoktiḥ sā sambandham āvirbhāvayati / (f) sā hi116 yogyatā tāvad avacchidyate yā vad uktyānuṛghītā praṇatim ivāpāditā bhavati //
“(a) Here in our system some teachers hold the view that the universal of a linguistic unit (śabdajāti) is related to

113. Aklujkar: arthasambandhinīm.
115. Iyer: vāsau tatra.
[the universal of] a meaning [without the intermediary of an action]; some hold the view that an individual linguistic unit (śabdavyakti) is related to an [individual] meaning [without the intermediary of an action].

(b) But, in the view of others, an action, whose sādhanaś 117 are universals or individuals, brings about the understanding [of a meaning] (samprayayaphalā).

(c) In this view, after receiving both, [the meaning] to be signified (vācyā) and [the linguistic unit] signifying it (vācaka), a speaker applies the linguistic unit the speaker has in mind (bhuddhistha-sabda) to [the meaning] the speaker has in mind (bhuddhistha-[artha]), that is, the speaker directs the former towards the latter (pravanikriyate), as ‘This [meaning] is capable of being signified by this [linguistic unit] (anennaYM vaktavyah)’.

(d) Although the linguistic unit in question has more than one meaning (anekārthatva), the capacity (sāmarthya) of this linguistic unit to signify a meaning is restricted to the meaning in question by excluding its other capacities to signify other meanings (avacchidyate).

(e) [This is why] the very activity of expressing (uktī) [which consists in the speaker’s activity of applying a linguistic unit to a meaning], related to the linguistic unit, manifests the relation [of capacity between the linguistic unit and the meaning].

(f) For, [the linguistic unit’s] capacity (yogatā) [to signify a meaning is restricted [to the meaning in question by excluding its other capacities to signify other meanings], insofar as the capacity, by the help of [the speaker’s activity of] expressing (uktyānugrhītā), appears to have acquired an inclination (praṇati) [towards the meaning].”

117. That is, a kāraka, which brings an action to accomplishment. See §4.1.
First of all, [J](a)–(b) are interesting in that Bhartṛhari points out that, as to the relation between linguistic unit and meaning, there are three views: (1) the universal of a linguistic unit is related to the universal of a meaning without the intermediary of an action; (2) an individual linguistic unit is related to an individual meaning without the intermediary of an action; (3) the relation is established through the intermediary of an action. As shown in §1, Bhartṛhari takes an approach to the relation according to the third view.

Now Bhartṛhari here considers the speaker’s act of expressing (uṇa) to consist in the activity of applying a linguistic unit, which the speaker has in mind, to a meaning, which also the speaker has in mind. Accordingly, [17] must be paraphrased as follows:

[18] *devadattāḥ śabdām arthe vinīyunaktī* ‘Devadatta applies a linguistic unit to a meaning’

Let us note [J](c). The term *vinīyuja* is glossed with the term *pravānīkriyata*. To apply the specific linguistic unit to the specific meaning is to direct the former towards the latter, which is none other than what is meant by the term *pranidhi*. Thus what is stated in [J](c) is the same as in the Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā passage cited above.118 A speaker, who has learned the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the specific linguistic unit and the specific meaning, can have both the image of the specific linguistic unit and that of the specific meaning (*ubhayor vācyavācakayoḥ parigrāhah*) and apply the former to the latter as ‘This meaning is capable of being conveyed by this linguistic unit’.

In this connection, it is important to note what Bhartṛhari states concerning the application of a linguistic unit to a meaning in his Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. He says:

MBhD IV.I.25.10–11: *tatra yāsau vinīyogakāle parigrhitārthavato ṝrtheṣu prapattīḥ sa sambandhah /

“In that case [where the words in the Brāhmaṇas become meaningful at the time of their application], that which lets

118. See §6.1.
the linguistic unit with the meaning taken at the time of its application go towards meanings is a relation.”

The point is that a speaker can apply a linguistic unit to a meaning on the basis of their relation, which the speaker has learned. Without reflecting upon the learned relation, one cannot achieve verbal communications.

The point made in [J](d) is the same as in [I](b). The establishment of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a specific linguistic unit and a specific meaning results in restricting their capacities.

[J](e) says that the speaker’s activity of applying the specific linguistic unit to the specific meaning manifests the relation of capacity such that the specific meaning is capable of being signified by the specific linguistic unit and the latter is capable of signifying the former. As shown in §4, the relation of capacity between a linguistic unit and a meaning is ever-present and beginningless and its understanding is conditioned by ‘convention’. [J](f) gives the reason for the point in [J](e). When the speaker applies the specific linguistic unit to the specific meaning, the specific linguistic unit appears as if it acquired the capacity to signify the specific meaning. But actually the specific linguistic unit’s capacity to signify a meaning is only restricted to the specific meaning.

The important point to note in VP 2.403 is that when the speaker applies the specific linguistic unit to the specific meaning, the former becomes the signifier of the latter. This point is made clearer in VP 2.404.

6.2 VP 2.404 praṇidhi 2

In VP 2.404 the term viniyoga is rephrased by praṇihita, saṁnihita:

119. Bronkhorst 1987: 84: “Here the approach of [the word,] which has meaning, towards the meanings, grasped at the time of application [of the word], is the connection [between word and meaning].” I have taken the word prapatti (← pra-pad-kti [A 3.3.94 striyāṁ ktin], pra-pad ‘enter upon, go to’) as a karanasādhana (‘that by which something is entered upon, gone to’).

120. See §5.5.
VP 2.404: \textit{yathā prāṇihitaṁ cakṣur darśanāyopakalpate / tathābhisaṁhitāḥ śabdo bhavaty arthasya vācakaḥ //}

“Just as the visual organ, when directed towards an object, brings about the perception of the object, so a linguistic unit, when directed towards a meaning, becomes the signifier of the meaning.”

This kārikā shows that [17] can be paraphrased as:

[19] \textit{devadattaḥ śabdam arthe prāṇidhatte (abhisamādhatte)}

‘Devadatta directs a linguistic unit to a meaning’.

On the present kārikā Bhartṛhari comments as follows:

[K] Vṛtti on VP 2.404 (302.21–23): (a) \textit{tatra cakṣur yathā sarvadṛṣyopalabdhiḥvisayābhir yogyatābhir yuktāṁ yatra yatra saṅkalpena prāṇidhyate tatra tatropalabdhiṁ karoti}

(b) \textit{tathā śabdo ’py anekārthapratyāyanayo yo yam arthāṁ praty abhisamhito bhavati tam upasaṅgrhṇāti svātmanī sanniveśayati prakāśayati //}

“(a) In that case [it is proper to say the following]. The visual organ, which is endowed with capacities (yogyatā) that are exercised in the domain of the perception of all things to be seen (sarvadṛṣyopalabdhi), brings about the perception (upalabdhi) of whatever it is intentionally (saṅkalpena) directed towards.

(b) Similarly, a linguistic unit, which is capable of conveying more than one meaning (artha), accepts (upasaṅgrhṇāti), causes to enter into itself (svātmanī saṁniveśayati), makes known (prakāśayati), the meaning towards which it is directed [by the speaker] (abhisamhita).”

It is shown that the application of a linguistic unit to a meaning is the directing of the linguistic unit to the meaning (prāṇidhi, abhisamādhi). What is stated in [K](b) is the same as in the Mahā-

121. MBhD IV.1.25.3–6: \textit{yathā saty eva cakṣuṣī satī ca rūpe na cakṣur aprāṇihitaṁ anadhiṣṭhitam manasā viṣayālocane samarthāṁ bhavaty evāṁ śabdo vyavasthitto ’rthe ’pi prayuktuh prāṇidhānam antareṇa prayāyane asamarthaḥ ity etat prayogagrāhaṇaśaṅacaśte /}
bhāṣyadīpikā (§6.1) and [J](c). Moreover, [J](c) reminds us of [H] (c)–(e). When a speaker directs a specific linguistic unit to a specific meaning as ‘This meaning is capable of being signified by this linguistic unit’, on the basis of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the specific linguistic unit and the specific meaning, the specific linguistic unit must be what accepts the specific meaning, what has the specific meaning enter into itself, and hence what makes known the specific meaning.\footnote{122} The specific linguistic unit is an upādānaśabda with respect to the specific meaning.\footnote{123}

The above-described operations are only the recurrence of what the speaker performed at the time of learning the relation between the linguistic unit and the meaning.\footnote{124} Importantly, the activity of applying a linguistic unit to a meaning or directing the former to the latter is none other than that of re-relating the former to the latter by means of establishing the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between them. Bhartrhari says that when the application or directing of a linguistic unit to a meaning takes place, the meaning enters into the linguistic unit (śabdo ... arthain ... svātmānī sanniveśayati). As shown earlier,\footnote{125} this implies that the meaning is identified with the linguistic unit and the relation of identity is established between them. It must be recalled here that in VP 1.48 Bhartrhari says that a mental linguistic unit which has entered into a mental meaning (arthe niveśitaḥ śabdaḥ) is manifested by the sequential utterance of sounds. When the linguistic unit enters into the meaning, the former is identified with the latter.\footnote{126}

\footnote{122} For one who has learned the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning, two ways of superimposing can take place. See §5.3.
\footnote{123} See §5.4.
\footnote{124} See [G](b) in §5.3.
\footnote{125} See §5.3.
\footnote{126} When commenting on VP 2.403–404 Puṇyārāja does not refer to the points made by Bhartrhari in the Vṛtti. Puṇyārāja, in introducing VP 2.404, says the following. Tīkā on VP 2.404 (161.17–19): atha kim svābhāvikah śabdārthasambandho 'this-is-that' daśāṃ daśāṃ upeto yad anī śabdāḥ vaktviniyogamukhopreksana-sambandhāḥ / hantaivaṁvādinā bhavāta vihūṣitaiva vaiyākaraṇadhurety āśaṅkyaitatsamarthanārtham åha / (‘Now a question arises: Is the relation
6.3 We can see from what has been said in the present section why Vṛṣabha says that the relation of identity between linguistic unit and meaning is included in the causal relation between them. In a speaker’s cognition, the following holds on the basis of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit (L) and a meaning (M): when the image of L appears, that of M appears; when the image of L does not appear, that of M does not appear: when the image of M appears, that of L appears; when the image of M does not appear, that of L does not appear. A speaker may identify M with L and L with M. In a hearer’s cognition, on the other hand, the following holds on the basis of the same relation: when the image of L appears, that of M appears; when the image of L does not appear, that of M does not appear. This is how the relation of

between linguistic unit and meaning something established by itself (svābhāvika), or does it have a state such that those linguistic units are related to their meanings by virtue of a speaker keeping the meanings in view by means of applying the former to the latter? You, by advancing the latter view, have wrongly ornamented the doctrine (lit. load) of grammarians. To sweep away the suspicion that these two views are contradictory to each other and establish the point in VP 2.403, Bhartrhari states VP 2.404.” Iyer 1977: 172 interprets this introductory remark: “The fact that conscious and deliberate application of a word to a meaning is necessary does not make the relation between word and meaning man-made. It is eternal.” As shown above, in the Vṛtti on the kārikās in question Bhartrhari does not problematize the speaker’s activity of applying or directing from the angle as noted by Puṇyarāja. Puṇyarāja here misses the point that the relation between linguistic unit and meaning, whose understanding is conditioned by convention, must be learned. See §4.2.1. It is very likely that Puṇyarāja has not read the Vṛtti on the kārikās.

127. See notes 44 and 49.

128. From a hearer’s point of view, Helārāja says the following. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.2 (126.7–9): ata eva ca svābhprāyānusārena śrotṛa vaktṛjñānasvātvānumānāt svayam śabdasmātvadhyastam artham avabuddhyata tathaiva vaākatry anumānam ucutam ity abhedaiva ghaṭaśabdādhyastam prayoktṛjñānam avasyate / On hearing a linguistic unit a hearer by himself/herself understands the meaning which is superimposed on the linguistic unit’s own form. The hearer infers that a speaker’s cognition is superimposed on the same form for establishing the identity between the linguistic unit in question and the meaning in question. Bhartrhari may say that the hearer infers that the image of the meaning, which appears in the speaker’s cognition, is superimposed on the image of the linguistic unit’s own form by the speaker.
‘this-is-that’ determines the causal relation. In this connection it is highly important to note that Helārāja observes the following: The fact that the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning is bidirectional shows that it is of a different kind from that between fire and smoke and that there is the relation of identity, characterized by superimposition, between them.129 Of course, when it is said that there obtains a relation between linguistic unit and meaning, there must obtain a capacity relation as well as a causal relation between them. It is because of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ not only that, of a linguistic unit and a meaning, when one is understood, the other is understood, but also that the capacity relation between them is manifested. The identification of a specific linguistic unit and a specific meaning results in the restriction on the linguistic unit and the meaning which are to be related to each other on the assumptions that any linguistic unit can be related to any meaning and that any meaning can be related to any linguistic unit.

7 VP 3.3.3 tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate

We have been dealing with the three types of relations between linguistic unit and meaning. We are now in a good position to consider the third kārikā of the Sambandhasamuddeśa, which has admitted of different interpretations.

VP 3.3.3: asyāyāṁ vācako vācyā iti saṣṭhyā pratīyate /
yogah śabdārthayos tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate //130

Iyer 1971: 79–80: “That this word is expressive of that meaning, that this meaning is the expressed meaning of that word, such a relation between word and meaning is under-

129. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.32 (145.15–17): evam cobhayathā kāryakāraṇabhāva- varṇanād dhūmāgniśvālaśaśanyena śabdārthayor abhedena saṁbandho 'dhyāsa- lakṣaṇaḥ pratipādito bhavati / Cardona 1981: 97 points out that when X occurs, Y occurs; when X is absent, Y is absent; when Y occurs, X occurs; when Y is absent, X is absent—if all these hold, the identity between X and Y is established.
130. Iyer reads pāda d: tattvam ity ato vyapadiśyate. I have followed Rau’s reading.
stood from the genitive suffix. That is why they are understood as identical.”
Houben 1995: 170: “This is the signifier of this, [and this] is the signified [of this],’ thus the connection of word and thing-meant is known through the sixth nominal ending (genitive). On this ground, the real nature (tattvam, sc. of word and thing-meant) is also indicated.”
Helārāja explains the phrase tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate in two manners:

Prakāśa on VP 3.3.3 (128.3–5): ata eva ca svābhāvikāt sambandhāc chabdārthayos tattvam gaur ayam artha ity abhedena vyavahriyata ity arthah / yadi vā atah śaṣṭhyāh sakāśāt tattvam svarūpaṁ sambandhasyocayate / /
“(1) What is meant is this: In addition (api = ca), on the basis of this natural relation (atah = svābhāvikāt sambandhā) the identity (tattva) between linguistic unit and meaning is expressed (vyapadiśyate = vyavahriyate), that is, they are expressed as identical with each other (abhedena) as in gaur ayam arthaḥ ‘This meaning is an ox’.
(2) Another alternative interpretation: From this sixth triplet ending (atah = śaṣṭhyāh sakāśāt), the essence (tattva = svarūpa) of a relation is spoken (vyapadiśyate = ucyate).”

We have the following utterances:

[20] asya arthasya ayam śabdaḥ vācakaḥ ‘This linguistic unit is the signifier of this meaning’.
[21] asya śabdasya ayam arthaḥ vācyah ‘This meaning is the significand of this linguistic unit’.

From the sixth triplet ending in these utterances it is understood that there is the signifier-significant relation (vācyavācakabhāva) between the specific linguistic unit and the specific meaning. But there is little point in simply arguing this. This is comparable to the case in which one argues that the possessor-possession relation

131. The expression atah is paraphrased as śaṣṭhyāh sakāśāt. This paraphrase shows that atah is equivalent to asyāḥ śaṣṭhyāḥ ‘from this sixth triplet ending’.
is understood from the sixth triplet ending in the utterance rājñah puruṣaḥ.

In connection with the present kārikā it must be recalled that in the Vṛtti on VP 1.23 Bhartṛhari states: asyedambhāve sati śadārthayoh so 'yam iti [yah] sambandhaḥ ([F](a))¹³² and that this passage can be interpreted as follows. When one has the cognition: ‘This has this for its signifier’ (asyedam vācakam); ‘This has this for its significand (asyedam vācyam)’, it is known from this cognition that there is the identity relation between the specific linguistic unit and the specific meaning. The identity relation is the cause of the cognition. If we take into consideration this interpretation of the above-mentioned Vṛtti passage, we may take VP 3.3.3 as meant for introducing the identity relation between linguistic unit and meaning and as implying that the identity relation is the relation underlying the relation understood from the sixth triplet ending in [20] and [21], the causal relation and the capacity relation. Accordingly, the present kārikā can be interpreted as follows:

“[Since] from the sixth triplet ending in the utterances asyāyam vācakah ‘this is a signifier of this’ and asyāyam vācyah ‘this is a significand of this’ the relation (yoga) between linguistic unit and meaning is understood, therefore (ataḥ) they are also said to be identical with each other (tattva).”

Helārāja’s first interpretation accords with Bhartṛhari’s theory on the relation between linguistic unit and meaning. Helārāja gives the second interpretation by taking into consideration VP 3.3.4, which argues that nominals such as sambandha cannot touch on the essence of a relation, which is denoted by a sixth triplet ending.¹³³ In my opinion, VP 3.3.1–3 make a set. In VP 3.3.1¹³⁴

¹³². See §5.2.
¹³³. VP 3.3.4: nābhidhānam svadharmanā sambandhasyāsti vācakam / atyantaparatantratvād rūpaṁ nāsyāpadīṣyate // (“There is no nominal to denote a relation in terms of its own property. Because it is absolutely dependent, its
Bhartṛhari mentions three relata of a single linguistic unit and points out that the relation between the linguistic unit and the three items is permanent; in VP 3.3.2\textsuperscript{135} he states that, unlike the other relata, the linguistic unit’s own form is invariably understood from the linguistic unit; in VP 3.3.3 he states that the understanding of a relation in utterances like [20] and [21] indicates that, as an underlying relation of the relation, there is the relation of identity. We may take the set of kārikās in this way. Bhartṛhari need not elaborate on the relation of identity which underlies the relation as understood in [20]–[21] in the Sambandhasamuddeśa, since it is a kind of meta-relation.

8 Conclusion
Bhartṛhari’s contribution is that he considered speech acts within the framework of Pāṇini’s kāraka theory. A linguistic unit and a meaning are related to each other through the intermediary of the action denoted by abhi-dhā or vac. A linguistic unit and its meaning serve respectively as instrument and as object with respect to such an action. This shows that, as substances, a linguistic unit and a meaning have respectively the capacities to function as instrument and as object with respect to the action in question. Thus it naturally follows, on the assumption that the action is that of denoting, that the linguistic unit has the capacity to denote the meaning, that the meaning has the capacity to be denoted by the linguistic unit and hence that there is the capacity relation between the linguistic unit and the meaning.

In addition, the action in question leads to the fruit of the understanding of the meaning. From hearing the linguistic unit a hearer can understand the meaning and a speaker utters the linguistic unit in order to convey the meaning to the hearer. We can easily see that there obtains a causal relation between the linguistic unit

\textsuperscript{134} See §2.

\textsuperscript{135} See note 31.

form cannot be referred to by its own word.”) On the interpretation of this kārikā, see Cardona 1999: 122.
and the meaning in two ways: from the points of view of a speaker and a hearer. But Bhartṛhari goes further into details. He explains the very core of the causal relation between linguistic unit and meaning in terms of the relation between a linguistic unit in the domain of the mind (buddhisthaśabda) and a meaning in the domain of the mind (buddhisthārtha). In the case of a speaker, the speaker, before uttering a linguistic unit, has the cognition in which the image of the meaning to be conveyed appears. How is this image of the meaning linked with the image of the linguistic unit? In the case of a hearer, the hearer, by hearing a linguistic unit, has the cognition in which the image of the linguistic unit appears. How is this image of the linguistic unit linked with the image of the meaning? Bhartṛhari answers these questions by pointing out that there is the relation of ‘this-is-that’, the relation of identity, between the linguistic unit and the meaning. This relation must be taught and learned. One learns the relation in two manners: by means of superimposing the linguistic unit on the meaning to attain the linguistic unit’s identity with the meaning; by means of superimposing the meaning on the linguistic unit to attain the meaning’s identity with the linguistic unit. The relation of ‘this-is-that’ allows the two ways of superimposition to occur. Thus this relation makes it possible that the image of the meaning and that of the linguistic unit are linked with each other: when the image of the meaning occurs, the image of the linguistic unit occurs; when the image of the meaning is absent, the image of the linguistic unit is absent; when the image of the linguistic unit occurs, the image of the meaning occurs; when the image of the linguistic unit is absent, the image of the meaning is absent. All this clearly shows that the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and meaning underlies the causal relation between them. In this sense, we may include, as Vṛṣabha does, the former in the latter.

What is more, the establishment of the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning leads to making restrictions on their capacities. On the basis of this establishment, the
linguistic unit’s capacity to convey a meaning is restricted to the
specific meaning, while the meaning’s capacity to be conveyed by
a linguistic unit is restricted to the specific linguistic unit. In the
former the linguistic unit’s other capacities to convey other mean-
ings are excluded, while in the latter the meaning’s other capacities
to be conveyed by other linguistic units are excluded. Thus the
relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning
serves to manifest that this specific linguistic unit is capable of
conveying this specific meaning and that this specific meaning is
capable of being conveyed by this specific linguistic unit. This is
the way the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between linguistic unit and
meaning underlies the capacity relation between them. It is pre-
supposed that there is a relation between a linguistic unit in general
and a meaning in general.

Bhartṛhari characterizes the activity performed by a speaker in
speech acts, as directing a linguistic unit to a meaning or as apply-
ing the former to the latter. Such an activity of a speaker is to re-
establish the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the linguistic unit
and the meaning in order for the former to become the signifier of
the latter.

To summarize the main points Bhartṛhari makes about the
relation of ‘this-is-that’ between a linguistic unit and a meaning:
First, this relation is taught and learned through an utterance of the
type so ‘yam ‘this-is-that’. Secondly, the relation is established by
the identification of the linguistic unit and the meaning. Once the
relation is established, the linguistic unit and the meaning appear
respectively as identical with the meaning and the linguistic unit.
Thirdly, the identification comes to the restriction on the linguistic
units and meanings which can be related to each other.

All this gives the answer to the second question mentioned
earlier in §0. Therefore we may be justified in arguing that Helā-
rāja’s understanding of the relation between linguistic unit and
meaning is thoroughly founded on Bhartṛhari’s theory on it.

The first question I raised in §0 has to be answered. The
answer is simple. The Pāṇinīyas’ view of a relation is formed on the basis of their kāraka theory. This is the reason that Bhartṛhari specifies only the two types of relations as the relation between linguistic unit and meaning, which is established in view of the action denoted by abhi-dhā or vac. It is quite reasonable that Bhartṛhari discusses only the two types in the Sambandhasamuddeśa. For this samuddeśa deals with relations of the type tasyedam ‘this-of-that’.

Readers may have wondered why I constantly use the expression ‘linguistic unit’ for the term śabda. The reason is also simple. In VP 2.40 Bhartṛhari says:

VP 2.40: so ‘yam ity abhisambandho buddhyā prakramyate yadā / vākyārthasya tadaiko ‘pi varnaḥ pratyāyako kvacit //

“In some cases, when, with a sentence meaning, the identity relation in the form ‘this is that’ is intended to be established by the mind, even a single phoneme becomes a conveyer of the sentence meaning.”

In Bhartṛhari’s view, even a single phoneme can become a signifier of a sentence meaning if the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between the phoneme and the sentence meaning is established. This implies that in his view any type of linguistic unit, a phoneme, a word, or a sentence, can be meaningful with respect to a given meaning if the identification of the linguistic unit and the meaning is established. We must be fully aware that, in Bhartṛhari’s theory of the relation of linguistic unit and meaning, much significance is attached to the relation of ‘this-is-that’ between them. In the theory this relation plays a central role.
References and Abbreviations

Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī.

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev


Bhaṭṭikāvyā Bhaṭṭi’s Bhaṭṭikāvyā. See Kamalāśaṅkara Prāṇaśaṅkara Trivedī 1898.

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MBhD Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣyadīpikā. See Bronkhorst 1987. [References to pages and lines.]

Ogawa, Hideyo


Pradīpa Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa. See Vedavrata 1962–63. [References to volumes and pages]
Prakāśa

PV

PWT

Ram Chandra Pandeya

Rau, Wilhelm

Subramania Iyer, K. A.


Tīkā Punyarāja’s Tīkā. See Subramania Iyer 1983.

References to kārikās, pages, and lines


VP Bhārtṛhari’s Vākyapadīya. See Rau, Subramania Iyer. [References to kārikās as numbered in Rau 1977]


Vṛtti Vākyapadīya Vṛtti. See Subramania Iyer 1966, 1983. [References to kārikās, pages, and lines]

Just a cavil or not: an example of outsiders’ dispute on the Aṣṭādhyāyī

_Yuki Tomonari_

0 Introduction

As is well known, the tradition of Pāṇinian grammar (pāṇinīyavyākaraṇa) accepts as a fundamental tenet that when the meaning of a sūtra of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is not clear and a doubt occurs, what should be reliable then is an explanation (vyākhyāna) given by Pāṇinian grammarians themselves. Through the very explanation, we will be assured that the meaning of the sūtra is certain and undoubted. This principle is expressed in the paribhāṣā vyākhyānato viñēṣapratipattir na hi sandehād alakṣanam.

Pāṇinian grammarians’ explanations, among which Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya is of the highest fame and importance, cover those problems thoroughly, and as the result of succeeding grammarians’ great efforts found in the traditional commentaries on the Aṣṭādhyāyī and so on, it seems that there is no longer any more scope for further dispute about Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras.

On the other hand, it does not seem to be well known that there exist some works of non-grammarians which include a series of disputes directly pointing out some problematic issues in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. For instance, Prabhākara Miśra’s Brhati on MS 1.3.24–29 has a series of criticisms of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as an opponent’s statement or a pūrvapakṣa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamaṇjarī also introduces a series of parallel or very similar arguments in the closing portion of its sixth āhnika. Studies on the

1. The author would like to express his gratitude here to all the venerable participants in the vyākaraṇa session of the 15th WSC, who gave many beneficial suggestions and information to him. He cannot say that all the advice has been utilized for this paper, but this is due to nothing but his inability to do so. This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows.
2. Apparently, this phrase appeared for the first time in the Mahābhāṣya, and was regarded as the first paribhāṣā by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Paribhāṣenduśekhara.
works of Pāṇinian grammarians are numerous; however, the arguments treated by these two non-grammarians\(^3\) do not seem previously to have been referred to often, although they deserve consideration, since they give us much suggestive information about how Pāṇinian grammar was accepted in their era.\(^4\)

In this paper, I will first confirm some basic information concerning these arguments, then examine them by comparing actual texts to make the nature of the arguments clear, and, finally, consider some problems we may meet with in those disputes.

1 Basic information

1.1 Background of the dispute

The section to which Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.24–29 belong is known to us by two names: sādhupada(prayukty)adhikaraṇa and vyākaraṇādhiṣṭhikaraṇa. Presumably, these sūtras and the Bhāṣya by Śabara Svāmin on them have as their main concern the distinction between correct words (sādhuṣabda/sabda) and incorrect words (asādhuṣabda/apāśabda), and the restriction on the usage (prayoga) of these two kinds of words (vyavasthā/niyama). The first name is based on this characteristic of the section. The name vyākaraṇādhiṣṭhikaraṇa, on the other hand, seems to be based on the content of the commentaries written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra, the Tantravārttika and Bhṛhatī. Both

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3. According to Raghavan (1960), Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was one of the commentators or vṛttikāras on the Aṣṭādhyāyī, though his vṛtti is now not accessible.

4. Jha 1911 seems to be the only study to take the pertinent Bhṛhatī arguments in its scope, but a summary of the argument is replaced by the arguments found in the Tantravārttika. On the related āhṇika of the Nyāyamaṇḍari, only Bronkhorst 2008 is available except for two translations, namely Bhattacharyya 1978 and Shah 1975–92. Examining the Nyāyamaṇḍari’s paragraph on an enumeration of word forms whose derivations present difficulties, Bronkhorst (2008) discusses a Cārvāka Udbhāṣa, who is supposed to have been a Pāṇinian grammarian with non-orthodox tendency because he did not accept the authority of the Mahābhāṣya.
commentaries explicitly use the word vyākaraṇa, which is not found in the sūtras and the Bhāṣya.\(^5\)

Although both the Tantravārttika and the Bṛhatī argue on the topic of grammar with lengthy prima facie arguments (pūrvapakṣa),\(^6\) their contents are quite different from each other. Kumārila’s opponent puts his major emphasis on the purpose (prayojana) of Pāṇinian grammar,\(^7\) while Prabhākara’s directly discusses some problematic issues in Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras.

The Bṛhatī’s pūrvapakṣa part begins with a question: “Then, if it is the case that vyākaraṇaṁśṛti has no basis, in what manner is it suspected that the Veda has no authority?”\(^8\) Mūla (‘basis’) is a keyword in this pāda of the Mīmāṁsāsūtra. As far as the sūtra and Bhāṣya discuss, it seems that the purpose of this adhikaraṇa was to establish a distinction and restriction between the two sorts of words on the basis of a certain śāstra. However, for Kumārila and Prabhākara, this was not enough, so that the śāstra, that is, Pāṇinian grammar itself, must have been taken into consideration as a basis of the distinction and restriction. In spite of this, the pūrvapakṣin in the Bṛhatī declares his opinion rather boldly\(^9\) and commences to discuss sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. We will deal with

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5. The word śāstra in 1.3.24: prayogotpattyāśāstratvac chabdeṣu na vyavasthā syāt could nevertheless possibly refer to vyākaraṇa. The Bhāṣya and Tantravārttika were both translated by Professor Ganganatha Jha. See Jha 1933–36 and 1983. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986 gives a helpful summary of the Tantravārttika’s argument in each related part of the Mahābhāṣya.

6. For example, in the Tantravārttika, more than one hundred forty verses with several prose paragraphs are devoted to the pūrvapakṣa, and approximately eighty verses to the uttarapakṣa. The Bṛhatī’s pūrvapakṣa extends to twenty-six pages, while its uttarapakṣa is less than four pages long.


9. B 119.6–7: āstāṁ tāvān mūlacintā śabdānuśāsanaṁ tāvad aniyatārtham “Leave the consideration of the basis aside. From the beginning, grammar (śabdānuśāsana) does not have any definite meaning”
his argument later, but now, let us see the corresponding argument in the Nyāyamañjarī.

The sixth āhūnika of this work is situated in the concluding section of the first half of the entire work. The first half of this Kashmirian scholar’s masterpiece mainly discusses the four means of gaining correct knowledge (pramāṇa) admitted in the Nyāya-school: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and verbal testimony (śabda). Among these, the Nyāyamañjarī devotes four āhūnikas to establish the status as a pramāṇa of śabda. The sixth āhūnika is thus the conclusion of the śabda section also. This āhūnika can be divided into two parts, of which the first mainly concerns the process of verbal understanding in daily life, while the second is “a long section dealing with grammar as an instrument for Vedic interpretation.”

In the Nyāyamañjarī, the critic’s main concern is how — by what means — one can interpret sentences from the Vedas, which convey meanings not knowable through perception or inference, and decide what such sentences enjoin one to do. Taking a simple Vedic sentence agnihotram jhuyāt svargakāmaḥ as an example, the critic raises a question: which kind of knowledge (kā pramāṇa) enables the hearer to decide that this sentence urges him only to perform the agnihotra, but not to eat dog flesh? At this point, Pāṇinian grammar, counted as one of the six vedāṅgas and praised as the most fruitful one, comes to be criticized. In the pūrvapakṣin’s opinion, the Aṣṭādhyāyī itself contains a lot of problems so that no one can use it to interpret the Vedas.

11. NM 220.4–12: svayaṁ rāgādīmān nārthaṁ vetti cet tasya nānyataḥ/ na vedayati vedo ’pi vedārthasya kuto gatiḥ/ .... tenāgnihotram jhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutaḥ/ khādec chvamāṇīsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra kā pramāṇaḥ/ These sthāvakas are quoted from Pramāṇavārttika, a work of the famous Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti.
12. See MBh I.1.18–20: āgamah khalv api/ brāhmaṇena niskārano dharmaḥ śādaṅgo vedo ’dhyeyo jñeyo iti/ pradhānāṁ ca satav āṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam/ pradhāne ca kṛto yatnāḥ phalavān bhavati/
Disputing some of Pāṇini’s sūtras, the pūrvapakṣin attempts to show that the Aṣṭādhyāyī is unreliable when one needs to decide the meaning of unclear words in the Vedas. If this system of grammar could not be reliable, those Vedic words would not be understood, and the Veda would lose its authority (prāmāṇya). This logic is shared by pūrvapakṣins both in the Brāhatī and the Nyāyamañjarī.

1.2 On the pūrvapakṣin

Was there any existent opponent or was he merely imagined by Prabhākara or Jayanta? On this account, we have hardly anything on which we could depend in either the Brāhatī or the Nyāyamañjarī. Whether he existed or not, Jayanta’s uttarapakṣa describes the pūrvapakṣin as a “discord-causing and cavilling roguish scholar (viplavakāravaitanḍikapaṇḍitataskara).” The compound used shows us an unwelcome character of the censurable scholar, who perhaps had been on Jayanta’s mind.

To learn more characteristics of the critic, we have these two concluding ślokas:

“He who is under the influence of bad stars or is cowed down with the fear of royal punishment or has been cursed by his parents embraces the study of grammar of a classical language.”

13. Certainly, the Nyāyamañjarī’s pūrvapakṣa quotes several verses of Dharmakīrti, and this Buddhist logician advocated the uselessness of vyākaraṇa as an instrument for Vedic interpretation; however, the dispute concerning sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is not found in his work; the Brāhatī with its commentary keeps silent about who is regarded as the opponent here.

14. NM 259.9–11: na ca teśām api dōṣotpṛekṣaṇasambhavād anavasthā nipuna-darśitamārge viplavakāravaitanḍikapaṇḍitataskarāvakāśānupapattiḥ


“In order to blunt the edge of one’s sharp intellect Pāṇini’s grammar and its commentary known as vyāti should be prescribed for his study, and sesame, a kind of pulses, wood apples\(^{17}\) and boiled rice prepared from a particular kind of rice should be prescribed for his food since these are the best instruments of benumbing keen intellect.”

Their exact meaning and true origin are not sure, but one thing is obvious, that both verses attempt — ironically — to keep the hearer from studying Pāṇinian grammar. With these verses, we may sense the pūrvapakṣin’s antipathy to Pāṇinian grammar.

2 The dispute about the Aṣṭādhyāyī

2.1 Criticized sūtras

Before we look into the actual argument, let us take a brief glance at the list of sūtras mainly criticized in the Brāhatī and Nyāyamaṇjarī. In the order of their appearance, these are: A 1.3.1: bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ, 1.4.24: dhruvam apāye ʿpādānam, 1.4.32: karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam, 1.4.42: sadhakatamam karaṇam, 1.4.45: ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam, 1.4.49: kartur īpsitamam karma, 1.4.54: svatantrāḥ kartā, 1.4.55: tatprayojako hetuḥ ca, 2.1.1: samarthāḥ padavidhiḥ, 4.1.82: samarthānāṃ prathamād vā, 1.2.45: arthavad adhātur apratyayāḥ prātipadikam, 1.2.46: kṛttaddhitasamāśāḥ ca. Ten of the twelve sūtras criticized are saṅjñāsūtras, in which technical terms (saṅjñā) are defined.

2.2 Text comparison

Now, let us compare the Brāhatī and Nyāyamaṇjarī texts concerning the dispute. The texts are divided into small sections according to their content and arranged showing corresponding arguments in the two works.\(^{18}\) Note the resemblance between two texts, especially the phrases I have underlined.

\(^{17}\) The word kaṭaṇḍī used here is obscure. NMGBh 177.9 says: kaḍa(ta)ṇḍī kodravodana iti / kaḍa(ta)ṇḍī vaiṣeṣikabhāṣyaviṣeṣaḥ (boldface and variant reading in brackets by the editor). For more detail, see NMGBh: 177, n.3, Introduction 9.

\(^{18}\) Numbers in brackets are for future reference. Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras are shown in boldface; I have changed punctuation and sandhi.
On A 1.3.1: B 120.11–124.10/NM 238.11–239.10

[B1.1]: .... dhātoḥ pare pratyayā bhavanti iti. *...ko nāmaṃ dhatuh? nanu bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ iti kämścic chabadān kayācit paripātyā paḥhitvā, dhātava iti sañjīna krātā, atas tayā sañjīyāya ye sañjīnino lakṣyante, tebhyah pare pratyaya bhavantīti, kim nopapadyate?*

[NM1.1]: ... dhātoḥ pare pratyayā bhavantīti laksanam kurvata vaktvayam kah punar ayaṃ dhātur nāmetīti nanu bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ ity uktam tatsuvarūpam, kecana śabdāḥ kayācit paripātyā paḥhitāḥ, te dhātusañjīnaya lakṣyante, tebhyah pare tināḥ krātā ca pratyayā bhavantīti / satyam uktam etat, kint evam pāthe kṛte 'pi na dhātusvarūpānīraya upavarnito bhavati /

[B1.2]: gandatītyādinām api sādhutvaṃ prāpnoti bhataṃ bhūyatā iti ca/ sattātiyādinām api tārtyapratyayā- prasangāḥ/ anāraś saṣṭha iti cet, bhavatvā apy ayaṃ paḥharaḥ, gandatītyādinām/ punar aprayoṣa eva/

[NM1.2]: tathā ca gandatīty api prāpnoti, dhātos tīṇapratyayavidhānaḥ / .... adhātor api ghaṣṭhābhivyacchabdarūpāt pare tīṇapratyayā bhaveyuh/

[B1.3]: athā kriyāvacano dhātur ity ucye, na, bhavati tiṣṭhātyādinām aprayoṣaḥ, gandeṣaṃ cānarthaḥcapaḥh... *

[NM1.3]: kriyāvacano dhātur iti cet, bhavati, tiṣṭhāti ity evamādinām adhātuvaṃ prāpnoti, gandehaṃ cānarthaḥ capaḥh/

[B1.4]: pāthakriyāvacanābhyāṃ niyama iti cet, tatrāpi samuditam vyastam iti vaktvayam/ samuditaṃpakoṣe gandatī- bhavatyādinām tathaiva vyudāsaḥ/ pratyekam iti cet, pacatyādinām pāthānarthaḥkyaṃ/ āgamayatīyādinām nivṛttyarthaḥ iti cet, ubhayām tārhy āśritam, evam sati bhavatyādīsu sa eva doṣaḥ... *

[NM1.4]: ubhayām tarhi dhātur laksanam, pāthah, kriyāvacanatā ceti, na bhavitum arhati/ tad api hi vyastam vā laksanam, samastāṃ vā/ vyastapakoṣa pratyekam abhihitā, doṣas tadavastha eva/ samastāpkāṣe 'pi bhavatyādau kriyāvacanatasya dvitiyakāṣanasya cābhāvād adhātuvaṃ eva syād iti /...†

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*a It is noteworthy that the finite verb form bhavanti is used here instead of the optative syuḥ.

b On the following arguments, cf. MBh I.253–261, esp. vārttikas.1, 3, 5, 12.

c In the Dhātupāṭha in the Mādhavaśyā Dhātuvṛtti, the root gadvl appears twice in the first gaṇa: 1.55 and 1.247. On 1.55: gadvl vadanaikadeśe, the commentary has handed down an opinion of another commentator, Kāśyapa: atyādavyah pañcaite na tiṃviṣayāḥ. Here, atyādavyah refers to atil, adil, idl, bidl, and gadvl.

d This argument is very interesting, for it indicates that before Prabhākara’s date, there was a debate over the authorship of meaning entries in the Dhātupāṭha. On this issue, see Cardona (1984).

e Keeping in mind vārttika 12 ad A 1.3.1 (bhūvādipāṭha prātipadikānapayatādi- nivṛttyarthah), āṇapayati, a vernacular form of āṇapayati is preferable here.

f I have transferred some arguments that follow to [NM8.1] and [NM8.2] for the sake of comparison. See [NM8.1] and [NM8.2].
To understand the relationship between these two arguments, Cakrādhara’s Nyāyamaṇḍarīgranthibhāṅga is helpful. According to Cakrādhara, at least one passage, ghaṭaṁbhūyata iti ca has its origin in the Brhaṭī, and Jayanta commented on this very phrase.\textsuperscript{a}

**On A 1.4.24: B 125.4–126.3/NM 240.2–9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[B2.1]: tathā kāraṇiyamāsiddhiḥ/ dhruvam apāye ’pādānam iti</th>
<th>[NM2.1]: tathā kāraṇāṃsūsanam api duṣṭham/ dhruvam apāye ’pādānam ity ucyate, tatra dhruvasya vrksādeḥ, vrksāt patito devadattaḥ iti patanakriyāyām acalataḥ kṛṣam api na kāraṇatvaṃ utpaśyāmaḥ/ kriyāyogi hi kāraṇam, sā ca vrksa nopalabhya iti/</th>
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<tr>
<td>dhruvatayāpādānam uktaṃ/ dhruvasya kāraṇatvaṃ eva nopapadyate/ mesān meso ’pasarpati iti kāraṇam, mesād iti kasyāḥ kriyāyāḥ kāraṇam etat? yasya hi yasyān kriyāyāṃ vyāpāro vidyate sa tasyām kāraṇam, na ca dhruvasya vyāpāra upalabhyaḥ/</td>
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<tr>
<td>[B2.2]: ... sārthād dhīnāḥ, rathāt patītaḥ iti sārtharathayāḥ kriyopalabhyaḥ iti, nāsti kriyā sārthasya rathaya ca, api tu gamanarūpāḥ, na ca kriyāntare vyāhartām kriyāntare kāraṇam bhavati, na ca gameḥ kartā pacattyasyāvastaye/ tasmāni niṣkriyām kāraṇam iti vadato vyāhartā anyat sarvaṃ sarvatva kāraṇam syait/</td>
<td>[NM2.2]: sārthād dhīnāḥ, rathāt patītaḥ iti sārtharathayāḥ kriyopalabhaye, na vrksavan niścalatvaṃ iti cet, satvam, sva- rasapravṛttya tāyor asti kriyā, hāne yāne ca pādāpanirviśesāy eva sārtharathau, na ca yad ekasyām kriyāyāṃ kāraṇam, tat sarvāsu kriyāsu kāraṇam bhavati, atiprasaṅgāḥ/</td>
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\textsuperscript{a} Cf. Vākyapadiya 3.7.140-141. For apādāna, cf. MBh ad A 1.4.23 as well as MBh ad A 1.4.24.

19. NMGBh 173.11–15: ghaṭaṁ bhūyata iti ca iti prabhākārī tīkā sādhu-śabdādharanae tatra ghaṭaṁbhūyata [iti] phakkikām vyākhyaṃ āha — ghaṭā ceṣṭāyām ityādīnā/ ghaṭaś ca am ca bhūṣ ca yaś ca taś ca ghaṭaṁbhūyat/ tasmād ghaṭaṁbhūyato ’pi prāṇnoti prātipadikebhyo ’pi ghaṭādibhyāḥ prayāyas tīnādayaḥ prāṇmuvantīty arthaḥ/ (underline, boldface, and bracketed text in original). The phrase ghaṭaṁ bhūyate is obscure. According to Cakrādhara, Jayanta seems to understand this phrase as a samāhāra dvandva compound ghaṭaṁbhūyat. Śālikanātha regards this as a sentence ghaṭaṁ bhūyate. See Rjuvimalāpaṇcīkā 121.13–20.
On A 1.4.32: B 126.4–127.7/NM 240.11–19

[B3]: .... karmanā yam abhiprāiti sa sampradānam iti/ karmanā ced abhipreyate, na kārakam/ kartā hi karmanā yo 'bhipreyate sa sampradānam ity udāharaṇād vidmaḥ upādhyāyaḥ gām dadātātīti/ kartavyāpārānunispādyāpūrām ca kārakam, yaḥ punar abhipreyate, na tasyābhiprayane vāyāpāḥ/ tena tam iti karmaka- raṇanirdēṣāt phalam karma bhavati, na kārakam, yajer iva svarghaḥ/ nanu ca karmanā yam abhiprāiti kārakam/ karma parighṛyate, sutarām akārakatvam/ na hi kārakasambhandhitaṣṭāḥ kārakavapadeśo bhavati, karoti iti kārakasabdavyutpādanātī/ .... kriyā- sambhandhitaṣṭāḥ ca [kārakatve]a viśeṣānusāsanaṃ na sidhyati, saṣṭhī ca sarvakārakānām prāpnoti, svargasya ca yāgakārakatvaprasaṅgāḥ, pra- yājādīnām ca darsapūrṇamsaṣṭāḥ ne vā

[NM3]: karmanā yam abhiprāiti sa sampradānam iti, atra karmaśabdah kri- yāvacano vā syād, īpsitataṃ kārakavacit vā/ ādye pakṣe kriyāya sarvakārakāny abhipreyanta iti kriyāsu kārakānī sampradānatām pratipadyeran/ na copadhyāya-sya kiṣcid abhiprtyamānasya vyāpāro utpaśyanta ity asāv akārakam eva tatra syāt/ pratigrahas tu kriyāntaram eva/ tatra coktaṃ kriyāya cābhiprēyamānaṃ phalam bhavati, na kārakam iti vakṣyā- mahādvītyas tu pakṣaḥ, karmanā kāra- kena gāvadānāḥ yam abhiprāiti sutarām saṅkaṭaḥ/ kriyāsambhandhitaḥ ca kārakam kārakam bhavati, na kārakasambhandhitaḥ, karotītī kārakam iti vyutpattah/

a The bracketed addition is supplied by the editor.

b It may be noteworthy that the opponent uses Mīmāṃsaka-like terminology, such as: yajer iva svarghaḥ, svargasya ca yāgakārakatvaprasaṅgāḥ, prayājādīnām ca darsapūrṇamsaṣṭāḥ. Even so, is it possible for a Mīmāṃsaka to appear in such an anti-Vedic context?

c See [NM6.2].

On A 1.4.42: B 127.8–126.6/NM 241.2–6

[B4]: yad api sādhakatamāṃ karaṇam ity ucyate, kim tat sādhakatamāṃ iti, .... prācuryat iti cet, yasya hi a phala- nispatteḥ punaḥ punaḥ vyāpāraḥ, kasya vā nāstīti

[NM4]: sādhakatamāṃ karaṇam iti tamabarthānaudadhāraṇād anupa- pannam/ .... prācuryena hi pradhāna- sampattiparyantavāpūrṇayogitvam ityādi sarvasādhāraṇam ....

On A 1.4.45: B 128.7–129.6/NM 241.9–242.2

[B5.1]: ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam iti cānu- sāsanam/ kasyādhārayatvam? yatrādhiyate sa ādhāra iti, yadi tāvat kriyā, sarvakārakānāṃ adhikaranatvapra- saṅgah/

[NM5.1]: ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam iti yad ucyate, tatra vaktavyāṃ kasyādhāra iti/ kriyāyāḥ, kārakasya vā/ yadi kriyādhāratvam adhikaranalakṣaṇam, aśeṣakārakānāṃ adhikaranasaṁñā prasajyeta, kriyāyogāviśeṣāt/
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<tr>
<td>B5.2</td>
<td>atha vatra karma tad adhikaranam iti cet, same pacati iti na prāpnoti, āpṣu pacati iti prāpnotti, kate bhūntke iti cāpabhramāḥ/ kartur hi tad adhikaranam na kriyāyah, nāpi karanāḥ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM5.2</td>
<td>atha vatra sthālyādau karmāśritam taṇḍulādi tad adhikaranam, same desē pacati iti na syāt, āpṣu pacati iti syāt, kate sthito bhūntke iti cāpabhramāḥ bhavet/ kartur hi tad adhikaranam na karanāḥ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5.3</td>
<td>sarvakārakavyavasthānām yatreti cet, sthālyām odanām pacati iti na prāpno- ti/ adhikaraṇasya vā kārakatvaprasa- ngah/ na hy adhikaraṇam adhikaraṇavya- vāṣṭhitam iti šakyate vaktum/ sambandhi- taye sarvakārakādhihaṇantā vā ḍhikaraṇa- nāvte hetur uktah/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM5.3</td>
<td>yadi tu sakalakārakādhihaṇtvam adhikaraṇalakṣāṇam, sthālyām odanām pacati iti na syāt, sakalakārakānādhihaṇatvāt/ sthālyā adhikaraṇasya cākārakatvaprasaktiḥ na hy adhikaraṇam adhikaraṇaśritam bhaveti/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5.4</td>
<td>nirvṛyāpāravatvān ca kālādiṣūktam/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM5.4</td>
<td>.... kālādinām avyāpāravatvād akārakatvam eva bhavet/ ....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See [B3].

### On A 1.4.49: B 129.7–130.6/NM 242.4–243.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6.1</td>
<td>.... kartur īpsitatamaṇ karma iti ko Ṭaṃatiśayinaḥ? sarvahā kriyārtham īpsitam/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM6.1</td>
<td>kartur īpsitatamaṇ karma iti, sādhakatamavad ihāpi na vācako ṭamatiśayanaḥ, sarvākārakānānā kriyārtha- taye kartur īpsitam/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6.2</td>
<td>athāyam abhipraṇah, yadartha kriyā tat tamapābhidhitaye, prāptam akārakatvam/ uktah hi sampradānasūtre/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM6.2</td>
<td>atha yadarthā kriyā tadartham kartur īpsitam, tadartham tv anyat iti tatra tamapratyaya ity ucyate/ tarhi tasya kārakatvam eva na yuktam/ kriyāsampādaḥ ki kāraṇa itye, na kriyāsampādah/ kriyāsampādah tu phalaḥ bhavati, na kārakam/ ....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See [B3].

### On A 1.4.54–55: B 130.6–132.3/NM 243.6–244.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B7.1</td>
<td>tathā svatāntraḥ kartā iti, kim idam svatāntryam? yadīcchātah pravrttiḥ, jāyate, mriyate, kūlam patati ity akartrā prāpnoti/ tataḥ cāśāhūtā- prasangāḥ sābdasāḥ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM7.1</td>
<td>svatāntraḥ kartā iti, kim idam svatāntryam? yadīcchātah pravartanam iti cet, kūlaṁ patati iti caitanyaśūnyatāyā kālasye- cchānupalabhād akartrtyam bhavet/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7.2</td>
<td>atha tadvyāpārādhināṁ kāraka- ntaram manyase, keyam taddhānātā? yasmin sati yo nispadaye tathaddhānāṁ, prāptam tāṁ sarva- kārakānāṁ kartṛtvam itaretārdhānātavā/ na kenacid vinā kasyacit nispadatim/ upalabhāmaḥ/ yasya hi yena vinā vyāpārasatpattiḥ na tena tad apektate, parasperapekṣaḥ ca kāraka-grāmāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM7.2</td>
<td>atha tadvyāpārādhināṁ kārakāntaraṇavyāpāraḥ sa kartā ity ucyate, sarvakārakānirvartayavāt kriyāyāḥ, na vidmaḥ kimvyāpārādhināḥ, kasya vyāpāra iti, samagrakāraka-grāmasya parasparāpeksatvāt/ ....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On tiṅ-suffixes: B 134.6–135.6/NM 239.9–1920

[B8.1]: evaṁ kṛprayāyā api vyākhyaṭāḥ/ tiṅprayāyā api kālādyupādhayah na tadvacanāḥ/....

[NM8.1]: evaṁ dāhīḥ prakṛteri anirṇītāvi, kutāh pare tinaś ca kṛtaś ca pratyayā utsadyeran/ kiñca kecana tiṅprayayāḥ kālādyupādhayah, na tadvacanāḥ/....

[B8.2]: kena coktaṁ kālādayo nocyanta iti? uktaṁ bhagavatā hāṣyakāreṇā bhūte dhātvarttha iti/ * na ca dhātvartthenaiva dhātvartthiṇāpanāṁ/ sākyam/ tiṅhā līnā- dayo pi vidhyādyartthiṇāpanāḥ/ katham punar vidhyāde anirṇīpam? upapadārthavaśatvad bhedasya/ na svato bhedah sākyate 'vagantum'/....

[NM8.2]: ucyatāṁ tarhi tinbhiḥ kālādaya iti cet, na, hāṣyavīrodhāṁ/ uktaṁ hi bhagavatā hāṣyakāreṇā bhūte dhātvarttha iti/ na ca dhātvartthenaiva dhātvarttho vyavasthāpayitum sākyate/ līnādayaś ca sutaram anadhigambhāmānavisayāḥ/ te hi vidhyādvār arthe vidhītyante/ sa ca vidhirāpa 'rthāṁ svarūpataś copādhiṣa ca na sākyo nircetum iti/

* Cf. MBh II.111.2–5.

On A 2.1.1, A 4.1.82: B 135.6–136.6/NM 244.9–17

[B9.1]: tathā taddhitasamāsau samarthvacinā[ī] durnirūpaḥ/ kim idāṁ samarthvacanad iti, samarthānāṁ prathamad vā/ samarthah padavidhiḥ iti cānūṣaṣā- nam/ ekārthānvyātā ca saṁarthyaṁ, tallakaśaṇavārttham ca s a māsā- viṣeṣābhidhānām/ taddhitāviṣeṣābhidhānām ca, tena ca tau lakṣyete ittartaretāśrayam/....

[NM9.1]: kiñca yad api taddhitasamāsānuśāsanāṁ tat saṁarthvyaniyamapūrva-kam, saṁarthānāṁ prathamād vā, sa-ma- rthāḥ padavidhiḥ iti pariḥśāsanāt/ tad arāṭī vaktavyam saṁarthyam nāma kim ucyata iti/ ekārthānvyātvaṁ iti cet, tat kuto 'vagamyaṭe? taddhitasamāsapravyagapratipattibhyām eveti cet, tarhi tābhāṁ saṁarthvyāgavamaḥ, saṁarthye sati tayoh pravṛttir ittartaretāśrayam/....

20. [NM8.1] and [NM8.2] actually do not appear after [NM7.4] but after [NM1.4]. Although the order of appearance is not the same as in the Bṛhatī, the content is almost the same. Operations concerning verb endings (tiṅpratyaya) depend on the meaning of a verbal root (dhātu) and particular kārakas, so that the criticism is appropriate. However, so long as the referent of dhātu is undetermined, it is not known after what the endings should occur. Therefore there is nothing logically strange if the argument is placed after [NM1.4].
On A 1.2.45–46: B 137.1–139.1/NM 244.19–245.7

As one can easily grasp from above, the disputes in both the Brhati and the Nyayamañjarī resemble each other to a high degree. The question arises: did Jayanta make his pūrvapakṣa with the Brhati’s argument in mind? In the light of the Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga, at least one phrase has a direct connection with the Brhati. However, taking into consideration Jayanta’s own words in the first āhnikā, there would be no surprise if he did paraphrase some of the disputes found in the Brhati’s pūrvapakṣa as a part of his own pūrvapakṣa.

2.3 Characteristics of the dispute

The technical terms (sañjñā) we have considered above play

21. NM 1.3.3–4: kuto vā niñatanāṃ vastu vayam utprekṣituṁ kṣamāḥ/vacovināsavaicitṛyātmaṁ atra vicāryatām/

22. In the sixth āhnikā, we can also find close connection to the Tantravārttika. See Ramachandrudu 1994.
significant roles in Paninian grammar because they are closely connected with morphological and semantic aspects of this grammar. This means that it can be fatal to the system of Paninian grammar to point out any doubtful points in the sūtras in question.

In advance of examining characteristics of the dispute, let me briefly confirm what we can say about the nature of saṅjñās. The distinction made by Paninian grammarians between long terms (mahāsaṅjñā) and artificial terms (kṛtrimasaṅjñā) is noteworthy. Saṅjñāsūtras that define artificial terms are quite simple. In such sūtras, the saṅjñā itself and what is defined with the saṅjñā — such as a certain word form, a list of word forms, a certain syllabic condition, etc. — are shown plainly, so that there is little possibility of any doubt. In the case of saṅjñāsūtras that define mahāsaṅjñās, however, the situation is complicated. There exist problems caused by uncertainty regarding what is defined with the mahāsaṅjñā. Furthermore, because of their length, such terms are not fully compatible with the system of Paninian grammar, in which pithy expression with an extremely small number of syllables is preferred, so that, as a result, some special explanations are needed.

For example, in A 1.4.23: kārake, which precedes the sections defining the particular kāraka-members, the term kāraka itself appears, although we cannot find out any other words to be defined at a glance. In order to solve these problems in A 1.4.23, the Mahābhāṣya suggests that the use of a long term (mahatī saṅjñā) make it known that the term has literal meaning (anvarthasaṅjñā):

“The sūtra kārake brings about the mahāsaṅjñā, and every saṅjñā has nothing smaller or shorter than it. [Q] Why is it so? [A] Because technical terms are brought about for brevity. A mahāsaṅjñā is used here for the purpose of letting us understand a term whose meaning is literal: a
kāraka is that which brings about (an action).”

This grammarian’s explanation is good because it resolves both problems. In spite of this, the explanation given arouses a new suspicion about the sūtra in question. Let us see a typical example of the criticism. On A 1.4.24, the critic states in [NM2.1]:

“The grammarian says that an apādāna is a kāraka that is a fixed point in separation. Then, in expressions such as ‘Devadatta fell from a tree,’ we hardly find any nature of kāraka in the tree, which never moves in Devadatta’s action of falling. Indeed, the nature of a kāraka is something connected with action, and no action of the tree is perceived.”

Certainly, this criticism reveals the points which might be problematic if we understand the term kāraka in A 1.4.23 literally and interpret the next sūtra, A 1.4.24, straightforwardly.

However, was it possible for Pāñinian grammarians to overlook such an easily predictable problem? In fact, further attention to the discussions in the Mahābhāṣya suggests how we can interpret the sūtra, keeping the literal meaning of the term and avoiding the problem. As shown above, the critic continues to attack other sūtras that also contain unclear expressions like karaṇa in A 1.4.32 ([B3], [NM3]) or the suffix -tamaP in A 1.4.42 ([B4], [NM4]), 49 ([B6.1–2], [NM6.1–2]), although those problems had already been predicted and argued by Pāñinian grammarians.

3 Considerations and conclusion

As regards to the characteristic of these arguments, it can be pointed out that those criticisms could be examples of criticisms of Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtras, but not criticisms of the Pāñinian system of

23. MBh I.324.7–9: kāraka iti mahaī saṃjñā kriyate/ saṃjñā ca nāma yato na laghīyaḥ/ kuta etat/ laghvarthān hi saṃjñākaraṇam/ tatra mahatyāḥ saṃjñāyāḥ karaṇa etat prayojanam anvarthasaṃjñā yathā vijñāyeta/ karoṭṭī kārakam iti/ 24. See MBh I.324.13–326.17. 25. For the Pāñinian interpretation of A 1.3.1: bhūvādayo dhātavah, see Ogawa 2005.
grammar, despite the pūrṇapakṣins’ intention. From this point of view, we can easily understand the reason why the siddhānta sections in the Brāhatī and Nyāyamañjarī that answer to the criticism are very concise, as follows:

“The explanation for these problems has been answered by interpreters in a certain manner. Would you accept the explanation they gave as it is? Indeed, their explanation is also smarana.”

“As for critics saying in many ways that the system of Pāṇini has uncertainty in the teaching of dhātu, prātipadika, and each kāraka-member, however, this criticism had also been solved by wise men. Moreover no infinite chain of wise men is needed for the possibility of mistake. Because, no room for discord-causing and cavilling, roguish scholars can be left in a path guided by the precise-minded.”

At this point, the second qualifier in the compound viplavakāravaītaṇḍikapāṇḍitataśkara, vaitāṇḍika, deserves consideration. The word vaitāṇḍika is derived from vītaṇḍā, which is enumerated as the term for one of the sixteen categories in the Nyāya-school. Explaining its definition, Jayanta describes a vaitāṇḍika as one who does nothing but dispute others’ thought and

26. It was the fault of pūrṇapakṣins that they did not examine enough what was argued in Mahābhāṣya and so on. At this point, it is interesting that the critics’ ignorance of — or rather indifference to — the tradition of Pāṇinian grammar seems to match that of non-orthodox Pāṇinian grammarians, as indicated by Bronkhorst (2008). The criticism might have come from critics’ indifference to the tradition of Pāṇinian grammar, but to siddhāntins it seemed merely to be a result of pūrṇapakṣins’ ignorance.

27. B 145.5–7: tadvyākhyānāṁ kathaṇcit samāhitaṁ vyākhyātrbhī/ yathā samāhitaṁ kathaṇcit tathaiva paīrghyaśāmi/ tad api hi smaranam eva/

28. NM 259.9–12: yad api pāṇīnitantre dhātuprātipadikakārākādyanusāsanaviṃśīṭhulatvam anekāśākham ākhyāpitam, tad api nipunamatiḥbhī pratisamāhitaṁ eva/ na ca teṣām api doṣotpreshsānasambhāvād anavasthā, nipuṇadarśitamārge viplavakāravaītaṇḍikapāṇḍitataśkaraśvāśānupapatteh/

29. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: pramāṇaprameyasyasāmyaprayojanandrṣṭāntasiddhāntavayavatarkanirnayavādadajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalarajāti-
nigrāhasthānānāṁ tattvajñānān niśśreyasādhigamaḥ.
does not have his own opinion. In this sense, what we have examined above is a cavil or vītaṇḍā. No matter how reasonable an argument might be as a serious criticism of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, as long as the pūrvapakṣins do not give any alternative opinion of their own, it is just a cavil.

30. See NM 602.13–603.14 on Nyāyasūtra 1.2.3: sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhino vītaṇḍā.

31. But in a broader context, they have clearly declared that their aim is to negate the authority of the Vedas. In addition to this, we may guess a “discord-causing” characteristic of the Brāhatī’s pūrvapakṣins. See the ironical use of the word namaḥ in B 127.6 and the word pramāṇam in B 132.2. Prabhākara also states (B 141.3–4): ākṛtigānabhidhānam ca śāstrato niyamasya mātrkā/ bahulagrahaṇām ca śāstrato ‘niyamasya dīndimah’/ Even if they are mere cavils, some of the criticisms might deserve further consideration in the future. For example, on the problem of the verb gaṇḍati in [B1.2] and [NM1.2], we need to examine the actual usage of this verb.
References and abbreviations

A  
Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.

Abhyankar, K. V.
1962–72  

B  
Brhatī of Prabhākara. See Subramania Śāstrī, S.

Bhāṣya  
Bhāṣya of Śabara Svāmin. See Subramania Śāstrī, S.

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The Mādhavīyā Dhātuvṛtti [A Treatise on Sanskrit Roots Based on the Dhātupāṭha of Pāṇini] by

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Joshi, S.D. and Roodbergen, J.A.F.


Mādhavīyā Dhātuvaṛtti See Dwarikadas Shastri.

MBh *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. See Abhyankar, K. V.


*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* See B.

NM *Nyāyamanjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa. See Varadacharya, K.S.

NMGBh *Nyāyamanjarīgranthibhaṅga*. of Cakradhara. See Shah, Nagin J.

Nyāyasūtra See See Varadacharya, K.S.

Ogawa, Hideyo

Raghavan, V.

Ramachandrudu, P. Sri

Rjuvimalāpañcikā See Subramania Śāstrī, S.

Shah, Nagin J.

Subbāśāstri

Subramania Iyer, K. A.

Subramania Śāstrī, S.
1962  *The Brhatti of Prabhākara Miśra [on the Mīmāṃsā*

TV Tantravārttika of Kumārila. See Subbāśāstrī.

Vākyapadīya See Subramania Iyer, K. A.

Varadacharya, K.S.


vārttika See MBh.
सारस्वतव्याकरणे प्रक्रियासारल्यम्: सुबन्तसन्दर्भे

वेदमित्र आर्य

‘युगे-युगे व्याकरणातराणी’ अत एव सम्प्रति संस्कृतभाषाय: साधुयप्रतिपादाय लोकों बहवः व्याकरणसम्प्रदायाः कृत्तवण्ठने। तेषु श्रीतत्त्वविधामके वैषयव्यग्ये नवविध व्याकरणानि उल्लिखितानि।

एतेऽ चाँद्र काशकृत्तं कौमारं शाक्तयनम्।
सारस्वतं चापिशालं शाक्तं पाणिनीयकम्।।

एतेऽ न्यायस्य सारस्वतव्याकरणस्य महावर्ण व्यविधिते। पञ्चाशिर्धिसहकारायं वैभवक्षितः (1150 वि.स.०) लोकानुप्रकाश्या अनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्य्यं चर्मे वयसि बालानां सुन्दरोपाय अनायासेन च व्याकरणाल्यायाय सारस्वतानां व्याकरणे व्यर्थे।

अनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्यस्य विषये प्राचीनविद्वद्वेद्ये विषयं किमव्यवस्थापि प्रस्तुतः यत् पुरा कदाचिदनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्यस्य मुखार्थितं वार्तक्ये दस्तविहितात्या च ‘पुंः’ इत्यस्य प्रस्तुः ‘पुंः’ इत्यमपपशः: न्यासतः। तद्नां तत्र सिद्धः: सर्वं वैयाकरणविद्याः: तद्याशुद्धिणामकण्यं उपजहसुः। उपहासान्तरमनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्य्यं: स्वाच्छारित्य अशुद्धिणामरस साधुवच्च प्रतिपादित्युः गुहमागात् सरस्वतीं देवीं प्राण्यामासुः।। प्रस्तान सती सा देवी सर्वत्र आग्नेयं सप्तशताः ददी। ताति सूत्राणैव भ्रूणो महानुपाया अनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्य्यं: यदू व्याकरण रचयामासुः: तदेव सारस्वतव्याकरणार्थिनाः नामाः प्राण्यामाः। सारस्वतव्याकरणं द्वितिय विभक्तम् – पुरूर्वांचिवरार्थं। तत्र पुरीन्द्र व्याकरणसन्याताः सर्वात: घुङ्गलिङ्गः, सर्वात: श्रीलिङ्गः, सर्वात: नृपुंकलिङ्गः, हस्तात: घुङ्गलिङ्गः, हस्तात: श्रीलिङ्गः, हस्तात: नृपुंकलिङ्गः, युम्सदुर्प्रक्रियायच सिद्धान्ताः पाणिनीयव्याकरणसन्याते प्रतिपदाने विहिततः: एकविशिष्ट: प्रत्ययः: समन्तमेव। परन्तु तत्र ‘सु’ इत्यस्य स्थाने ‘सि’ ‘औद’ इत्यस्य स्थाने च ‘औ’ इति पाणिनितोऽर्थे वर्तते।

आचार्यं न उपस्थते पाणिनेये महामनसे कृतिचित्रू स्पष्टिनिर्देशं प्रक्रियालघुवृत्तं कृतं\ कविचित्र स्वरूपानमूलणम् यथेऽच्छ प्रक्रियापरिवर्तनं विहितम्। तन्नेयं परिवर्तनानं अस्य व्याकरणस्य पाणिनितो वैशिष्ट्यम्। परिवर्तनेनु तेषु सुबन्तमघुक्तं अत्र शब्दविदामुः पुरुस्तात् प्रस्तुतः। तत्र प्रथमम: प्रक्रियायां स्पष्टिनिर्देशमधिकृत्य वर्ण्यं। तथाहि –

1 पणेद्विशिष्टमानसेन विचित्रे संस्कृत-व्याकरणशालेनिहासे, प्रथमे भागे, पृ० ६२।
सत्यपि प्रत्यथलक्षणकार्य भवतीत्यायति। तेन प्रत्यथलक्षण ‘अस्थि 0’ इत्यत्र समबूधृ परत: गुणे० सति ‘हे अस्थे’ इति रूप सिद्धयति। एवं पाणिनीयप्रक्रियायां व्याख्यानेनव ज्ञात्य भवित यदाचार्यपाणिनिना सम्बोधनेन रुपहिम्यते।

अनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्यस्तु अत्र सार्थाथ स्पष्टरूपेण इकारोकार-अयकारानां धि परत: वैकल्पिकः गुण विधाय रुपमभः (हे अस्थि/हे अस्थे इति) साधिताः।

3. अनेन-अनवः:
अन पाणिनीयप्रक्रियाया ‘इदम्-द’ ‘इदम्-आसु’ इति सिद्धति ‘अनायकः’ इतन्तन सूत्रेण आच्छाध्यक्तो परत: ‘इदम्’ इतन्तन इदेवपर्य थाने अनू विधियतो। ‘अनायकः’ इतन्तन सूत्रे आच्छाध्यण प्रत्येकारो गुढ़ते वृत्तिकारमते।

तत्रपि ‘द’ ‘आसु’ इति विभवतिदृढ़मेव गुढ़ते पारिष्ठियत। एड्भामादीनाः विभवतीनाः महणान तस्न भवति तत्रान्त्यकार्याणाः विधानात। एवं प्रकारणेन अन ‘द’ ‘आसु’ इतन्तनोर्वेक विभवतयोः परत: इदमोजादेशो भवित।

तत्रतच ‘अनेन, अनवः’ इति रूपद्व विधिति। एवं पाणिनीपरमपर्याणाः पारिष्ठियण्यायादेव इदेव सर्वं सेतुत्यत। सारस्वते पुनः प्रतिपत्याय स्मृतितः: स्थाने साक्षादेव ‘द’ ‘आसु’ इतन्ततयोः: विभववयोः परत: अनू विधियतो।

अत: नात पारिष्ठियण्यायायपेदयते। एवं पाणिनीपरमपर्यितिः सर्वस्तितोक्ताभरणं व्याकरणगौप विद्यादेव ‘द’ ‘आसु’ विभवतयोः परत अनू विहित:।

4. अद्यतन:-अद्यतनः:
अन पाणिनीयप्रक्रियायां ‘अष्टनु-भिभिः’ इति सिद्धति ‘अष्टन आ विभवतो’
इतन्तन सूत्रेण ‘अष्टनु’ इतन्तनाय्यस्मु आकारादेशो भवित विभवती परत:। ‘अष्टनो दीर्घत्व’ इति पाणिनीये सूत्रे दीर्घ-प्रबन्धण ‘अष्टथा औसु’ इतन्तन च आलोचकन्तिनिरूपेन ज्ञात्य यतु आचार्यपाणिनिना ‘अष्टन आ विभवतो’ इतन्तन सूत्रे आलोचकन्तिम्यति।

14 इतन्तन गुणः। — अद्यतन 7.3.108
15 यत्रां नपुस्कं धी वा गुणो वस्तुतः। — सार्वभौमर्यागम 9/8 पृष्ट
16 अद्यतन 7.2.112।
17 आपीति प्रत्याहारः: तुतीयेक्षचनात्प्रभृति सुपु: पकारे।। काशिका, 7.2.112
18 अन दौसः।। — सार्वभौम 10/29 पृष्ट
19 ताओमि अन:। — मलयावागम 4/65
20 दौसंसनकोनान:। — सृजा 205
21 दौसंसनाः।। — सृजा 6.4.79
22 अद्यतन 7.2.84।
23 विकृतेनायाकारो भवित, अद्यतनायि ‘अष्टनो दीर्घत्वः’ (6.1.172) इति दीर्घायणात्, ‘अष्टथा औसु’ (7.1.21) इति च कुक्तस्य निर्देशाः। तेनाद्यतनः, अद्यतन इत्यापि भवित।। काशिका 7.2.84
एवं जापिते सति आपन्नन्यस्य आत्म विकल्पते, तेन अष्टाभि: अष्टभरिति रुपद्वृत्त्य भवति। सारस्वत्वायकरणे तु सारल्याधिक स्पष्ट्रूपणे सृजने एव वाग्रहणं कृतम्।

तेन अष्टाभि: अष्टभरिति रुपद्वृत्त्य सिध्यति। अत्रापि साक्षादेव वाग्रहणे अपत्त: आत्मविकल्पप्रक्रियायं प्रतिपतिलाभं भवति। हैम  

मलयिनिर्व-सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरणे

व्याकरणेऽपि साक्षादेव आत्मविकल्पं निर्धिर्यते।

इत्य्योपयुक्तेऽपूर्वहरणे पाणिन्यप्रक्रिया सारस्वतवायकरणे स्पष्टनिर्देशेन प्रक्रियासारल्यं विस्पर्दं दृष्टान्तविवेच्यते।

उपयुक्तेऽपि निर्देशनेऽपि स्पष्टनिर्देशं निरूपितः।

(ख) प्रक्रियाललचवेण सार्ल्यम्

इदानीः प्रक्रियाललचवेणमाधुर्य सार्ल्यं प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्र हमानुपातहरणानि प्रदर्शयते –

1. देवं: - अतः सारस्वतवायकरणे वकारेष्योविवर्णस्तिनित्यादेशो भवन्त्याधि: सति पदानि च परतः।

यथा - ‘देव-सि’ इत्यत्र अनुत्वत्वोपेष स्वाक्षरं च विस्में सति ‘देव-सि’ रूपं सतित्वं। पाणिन्यप्रक्रियायाम् तु ‘सु’ इत्यत्र रेखः।

रेखस्य च विस्में सति ‘देव-सि’ इति रूपं सिध्यति। पाणिनयेतेर चाद्रः - 'जैनेन्द्र' शाकटायनः - सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरणः व्याकरणेऽपि रेखस्य प्रथाने विस्में विधियते। अत्यन्तर्पूर्वविकल्पांक्षयेष्याम् अनुपूर्तिस्वरूपार्थायं लालचवेण सार्ल्याधिक स्वाक्षरेऽविवर्णनित्यादेशो विविधितः।

2. हर्षं: - अतः सारस्वतवायकरणे इकारान्तस्य उकारान्तस्य च जसि परे एकारः

ओकाराधिक भवन्तः।

यथा - ‘हरि-जसु’ इत्यत्र हरे: इकारस्य एकारे,
एकार्य अयादेश36 च कृते 'हरष:' इति रूपं सिध्यति। जैनेत्र37-पाणिनी38-सरस्वतीकण्ठाभाष्यम्39 व्याकरणपोषु गुणविधानपूर्वकं रूपं साध्यते। अतानुभूतस्तरप्राचार्येण गुणविधानप्रथा इकारेकरोऽयोऽथाने स्यातः। एकार्यासंवर्गेण विहिती प्रतिपत्तिलाभवाय। यतो हि पाणिनीव्याकरणं गुण-विधानाय 'स्थानेनज्ञातं':40 इति परिभाषाश्रयणीयाः।

3. हरौ - सरस्वतेत्र इदुद्विमृत्तरस्य डौ: स्थाने औ भवति स च दितुः41 यथा - 'हरि-डि' इत्यत्र डौ: स्थाने औकारादेशे, डित्वात् 'डिति टे':42 इत्यनन टिलेपे च सति 'हरौ' इति रूपं सिध्यति। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां 'अच्छ घे':43 इत्यनन सूत्रेण विसंजकादुरस्य डौरौकारादेशे, प्रेक्षादेशे, 'बुद्धिषेच्छ':44 इत्यनन सूत्रेण बृहद्ग्रेकारादेशे च सति रूपं सिध्यति। अन्तः पाणिनीये प्रेक्षादेशार्थाप्रक्रियायां प्रतिपत्तिलाभो वर्तते। यतो हि पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां प्रेक्षादेशस्य पर्यायाकारादेशे कृतं एस इति रूपं सिध्यति। तत्र च गौरवं वर्तते।

4. सखा - सरस्वतव्याकरणे सखिशब्दस्य अथे: सेंड़ा भवतीत्वकाम।45 यथा - 'सखि-सि' इत्यत्र से: स्थाने डौरौ डित्वात् टिलोपे46 सति 'सखा' इति रूपं सिध्यति। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां तु अनादेशे,47 उपवेदीचे,48 सूतोपे,49 नलोपे50

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36 ए अवं। - सारोत्स 3/8 पृ०
37 जसै। - जैनोत्स 5.2.104
38 जसै च। - अष्टोत्स 7.3.109
39 जसै च। - सृष्टो 7.2.147
40 अष्टो 1.1.50 ।
41 डौ पेठ। - सारोत्स 7/42 पृ०
42 सारोत्स 7/43 पृ० ।
43 अष्टो 7.3.119 ।
44 अष्टो 6.1.88 ।
45 सेंडादेशः।। - सारोत्स 7/44 पृ०
46 डिति टे।। - सारोत्स 7/43
47 अन्य सौ।। - अष्टो 7.1.93
48 सर्वनामस्य चासम्पुर्ण।। - अष्टो 6.4.8
49 हल्ड्याचेवः दीर्घाचुडिश्चक्षुः हल।। - अष्टो 6.1.68
50 नलोप: प्रतिपदिकाचतः।। - अष्टो 8.2.7
च सति ‘सखा’ इति रूपं निष्पद्वते। पाणिनीयतरत्वान् 51–जैनन्द्र 52–
सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरणेणू 53 व्याकरणविधि अन्वदेशः विधाय रूपं साध्यते। अशेषपुक्त–
व्याकरणप्रयुक्तान्वदेशःप्रक्रियाप्रयोगस्य डारेशःप्रक्रिया सत्संस्कृतया सतला च वर्तन्ते।

5. सरकारियो– अनुभूतस्वरूपचार्यस्य मते सर्वशब्दयैकारादेशो भवति विविषितेपु
पञ्चसु परेषु 54 यथा – ‘सखि–ओ’ इति स्थिते खर्चारोत्वरित्तम इकारस्य
एकारादेशो, आयादेशो। 55 सति ‘सखायो’ इति रूपं सिद्धति। पाणिनीयप्रक्रियायां
tु सखि शब्दद्विध च, सर्वनामस्तथासंज्ञा ‘सु’ ग्रंधो भवति, 56 विविषाच्य बुझि। 57
आयादेशों 58 च सति ‘सखायो’ इति रूपं सिद्धति। पाणिनीयतरजैनन्द्रप्रकरणेपिप। 59
शब्दस्त्र्यृण वृद्धम्। अन्त्र पाणिनीजैनन्द्राध्यायां शब्दमात्रित्मां अनुभूतस्वरूपे
tु नाशितम्। तत्र स्पष्ट्मेव प्रक्ष्याृताचावम्।

6. पिता – सरस्वतव्याकरणे ऋक्षार्थात्तपरस्य से: स्थान आकारादेशो भवति स
tु दित्तो 50 यथा – ‘पितू–सि’ इति स्थिते से: स्थाने आकारादेशो दित्वादित
dितोपें 51 च सति ‘पिता’ इति रूपं सिद्धति। पाणिनीयप्रक्रियायां अन्वदेशों, 52
उपाध्यायोः, 53 सुपोः, 54 नकारादेशोः 55 च सति ‘पिता’ इति रूपं सिद्धति।
pाणिनीयतरत्वान् 60–जैनन्द्र 61–सरस्वतीकण्ठाभरणेणू 62 व्याकरणेष्यपि
अन्नादेशपूर्वकमेव रूपं निषादते। अत्र अन्नादेशपूर्वका अनुभूतिस्वरूपपारायण्य
दिल्लिवर्भटलोपप्रक्रिया लाभवर्धम वर्तते।

7. पिताम् - सारस्वतप्रक्रियायां ऋकारस्यायां भवति पञ्चमसु स्वादिशः परेऽः

- ‘पितृ-ौ’ इत्यत्र ऋकारस्यारदेशे ‘पिताम’ इति रूपं सिद्धितात।
पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां तु गुणे, \[\text{रसर} 7\] च कृते ‘पिताम’ इति रूपं भवति।
पाणिनीयेतसरस्तीतिकण्डः भरणव्याकरणमथपि गुणप्रक्रिया एव रूपं साधयति।

8. गौः - सारस्वतप्रक्रियायामात्र ऋकारस्याकारदेशे भवति पञ्चमसु परेऽः

- ‘गौ-सि’ इत्यर्थ ऋकारस्य औरकारे सकारस्य च विस्तर चतुर्थी ‘गौः’ इति
रूपं सिद्धितात। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां तु गोराशवातः परेऽः ‘सु’ इत्यथा गौरवं व्रृद्धिकृते,
व्रृद्धिच्छ वृद्धी 76 विचारकः गौः इति रूपं सिद्धितात। जैनस्थिरर्ष्येतव
वृद्धिपूर्वकः रूपं साधयते। अत्र पाणिनिजैने-दार्शनिकवाच्याक्षर्वपेश्या
अनुभूतिस्वरूपपारायण्य साधौकारविधायात्र प्रक्रियालचार वर्तते।

9. अन्यत् - सारस्वतप्रक्रियायां अन्यायानारायायाः स्मः: शतुर्भवति।

- ‘अन्य-सि’ इत्यस्तं स्मः: स्थ्यने ‘शतृ’ स्वर्तोदेशो भवति। ततथं ‘अन्यत्’ इति
रूपं सिद्धितात। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायां संह: स्थान अद्वैदेशं दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि
च सति रूपं सिद्धितात। अत्र अनुभूतिस्वरूपपारायण अद्वैदेशपूर्वका शतादेशः
प्रतिपतिलाभवर्धम क्रियते। यतो हि अद्वैदेशं कृते दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि अपेक्षाते
पाणिनीप्रक्रियायाम्।

69 अदृ पञ्चमसु। - सावधान 7/58 पूर्ण
70 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश गौरव 7.3.110
71 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 1.1.51
72 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - सावधान 7.2.61
73 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 7.64 पूर्ण
74 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - सावधान 7.4 पूर्ण
75 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 7.1.90
76 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 7.2.115
77 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 5.1.67
78 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - सावधान 9.6 पूर्ण
79 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - अद्वैदेश 7.1.25
80 अदृ  दिल्लिवर्भटलोपपि। - सावधान 6.4.143
10. शुनः - सारस्वतप्रकृतियां श्वासेवकास्य उत्तर्भवति श्याये र्सरे परे।

11. अद्वः - सारस्वतप्रकृतियांमत्राबादीनां भक्तरे रपे द्वर्भवति।

12. त्वम्-अहम् - अत्र सारस्वतप्रकृतियां सिसहितयोऽवुभद्रसमस्यत्वमहति।

81 श्वासेवक २:१ - सारव्या १०/१५ पृष्ट
82 सोंविसंग: - सारव्या ७/४ पृष्ट
83 श्वयुज्यायोनामहाम सारव्या ६.४.१३३
84 अद्वत ६.१.१०४
85 भि देशाम् - सारव्या ११/८ पृष्ट
86 अद्वत ७.४.४८
87 अद्वत ८.२.३९
88 त्वमहि सिना - सारव्या १३/१ पृष्ट
89 अद्वत ७.१.२८
90 अद्वत ७.२.९४
91 अद्वत ६.१.९४
92 अद्वत ७.२.९०
‘अमि पूर्वः’ः ९३ इत्यनेन च पूर्वरूपे कृते लम्बायित्व रूपे सिद्धतः। अत्र पाणिनेपेश्या अनुभूतिस्वप्राप्ताचर्यैस्य सिद्धितपूर्वमहत्मस्वः। स्थाने लम्बायिदेशाप्रकृतिया संक्षेपिता सरला च वर्तते।

13. युग्म-वयम् - सारस्वतप्रक्रियायां जसा सहितपूर्वमहत्मद्वृत्त व्यममिलतवादेशी भवतः। ९४ यथा - ‘युग्मद्-जसू’ ‘अस्मद्-जसू’ इत्यत्र जससहितपूर्वमहत्मद्वृत्त:। स्थाने यूग्म व्यममिलनयोदेशायाः कृतयो: यूग्म व्यममिलन रूपे सिद्धतः। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायाः युग्मद्-जसू, अस्मद्-जसू इत्यत्र ‘ड्योथम्यस्य’ ९५ इत्यनेन अधाते, ‘यूग्मद्वृत्त जसू’ ९६ इत्यनेन यथासंख्यं यूग्मवादेशायाः कृतयो: यूग्म अद्-अम्, वय अद्-अम् इति सिद्धते ‘अतो गुणं’, ९७ इत्यनेन पररूपे, ‘शेषे लोपः’ ९८ इत्यनेनान्यस्य दकारस्य लोपे, पूर्वरूपे ९९ च कृते यूग्म व्यममिलन रूपे सिद्धतः।

14. तुध्यम-महम् - अत्र सारस्वतप्रक्रियायां ड्योथम्यस्यपूर्वमहत्मद्वृत्त:। स्थाने यथासंख्यं तुध्यं महम्मिलनयोदेशायाः कृतयो:। १०० तुध्यं महम्मिलन रूपे सिद्धतः। पाणिनीप्रक्रियायाः युग्मद्-डें, अस्मद्-डें, इत्यत्र ‘ड्योथम्यस्य’ १०१ इत्यनेन अधाते ‘तुध्यमहं डय’ १०२ इत्यनेन यथासंख्यं तुध्यमहादेशायाः कृतयो:, तुध्य-अद्-अम्, मद्य अद्-अम् इति सिद्धते पररूपे, १०३ दकारस्य लोपे, १०४ पूर्वरूपे १०५ च संि तुध्यं महम्मिलन रूपे सिद्धतः।

15. तब-मम - अत्रापि सारस्वतप्रक्रियायां ड्योथम्यस्यपूर्वमहत्मद्वृत्त:। स्थाने यथासंख्यं
तवममयोगादेशायो: कृत्यों: 106 तब ममति रूपे सिध्यत:। पाणिनीयांक्रियां
युमद-डस, अस्मद-डस इत्यं ‘युमदमद्वर्गों डसोंश्र’ 107 इत्यनेन अशादेसो,
‘तवममयो डस’ 108 इत्यनेन तवममयो: च तब अद्व-अशु, मम अद्व-अशु
दिति सिध्यते ‘अतो गुणों’ 109 इत्यनेन परसः, ‘शोधे लोपे:’ 110 इत्यनेन तिलोप
पक्षे 111 अद्व भागस्य लोपे तव ममति रूपे सिध्यत:।

उपर्युक्ते युमदसंस्करणो: प्रसःनु अनुभूतिस्वरूपप्रकारण पाणिनीयांवृति प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोंरुपभयो: स्थान आदेशप्रक्रियामाध्यमेन महत्तावाव सार्थ्याव विहितम।

निष्कर्षः
संस्कृतस्वत्वाकरणस्य सुमहत्स्वप्यायामरोपिष्येयस्मात्वाचार्यपाणिनेत्स्रकाणां नैकेव वैवधारणः:
प्रादुर्भवन। तेषुन्नूर्तिस्वरूपप्रकारणस्य 106 अनेन विदुपा तात्ताकलिकप्रमाक्यावेन
लघुस्मिद्धत्वः भ्य: वैवधारणायथावृत्तः: पाणिन्यालिव्याकरणप्रक्षया लघुतरस्वत्वाकरणप्रथो
व्याचि। येन ग्रेनें स्वत्त्स्वप्रमेण अद्वयेन च कालेन सहजया व्याकरणावबोधो यथा
स्थात। तथेऽवैवधारणः: सार्थ्यस्वत्वाकरण नामिन स्वत्वार्थस्य प्रतिज्ञानिते —
प्राणम्य परमात्मानं बालशरीरिविशिष्टः।
सार्थ्यस्वत्त्स्रूयु कुवे प्रक्रियायां नातिविश्वसाधु॥

अत एव तत्र तत्र सार्थ्यस्वत्वाकरण पाणिन्यप्रक्षया लाभवं सार्थ्यचावलोक्यते। यद्यपि
वैज्ञानिकी पाणिनीयांक्रिया, पुनर्पि सार्थ्यस्वत्वाकरणप्रणेता अनुभूतिस्वरूपप्रार्थणा: लघुतां
सरलां च अधिकालश्किर्ष्यति। तस्मातेव सुन्त्तसर्वस्य कर्षिनु वाचायने कुञ्जतु गुणादि
स्वस्फलत्त्वास साक्षात् साध्विनविवेहन सक्तोच्च प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोंरुपों: स्थाने सवदिशं कृत्वा
प्रकृत्यालाभवं विहितम। येन कोमलतमाशो बाला अधि अनन्यासेतैव व्यक्तिरणज्ञान प्राप्यू॥

सन्दर्भ-सूत्रसूची
अष्टाध्यायोः — आचार्यपाणिनिप्रणीति: अष्टाध्यायसूत्रस्तः:, सम्पा० पण्डितब्रह्मदत्तज्ञासु, बहालगढ़ सोनीपत, रामलाल कपूर ट्रस्ट, ई०सन० 1956 ल।

106तवममय डस। — साधन 13/11 पृ०
107अष्ट 7.1.27
108अष्ट 7.2.96
109अष्ट 6.1.94
110अष्ट 7.2.90
111कृपिशु शोधे लोपे तिलोपप्रमित्वान। — काशिका 7.2.90
काशिका - श्रीवामननवर्ादित्यविरिति पाणिनिवास्यायायायमस्युक्तिः, सम्पा० विजयमालो विद्याधरिषि; बालागाढ़, सोनीपत, रामलाल कुप्रू ट्रस्ट, ई०सन० 1956।

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जैनेन्द्रयाकरणम् - पूर्ण्यपाददेवनिदिवरिति जैनेन्द्रयाकरणः तस्य टीका आचार्यभूषणदिप्रणीता जैनेन्द्रमहावृति; सम्पा० पण्डितमहमुदाध त्रिपाठी, सहायक पण्डितमहजादेव चतुर्जी, काशी, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, ई०सन० 1956।

पदमञ्ज्री - श्रीहदात्मश्रीरिति पदमञ्ज्री (वामनबदित्यविरिति: काशिकाया व्याख्या) सम्पादको आ. डॉ. पुलेल श्री रामचन्द्र, विनेतन सुदर्शन, दौ भागो, हैदराबाद, संस्कृत परिषद्, उद्यमिनविश्वविद्यालय, ई०सन० 1969-85।

महाभाष्यम् - श्रीमद्रावणक्तज्ञलिमितिनिरितं ध्वजकरणमहाभाष्यम् महामहोपाध्याय-श्रीं नागो ज्ञेंद्र गौरेश्वरित महाभाष्य - प० दो पाठों हवा तो द्वारसिदते न महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकैयोपाध्याय विरितेन प्रदीपेन विराजितम्, सम्पा० श्रीमुकुलस्वाद शास्त्री, नवभाग; दिल्ली, प्रतिभा प्रकाशन, ई०सन० 1938, नृभःसंस्करणम्।

मुद्राभंधुव्याकरणम् - महामहोपाध्यायो श्रीमितावं पदें वें विरितम् श्रीमददुरागादसविद्याधारी - श्रीराममं स्वागो-कृत टीकामेतम्। पण्डितकुलपतिनाच ए उपाधिधारिणा श्री जीवानन्दविद्यासागरभट्टचार्येण संस्कृत प्रकाशितव्यायम्। वाराणसी, चौथम्बा विद्याभवन, ई०सन० 1994।

शाकटायनव्याकरणम् - पाल्यकौरोशाचार्यनानन्दप्रणीतं शाकटायनव्याकरणम्, अमोघवृत्तिसहितम्, सम्पा० श्रमुदाध त्रिपाठी, दिल्ली, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ प्रकाशन, ई०सन० 1971।

सरस्वतीकण्ठभाष्यम् - श्रीमें जदेव वर्णनीति सरस्वतीकण्ठभाष्यं श्रीनारायणदुरागं विरितया हृदयारिण्यावलया वृत्त्या समेतम्, केंद्र साधारणिवाचारिणा संस्कृतीम्। अनन्तशास्त्रसंस्कृतग्रंथावलि: तिब्बतम्, महोत्तमहामहिमश्रीचित्रातात्ममहाराजशास्त्रां रश्कौभाराण्यन्त्रलेयो तद्व्यक्षेप मुद्रितम् प्रकाशितम्। ई०सन० 1935।
सारस्वत्वाकरणम् - अनुभूतिस्वरूपाचार्यप्रणीतं सारस्वत्वाकरणं श्रीचन्द्रकौरीति 
सूतिप्रणीतचन्द्रकौरीतिनाम्यसुभोधिकथा व्याख्याया, श्रीवासुदेवभट्टाचार्यम्
प्रसादवार्थीकथा च समन्वितम् . . . यस्मात् श्रीनवकर्मोपत्स्वास्तिकणे निरंतरतया 
मनोरमया चित्तुत्त्वम् समुद्भासितम्। द्वाभागी। काशीसंस्कृतप्रथमाला 111, बाराणसी, 
चौथम्भा संस्कृत संस्थान, ई०सन् 1985।

सिद्धांतशब्दानुशासनम् - कालिकालसर्वं श्रीहं मचन्द्रचार्य विकारितं 
श्रीसिद्धांतमचन्द्रशब्दानुशासनमुद्दत्वप्रकाशकाणया बृहदवृत्तम् समन्वितम् सम्पादितम्।
- व्याकरणचार्य पन्यप्रश्रीमचन्द्रविजयो गणिता। द्वाभागी। मुंबई, श्री 
अमृतजैनसाहित्यवर्धकसंस्था, ई०सन् 1972।

ऐतिहासिकग्रन्थ:
मीमांसक, युधिष्ठिर, संस्कृत-व्याकरणशास्त्र का इतिहास, बहालगढ़, सोनीपत, 
रामलाल कपूर ट्रस्ट, ई०सन् 1950।

संक्षेपताक्षरसूची
अष्टादशसंक्षर - अष्टाध्यायी
चार्यत्वविषयक - चार्यत्वविषयक
जैत्तविषयक - जैत्तविषयक
पृथ्वी - पृथ्वी
पृथ्वी - पृथ्वी
महाभारत - महाभारत
महाभारतांश - महाभारतांश
मलय - मलयांश
mलयांशनाम - मलयांशनाम-नाम
मुङ - मुङ
शाब्दविषय - शाब्दविषय
संस्कृत - संस्कृत
सारस्वत - सारस्वतविषय
sावधान - सावधान
सिद्धांत - सिद्धांतशब्दानुशासनम्
शिवराजविज्ञायस्य शाब्दिकदृष्ट्या समीक्षणम्

डॉ. परमानंद झा

अवतरणम्
संस्कृतसाहित्यकलात इतिहासमत्या आधुनिकम् उपन्यासविभागम् अवतारयनः प्रायोण सतंत्र विचित्रशैलीविज्ञानभित्रः श्रीमद्व्यासाध्विकादर्शवाचर्यः शिवराजविज्यो नाम वेयाकरणां वहृपकारको गद्यप्रबन्धः। पदे पदे सुविशिष्टानां सन्तोषबन्धवत्वकारको। संस्कृतप्रत्ययसन्धानम् सातिंत्रां गूँवततिंत-नकृत्तानां पदानामपृण विहितः प्रत्ययप्रयोगः। प्रस्तुतां प्रश्नाते चेतासं चालक्तः। साहित्येन सह बहुततरेशार्दृशत्रोपकारितमवेश्वरे अर्थांशः। शिलाविठ्ठ्यप्रेमस्थोर्भं देशे विदेशेशु च प्रायः सकलेषुचावचेषु संस्कृतिशासिप्रेमकेशलेलेनाजीकृतः। प्रयोगवस्य तीनांतिकासमावेश्वराम पर्यालोचनातो शाब्दिकदृष्ट्या नैको चालकारिकः कतिपये चिन्तायण प्रयोगार्चकुष्माण्डाः। वानिकीकृत्य संस्तोत्तो विचारः। परमावशयः परिधारणतः प्रकारणः प्रस्तुतः।

सन्ध्यः
शिवराजविज्यकारः काश्यपसिनिन् प्रायशः सकलानु सन्धिनु यथावसरध्रस्य प्रयुक्तानोक्तिक इत्य्यमको चालितकाराणां प्रकारमध्यो दृश्यः। स्वरसन्धिषु पित्रनुमितः, नौमितः, चौमितः-इत्यय यणु-पररूपः-कार्यः विशिष्ट निर्दर्शनमात्रायते।

व्यञ्जनसन्धिषु वंशारंशः, जनांशः, अस्मान्ताशः, बिनिद्वांशस्यः, परांस्तोष्यितुमूः

1 शिवराजविज्ञयः (शिष्यः), निर्दासः: 9, पृथमः 69
2 तत्रः 8.233
3 तत्रः 8.252
4 इवो यणशः (पा.सू. 6.7.77)।
5 बायादशः (पा.सू. 6.1.95)।
6 शिष्यः: 1.23
7 तत्रः 1.27
8 तत्रः 1.28
9 तत्रः 1.73
10 शिष्यः: 5.8
इत्यादिदु नश्च्चन्वप्रशाना० इतिसृष्टिासिणितस्थय रूचविधंशयोगों कवि: सातिशयमिभिमिचिं
दर्शयति। तन्नभामलन:१२, उच्चलच्छोणित-१३, मच्छिब्रम०१४ इत्यादिदु चचत्वस्थय,
प्रणमनुवाच१५, विदनपि१६, तरसिमनेव१७ इत्यादिदु नुडागमस्थ्१८, तद्रथस्तातु१९ इत्यादी
पूर्वसवर्णस्त० चापो विविध्याः प्रयोगः: कविना प्रदशिताः। विसर्गसर्द्धरु स्वादिस्वन्धिकु
च पुनः पुना रोदित्युव२१, अस्माभी राज्यात्२२, सन्धी राजधर्म२३ इत्यादिदु रेकलोपस्य२४,
शाखात् उत्तराय२५, युध्य उत्तपेत२६, सिङ्हुरु एव२७, मार्ग एव२८, इत्यादिदु यलोपस्य२९
च विशिष्ट्यः प्रयोगः: प्रेक्षणपथमवतरति। पुनरहू३० इतीय योगां प्रस्तुतात कविना रूचसमबन्धः
नो रेफस्ठैव यल्ल३१ लोण३२ योगशिल्य समारत्म०३३।

य एत०३४ इत्यत्र कविना प्रदशितां यलोप३५वनु चिन्त्य एव, ये इति प्रकरणात्

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11 प्र.सू. 8.3.7  
12 श्र.यत्रि. 2.100  
13 तत्त्व 3.152  
14 तत्त्व 9.95  
15 तत्त्व 2.58  
16 तत्त्व 2.70, 6.62  
17 तत्त्व 2.103  
18 दोमो इस्वादित्व डमुयू नित्यम् (प्र.सू. 8.3.32)।  
19 श्र.यत्रि. 5.2, 8.226  
20 प्र.सू. 8.4.62  
21 श्र.यत्रि. 1.18  
22 तत्त्व 6.81  
23 तत्त्व 9.95  
24 ये राजः (प्र.सू. 8.3.14।)  
25 श्र.यत्रि. 3.158  
26 तत्त्व 5.9  
27 तत्त्व 5.29  
28 तत्त्व 6.49  
29 लोण: शाकल्यस्य (8.3.19।)  
30 श्र.यत्रि. 9.39  
31 भौमण्डोअच्छोआच्छोस्य योंश (प्र.सू. 8.3.17।)  
32 लोण: शाकल्यस्य (प्र.सू. 8.3.19।)  
33 अलो ये:० (प्र.सू. 6.1.113) इत्यत्र 'ये:' इत्यस्य फलमेतत्।  
34 श्र.यत्रि. 7.122  
35 लोण: शाकल्यस्य (प्र.सू. 8.3.19।)
श्रीलिङ्गपर्य एद्यतालिकवनस्य ३६ प्रमूहसंस्य ३७ प्रयूक्तेन प्रकृतिभावेन ३८ अयादेशलोककार्यो ३९ रशक्तचालात।

श्रेणी:
अपेन्द्र, विश्वेश्वर, विश्वविद्यालय, निजरसाम, संनाथ, संनाथ, दक्षिणसाम, उत्तरसाम, पथो, पथो, पथो, अध्वा, यूताम, मचवाम, योगिराज, योगिराज, इत्यादिभु सुबन्तप्रयोगों सर्वनामीभूतात्माविश्व–निजरसेनानी–

dक्षणोत्तरा–परित्य–अध्व–युतान–मधवन–योगिराजादि राज्यां विशिष्टानि रूपाणि समवलोक्यन्ते। एनम, एनम, नगरमन, इत्यादि मध्यवर्त्त्य अन्वादेशाविषयनिवः

36 अत्र प्रसङ्गः सुन्दरः पूर्वपरामस्को पर्यवे:।
37 ईदद्यतालिकवन प्रमूहसंस्य (पां.सू. 1.1.11)।
38 पुलप्रमूहा अचि नित्यम् (पां.सू. 6.1.125)।
39 एनो ग्यथायायः (पां.सू. 6.1.78), लोपः (पां.सू. 8.3.19)।
40 श्र.वि. 4.193
41 तृतीय 1.5, 2.81
42 तृतीय 12.304
43 तृतीय 10.131
44 तृतीय 7.190
45 तृतीय 7.182
46 तृतीय 3.157
47 तृतीय 3.157
48 तृतीय 1.4
49 तृतीय 3.157
50 तृतीय 11.225
51 तृतीय 3.145
52 तृतीय 4.188
53 तृतीय 4.168
54 तृतीय 1.12
55 तृतीय 1.13
56 तृतीय 2.54, 7.145, 10.129
57 तृतीय 3.45, 4.194
58 श्र.वि. 7.159
नानि एन⁵⁹-एनदेशों⁶⁰ घटितानि विशिष्टानि सुवनतरुपाणि काव्येःसमनु कवि:
प्रकाशामनयथिः। जानेंहि वा⁶¹, नौ वादयति⁶², नौ विनां⁶³, न यूयं वा⁶⁴, नौ चेतः⁶⁵
इत्यादिः युगदर्शमोः: वानी-आदेशोः⁶⁶ विशिष्टानि वायोधारणानि कविना प्रदर्शितानि।
एवमेव अतदद्⁶⁷, विधताः⁶⁸, अभिदक्षता⁶⁹, विद्धता⁷⁰, परिजह्दः⁷¹ इत्यादिः नाम्यस्ताच्छुषः। ⁷²
इतिसुत्रविचित्रो नुभावावशः: कविना सुतां स्मरितः। ⁷³ निपदवविनिर्दुनिः नयने⁷⁴, माधुः
र्षवर्षिणि अक्षणि⁷⁵, तेजस्वीरि अपत्यानि⁷⁶ इत्यादिः प्रयोगेशु कविना कलित्वप्रयुक्तो
नुभृविधः। ⁷⁷ साधु निदर्शयते।

सेनानीनाम्⁷⁸ इति प्रयोगस्तु चिन्तय एव, एरेकाचोःसंयोगपूर्वस्यांति⁷⁹ वणूशास्त्रस्य
जागरूकत्वात् सेनानयाम् इति रूपस्येव समुचितत्वात्। विशविस्मिनिः विश्वसिमनु⁸⁰ इत्यत्र

⁵⁹ द्वितीयावस्तेन: (पा.सू. 2.4.34)।
⁶⁰ अन्वादेशे नपुसके एन्दु बक्तवः: (सिं.कौं, हलतननपुसकलिङ्गकरणे)। एनविद्ति नपुसके कवचने
(2.4.34 वा।)।
⁶¹ शिविर. 3.120
⁶² तत्वेन 3.129
⁶³ शिविर. 3.136
⁶⁴ तत्वेन 3.146, 3.159
⁶⁵ तत्वेन 3.148
⁶⁶ युगदर्शमोः: चाँदीचतुघ्रःद्वितीयाष्ट्रयोजनाय (पा.सू. 8.1.20)।
⁶⁷ शिविर. 2.51
⁶⁸ तत्वेन 6.99
⁶⁹ तत्वेन 6.115
⁷⁰ तत्वेन 8.113, 8.220
⁷¹ तत्वेन 4.168
⁷² पा.सू. 7.1.78
⁷³ एषु उदाहरणेः उभे अभ्यस्तम् (पा.सू. 6.1.5) इति अभ्यस्तसंसाः।
⁷⁴ शिविर. 1.23
⁷⁵ तत्वेन 4.123
⁷⁶ तत्वेन 4.176
⁷⁷ नपुसकस्य झलच: (पा.सू. 7.1.72)।
⁷⁸ शिविर. 2.78
⁷⁹ पा.सू. 6.4.82
⁸⁰ शिविर. 12.304
शिवराजविजयस्य शाबिद्धकृत्या समीक्षणम्  317

संसारवाचिनि द्वितीयसिनू विश्वशादे सर्वनामत्वप्रयुक्तः सिमनादेशोपि नैवोचितः।
सर्वादिगणे सर्वासाहचर्यात् सर्ववाचकस्पौव विश्वशाश्वद्य सर्वनामतया: शाबिद्धकाचारयः
स्थिरोकृतत्वादः। वाचममुमाकरणः इत्यज्ञ अमूम इति स्थाने अमूम इत्यतेत्तु दीर्घरूपमेव
प्रयोजयुः, अदस्तोजसौदू दौ मः। इत्यज्ञ उ इति ह्रसवधीर्ययोः: समाहारद्वादू अदयशाश्वद्य
स्त्रीलिङ्गे तदादृश्य दीर्घरूपस्याततत्तम्यादा विधानात्। वृद्धोशोः, अदस्तोपि वचः।
इतनोवर्क्योपरिपु वृद्धोशयम्, इदमपि वचः: इतीमे इदमृशाश्वरूपे एव सज्ज्ते,

इदमस्तु सनिन्त्वे, समीपतरवति चैतदे रूपम्।
अदस्तस्तु विप्रकृतः, तदिति परोऽश विधानीयात्।

इति वचनातु वर्तुतु सनिन्त्वप्रस्तु अदयः प्रयोगस्य अनूचितत्वात्। तदवल्लयः,
तदालम्बः। इति प्रयोगयोपिपि स्थाने क्रमात् तं ताम इत्यते पुस्त्रीलिङ्गेविशारदेतत्त्वादु
एव प्रयोज्ये, तथा: प्रस्तुते प्रकरणे क्रमात्: वैश्यदुःखलाश्योः: पूर्वप्रामार्शित्वात्। त्रिशादः
वा वीरानु सह नीत्यवाय इत्यग्रापि त्रिशात वीरानु-इत्येष एव प्रयोगः: आपसममतः,

यल्लिङ्ग, यदृ वचनं, यथा च विभवक्तर्विवेश्यस्य।
तल्लिङ्ग, तदु वचनं, सा च विभवक्तिविवेश्यप्रणयापिी।

इति नियमादृ वीरानु इति द्वितीयान्तविवेश्यपदादुरूपं द्विशाच्चवदापि तादृश्यः
द्वितीयानं विभवकोरकरवर्षकत्वात्।

81 द्रष्टव्यम् — महाभाष्यम् — सर्वादिनि सर्वनामानि (प्र.सू. 1.1.27) इति सूत्रोपरि।
82 शि.वि. 12.288
83 पा.सू. 8.2.80
84 शि.वि. 9.37
85 तत्त्व 12.307
86 प्रुद्ष्टमार्मावयं हलनपुलिंग्रकरणेः इदमृशाश्वयाख्याप्रस्तुं उद्धृतं पद्यम्।
87 शि.वि. 11.187
88 तत्त्व 11.187
89 तत्त्व 9.37
90 प्राचीनोक्तिरिम्, मूलं मूर्यम्।
स्त्रीप्रत्ययः:
स्त्रीप्रत्ययेषु लक्ष्मणान्, स्मयमाना, इश्क्मणा–इत्यादिभु कविना टाप्रत्ययस्य निदर्शनानि प्रस्तुताने। लोचनरोचिकाः हि इत्यादिभु टापि परे इत्विवधे, तारकापटलम् हि इत्यादिभु तद्भावस्य चोदाहरणानि कविः प्रस्तूति। अनुभवती, पश्यती, पर्यटनी, प्रवहनी, दहती, ध्यायती इत्येंदु उगित्तर्मेति विहितस्य डोपो मालिकें कविना काल्येसमन् प्रकाशानीतांश्च। सहै, रुदती, निर्बसती, निधनती, विन्धती, चिन्यती, तिरस्कृतती, कृत्ती, इत्यादिभु कविना व्यासेन शास्त्रप्रत्ययस्यवर्णान्तधातुथः परं विहितत्वाभावः नुम्भाभावः सुतां स्मारितः।

91 श्र. वि. 8.209
92 तत्रैव 8.209
93 तत्रैव 8.219
94 अजाधतपापः (प्र.सू. 4.1.4)।
95 श्र. वि. 4.169
96 प्रत्ययस्याद् कांश् पूर्वस्यात् इदायाः (प्र.सू. 7.3.44)।
97 श्र. वि. 10.146
98 तारका ज्योतिषि (सिसौ. प यासयोः (प्र.सू. 7.3.45) हि सूते) हि नियमात्।
99 श्र. वि. 7.155
100 तत्रैव 12.322
101 तत्रैव 10.116
102 तत्रैव 11.254
103 तत्रैव 4.164
104 श्र. वि. 12.272
105 तत्रैव 4.181
106 तत्रैव 7.149
107 तत्रैव 5.152
108 तत्रैव 7.179
109 तत्रैव 10.116
110 तत्रैव 10.116
111 तत्रैव 11.192
112 तत्रैव 4.188
113 तत्रैव 7.139
एवं एक पुस्तकम्।

कारकाणि

कविव्यासां विभिन्नानां सिद्धांशाणां कारकोपपदविभक्तिनां प्रयोगानि प्रस्तुते गद्यन्ये पुस्तकं पादमुपदर्यानि। तथाहि -

कुशलवाचिता: आलम् 127, अस्मानु निन्हावति 128, भवन्तमाशिपो बुद्धवति 129, महाराजस्वत ग्राणिः मां ग्राहविष्यति 130, राजमाता कुशलमावदनियाः 131, बन्धुविद्यागुंडः स्मारित इव 132
इत्यादिद् स्थलेषु कविना द्वितीयाविभक्तेनविशिष्टः प्रयोगः: समुपस्थापितः सति।

श्रीमर्गः द्वितीयः, द्वाढ़ति भवनम्, द्वितीयः: स्थलोऽपि प्रयुक्ता द्वितीया तु चिन्त्येव प्रतिभाति, क्रुद्धवद्यर्थः। इत्यादिद्वात्रिकाविभक्तेन भवम्भवनाविभक्ताः: ओचित्यात्। एवमेवम्: द्वादशोऽपि गच्छताम्, न गर्भायस्य: परितः। इत्युनयः: स्थलयः: कविना प्रयुक्ता षड्ष असंयता भावः, अभितः: परितः: समावक्षापिन्ते। एवोपि परित: इतिवर्तिन्यभवनात् मां: परितः; नागरं: परितः: इतिप्रस्थऽयोऽपि समुचितत्वाऽरुत।

अकृत्याः सुन्दरः: वर्णेण: गौरः: जदाभिस्तापसः। वैयोऽपि समम्, मन्त्रां स्वरणोऽरुत, अन्तः बायामलापशते। इत्येवऽपि स्थलेषु विश्वास्तृतीयात्प्रयोगः: कविन्तरः: निभालनीयः।

तेन साशकारः। इत्यत्र तु तस्यविषयं षड्ष भविष्यितः, कृत्वकर्मणोऽपि: कृत्ति: तिशास्तम: जागरुकत्वाऽरुत। एवमेव अवतोक्तकम् तथ। इत्यमारिका इत्यतत्त्वाऽपि: तिताः। कर्मरी प्रथमायाः: विधानाऽरुत। लक्ष्यः विस्तारः। इति स्थानेः अपि: लक्ष्यः इति पञ्चमेव प्रयोक्तमुचिता प्रतिभाति, विभागे: सति: अवधिभूताऽरुत: पञ्चम्यः: विधानाऽरुत।

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133 कः.कः. 6.102
134 तत्त्वः 11.210
135 फ्र.सू. 1.4.37
136 कः.कः. 7.121
137 तत्त्वः 11.187
138 कर्मणि द्वितीयः (फ्र.सू. 2.3.2) इति सुवे समवाचिक्षापािहयोगूपसंख्याम् (व्रा. 1) इति वाविकापूर्तकम्, तत: भाष्यम्: अपर: आह्यम्: द्वितीयाविभाजनेभितः: परितः: समवाचिक्षापािह्याधिक्षिप्योगूपसंख्याम्। इति।
139 कः.कः. 1.6
140 तत्त्वः 1.26
141 तत्त्वः 2.62
142 तत्त्वः 7.138
143 तत्त्वः 4.170
144 फ्र.सू. 2.3.65
145 कः.कः. 7.186
146 प्रथमान्तरम्: अनिलितमि (फ्र.सू. 2.3.1) इतिभिकारऽतु।
147 कः.कः. 8.260
148 अपालने पञ्चमी (फ्र.सू. 2.3.28)।
सहसराय चरित्र स्वरूप 149, तृतीय मन्यमान 150, भवनिधित्वास्वरूप रोचना भवतोऽः। 
क्षेलनातिः 151, हृद रोचने युमभयाम् 152-इत्येवतृटशशास्त्रविकारिकः प्रयोगः। चतुर्थीविभक्तोपि 
कविना समुपासिता। सन्निः।

पञ्चमयां प्रकृष्टि प्रयोगः: पुनः।- ऋतु दुराचारात् 153, अपर। शिववीरात् 154, धर्मदपि 
निर्माणकारात् 155, मन्दिरदारात् 156, वेशनादारात् 157, न निजकायांनिवर्तते 158 इत्यदिपु स्थलेनु 
शास्त्रिःः। समावादः।

षष्ठिः पुनः।- असीनामेकमाकृष्टि 159, प्राणे बधानामशवाना कौँचीच्छवंदेगाः 160, 
भारतवर्षस्मार्णाः 161, दयतामिकिलाना दामोदरः 162 इत्यादियो विशिष्टा। प्रयोगः: प्रेशावतां 
लोचनां। समुपलासयित।

प्रत्याथिनामाकमण्डी विभास्यिति 163, दुराचारस्य न कोऽपि स्तिऊति 164। इत्यनयोः 
स्थलोत्तृः क्रमशः। प्रत्यधिकु, दुराचारस्य/दुराचारस्य इतीमें रूपे एव। प्रयोक्तुमुच्यते। 
मन्दिरस्य पश्चिममतः 165, मन्दिरस्य पूर्वतः 166 इत्यन थलेपि मन्दिरस्येति षट्येव समुचिता, 
तत्र दिनयोगपण्यांम प्राणव्य षट्ययुतस्थित्यत्रत्यनेनेन्ति 168 षट्यशास्त्रस्य जागरूकत्वात्। 

149 शिव.विष. 7.70 
150 तत्तव 9.150 
151 तत्तव 7.135 
152 तत्तव 9.81 
153 तत्तव 2.64 
154 तत्तव 3.115 
155 तत्तव 3.153 
156 तत्तव 3.153 
157 तत्तव 3.153 
158 तत्तव 4.166 
159 तत्तव 1.37 
160 तत्तव 3.130 
161 तत्तव 1.49 
162 तत्तव 12.338 
163 तत्तव 7.174 
164 तत्तव 12.366 
165 तत्तव 4.178 
166 तत्तव 10.113 
167 अन्वयार्द्धतत्तवोऽ (पासू. 2.3.29)। 
168 पासू. 2.3.30
एवमेव कुमारीं ममार्पिततुमुः\textsuperscript{169} इत्यार्थापि महामिति प्रयोज्यम्, दानाक्रिकाभासूना योगे 
चतुथ्या: \textsuperscript{170} एव सहोदरणाय।

समस्यां विभवस्त्र निलोच्छिति मार्त्तोभुद्धले\textsuperscript{171}, समपरंतपावनानकृति गुरू \textsuperscript{172}, 
अरमतिते मरीचिमालिनं \textsuperscript{173}, कथयतस् सदस्यो वर्गाः \textsuperscript{174}, समुद्रशायिनि निविवेद्यिषु: \textsuperscript{175}
इत्यादि: हद्यः प्रयोगः काव्यकृतप्रवन्ते प्रस्तुता:।

समासः

समासः: समुपवर्णनाप्रधानान् साहित्यकाव्यानां साहित्यकाव्यानां प्राणभूतः मन्यन्ते। समासेऽथ विषय
तत्पुर्वहुहुहिस्त्वा द्वीपेष्टतरणेऽं ललितललितानि पदकद्विकानि संगमक्र्षण कविकुर्जः:
काव्यसौऽन्येऽं परां काण्यां नयन्तः। कविर्यासाम्भवादत्रोषं पत्रुलचूरि त्रस्तादुगुणोपेतानां 
समस्तपदानां प्रयोगे परमं पात्रवृट्तं ध्वते। कविर्यं तत्र तत्र प्रसंज्ञे प्रायसः: समेषां समासानां 
विशिष्यनि निदर्शनानि प्रतीतिता। तथा हि -

अव्यवहीने—निरंदेशकः\textsuperscript{76}, निरंशकः\textsuperscript{177}, समंखे\textsuperscript{78}, सोल्यासन\textsuperscript{179}, प्रतिगोपुरं प्रतिपिल्ल\textsuperscript{180}, 
आलंकरम् आविन्ध्यं च\textsuperscript{181}, अनुतिम्\textsuperscript{182}, उपकरणं\textsuperscript{183} इत्यादिषु थथलेषु विशिष्यनि 
सामासिकक्षापणेण आकलन्तुं शाक्यानि।

\textsuperscript{169} शि.वि. 11.209
\textsuperscript{170} चतुश्च मन्यन्ते (प्र.सू. 2.3.13)।
\textsuperscript{171} शि.वि. 7.166
\textsuperscript{172} तत्त्रेऽव 1.113
\textsuperscript{173} तत्त्रेऽव 5.114
\textsuperscript{174} तत्त्रेऽव 1.28
\textsuperscript{175} तत्त्रेऽव 2.48
\textsuperscript{176} तत्त्रेऽव 1.33
\textsuperscript{177} तत्त्रेऽव 10.118
\textsuperscript{178} तत्त्रेऽव 2.78, 9.95
\textsuperscript{179} तत्त्रेऽव 11.240
\textsuperscript{180} तत्त्रेऽव 11.240
\textsuperscript{181} तत्त्रेऽव 12.373
\textsuperscript{182} तत्त्रेऽव 11.238
\textsuperscript{183} तत्त्रेऽव 12.349
तत्पुरुषे-परस्सहसा: 184, कविवर्णम् 185, शाकाधिक: 186, महानाथाश्रमा: 187, दिनकारिय: 188, स्वेदाक्षी कपोलाऔ 189, दास्या: पुन: 190, प्रेमवार्ता: 191, टिप्पणिपृष्ठित: 192, इत्यादियो विशिष्टाः: प्रयोगः: दृष्टिगोचरीभवति।

वहुःविहितमसास्मे कविर्यं लघुलघून विशेषणानां प्रसुतिभीः काव्यस्तुनि पद्मा पुणे नवलोकयते। यथा - निःश्रोतरध्वनिनिध्वनितिविद्यते: फलपतलादचंपलित- चन्द्रुपतिकक्षाक्रमणाधिकविनतशाखशाखिसूमह्यात्: सुन्दरकरः: पर्वतविण्ड: 193, चन्द्रचन्द्रितभालः: कपूरगुरुस्त्रपुरितक्षोभानुवन: 194, समाचारदितललाट- कपोलनासाध्यायोऽः 195, कमीयकपोलपालि: प्रसन्नवनन्दोभ्यार्दितोछमतुद्वसुनन्तसाह: 196, समिद्वशः: 197, धारितारितपरिधानाम्: रश्कुलवसनाम् 198 इत्यादि। किंच सतीयः 199, दिरः 200, पत्निः 201, कुन्दकोक्षापतिः 202, लशुगणितमिनिनिश्वास: 203, इत्यादिपाणि 204, कुमुदेन्द्र वनः 205 इत्यादियो बहुःविहितमसानिवन्दनानि विशिष्टकाथायणि कविना अनायासं स्मार्यते।

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184 श्र. वि. 1.6
185 तत्रेव 1.41
186 तत्रेव 3.115
187 तत्रेव 3.155
188 तत्रेव 3.57
189 तत्रेव 12.369
190 तत्रेव 7.163
191 तत्रेव 8.220
192 तत्रेव 6.74
193 तत्रेव 1.7
194 तत्रेव 1.8
195 तत्रेव 4.163
196 तत्रेव 4.163
197 तत्रेव 7.189
198 तत्रेव 9.4
199 तत्रेव 1.8
200 तत्रेव 1.6
201 तत्रेव 3.49
202 तत्रेव 1.16
203 तत्रेव 1.38
204 तत्रेव 11.262
205 तत्रेव 12.344
इन्हें-कविः केंद्रितीय स्थलशु दीर्घदीघाणि दुर्लभतारणि हरतरद्रोहवाहरणानि
दर्शयनु पुलभ्येत्, यथा-कूलकुपकर्करंक्रोक्तकोक्तकर्मवायुः 206,
गण्डसैलपरिक्रमण-अधित्तकाधि-रोहण-उपत्यकानुमि-तत्तनीतिरणायायासदीशाश्चर्याः
पथा 207, दो-दुधिफः-चैत्यविक-चैत्य-मार्दिक-मौर्यिक-पाणिपथः 208 इत्यादिनि। एवमेव
आगतप्रभावानं विद्यानि 209, हस्तपार्ख धार्मिकां 210, यातायात कूलवनोऽ-इत्यादिय विषेणु
समाहारद्विस्यापि विशिष्टं। प्रयोगः साक्षात्कर्तुः सुशासकः।

मालूपित्रिविहीनाया: 112, मालूपित्रुमकमः 211 इत्यत्र स्थलयोः आनंदाभावस्तु कूलकरिचन्तन
एव, आनंदः ऋतूः इन्हें 214 इत्यतद्विधायकशास्त्रस्य जागरुकत्वात्। तथा च स्वयमपरारः
कविः माता प्लूथ्यामदतमः 215 इत्यादिसू नैक्रत्र स्थलेषु आनंदागमविशिष्टानि इन्हु
प्रयोजानो दृष्टयते।

कविश्चित् कविश्चित् कविना उपन्यासेः रिम्नि एकोपेश्यापि उपयोग उपदर्शितः,
यथा-तद्वत्तमः: परिकारणीयानि पितरो गृह च 216, पिताः 217, सहस्पिताः 218 इत्यादिय विषेणु
स्थलेषु।

तद्वित्ता:
कविना व्यासेन तद्वित्तात्पदतानि प्रयोगेणचपि प्रकामपात्त्वं प्रदर्शितम्। तद्वित्ता वेनाचित्
प्रत्ययानि कविवरं परमप्रवो दृष्टयते। तद० यथा - चित्रप्रकारान्त्पदानमालिकायाः सुगमसा
काव्येः रिम्नि निबलाल्यात्मात् -

206 श्रि.वि. 2.76
207 तत्त्व 3.157
208 तत्त्व 11.296
209 तत्त्व 1.50
210 तत्त्व 4.178
211 तत्त्व 5.42
212 तत्त्व 7.144, 155
213 तत्त्व 7.146
214 फ़ि.सु. 6.3.25
215 श्रि.वि. 9.22
216 तत्त्व 1.10
217 तत्त्व 3.113
218 तत्त्व 3.21
महर्षिकरोति, जनपदीकरोति, काननीकरोति 219, मनुरीक्रियन्ते 220, अरुणीक्रियमाणः 221, तनूभूतं तमः 222, निरभोषूक्त्या 223, भूमिसाल्कृतानि 224, अग्रिसाल्कृतवर्गः 225, भस्मसाल्म 226, सूलाकुर्वितः 227, दुःखाकुर्वितम् 228 इत्यादि।

एवमेव भावप्रक्षायान्ते-नेनिष्ठ्यतः 229, उदारता 230, सारवता 231, मधुरिमा 232, महिमा 233, मद्नमा 234, ऋशिमा 235, धवलिमान 236, कालिमानम् 237, चाकचकस 238, वैधुर्य 239, साहचर्य्म 240, इत्यादीनि, इत्तत्त्ववायान्ते-तारकितः 241, पुलकितः 242, कण्टकितम् 243, आद्रितम् 244, दुःखितम् 245, इत्यादीनि चोदाहरणानि प्रेक्ष्यतुं साक्षानि।

219 श्र्यं.श्र्यं 1.24
220 तत्त्वेत् 1.25
221 तत्त्वेत् 12.347
222 तत्त्वेत् 12.268
223 तत्त्वेत् 12.288
224 तत्त्वेत् 1.30
225 तत्त्वेत् 2.75, 111
226 तत्त्वेत् 10.57
227 तत्त्वेत् 2.76, 3.114, 7.162
228 तत्त्वेत् 3.145, 7.140
229 तत्त्वेत् 12.336
230 तत्त्वेत् 4.103
231 तत्त्वेत् 6.100
232 तत्त्वेत् 7.227
233 तत्त्वेत् 6.75
234 तत्त्वेत् 9.10, 2.48
235 तत्त्वेत् 6.119
236 तत्त्वेत् 7.139
237 तत्त्वेत् 2.74
238 तत्त्वेत् 1.27
239 तत्त्वेत् 6.93
240 तत्त्वेत् 6.43
241 तत्त्वेत् 3.136
242 तत्त्वेत् 6.63
243 तत्त्वेत् 6.110
244 तत्त्वेत् 7.129
245 तत्त्वेत् 7.150
किंच प्रयोगानेतानतिरिच्छापि कविना प्रायश: सर्वेद्वय: तद्वर्त-प्रकरणेश्चामत्कारिकाणि उदाहरणानि यथावसरं काव्येःसम्मुपस्थापितानि। तानि यथा त्वाँ-246, अस्माद्वाणाम्247, आश्चर्यो ग्रामः248, आस्माकोने:249, श्वेतेश्यानाम्250, भालकरु251, श्रेयस्तः252, स्वाभाविकम्253, मार्मकः254, नैशीयो ध्वनि:255, सौरतान् विशेषाणि:256, विषयैः257, अध्वनि:258, आजनेयेन धवित्तुम्259, शोभिष्ठम् गरीयाण्स:260, शोधरायवेदीशीयः261, पुत्तवर्षकल्पाम्262, पञ्चशास्त्रम्:263, महाराष्ट्र:264, यतः: तत्:265, सहस्राणां266, गृह्यति:267, परेषु268, कथानकानि269, मुयुदेमाराम्270, अस्मित्तमाम्271 इत्यादिनि।

246 श्री.वि. 6.73
247 तत्रेषु 6.105
248 तत्रेषु 8.337
249 तत्रेषु 9.60, 2.78
250 तत्रेषु 9.45
251 तत्रेषु 9.38
252 तत्रेषु 11.149
253 तत्रेषु भूमिकाः।
254 तत्रेषु भूमिकाः।
255 तत्रेषु 7.180
256 तत्रेषु 8.268
257 तत्रेषु 12.216
258 तत्रेषु 12.364
259 तत्रेषु 11.241
260 तत्रेषु भूमिकाः।
261 तत्रेषु 4.62
262 तत्रेषु 1.9
263 तत्रेषु 2.22
264 तत्रेषु 5.23
265 तत्रेषु 6.108
266 तत्रेषु 7.140
267 तत्रेषु 8.210
268 तत्रेषु 9.37, 10.155
269 तत्रेषु 9.43
270 तत्रेषु 11.240
271 तत्रेषु 8.202
मरीचिमालिनः ॥२२७॥ चतुरब्रजपीणी सेना ॥२७३॥ उदवचतरोममाली ॥२७४॥ यववधव्यसनिनः ॥२७५॥ मूनचेतकोऽधिकः ॥२७६॥ विवनसर्वाणिपीणी ॥२७७॥ अन्तरज्ञितवर्गविनोः ॥२७८॥ निजकपप्रणिविनी ॥२७९॥ महाराजस्त्रधारणी ॥२८०॥ पुष्मीधिमापिनी ॥२८१॥ इत्यादिपु स्थतेशु कनिना कृतः ॥इनिप्रत्यप्रयोगस्तु अतिरिक्त एवे ॥ तत तत्रोक्तस्थतेशु बहुव्रीहिशमासेनेव मुतुवर्धलाभसम्भवातः ॥ तथा चोक- मवियुक्तीरधी - न कर्मधार्याः मत्वथारीयो बहुव्रीहिशचतदर्श्यप्रतिपतिकरः ॥२८२॥ संबोधीतिमामः ॥२८३॥ मोभुदुतेमामः ॥२८४॥ अधिक भाग्यवतः ॥२८५॥ इत्येवा स्थताः संबोधीतिनिति, मोभुदुते, भाग्यवते इत्येवतातमंब यथोग उचितः ॥ आद्यः ॥ बढ़प्रत्ययेन, अन्ते च तरंप्रत्ययेनाव अतिशायार्थलाभसम्भवे ॥२८६॥ तमपः ॥ अधिकशब्दस्य च व्यर्थत्वात्, पीनरक्तपाच्छ। किंव ताम्य पालभीरी ॥२८७॥ सांभूिकः ॥२८८॥ शौरसेनः ॥२८९॥ पाण्डालेशु मैथिलेशु इत्येवेशु स्थतेशु आदिबुद्धिरिपु असमीचीनेव प्रतिभाति, आद्यः ॥ विहिते ख्यात्यरे वृद्धिनिर्मितत्वाभाबातः, अन्ते च प्रत्ययस्य जन्यंदे लुत्वः ॥२८१॥ लुप्तव्यायाम् आदिबुद्धः ॥ अशब्यत्वात्। कथवशेषकृतः ॥२९२॥

॥२७२॥ लिङ्ग. १.२, ५.१४

॥२७३॥ तत्रैव । १.२९, ६.९३

॥२७४॥ तत्रैव । ३.११७

॥२७५॥ तत्रैव । १.४१

॥२७६॥ तत्रैव । ९.४६

॥२७७॥ तत्रैव । ७.१३३

॥२७८॥ तत्रैव । ७.१३७

॥२७९॥ तत्रैव । १०.१२१

॥२८०॥ तत्रैव । ९.३६

॥२८१॥ तत्रैव । १०.१२२

॥२८२॥ यववधव्यसनिनः, मायुद्वयाख्या, आरम्भे - 'साध्याभाभवव्यविनिन्त्वात्' इत्यतः

॥२८३॥ लिङ्ग. २.७८

॥२८४॥ तत्रैव । १२.३४८

॥२८५॥ तत्रैव । भूमिका।

॥२८६॥ धातोरकोनो हलादे: क्रियासमन्वितये यह (पा.सू. ३.१.२२), द्रिवचनविभाव्योपदे तर्तीशुनौ (पा.सू. ५.३.५७)।

॥२८७॥ लिङ्ग. १२.३३९, ६.८३

॥२८८॥ तत्रैव । ११.१७९, ११.२३६

॥२८९॥ तत्रैव । ६.८१

॥२९०॥ तत्रैव । ६.१८१

॥२९१॥ पा.सू. । ४.२.८१

॥२९२॥ लिङ्ग. । १०.१०५
इत्यत्र चिन्ताप्रत्ययुक्ततया: इत्यदृष्टियोगा293 भावोंपि चिन्त्य एव भावति, तत्स्थाने
कथावशेषकृत्ति इति रूपमेव सम्यकृ। पिच्छलीभवदिरिदत्त रूपमेव साधु, तत्र इलाक्ष्यतयस्य विमितत्वात्295। फिन्या श्वो राजो296, हृद राजा297,
आध्यात्मिक रजनी298इत्यादित्या स्थानेष्पिप्राग्याणि राजो, व्यतीतायं राजो, इत्य रजनी
इत्येति प्रयोगः: साधुतस्य: प्रतिभातिः, अस्मि दच्य इति अयो इति व्युत्तत्या299
दिवसमेव राज्यभिन्नतत्तात्। पूर्वं पर्यंतितवर्षम्100 इत्यत्र पुनः कर्त्त्रप्रत्येकवः301 पूर्वार्थे लम्बे
पूर्वमप्रयोगः: पुनर्विततृपितै: एव।

tिद्वता:
क्रियापदे शब्दविधिः परस्परः इति प्रसिद्धरुपुर्ण कविना व्यासेन प्रायशः: सर्वविधानि
पूव्बोधनवितत्वनानुपायं यथा प्रमाणं: शिवश्चिवजयमेव सहजता युमुल्यकानि दृष्टतो। तत्र
पूव्बोधनवितत्वनां प्रयोगमेव प्रायशः: समेता लक्षणां भावुपायं कविना प्रयुक्तो। तथाहि —
यथा लट्टकारे — निर्विवक्ता302, विभक्ती303, उपपदक्षणते304, अवचिनोमित305,
स्वप्पित306, वेच307 इत्यादिन।

293 अस्य चौ (प्र.सू. 7.2.32), चौ च (प्र.सू. 7.4.26) इत्यावयम्।
294 व्य.वि. 12.253
295 तोमामायामपिनिच्छादिभ्य: शलेषच (प्र.सू. 5.2.100)।
296 व्य.वि. 9.36
297 व्य.वि. 8.210
298 तृतीय 4.196
299 सद:प्रसिद्धारि (प्र.सू. 5.3.22) इति निपातनात्।
300 व्य.वि. 6.67
301 भूतपूर्व सचद (प्र.सू. 5.3.93)।
302 व्य.वि. भूमिका।
303 तृतीय 1.4
304 तृतीय 1.5
305 तृतीय 1.5
306 तृतीय 1.10
307 तृतीय 1.10
लिद्दलकारे - निष्चक्राम

लिद्दलकारे - अवलोकयितासि कथयितासि, श्वो द्रष्य  हितारी.

लिद्दलकारे - वास्तवन्ते भोत्यति, संबत्वयथा, विनद्वयथा, योल्ये, समाप्यति  हितारी.

लोद्दलकारे - भुक्त्व, भिनं छंद्लि, त्यज, नायव, विविन्वतु, क्रीणिध्वम्  हितारी.

लह्लकारे - प्राविशात्, समालिठत्, आर्पयत्, अरुध्यत्, आविध्यन्, समस्कन्त् हितारी.

308 शि.वि. 1.5
309 तत्रैव 1.6
310 तत्रैव 1.10
311 तत्रैव 1.17
312 तत्रैव 1.18
313 शि.वि. भूमिका 6.75
314 तत्रैव 6.77
315 शि.वि. 6.112
316 तत्रैव 7.134
317 तत्रैव 7.143
318 तत्रैव 7.161
319 तत्रैव 11.264
320 तत्रैव 12.277
321 तत्रैव 12.345
322 तत्रैव 12.359
323 तत्रैव 4.194
324 तत्रैव 5.12
325 तत्रैव 6.66
326 तत्रैव 6.73
327 तत्रैव 6.76
328 तत्रैव 11.187
329 तत्रैव 11.221
330 तत्रैव 11.246
331 तत्रैव 1.16
लिङ्गलकारे - संबत्तें²³², परीक्षण²³³, विद्युः²³⁴, रोचक²³⁵, जानीयात्²³⁶, निश्चित्तुयाच्छ।²³⁷ इत्यादीन।

लुङ्गलकारे - व्यक्तिकत²³⁸, समरौत्रील²³⁹, अजागरी²⁴⁰, अनेशः²⁴¹, अश्रौषम्²⁴², अरोदी²⁴³ इत्यादीन।

लुङ्गलकारे - प्राप्तः अक्षरितः अकल्पितः²⁴⁴, व्यक्तित्वः²⁴⁵, व्यवहारित्वः²⁴⁶ इत्यादीन च।

किंव व्यासमिथ्वकादतो मा-मास्मोपदयोऽऽ प्रायः। प्रायः। प्रायः। यथा - मा संभूतः मा संभूतः²⁴⁷, मा संभूतः आरोपयः मा संभूतः कार्यः²⁴⁸, मा संभूतः अवधीरयः²⁴⁹, मा स्माकः²⁵⁰ इत्यादिहु स्थलेषु।

अथ उत्तरतित-तपदानां प्रयोगेणपि कवेंभूतःयानाग्रहो दरीदृश्यते। एष्माननायासप्रयोगे कविना साफल्यमपि अधिगतम्। तथाहि -

²³² श्र.वि. 1.28
²³³ तत्रेव 1.28
²³⁴ तत्रेव 1.28
²³⁵ तत्रेव 6.109
²³⁶ श्र.वि. 6.161
²³⁷ तत्रेव 6.165
²³⁸ तत्रेव भूमिका।
²³⁹ श्र.वि. भूमिका।
²⁴⁰ तत्रेव 1.9
²⁴¹ तत्रेव 1.10
²⁴² तत्रेव 1.15
²⁴³ तत्रेव 1.16
²⁴⁴ तत्रेव 12.294
²⁴⁵ तत्रेव 12.296
²⁴⁶ तत्रेव 9.38
²⁴⁷ तत्रेव भूमिका।
²⁴⁸ तत्रेव 1.16
²⁴⁹ तत्रेव 1.22
²⁵⁰ तत्रेव 1.28
यथा - णिजन्तेपु - जनयति\(^{351}\), पातथ मज्जय खण्डय कर्तय ज्वलय\(^{352}\), अदीदलय\(^{353}\), साधपेयय मातपेयय\(^{354}\), न्यवीवदत\(^{355}\), प्रान्विवशात\(^{356}\) इत्यादीनि।
स्तत्तेपु - चिकेददियािमि\(^{357}\), शुघ्रुषेऽ\(^{358}\), पिपुङ्छियािमि\(^{359}\), जिगमिपायः\(^{360}\), ददृश्यते\(^{361}\), विवक्षिति\(^{362}\) इत्यादीनि।
यदन्त-यदलुग्न्तेपु - चर्कातं बर्बातं जहारिति\(^{363}\), दोधूश्यते\(^{364}\), चर्काति\(^{365}\), संवोधवीति\(^{366}\), जान्वलयते\(^{367}\) इत्यादीनि।
नामधायुपु - विधुरायसि\(^{368}\), अशवयामवृहूः\(^{369}\), कलंकयति\(^{370}\), पाशयति\(^{371}\), विरहयामवृहूः\(^{372}\), चटुलयति\(^{373}\), इत्यादीनि।

\(^{351}\) शिल्भि. 1.4
\(^{352}\) तत्रेव 1.28
\(^{353}\) तत्रेव 1.32
\(^{354}\) तत्रेव 1.33
\(^{355}\) तत्रेव 2.60
\(^{356}\) शिल्भि. भूमिका 2.63
\(^{357}\) तत्रेव 1.24
\(^{358}\) तत्रेव 1.26
\(^{359}\) तत्रेव 1.34
\(^{360}\) तत्रेव 2.48
\(^{361}\) तत्रेव 2.62
\(^{362}\) शिल्भि. 2.71
\(^{363}\) तत्रेव 1.4
\(^{364}\) तत्रेव 1.33
\(^{365}\) तत्रेव 3.121
\(^{366}\) तत्रेव 4.193
\(^{367}\) तत्रेव 5.22
\(^{368}\) तत्रेव 1.26
\(^{369}\) तत्रेव 1.30
\(^{370}\) तत्रेव 1.3
\(^{371}\) तत्रेव 3.114
\(^{372}\) तत्रेव 3.27
\(^{373}\) तत्रेव 3.181
कर्मकर्तुपु - तप्यते, तप्ये, विदीर्यते इत्यादिनि।
भावकर्मसु - प्रशस्यते समभावित, अदर्श, ध्यायते भर्ज्ययते अपविवहयते लुण्डयते सुदृढ़यते विदीर्यते समृद्धयते इत्यादिनि।
लकारशेखु - श्व: नीयते इत्यादिनि च।

पुरात्तरितःनापदप्रयोगः कथेवायस्य कानिचन पदानि चित्यायन्यि दृश्यते। तथा हि
- जार्यनि इति स्थाने जार्यनि इत्येव साधु स्वातः तश्र मित्यप्रायुक्तस्वप्रसाधनात्।

374 श्र.श्र. 9.9
375 तत्रेव 9.95
376 तत्रेव 9.41, 46
377 तत्रेव भूमिका।
378 तत्रेव 1.10
379 श्र.श्र.भूमिका। 1.10
380 तत्रेव 1.23
381 तत्रेव 2.98
382 तत्रेव भूमिका।
383 घटद्यो मिति: (गणस्तुम्), मितां हस्यः: (प्र.सूः 6.4.92)।
384 श्र.श्र. 1.28
385 तत्रेव 2.70, 10.115, 11.218
386 तत्रेव 7.156, 7.172
387 तत्रेव 7.185
388 तत्रेव 2.103
389 तत्रेव 4.174
390 तत्रेव 4.174
391 तत्रेव 7.171
392 तत्रेव 6.101
393 तत्रेव 6.113, 10.118
394 तत्रेव 8.248
विद्यार्थीं\(^{395}\), प्रतिज्ञाने\(^{396}\) - इत्यादिनि आत्मनेपदविशिष्टानि, असंसात\(^{397}\), प्रशासिंगे\(^{398}\), पिपासामहे\(^{399}\), संवत्सरे\(^{400}\), चिन्हींडे\(^{401}\), क्षये\(^{402}\), हस्ते\(^{403}\), विवश्चते\(^{404}\) इत्यत्तेषां स्थाने असंसात\(^{405}\), प्रशासिंगे\(^{406}\) परस्मैपदविशिष्टानि च तत्सूज्जनिनिर्देशानि रूपाण्येव प्रयोक्तुपुनिनिनाति। एवेचेत प्रतिरुध्धे\(^{408}\), विवश्चते\(^{409}\), सहयुक्ते\(^{410}\), विवश्चते\(^{411}\), समुच्छेद्येयम्\(^{412}\) इत्यत्तेषां प्रयोगाणं स्थानेः पि प्रतिरुध्धे; विवश्चते इत्यादिनि रूपाण्येव प्रयोज्यानि, तत्र-तत्र रुचायदातिद्विप्रयुक्ततन्त्रमुग्निकरणविधाने\(^{413}\) सततरुपुनाणामेव साधुवाद्। अथवा, मध्यकालिनिमयिः\(^{414}\) परिभाषया कथविचवतु समाधानं विधातु सक्यते, न विवश्चते\(^{415}\), इत्यादिप्रयोगेत। किंवच अथाधित\(^{416}\), जरीमाहते\(^{417}\), कलयति\(^{418}\),

395 परिभाषेयम्: क्रिया: (प.स. 1.3.18)।
396 सम्प्रतिप्रभामनाध्याये (प.सू. 1.3.46)।
397 श्र.विष्य. 10.101
398 त्तृत्त 11.244
399 त्तृत्त 6.88
400 त्तृत्त 9.48
401 त्तृत्त 11.212
402 त्तृत्त 11.225
403 त्तृत्त 11.231
404 श्र.विष्य. 12.332
405 शंसु स्तुति (धातुसं. 728, भवितः: सिंभृतः)।
406 शंसु स्तुति (धातुसं. 728, भवितः: सिंभृतः)।
407 पिपासामहे, संवत्सरे, चिन्हींडे: इत्यादिनि।
408 श्र.विष्य. 2.55
409 त्तृत्त 3.145
410 त्तृत्त 6.57
411 त्तृत्त 12.282
412 त्तृत्त 12.327
413 रुचादनिः: शामु (प.सू. 3.1.78), अदिप्रभृतिः: शप: (प.सू. 2.4.72)।
414 परिभाषेद्युक्तकर: परिभाषा संख्या 96
415 मूल ग्रंथम्।
416 श्र.विष्य. 3.127
417 त्तृत्त 5.3
418 त्तृत्त 6.61
जापत, चिक्करिदन्ति, विनुफोरिष्यामी, प्रियेय, कणो स्फुट्येति, आशिलप, क्रमत, भोजगिययं, आमूशचतु, जहुः, व्यत्षययामी, इत्येता प्रयोगाणामपि असाधुपुथमेव प्रतिपादति, तत्तत्तुणिनिमें: तत्र तत्र स्थाने क्रमशः: अवाच, जयीक्षणेति, कलयसि, जागृति, चेत्ररिदयेति, चेत्ररिदन्ति, विनुफोरिष्यामी, माधेय, स्फुटत, आशिलप, क्रमत, भोजयेति, अमुजव, जहुः, व्यत्षययामी, इत्येतापामेव रूपाणामाचित्वात्। मा सम गमत इत्यत्र प्रकरणानुरूपम् आडागमविशिष्ट मा

419 शि.वि. 6.70
420 तत्रेव 6.94
421 तत्रेव 7.113
422 तत्रेव 2.102
423 तत्रेव 9.46
424 तत्रेव 10.122
425 तत्रेव 11.236
426 तत्रेव 11.244
427 तत्रेव 11.184
428 तत्रेव 12.294
429 शि.वि. 7.144
430 विगुण तुक्त (प.सू. 6.4.104) इति तत्तोपाठ।
431 योह तत्तैव रूपीचित्वात्।
432 प्राणुप्रसंह गुणवदा साहचयात।
433 लोणध्यमवधुवचने तत्तैव रूपीचित्वात्।
434 यहुतुक गुणस्यावस्यभावात्।
435 सनं इडगमात्।
436 प्रकृतप्रसंह गिजर्थसङ्गणणः सत्त्वात्।
437 दिवादी स्फुट-भारतीपाठालं कर्तुवाच्ये ताहुरुपयोगीचित्वात्।
438 आलिङ्गनेति शिल्पर्त्युः आलिङ्गने (प.सू. 3.1.46) इति नियमात् तत्रेव रूपात्।
439 ताहुरुपयोगेऽव लट्टे औचित्यात्।
440 गिजर्थसङ्गणणात्।
441 गिजर्थसङ्गणणात्।
442 असमयोगलिदु कितु (प.सू. 1.2.5) इति नियमात् श्री गुणप्रतिषेधात्।
443 णि गमिनवाहने (प.सू. 2.4.46) इति नियमात्।
444 शि.वि. 1.40
कृद्दता:

कविवर्ग: कृद्दतपदानं वैविध्यपूर्णप्रयोगोपि काव्येष रिशिन् परमं साफल्यमासीसदत।

विद्याङ्क - यदं तद्विद्धलुगतातिदिष्ट:। स्वतःनेव भर्यं धातुध्:। शान्तच्छयातिपत्तपदानं

कविनोपस्थापिना मालिका नित्यं निभालनीय। तथाहि -

भज्यमान" 453 - भूमिमान" 454 - अनुसम्यमान" 455 - समुद्दृष्टमान" 456 - दौद्भवमान" 457 - वेदियमान" 458 -

मामदमान" 459 - तोद्यमान" 460 - वृज्ञमान" 461 - संजीव्रियमाण" 462 - सोहुद्धमाण - सरीरिस्थमाण" 463 -

445 कार्यक. 7.163
446 तदेव 9.77
447 तदेव 7.184
448 तदेव 9.61
449 धातोरेकाचः (पा.सू. 3.1.22)।
450 कार्यक. 2.348
451 तदेव 2.79
452 तिथिरच (पा.सू. 5.3.56)।
453 कार्यक. 1.24
454 तदेव 2.45
455 तदेव 1.37
456 तदेव 2.46
457 तदेव 7.126
458 तदेव 8.229
459 तदेव 8.259
460 तदेव 9.109
461 कार्यक. 9.47
462 तदेव 12.277
463 तदेव 12.350
प्रतिष्ठानागारनां ॥ ॥

नानाविधानां भवनतपदानां प्रयोगोऽधि कर्माकर्षति समभिष्चितः प्रकाशमायाति काव्येषस्मिनः,

यथा - विचित्राः"

उत्तरकीम् ॥ ॥

उपन्यासस्य स्वतः स्वतः स्वतः स्वतः ॥ ॥

सनन्तरकथा: उपनिषदः प्रयोगः: अपि नैकृत निदर्शनीयः: यथा - रिचित्यवः।

स्वतःनिबध्यः कथातीते भभासतः काद्रात् प्रयोगः कर्याविशिष्टस्तु लोकान्तिः।

यथा - सुपुत्त.। कृतज्ञ पूजित पूर्वित.। विस्तुपेः। अवलोक.। खुशबुरालित:।

\(^{464}\) श्री. वि. 9.59

\(^{465}\) तत्रैव भूमिका।

\(^{466}\) तत्रैव 1.20

\(^{467}\) तत्रैव 1.20

\(^{468}\) तत्रैव 2.72

\(^{469}\) तत्रैव 3.154

\(^{470}\) तत्रैव 3.155

\(^{471}\) तत्रैव 3.160

\(^{472}\) तत्रैव 5.40

\(^{473}\) तत्रैव 9.221

\(^{474}\) तत्रैव 1.6

\(^{475}\) श्री. वि. 1.6

\(^{476}\) तत्रैव 2.58

\(^{477}\) तत्रैव 2.58

\(^{478}\) तत्रैव भूमिका।

\(^{479}\) तत्रैव 1.14

\(^{480}\) तत्रैव 1.37

\(^{481}\) तत्रैव 1.40

\(^{482}\) तत्रैव 1.41

\(^{483}\) तत्रैव 2.47

\(^{484}\) तत्रैव 1.5

\(^{485}\) तत्रैव 1.7

\(^{486}\) तत्रैव 1.14

\(^{487}\) तत्रैव 1.16

\(^{488}\) श्री. वि. 10.160
खण्डखण्डायितः\(^489\), धम्मधमकितः\(^490\) इत्यादयः।

एवभेद अनुयायमिषु तुम्मनादिकृत्रत्याक्ष्यातपदानं कविना यथावसरं प्रस्तुतः। चामलकारिकः:
प्रयोगः प्रस्तुते गद्दकायेम् आस्तादवितिः शक्यः। केवल उदाहरणार्थ - योद्धम्\(^491\), उपयोग\(^492\),
समार्थर्\(^493\), कृत्तिः\(^494\), मरणः\(^495\), चुतुकः\(^496\), समापनीयानि\(^497\), पूज्यायां\(^498\), निर्बलायाः\(^499\),
संसूतः\(^500\), कणोणवः\(^501\), ध्यायां\(^502\), भित्तम्\(^503\), बद्धाः\(^504\), भुक्ताः\(^505\), नमस्याः\(^506\), संस्था\(^507\),
श्रावः-श्रावम्\(^508\), आलोकम्-आलोक\(^509\), सहवासिनाम्\(^510\), जयजयेतिवादितः\(^511\), व्यर्थहत्या\(^512\),

\(^{489}\) स्र.स्र. 12.371
\(^{490}\) तत्रेण 5.17
\(^{491}\) तत्रेण 1.35
\(^{492}\) तत्रेण 1.37
\(^{493}\) तत्रेण 3.118
\(^{494}\) तत्रेण 2.45
\(^{495}\) तत्रेण 2.80
\(^{496}\) तत्रेण 8.226
\(^{497}\) तत्रेण भूमिकाः।
\(^{498}\) तत्रेण 3.119
\(^{499}\) तत्रेण 3.151
\(^{500}\) स्र.स्र. 4.194
\(^{501}\) तत्रेण 5.5
\(^{502}\) तत्रेण 8.245
\(^{503}\) तत्रेण 1.20
\(^{504}\) तत्रेण 2.81
\(^{505}\) तत्रेण 2.101
\(^{506}\) तत्रेण भूमिकाः।
\(^{507}\) तत्रेण 1.20
\(^{508}\) तत्रेण 5.41
\(^{509}\) तत्रेण 2.87
\(^{510}\) तत्रेण 6.47
\(^{511}\) तत्रेण 8.223
\(^{512}\) तत्रेण 7.190
भट्टमन्यान: 513, यायजुः 514, दुर्करम् 515, प्रणतवत्ती 516, कर्णजपस्य 517, पतिर्मान: 518, उपेनुष: 519
इत्यादयः।

कृदन्तप्रत्यां प्रयोगप्रसंख्यापि करवः: केवल प्रयोगप्राणिचतत्वं यत्ताः। यथा - आकर्षणिभि 520,
पिषोधिभिः 521, चिचविभिः 522, लुमुण्डिभिः 523, इत्येतेषु प्रयोगेणु विच्छद्रयस्य अनौपचितमेव,
मूर्तार्थाद्वित्य एवं विविष्कारार्थालाभातु अत्र च विज्ञाज्ञनार्थाय: अन्तग्निकक्तवात्। आहंकारमात् 524
इति स्थाने आहंकारतीमृ इति प्रयोगं एवोचितः। स्थानमायां 525 इतिमूलतिः अधिविशिष्टस्य
हृदं: स्थानोब्ज्ञानार्थकातः, अत्र च दूराहान्नार्थस्य प्रसङ्क्षात्। प्रंशसमानी 526, ऋद्यानमादम् 527,
खासानां 528 इत्येतेषु न्यालेषु आत्मस्वतेत्प्रमुखः: शान्तिर्वाचयो 529 ज्ञाज्ञें एव, ततात्मानस्यादात्तानां
परस्मैपदित्वेन शान्तिप्रदेष्यवैचित्रत्वात्। क्रियासमभिहारेन च दंककम्याणम् 530 इत्यत्रापि
क्रियासमभिहारेणेति पुनःतत्कामेव, तदर्थं यथापद्गरात्यहप्रत्येकैव लब्धतवात्। दुन्द्यानमात् 531
इति प्रयोगस्वस्तु नदन्द्यानमात् हिताद्यदेश्यादसद्युहद्यहेव पवित्र तृतीयोऽद्वेषानां तृतीयानी 532 इतस्तः आप्रूपिणिष्याणाम्

513 शं.वि. 12.372
514 तत्वेत्र 1.25
515 तत्वेत्र भौमिकाः।
516 शं.वि. 3.155
517 तत्वेत्र 4.174
518 तत्वेत्र 8.197
519 तत्वेत्र 10.142
520 तत्वेत्र 2.81
521 तत्वेत्र 10.143
522 तत्वेत्र 11.236
523 तत्वेत्र 11.237
524 तत्वेत्र 7.163
525 प.सू. 1.3.31
526 शं.वि. 3.146
527 तत्वेत्र 8.244
528 तत्वेत्र 10.144
529 तदादि: शान्तिर्वाचयो (प.सू. 2.2.124)।
530 शं.वि. 3.140
531 तत्वेत्र 9.47
532 तत्वेत्र 7.173
इत्यादितम्, तत्र ग्रहितेऽति सम्प्रसारणस्य अवश्यमभावतः। किवच आपिप्रभृष्माणम्। आपृष्माणाः, किवच्चमानाः। इत्यत्र आपृष्माणाः, चित्रमभावाः। इत्यत्र आपृष्माणाः, सहवासिनाः। इत्यत्र सहस्पदस्य चायथापौथिमेव प्रतिभाति, तत्रनिर्माणश्च हर्षनातराणां प्रसिद्धतवतः। क्रमतः। इति स्थाने क्रमयतः। क्रमः। परसंनिदेशाति। अयमातूनं दीर्घरस्थिरोषिविचित्रताः। हत्यामिन्निधिः। इत्येष प्रयोगोऽघ्नुपपन्न एव, हनस्ते चैरतिं सृजनियात्त्व हनं। सुयुपपदे एव कथविधाताः। उद्यद्धम्। इति स्थानेऽष्पिं उद्यद्धम्। इत्येष प्रयोगम्, तुमुनि नलोपासम्भवायाः। लिखितम्। इति प्रयोगार्थवायाः। लेखितधित्येष साधु, तत्र लक्षुधुपणस्य।

इतरे भाषाप्रयोगः:

व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य तततकरणसमंजानो चामकारिकप्रयोगान्तिरिथ्य कविनांविधकार्याते। कविनातं चिरांगी। सुभाषितं शब्दभावणासमुदितं जिनका। अभिनवः। भाषाप्रयोगः। शिवराजविजयेः। समाचारितः।

कविनानेन गद्यप्रबन्धेऽस्मिन् नैकथा कोषगतानि अवहुदृष्टक्तानि पदानि तत्र तत्र प्रसंगे सफलत्या समवतारितानि, यथा - दम्भोऽि (वर्गम्)। वसुमती (पृथ्वी)।

533 या.सू. 6.1.16
534 श.वि. 7.173
535 तात्वेऽ 8.265
536 तात्वेऽ 9.18
537 तात्वेऽ 11.230
538 तात्वेऽ 6.47
539 श.वि. 11.236
540 या.सू. 7.3.76
541 श.वि. 9.60
542 या.सू. 3.1.160
543 श.वि. 9.20
544 तात्वेऽ 12.288
545 पुरातलस्मिन्न च (या.सू. 7.3.86)
546 श.वि. 1.23
547 तात्वेऽ 2.48
कविरेख भाषान्तरणां सर्वक्रृते सुसम्भावितानिच्छायापदानि नैकंतात्र प्रबन्धे सफलतया प्रसंगति, यथा – महामाय: [महमूद]563, दरभुमन: [मुँहजला]564, पूण्यनगर: [पुणे]565, महामायगणि: [महमूद गणी]566, अवरजजीव: [औरंगजेब]567, मन्निजस्तानमू (मस्त्र)568, मोहावर्तखान: [मोहब्बत खाँ]569, मोहरम: [मोहरम]570, रामयानम्571

548 श्र.वि. 3.114
549 तत्रेव 4.161
550 तत्रेव 5.32
551 तत्रेव 1.28
552 तत्रेव 2.75
553 तत्रेव 2.95
554 तत्रेव 10.126
555 तत्रेव 10.160
556 तत्रेव 12.371
557 श्र.वि. 5.15
558 तत्रेव 5.19
559 तत्रेव 11.235
560 तत्रेव 2.96
561 तत्रेव 3.150
562 तत्रेव 2.111
563 तत्रेव 1.26
564 तत्रेव 1.29
565 श्र.वि. 2.45
566 तत्रेव 5.23
567 तत्रेव 10.132
568 तत्रेव 11.242
569 तत्रेव 12.371
570 तत्रेव 6.50
(रमजान) 571, मौलवि: (मौलवी) 572, शास्त्रिखान: (शास्त्र खाँ) 573, चाद-खान: (चाँद खाँ) 574, रसनारी (रोशनआरा) 575, मायाजिह: (मुअजजम) 576 इत्यादिनि।

बहुत्र भाषायं प्रचलितानि अपथ्यानि नामानि कविः शाब्दिक्षुद्धार सुपरिण्यपूर्व प्रयुक्तः। यथा - यशस्विनिः: (जसवन्त सिंह) 577, मुरेश्वर: (मोरेश्वर) 578, सत्यजीवः: (तानाजी) 579, अनन्दवदतः: (अनाजी दतोवा) 580, शिवराजः: (शिवाजी) 581 इत्यादिनि।

आइूलहिन्दिभाषासू प्रधितः: सुललिता: लोकोक्ती: कविव्यासो बहुत्र सर्वत्र तस्मधि तस्मधि सफलतया अनूप्रा व्यवहरति, यथा - कार्य वा साधयेयं, देहं वा पालयेयम् (do or die) 582, चूँकि स्नातु भवद्वरसना (आपके मुख में घी-शककर) 583, एकमेवं चाकाळो चक्ती भवति (एक-एक ग्यारह होते हैं) 584, सत्यं, दुःखद्वायो जनस्त्रक्षमापि व्यजनेत्रीजयित्वा पिवति (सच हैं, दृढ़ का जला छोटा भी पंखा झल-झलकर पीता है) 585, अपुरुषत्कम्सः कर्यो यात्: (विना बाल बाँका हुए चला गया) 586 इत्यादि:।

कार्येश्वरभिमन् नैतिको भावानि सहजतयाभिभव्यं कविना तत्त्र तत्त्र प्रस्तुत प्रदर्शिताः: पद्यवर्धाः: अपि नितरं निभालनीयाः; यथा - मन्दरे मन्दरे जयजयधनिः; तीथं तीथं घण्टानादः; मठे मठे वेदशापः(व्याप्ती) 587, शय्यामस्यामः: गुणगुणछः:

571 श्रिविषयं 6.50
572 तत्त्रेव 6.51
573 तत्त्रेव 6.76
574 तत्त्रेव 6.76
575 तत्त्रेव 8.193
576 तत्त्रेव 8.262
577 तत्त्रेव 6.80
578 तत्त्रेव 7.168
579 तत्त्रेव 12.303
580 तत्त्रेव 7.168
581 श्रिविषयं 12.353
582 तत्त्रेव 1.33
583 तत्त्रेव 2.74
584 तत्त्रेव 12.328
585 श्रिविषयं 12.353
586 तत्त्रेव 12.353
587 तत्त्रेव 1.18
कृत्वितकोइनतेव: कचकलापि: 588, मदमदं मुख्यमुखं मधुरमधुरं किनिचरं गायति 589, गहनाहैः कोमलकोमलै: मधुरमधुरे: वाचां विलासमभसो हरसि (प्रशंसासायम्) 590, अलमलं विरमदं-विरमदं पतामि (भये) 591, हरिद्रा-हरिद्रा, लघुरं-लघुरं, मरिच-मरिचं, चुकु-चुकु, वितुनक-वितुनकं, शुद्धवेर-शुद्धवेरं, रामठ-रामठं, मत्वयंिि-मत्वयंिि, मत्या:-मत्या:, कुकुकुटाण्ड-कुकुकुटाण्डं, पपल-पपलम इति ककलकतः (त्वरागयम्) 592, आयो आयो आयो ... साथु साथु, महानेष पण्डत: (शान्तको) 593 इत्यादयः।

उपयुक्तेषु भाषाप्रयोगेषु कविरि तः कविचित्रत्वानि प्रयोगानन्तरनुपत्त्यते।

तथाहि - वार्ता: कतु 594, प्रसादमोदकसः 595, सतोऽक भव 596 इत्येंते भुजलथु वुतान 597-प्रसनन्तः 598-समुक्तयः 599-त्युषु ककोषण निधिरितान् वार्तस्रन्तदहस्तकश्रव्यान् कविरियं लोकप्रचलितवेश्चर्यान्तेषु 600 प्रयुजानां दूसरते। समागमनसाोम् 601, सुरसंगमः 602 इत्यनन्तः: असतताध्यायता ककोषण घोषितया: शयनो: प्रयोग कवि: अर्थात्तयोगुतिस्थति। भयोनता: 603, द्वार समभास: 604, द्वार भावतः 605, परित: परिसर्योणो जनान् 606, चन्दनः 607
इत्येंद्रे स्थलेषु पुनःशिंकत: स्पष्टैव। स्वपःः, स्वमातः।६०८ इत्यादिनः स्थले स्वशव्याधिप अतिरिक्त एव। लेखप्रकाण्डः।६०९, मण्डनः।६१०, अपरम्।६११, दरा: अपहरणः।६१२, ज्ञालाजालः।६१३, इत्यादिनः स्थलेषु लिङ्ग्युक्त्यम्।६१४, उपयवत्यकालः। तारकमण्डलम्।६१५ इत्यावधि तारकशाख्यः एव कोषांनिर्देशः।६१६, न तु तारकशाख्यः।६१७।

उपसंहितः

कविवर्यसाम्भविकादत: आधुनिकसंस्कृतसाहित्यज्ञत: सुप्रतिष्ठितो गद्यकारः। अनेन कविना प्रणवपछारेर्तपर्नामेय गुलामुप्रदर्शनम्, अन्यानि च कवित्स शब्दशास्त्रोपकारकाणि कृतिर्वानि विरच्य स्वीय शाब्दिकप्रवर्तमापि सुरता प्रतिपादित्मृ। एतत्रप्रतिष्ठातुरुपमेव च स्वीये सभीकृत्वे शिवराजविजयकाये अनेन सन्निपातासादिभ्य: तत्रव्याखरण-प्रकरणेश्वरचात्मकारिकः। प्रयोगः शहुताय समाचारितः। व्याखरणस्य विशिष्टानां प्रयोगणां व्यक्तारकसे कविश्वसं कौशिक प्रयोगः प्रस्तुतायां शस्मिश्वाय प्राथमिकदृष्टाय चित्त्वल्लेन प्रदशितः। सन्ति। प्रयोगानेतत्सः पुरस्कृत प्रश्नाहता वस्तुस्थितिविद्वार्थो नीर्द्वेदविवेकविव्यूषितिः दयादुर्स्पातः, समाधान प्राप्ताध्य परम्पराः: सादरमानन्तः।

गच्छत्: स्खलनं कवापि भवत्येव प्रामादतः।

हस्सनि दुर्जनानसात्र समादध्यति सन्नजः॥६१८

इत्यभुयोक्तिपद्यतर्म प्रथमप्रेषणर्म प्रामाणिकज्ञनं प्रतीयमानान्त: दुर्जप्रयोगणां सुपन्वेश्यकार्य विलयासोपेश्यते। तथा च सत्विपि प्रयासे चित्ठ्यप्रयोगणां साधुवेश्युभय: उक्तप्रयोगानु परिपूर्त्त्व काव्यवृत्ती सृजोधितं संसक्षरणेन प्रकाशितमुपमावृत्त्यमकः। यथो हि गद्यप्रकन्योऽदनाम आधुनिकसंस्कृतगद्यकालाव्याकारामाधारे: नै सत्र चापथपुतकोऽरुपुरुषो अनुप्रेषिताश्च निर्मिततः। अत्र च प्रामाणिकपु: पदेषु सत्यु जनास्त्यावानूहः। -

608 श्रिविश. ८.२२
609 तत्रेव भृमिका।
610 तत्रेव भृमिका।
611 तत्रेव २६८
612 तत्रेव ६.१०२
613 तत्रेव ९.२५
614 प्रकाण्डः, मण्डनः, अपरः, दरा: जालम्। इत्यावधि तारकशाख्यः।
615 श्रिविश. ४.१८९
616 नक्षत्रपुष्य भः तारा तारकापदु वासिनियम्। (अमरकृप. १.६।)
617 न च दृष्ट्योऽसत्यानुपाध्य दृष्ट्योऽसत्यानुपाध्य (प्र.सू. ६३.६३) इति हस्यः सर्जंचन्त्रसोर्बनावादः।
618 परम्पराय द्राढः, मूपत नृपयम्।
यदृ यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तद्वेंतया जनः।
स यत्र प्रमाणं कुरूते लोकस्तदनुष्ठलते॥६१९

इत्यादिगीतावचनात्। न चैतम् एतादुर्दश्यधोण्यु सत्सु काव्यस्थायस्य दूषितत्वेन परिहेयतवं
प्रतिपादितुं शक्यम्, इतरथाःस्य नानागुणगणविभूषितत्वात्। तथा चोक्तमभिभुक्ते: —
कौटानुविधतरलादिस्धारणेन काव्यता।
दुष्टेष्वपि मता, यत्र रसायनुगमः स्फुटः॥६२०

इत्यतम॥

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६१९ श्रीमदभगवदगीता ३.२१
६२० साहित्यदर्पणस्य प्रथमेऽपरिच्छेदे उत्कृष्टैः पद्यम्, मूलमन्वेयम्।
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